The American Political Science Review

Articles and Essays by Donald A. Wittman, Herbert B. Asher, Bernard Grofman and Edward N. Muller, Edward R. Tufte, Fred Kort, Louis P. Benson, Richard J. Stillman, II, Edward H. Buehrig

---

Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz and Alden E. Lind
The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems

Bradley M. Richardson
Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan

Eric C. Browne and Mark N. Franklin
Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies

Lawrence B. Mohr
The Concept of Organizational Goal

Michael W. Suleiman
Attitudes of the Arab Elite Toward Palestine and Israel

Published Quarterly by

The American Political Science Association

Vol. LXVII June 1973 No. 2

NEW
Summer Publications
from HARPER &ROW

CHALLENGE AND DECISION
Political Issues of Our Time
Fourth Edition
Reo M. Christenson
Tentative: 250 pages; $2.95: paper.
August, 1973.

MODERN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Third Edition
Felix A. Nigro
and Lloyd G. Nigro
Tentative: 500 pages; $10.00.
October, 1973.

Published earlier this year . . .

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FEDERAL POLICY
Robert H. Haveman
and Robert D. Hamrin
302 pages; $9.95: cloth; $4.95: paper.
January, 1973.

HARPER & ROW,
PUBLISHERS
1817 10 East 53d Street, New York 10022

POLITICS AND THE LEGAL PROCESS
James Eisenstein
Tentative: 384 pages; $4.00: paper.
August, 1973.

PUBLIC OPINION AND CONTEMPORARY DISARRAY
Richard E. Dawson
Tentative: 224 pages; $2.95: paper.
August, 1973.

And previously announced . . . a new volume in HARPER'S COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT SERIES under the advisory editorship of Michael Curtis . . .

IDEOLOGY AND CULTURE
An Introduction to the Dialectic of Contemporary Chinese Politics
John Bryan Starr
Tentative: 288 pages; $3.50: paper.
July, 1973.

The American Political Science Review

Vol. LXVII June 1973 No. 2

CONTENTS

415 The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems
Donald D. Searing, Joel J. Schwartz and Alden E. Lind

433 Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan
Bradley M. Richardson

453 Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies
Eric C. Browne and Mark N. Franklin

470 The Concept of Organizational Goal Lawrence B. Mohr

482 Attitudes of the Arab Elite Toward Palestine and Israel Michael W. Suleiman

490 Parties as Utility Maximizers Donald A. Wittman

499 The Learning of Legislative Norms Herbert B. Asher

514 The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis Bernard N. Grofman and Edward N. Muller

540 The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems
Edward R. Tufte

555 Regression Analysis and Discriminant Analysis: An Application of R. A. Fisher's Theorem to Data in Political Science Fred Kort

560 A Research Note on Machine Politics as a Model for Change in a Philippine Province
Louis P. Benson

567 Communications

579 Editorial Comment

582 Book Reviews and Essays

Review Symposium: Woodrow Wilson Reconsidered
Woodrow Wilson and the Study of Administration: A New Look at an Old Essay
Richard J. Stillman, II

Woodrow Wilson to 1902 Edward H. Buehrig

Office of publication: **Curtis Reed Plaza, Menasha, Wisconsin.**
Foreign Agent: **P. S. King and Staples, Ltd., Great Smith Street, Westminster, London.**
Second class postage paid at Washington, D.C., and at additional mailing offices.
Printed in the United States of America by George Banta Company, Inc., Menasha, Wisconsin.
Copyright, 1973, by The American Political Science Association

ARTICLES

415 **The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems.** This paper assesses the theoretical significance of data on childhood political learning. Two socialization models are involved. Each confers relevance on childhood learning by linking it with political outcomes. The first is an allocative politics model, which seeks a linkage with policy outputs. The other is a system persistence model, looking toward the stability and continued existence of political systems. Each model incorporates the following assumptions: (a) the primacy principle: childhood learning is relatively enduring throughout life; (b) the structuring principle: basic orientations acquired during childhood structure the later learning of specific issue beliefs.

It is this structuring principle which we examined and tested in the present paper. The data show no or little association between childhood orientations and the later learning of specific beliefs about the most important political issues of the day. Our evidence suggests a need to carefully reexamine the basic assumptions and directions of current political socialization research.

By Donald D. Searing, Associate Professor of Political Science, Joel J. Schwartz, Associate Professor of Political Science and Alden E. Lind, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

---

433 **Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan.** Research has shown that place of residence (urban-rural) has an ambiguous influence on political participation. Japan is one of several major nations in which rural people participate politically more than their urban counterparts. An analysis of urban-rural political attitudes in Japan shows some of the roots of the tendencies in participation. While urban residents are more psychologically involved in national politics, they also tend toward greater pessimism and have lower feelings of the vote being a duty than do their rural counterparts. In contrast, rural voters are highly dutiful in orientation, as well as being strongly involved in local politics and more concerned than urban residents about having their political needs represented. A Coleman effect parameter analysis of the urban-rural attitudes and political participation shows that the attitudes do in fact account for differences in political participation in local politics. But the attitudinal tendencies are less important for national political participation, and it is possible that the older social influence interpretation of Japanese urban-rural differences is most applicable to sectoral trends in this case.

By Bradley M. Richardson, Associate Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.

---

453 **Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies.** One important proposition about the distribution of coalition payoffs is found in W. A. Gamson's theory of coalition formation: "Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition." This proposition is tested in a universe of cabinet coalitions existing in thirteen European democracies during the postwar period. Here, payoffs to partners are indicated by the percentage share of cabinet ministries received by parties for their percentage contribution of parliamentary seats/votes to the coalition.

The proportionality proposition is shown to hold strongly. Disproportionality, however, is observed to occur in distributions at the extremities of party size—large parties tend to be proportionately underpaid and small parties overpaid, the larger or smaller they become. This effect, however, is most pronounced when the size of the coalition is small, and tends to reverse itself as the size of the coalition increases.

By Eric C. Browne, Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee, and Mark N. Franklin, Lecturer, University of Strathclyde.

---

470 **The Concept of Organizational Goal.** The organizational goal concept is important for significant types of organizational research but its utility has been downgraded in recent scholarship. This paper reviews critically key contributions to conceptualizing the organizational goal and synthesizes many of their elements into a more concrete and comprehensive conceptualization. The efforts of Etzioni, Seashore and Yuchtman, Simon, and Thompson to bypass the need for a goal concept in evaluative and other behavioral research are unconvincing in important respects. However, they are persuasive in underscoring the importance of viewing organizational goals as multiple and as empirically determined. Perrow, Gross, and others convincingly suggest a dual conceptualization, so that goals are dichotomized into those with external referents (transitive goals) and those with internal referents (reflexive goals). Deniston et al. contribute the desirability of subsetting the goals of organizations into "program goals" and of differentiating goals from both subgoals and activities. The existence and relative importance of organizational goals and an allied concept, "operative goals," may be operationally determined by current social science methods. The goal concept as presented here has implications for the evaluation of organizational effectiveness, for research on organizational behavior, for organization theory, and for views of the role of organizations in society.

By Lawrence B. Mohr, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science, and Research Associate, Institute of Public Policy Studies, University of Michigan.

482 **Attitudes of the Arab Elite Toward Palestine and Israel.** Unlike most studies of the Arab-Israeli conflict, this one attempts not only to delineate the attitudes of Arab elite (professionals and university students) at home and abroad on the issue but also and primarily, to investigate the determinants of those attitudes. The sources include the relevant political literature, especially since the 1967 war; a set of depth interviews conducted among members of the elite in the Arab world; and a more structured sample survey conducted among Arab students and professionals in the U.S. Conclusions are based on the data from all three sources. The results show that religion, sectionalism, age, and level of education are important determinants of political attitudes and behavior among Arab elite. Neither locale (urban-rural residence) nor socioeconomic background, however, is found to be a significant factor.

By Michael W. Suleiman, Professor of Political Science, Kansas State University.

---

490 **Parties as Utility Maximizers.** The article introduces two models of political party decision making. Both models assume that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.

The models are analyzed in an intransitive case (an election concerned only with income distribution) and a transitive one (an election where all political attitudes can be put on a left-right continuum), and under the assumptions of perfect and imperfect information.

With perfect information the intransitive case results in the parties ending up with all the income; while in the single peaked case neither party will have a position to the left (right) of the left (right) party's most preferred position whatever the attitudes of the voters.

Finally it is shown that it is rational for the parties to collude and present similar platforms.

By Donald A. Wittman, Assistant Professor of Economics, University of California at Santa Cruz.

---

499 **The Learning of Legislative Norms.** The paper focuses on the learning of legislative norms on the part of freshman members elected to the United States House of Representatives in November, 1968. Since a research interest in learning is a longitudinal concern, a two-page panel design was employed. the first set of interviews conducted in late January and February of 1969 and the second set the following May. As the concept of a norm involves the notion of shared expectations, a sample of the nonfreshman members of the 91st Congress was also interviewed.

The main finding of the paper is that the amount of norm learning was surprisingly low; it appeared that freshmen largely knew the general House norms prior to entering Congress. And the extent of attitude change toward the norms once in office was minimal. Freshmen and nonfreshmen generally expressed similar attitudes toward the norms. Support for the norm of apprenticeship was found to be weak, suggesting the need to revise the traditional image of the freshman representative.

By Herbert B. Asher, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Ohio State University.

---

514 **The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis.** Perception of discrepancy between optimum level of achievement with respect to desired values and actual level of achievement is a concept that has figured importantly in explanations of collective violence and its subset, political violence (approval of and readiness to engage in behaviors which constitute progressively greater challenge to a political regime). Hypotheses about relationships between a number of static and dynamic achievement discrepancy constructs (labeled "relative gratification," and built from a variant of the Cantril Self-Anchoring scale) are tested. The achievement discrepancy constructs generally show only a weak degree of association with potential for political violence. However, measures of shift over time in discrepancy show an unexpected and intriguing relationship with potential for political violence: individuals who perceive negative change and individuals who perceive *positive* change show the highest potential for political violence, while individuals who perceive no change show the lowest potential for political violence; and this *V*-Curve relationship persists in the presence of various control variables. Moreover, *absolute magnitude* of shift in discrepancy from present to future shows a moderate degree of correlation with potential for political violence, and makes an independent contribution to a linear additive model. The data base is a sample of a population in which instances of political violence have been relatively frequent in the past.

By Bernard N. Grofman, Assistant Professor of Political Science, and Edward N. Muller, Associate Professor of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook.

---

540 **The Relationship Between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems.** An enduring fact of life in democratic electoral systems is that the party winning the largest share of the votes almost always receives a still larger share of the seats. This paper tests three models describing the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party and then develops explanations of the observed differences in the swing ratio and the partisan bias of an electoral system. The "cube law" is rejected as a description, since it assumes uniformity (which is not observed in the data) across electoral systems. Explanations for differences in swing ratio and bias are found in variations in turnout over districts,

the extent of the "nationalization" of politics, and, most importantly, in who does the districting or reapportionment. The measures of swing ratio and partisan bias appear useful for the judicial evaluation of redistricting schemes and may contribute to the reduction of partisan and incumbent gerrymandering.

By EDWARD R. TUFTE, Associate Professor of Politics and Public Affairs, Princeton University.

---

555 **Regression Analysis and Discriminant Analysis: An Application of R. A. Fisher's Theorem to Data in Political Science.** The conversion of multiple regression analysis to discriminant analysis is not only of theoretical interest, but—in view of the extensive use of these methods in political science—it also has considerable value for applications. It is the purpose of this presentation to explain the underlying theoretical relationship and to demonstrate its application in the form of an example chosen from the judicial process. Specifically, the Supreme Court's acceptance or rejection of the fact that the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel in an involuntary confession case is considered as a function of the appearance, nonappearance, or denial of the fact in lower court records and appellate briefs. Since the acceptance or rejection of the fact by the Supreme Court is a dichotomous dependent variable, discriminant analysis is appropriate. It is shown in this study how discriminant analysis can be employed by initially using regression analysis, not only in the example presented for illustration, but in any situation in which a phenomenon with dichotomous manifestations may be examined as a function of specified variables.

By FRED KORT, Professor of Political Science, University of Connecticut.

---

560 **A Research Note on Machine Politics as a Model for Change in a Philippine Province.** The purpose of this research note was to determine whether Philippine politics could be characterized as fitting a "machine politics model" (James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development, *APSR,* 63 [December, 1969], 1142–1158). A province was selected which matched the criteria cited in Scott's model, and provincial political leaders and subleaders were asked to evaluate important considerations they used in deciding whom to support for public office.

Scott proposed that in electoral political systems, support moves from a dependence on deference to a dependence on particularistic rewards, and finally to dependence on ideology. Part of the study tested the three-phase model using factor analysis on ten variables generally thought to be crucial in Philippine politics. The factor analysis revealed six factors, three which matched Scott's three phases plus: the chance of winning, the use of threats, and party loyalty. Although Scott's three-phase model was rejected as inadequate, at the descriptive level the general attributes of machine politics (particularly as Philippine politics has moved from a reliance on deference and personal loyalty to a dependence on material reward) could be used to characterize Philippine politics.

By LOUIS P. BENSON, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Kent State University.

---

567 COMMUNICATIONS

From James S. Coleman, Walter Dean Burnham, Charles H. Levine, Jeffrey L. Pressman, Bruce Gillespie, Robert G. Wesson, and Franklin W. Houn.

---

579 EDITORIAL COMMENT

---

582 BOOK REVIEWS AND ESSAYS

582 **Woodrow Wilson and the Study of Administration: A New Look at an Old Essay.** Unquestionably, Woodrow Wilson's scholarly essay, "The Study of Administration," (1887) stands as an historic landmark in American administrative thought. As Leonard D. White once wrote, "Wilson's essay introduced this country to the idea of administration." Based upon the recent publication of the Woodrow Wilson papers by Princeton University Press, the present paper attempts to examine the origin and enduring contribution of Wilson's administrative thought. The central thesis of the paper is that Wilson's administrative theories grew out of the salient ideas of late nineteenth century America, particularly, Social Darwinism and the pressing demands for political reform. In many respects, however, Wilson's essay created more issues than it resolved since it failed to delineate clearly the substance and boundaries of the field of administration.

By RICHARD J. STILLMAN, II, Associate Professor of Public Administration, California State College, Bakersfield.

589 **Woodrow Wilson to 1902.** Arthur S. Link and associates, eds., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.*

By EDWARD H. BUEHRIG, Professor of Political Science, Indiana University.

592 **Political Theory, History of Political Thought and Methodology**

Paul Breines, ed., *Critical Interruptions: New Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse.* George Lichtheim, p. 592
William J. Chambliss and Robert B. Seidman, *Law, Order and Power.* Herbert L. Packer, p. 593
Serge Chermayeff and Alexander Tzonis, *Shape of Community: Realization of Human Potential.* Joseph Smucker, p. 594
R. W. Connell, *The Child's Construction of Politics.* M. Kent Jennings, p. 595
Louis Crompton, ed., assisted by Hilayne Cavanaugh, *Bernard Shaw: The Road to Equality: Ten Unpublished Lectures and Essays, 1884–1918 With an Introduction by Louis Crompton.* M. Susan Power, p. 596
Virginia Held, Kei Nielsen, Charles Parsons, eds., *Philosophy and Political Action.* Harry Girvetz, p. 597
Nigel Howard, *Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior.* John C. Harsanyi, p. 599
David S. Landes and Charles Tilly, eds., *History as Social Science.* W. B. Gallie, p. 600
Albert William Levi, *Humanism and Politics.* Allan Bloom, p. 602
Jack Lively, ed. and trans., *The Works of Joseph de Maistre.* Russell Kirk, p. 603
Alasdair MacIntyre, *Herbert Marcuse,* George Lichtheim, p. 592
David McLellan, ed. and trans., *The Grundrisse,* by Karl Marx. Shlomo Avineri, p. 604
K. Bruce Miller, *Ideology and Moral Philosophy.* Paul E. Sigmund, p. 605
Raymond Polin, *L'Obligation Politique.* Richard E. Flathman, p. 606
Herbert Read, *Anarchy and Order; Essays in Politics.* D. A. T. Stafford, p. 607
Paul Roazen, *Freud: Political and Social Thought.* Fred R. Dallmayr, p. 608
Robert S. Summers, ed., *More Essays in Legal Philosophy.* Hugo Adam Bedau, p. 610
Martin J. Wiener, *Between Two Worlds: The Political Thought of Graham Wallas,* Sugwon Kang, p. 612

613 **American Government and Politics**

Adam Carlyle Breckenridge, *Congress Against the Court.* Robert G. Seddig, p. 614
Richard M. Burkey, *Racial Discrimination and Public Policy in the United States.* Herbert Garfinkel, p. 614
Paul B. Downing, ed., *Air Pollution and the Social Sciences: Formulating and Implementing Control Programs.* Charles O. Jones, p. 616
Leon Friedman, *The Wise Minority: An Argument for Draft Resistance and Civil Disobedience.* William Gangi, p. 616
James M. Gerhardt, *The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement 1945–1970.* Clyde E. Jacobs, p. 617
Barbara Hinckley, *The Seniority System in Congress.* Stephen Horn, p. 618
Perry H. Howard, *Political Tendencies in Louisiana.* William C. Havard, p. 619
Charles O. Jackson, *Food and Drug Legislation in the New Deal.* James R. Woodworth, p. 621
Charles O. Jones, *The Minority Party in Congress.* David E. Price, p. 622
Frank Levy, *Northern Schools and Civil Rights: The Racial Imbalance Act of Massachusetts.* Edwin Andrus Gere, p. 623
Robert G. McCloskey, *The Modern Supreme Court.* Edited by Martin Shapiro. David Fellman, p. 625
Thomas K. McCraw, *TVA and the Power Fight: 1933–39.* Victor C. Hobday, p. 626
James E. McEvoy III, *Radicals or Conservatives? The Contemporary American Right.* Sheilah R. Koeppen, p. 626
Arnold Meltsner, *The Politics of City Revenue.* Martin A. Levin, p. 628
Barry A. Passett, *Leadership Development for Public Service.* Raymond Pomerleau, p. 630
James T. Patterson, *The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition.* William Anderson, p. 631
Henry S. Reuss, *Revenue Sharing: Crutch or Catalyst?* Lyle C. Fitch, p. 631
Neal Riemer, *James Madison.* Donald S. Lutz, p. 632
Alan H. Schechter, *Contemporary Constitutional Issues.* Robert A. Carp, p. 632
Marvin Schick, *Learned Hand's Court.* Irving Dilliard, p. 634
Gilbert Y. Steiner, *The State of Welfare.* Randall B. Ripley, p. 636
Gerald Stourzh, *Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government.* Harvey Flaumenhaft, p. 637
William W. Turner, *Power on the Right.* Sheilah Koeppen, p. 626

639 **Comparative Government and Politics**

John Clarke Adams, *The Quest for Democratic Law: The Role of Parliament in the Legislative Process.* Norman Ward, p. 639
Iurii V. Arutiunian, *Sotsial'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR.* Rolf H. W. Theen, p. 640
Nnamdi Azikiwe, *My Odyssey: An Autobiography.* William Tordoff, p. 641
J. Bowyer Bell, *The Myth of the Guerilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice.* Rex Mortimer, p. 642
John Patrick Bell, *Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution.* James L. Busey, p. 644
Robert Benewick, *Political Violence and Public Order: A Study of British Fascism.* Henry Steck, p. 646
André Bernard, ed., *Réflexions sur la Politique au Québec.* 2nd Edition. Michael B. Stein, p. 660

Noel Boaden, *Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs in England and Wales.* G. W. Jones, p. 646

Otto Preston Chaney, Jr., *Zhukov.* Raymond L. Garthoff, p. 647

Eugenie Chang-Rodrigues, ed., *The Lingering Crisis: A Case Study of the Dominican Republic.* Abraham F. Lowenthal, p. 648

Chu-yuan Cheng, *The Machine-building Industry in Communist China.* Thomas G. Rawski, p. 649

Pran Chopra, ed., *The Challenge of Bangla Desh.* Anwar H. Syed, p. 650

Robert E. Cole, *Japanese Blue Collar: The Changing Tradition.* Marius B. Jansen, p. 652

Istvan Deak, *Weimar Germany's Left-Wing Intellectuals: A Political History of the "Weltbuhne" and Its Circle.* Peter J. Fliess, p. 653

Reinhold August Dorwart, *The Prussian Welfare State Before 1740.* John R. Gillis, p. 654

David R. Evans, *Teachers as Agents of National Development: A Case Study of Uganda.* M. Crawford Young, p. 655

Francois Fejto, *A History of the People's Democracies.* Paul Shoup, p. 656

Ruth First, *Power in Africa.* Immanuel Wallerstein, p. 657

Sheila Fitzpatrick, *The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts Under Lunacharsky.* Gail Lapidus, p. 658

Francine R. Frankel, *India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs.* Stanley J. Heginbotham, p. 659

Maurice Giroux, *La Pyramide de Babel.* Michael B. Stein, p. 660

Roger F. Hackett, *Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922.* Sidney DeVere Brown, p. 662

James Harding, *The Astonishing Adventure of General Boulanger.* Cameron Nish, p. 664

Jan Hinderink and Mubeccel B. Kiray, *Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages.* Noralou P. Roos and Leslie L. Roos, Jr., p. 665

Howard Palfrey Jones, *Indonesia: The Possible Dream.* Stephen Sloan, p. 666

Harold L. Kahn, *Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes: Image and Reality in the Ch'ien-lung Reign.* E. G. Pulleyblank, p. 667

Andrew D. Kalmykow, *Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1897–1917.* Edited by Alexandra Kalmykow. Arthur E. Adams, p. 669

K. S. Karol, *Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution.* Carmelo Mesa-Lago, p. 670

Paul P. Kennedy, *The Middle Beat: A Correspondent's View of Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador.* Edited by Stanley R. Ross. John W. Sloan, p. 672

B. M. Khaketla, *Lesotho 1970: An African Coup Under the Microscope.* Richard F. Weisfelder, p. 673

Iltija H. Khan, *Government in Rural India.* Benjamin N. Schoenfeld, p. 669

Se-Jin Kim, *The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea.* John C. H. Oh, p. 674

Philip A. Kuhn, *Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864.* Franz Michael, p. 675

Denis Laforte and André Bernard, *La Legislation Electorale au Québec*, 2nd edition. Michael B. Stein, p. 660

Jacques Lazure, *La Jeunesse du Québec en Revolution.* Michael B. Stein, p. 660

Arthur Liebman, Kennth N. Walker, and Myron Glazer, *Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study.* Ronald M. Schneider, p. 676

Eliahu Likhovski, *Israel's Parliament: The Law of the Knesset.* Michael Kahan, p. 678

Peter C. Lloyd, *Classes, Crises and Coups, Themes in the Sociology of Developing Countries.* R. D. Scott, p. 679

Michael F. Lofchie, ed., *The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa* Harvey Glickman, p. 680

Anthony Mascarenhas, *The Rape of Bangla Desh* Anwar H. Syed. p. 650

Thomas and Marjorie Melville, *Guatemala: The Politics of Land Ownership.* Roland H. Ebel. p. 682

Deborah D. Milenkovitch, *Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought.* Jozef Wilczynski, p. 683

Alan S. Milward, *The New Order and the French Economy.* Helen P. Liebel, p. 684

D. J. Murray, ed., *Studies in Nigerian Administration.* Alvin Magid, p. 685

Boniface I. Obichere, *West African States and European Expansion: The Dahomey-Niger Hinterland, 1885–1898.* Claude E. Welch, Jr., p. 686

Monte Palmer and Larry Stern, eds., *Political Development in Changing Societies.* Frank Tachau, p. 687

Peter A. Poole, *The Vietnamese in Thailand: A Historical Perspective.* Fred R. von der Mehden, p. 688

Aníbal Quijano, *Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru: A Study in Neo-Imperalism.* Trans. by Helen R. Lane. Jack W. Hopkins, p. 688

Erik Rasmussen and Erik Damgaard, eds., *Scandinavian Political Studies.* Vol. 6/71. Nils Andren, p. 689

Amal Ray, *Tension Areas in India's Federal System.* Norman D. Palmer, p. 690

Ronald Robinson, ed., *Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Ninteen-Sixties.* W. W. Rostow, p. 691

Abdul A. Said and Daniel M. Collier, *Revolutionism.* Rex Mortimer, p. 642

Sayre P. Schatz, *Economics, Politics and Administration in Government Lending: The Regional Loans Boards of Nigeria.* David B. Abernathy, p. 693

Theoder Shanin, *The Awkward Class. Political Sociology of Peasantry in Developing Society: Russia 1910–1925*. Szymon Chodak, p. 694
Juan Angel Silen, *We, The Puerto Rican People: A Story of Oppression and Resistance*. William J. Brisk, p. 698
Alfred Stepan, *The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil*. Robert A. Packenham, p. 694
Walter Stewart, *Trudeau in Power*. H. G. Thorburn, p. 696
Chester C. Tan, *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century*. Richard P. Suttmeier, p. 697
Pierre Elliott Trudeau, *Approaches to Politics*. H. G. Thorburn, p. 696
Melvin M. Tumin, with Arnold S. Feldman, *Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico*. William J. Brisk, p. 698
Eric R. Wolf, *Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century*. Rex Mortimer, p. 642
Ehsan Yar-Shater, ed., *Iran Faces the Seventies*. James A. Bill, p. 700
Eberhard Zeller, *The Flame of Freedom: The German Struggle Against Hitler*. Trans. by R. P. Heller and D. R. Masters. George K. Romoser, p. 701
Valentin S. Zorin, ed., *SShA: Problemy vnutrennei politiki* (*The USA: Domestic Policy Problems*). Richard M. Mills, p. 702

---

704 International Politics, Law, and Organization

John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody, eds., *Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy*. Stephen D. Kertesz, p. 704
Michael Brecher, *The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process*. J. C. Hurewitz, p. 705
Ian Brownlie, ed., *Basic Documents on Human Rights*. Louis B. Sohn, p. 707
Francis Deak, ed., *American International Law Cases*, Vol. I. Thomas M. Franck, p. 708
Margaret P. Doxey, *Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement*. Forest L. Grieves, p. 709
John W. Evans, *The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of GAAT*. Irving B. Kravis, p. 710
Bruno Fritsch, *Die Vierte Welt: Modell einer neuen Wirklichkeit*. Gerard Braunthal, p. 711
Theodore Geiger, *Transatlantic Relations in the Prospect of an Enlarged European Community*. Edward L Morse, p. 728
James Henry Giffen, *The Legal and Practical Aspects of Trade with the Soviet Union*. Revised edition. Robert Sharlet, p. 712
Theodore R. Giuttari, *The American Law of Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis of Legal Interpretation*. Guenter Weissberg, p. 713
Rainer Hellmann, *The Challenge to U.S. Dominance of the International Corporation*. Fouad Ajami, p. 714
Harold C. Hinton, *The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking Under Soviet Pressure* James L Nichols, p. 717
Charles Fred Iklé, *Every War Must End*. Paul Kecskemeti, p. 718
K. Jones and A. D. Smith, *The Economic Impact of Commonwealth Immigration*. E. J. B. Rose, p. 719
Luis Kutner, ed., *The Human Right to Individual Freedom: A Symposium on World Habeas Corpus*. Louis B Sohn, p 707
Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden, *Euatlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites*. Sidney Verba, p. 720
Richard H. Minear, *Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial*. Theodore McNelly, p. 721
Michael Nicholson, *Conflict Analysis*. Raymond Tanter, p. 722
F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve, *A Hundred Years of International Relations*. Hedley Bull, p. 724
National Planning Association Advisory Committee, *U.S. Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970s: A New Approach to New Realities*. Robert E. Asher, p. 725
Lester B. Pearson, Chairman, *Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development*. Raanan Weitz, p. 726
Robert E. Riggs, *US/UN Foreign Policy and International Organization*. H. Field Haviland, p. 727
Stuart A. Scheingold, *The Law in Political Integration: The Evolution and Integrative Implications of Regional Legal Processes in the European Community*. Edward L. Morse, p. 728
Urs Schwarz, *Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World*. I. William Zartman, p. 730
Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz, eds., *Conflict in World Politics*. Fred A. Sondermann, p. 731
Maxwell D. Taylor, *Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir*. Bernard Brodie, p. 732
Arthur Campbell Turner, *The Unique Partnership: Britain and the United States*. F. S. Northedge, p. 733
Raymond Vernon, *Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises*. Fouad Ajami, p. 714
Harald von Riekhoff, *German-Polish Relations, 1918–1933*. George Brinkley, p. 734
Byron S. J. Weng, *Peking's U.N. Policy: Continuity and Change*. Allen S. Whiting, p. 735
Walter L. Williams, Jr., *Intergovernmental Military Forces and World Public Order*. Lincoln P. Bloomfield, p. 736
Mason Willrich, *Global Politics of Nuclear Energy*. Ralph Sanders, p. 737
S. S. Zarkovich, *Le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Dèveloppement*. Peter R. Baehr, p. 738

What if they gave an election and nobody came?

POLITICAL ALIENATION AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR

by David C. Schwartz

"An outstanding job of synthesis, theory and construction and empirical validation. This book is likely to be judged one of the major contributions to political psychology of the decade."
— Ted Robert Gurr, Northwestern University

This book presents and confirms by extensive research a completely original three-variable psychological theory to explain the causes and consequences of political alienation and how psychological attitudes predict political behavior. The author shows why present theories of social status and economic difficulties do not adequately explain alienation and replaces them with theory based on observations of the following individual psychological phenomena: threat from value conflict, perceived personal inefficacy, and perceived systemic inefficacy. A process model for predicting political behavior is also stated and validated. This book will be of interest to many social scientists and will be especially important to anyone concerned with American politics and more generally with the relationships of economic, social, and psychological forces manifested in political behavior.

David C. Schwartz is presently Professor in the Political Science Department of Rutgers University and is the author of a number of articles published in major political science and behavioral science journals.

1973. 356 pp. $9.95.

DILEMMAS OF SOCIAL REFORM: POVERTY AND COMMUNITY ACTION IN THE UNITED STATES (Second Edition)

by Peter Marris and Martin Rein

"The 2nd edition of Dilemmas of Social Reform is a valuable updating of a book that became a classic in the literature of urban politics and urban studies in just a few short years. It remains the best book on the efforts of various urban wars on poverty to improve the lives of the poor in the city, and its insightful analysis of the failure of these efforts has much to teach us about future such efforts. I especially liked the new final chapter, for it is a thoughtful and constructive analysis of the dilemmas, not just of social reform, but of democratic politics."
— Herbert Ganz, Columbia University, Center for Policy Research.

This second edition of a classic work on social reform brings the story of community action up to date from 1965 to 1971. It is an account of the origins and development of community action from its beginnings in the Ford Foundation Gray Area Programs and the President's Committee on Juvenile Delinquency, through the rise and decline of the War on Poverty and the Model Cities Program. In a ruthlessly impartial examination of poverty programs two social scientists — one British, one American — explain why programs of such size and complexity have only a minimal chance of success. They describe the realities of reform and point up how the conservatism of bureaucracy, the rivalries among political and administrative jurisdictions, and the apathy of the poor have often hindered national and local efforts. On the other hand, they show how these obstacles can be overcome by an imaginative combination of leadership, democratic participation and scientific analysis.

Distinguished by an analysis of the major critics of community action, the book provides a balanced perspective of the movement against its many detractors. It is valuable for anyone engaged in community action, whether as organizer, consultant, official or politician.

Peter Marris is a member of the Institute of Community Studies in London. He has been a visiting lecturer in the Department of City Planning of the University of California, Berkeley, and is now working on a general study of social change. Martin Rein is Professor in the Department of Urban Studies and Planning at MIT. He has worked as a social worker with street gangs, has supervised a number of research projects, and has written about poverty, social planning, and the social work profession.

1973. 320 pp. $8.50, cloth.

Aldine Publishing Company
529 South Wabash Avenue
Chicago, Illinois 60605

The American Political Science Association

1527 New Hampshire Ave. N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036

President: Robert E. Ward, University of Michigan; *President-Elect:* Avery Leiserson, Vanderbilt University; *Vice Presidents:* Charles V. Hamilton, Columbia University; Ralph K. Huitt, National Association of State Universities and Land Grant Colleges; Ruth C. Silva, Pennsylvania State University; *Secretary:* Samuel Barnes, University of Michigan; *Treasurer:* Charles O. Jones, University of Pittsburgh; *Program Chairman:* Lucian Pye, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; *Executive Director:* Evron M. Kirkpatrick, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; *Managing Editor, APSR:* Nelson W. Polsby, University of California, Berkeley.

COUNCIL: (Above-named Officers *ex officiis*), 1972–1973: Christian Bay, University of Alberta; Samuel Dubois Cook, Duke University; Valerie Earle, Georgetown University; Richard F. Fenno, University of Rochester; Robert O. Keohane, Swarthmore College; Samuel Krislov, University of Minnesota; Gerhard Loewenberg, University of Iowa; Kenneth Prewitt, University of Chicago. 1973–1974: Paul Y. Hammond, Rand Corporation; Donald G. Herzberg, Rutgers University; Matthew Holden, Jr., University of Wisconsin, Madison; Robert Horwitz, Kenyon College; H. Mark Roelofs, New York University; Roberta S. Sigel, State University of New York, Buffalo; Sidney Wise, Franklin and Marshall College.

FORMER PRESIDENTS: Frank J. Goodnow, Albert Shaw, Frederic N. Judson, James Bryce, A. Lawrence Lowell, Woodrow Wilson, Simeon E. Baldwin, Albert Bushnell Hart, W. W. Willoughby, John Bassett Moore, Ernst Freund, Jesse Macy, Munroe Smith, Henry Jones Ford, Paul S. Reinsch, Leo S. Rowe, William A. Dunning, Harry A. Garfield, James W. Gardner, Charles E. Merriam, Charles A. Beard, William B. Munro, Jesse S. Reeves, John A. Fairlie, Benjamin F. Shambaugh, Edward S. Corwin, William F. Willoughby, Isidor Loeb, Walter J. Shepard, Francis W. Coker, Arthur N. Holcombe, Thomas Reed Powell, Clarence A. Dykstra, Charles Grove Haines, Robert C. Brooks, Frederick A. Ogg, William Anderson, Robert E. Cushman, Leonard D. White, John M. Gaus, Walter F. Dodd, Arthur W. MacMahon, Henry R. Spencer, Quincy Wright, James K. Pollock, Peter H. Odegard, Luther H. Gulick, Pendleton Herring, Ralph J. Bunche, Charles McKinley, Harold D. Lasswell, E. E. Schattschneider, V. O. Key, Jr., R. Taylor Cole, Carl B. Swisher, Emmette S. Redford, Charles S. Hyneman, Carl J. Friedrich, C. Herman Pritchett, David B. Truman, Gabriel A. Almond, Robert A. Dahl, Merle Fainsod, David Easton, Karl W. Deutsch, Robert E. Lane, Heinz Eulau.

The American Political Science Review

Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley 94720

EDITORIAL BOARD: Nelson W. Polsby, *Managing Editor, University of California, Berkeley;* Philip Siegelman, *Book Review Editor, California State University, San Francisco;* Shlomo Avineri, *The Hebrew University of Jerusalem;* Brian Barry, *Nuffield College, Oxford University;* Richard A. Brody, *Stanford University;* Edith T. Carper, *The Aerospace Corporation;* Samuel D. Cook, *Duke University;* S. Rufus Davis, *Monash University;* Robert C. Fried, *University of California, Los Angeles;* Arthur S. Goldberg, *University of Rochester;* Morton H. Halperin, *The Brookings Institution;* Nannerl O. Keohane, *Swarthmore College;* Peter Laslett, *Trinity College, Cambridge University;* Dale Rogers Marshall, *University of California, Davis;* Russell D. Murphy, *Wesleyan University;* Joan M. Nelson, *The Urban Institute;* H. Douglas Price, *Harvard University;* Robert D. Putnam, *University of Michigan,* Douglas W. Rae, *Yale University;* Austin Ranney, *University of Wisconsin, Madison;* Giovanni Sartori, *University of Florence;* Michael J. Shapiro, *University of Hawaii;* Stephen V. Stephens, *The Johns Hopkins University;* George E. Von der Muhll, *University of California, Santa Cruz;* Richard A. Watson, *University of Missouri.* **MANUSCRIPT EDITOR:** Ellen Y. Siegelman. **EDITORIAL ASSISTANTS:** Barbara Epstein, Barbara Kelly. **EDITORIAL INTERNS:** Dorothy Clayton, Gerald Clayton, Peter Cowhey, Craig Garrett, Jeffrey Hart, Yvonne Jones, Beverly Kearns, Sam Kernell, David Laitin, Steven Lieberman, William M. Lunch, Ian Lustick, Jesse McCorry, Dan Metlay, Matthew Pinkus, Alex Radian, Brinton Rowdybush, Bryon Shafer, Robert Stumpf, Stephen Van Evera, Arthur Trueger, Harry Williams.

About the American Political Science Review

The American Political Science Review, published quarterly during the months of March, June, September, and December, is supplied to all APSA members. Membership dues are charged according to the following schedule:

Membership Category	*Dues*
Regular	
Annual income	
Under $12,000	$20
$12,000–$15,000	$25
Over $15,000	$30
Student and Retired	$10
Family	$5
Life	$1000
Institutional (includes *APSR* and *PS*)	$35

Student memberships are limited to five years per person. Foreign currency at the official exchange rate will be accepted for foreign subscriptions and foreign membership fees. The equivalent of $1 for additional postage should be added for foreign subscriptions.

Current issues are priced at $7.50 per copy; for *back issues prior* to 1968 address Johnson Reprint Corp., 111 5th Ave., New York, N.Y. 10003; for issues 1968 and later send request directly to the American Political Science Association.

Applications for membership, orders for the *Review*, and remittances should be addressed to the Executive Director, The American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. *Notices of changes of address* should be received in the Washington office by the 25th day of the months before publication.

INSTRUCTIONS TO CONTRIBUTORS

Address correspondence about contributions to the *Review to* Nelson W. Polsby, Department of Political Science, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Each manuscript should be accompanied by an abstract of up to 150 words briefly describing the article's contents. All manuscripts and abstracts should be submitted IN DUPLICATE. They should be double-spaced and may be in typed, mimeographed, hectographed, or other legible form. Footnotes should appear at the end of the manuscript, not at the bottom of the page, and should also be doubled-spaced. Manuscripts that do not follow this format will be returned to the authors for retyping.

Since manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name and affiliations should appear only on a separate covering page. All footnotes identifying the author should also appear on a separate page.

Address books intended for review to Philip Siegelman, *American Political Science Review*, 210 Barrows Hall, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, California 94720. Information, including News and Notes, for the Association's newsletter, *PS*, should be sent to 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036; advertising, reprint and circulation correspondence should be sent to the Executive Director at the Washington office. Advertising information and rates are available from Nancy Edgerton, Adv. Manager, APSA, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036.

Articles and notes appearing in the *Review* before the June, 1953 issues were indexed in *The Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*. Current issues are indexed by *The International Political Science Abstracts* and the *Social Sciences and Humanities Index*. Microfilm of the *Review*, beginning with Volume 1, may be obtained from University Microfilms, 313 North First Street, Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106. A *Cumulative Index* of the *Review*, Volumes 1–62: 1906–1968, may also be obtained from University Microfilms. Articles appearing in the *Review* are listed regularly in *ABC Pol Sci* and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social & Management Sciences.*

The Structuring Principle: Political Socialization and Belief Systems

DONALD D. SEARING, JOEL J. SCHWARTZ,
AND ALDEN E. LIND
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

Of what interest to political science are children's attitudes? Almost without exception, our socialization research has focused on childhood political learning. But the assumption that children's attitudes are important has never been convincingly demonstrated. Neither has this research been justified by fully articulated theoretical statements. The present article does not pretend to provide the final word on these complex matters. Rather, it proposes only to clarify one aspect of existing models, and subject this to an empirical test.

Two theoretical models are involved.[1] Each offers relevance to childhood learning by linking it with political outcomes. The first is an allocative politics model, which seeks a linkage with policy outputs. The other is a system persistence model, looking toward the stability and continued existence of political systems. We believe that each model incorporates the following assumptions: (a) The primacy principle: childhood learning is relatively enduring throughout life; (b) The structuring principle: basic orientations acquired during childhood structure the later learning of specific issue beliefs. It is this structuring principle which will be examined and tested in the present paper.

Assessment of childhood socialization's importance has been sidetracked by a widespread belief. This is the notion that the primacy principle must be tested in any such assessment. And, since that test would require longitudinal data which are presently unavailable, the entire question has been set aside. Yet, we shall argue, theoretical relevance rests not upon the primacy principle alone, but upon the structuring principle as well. Our point will be that the models' theoretical relevance is only as strong as their weakest links to the dependent variable. If these break, the models fail. If they hold, the models are ready for further testing.

Because these models are poorly articulated in socialization literature, it is essential to clarify the range of research to which our inquiry does and does not apply. Moreover, the falsification rules we propose have not been self-evident to colleagues in the field. The burden is upon us, then, to make a convincing case that our test is indeed a reasonable one. We shall examine first the primacy and structuring principles, and then the allocative politics and system persistence models which incorporate them.

The Primacy and Structuring Principles

In explaining political outcomes, one naturally looks to *adult* attitudes, not to the attitudes of children. But if adult attitudes are the phenomena of interest, why have socialization investigators interviewed children? The reason is that childhood antecedents are regarded as important determinants of adult attitudes. Hence, childhood learning represents a legitimate focus for political science inquiry.[2] To a considerable extent, this position reflects the work of child development theorists who argue that what is learned earliest in life is learned best, and is least likely to be displaced by subsequent experiences.[3] The belief that early political learning

---

* For helpful comments on earlier versions of this paper, we are indebted to Fred I. Greenstein, Kenneth P. Langton, Richard G. Niemi, and Jeffrey S. Obler. The research was supported by a National Science Foundation grant to the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.

[1] For a discussion of these models, see David Easton and Jack Dennis, *Children in the Political System* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1969), Chapter 2.

[2] At the same time, it should be emphasized that scholars engaged in this research do not suppose that political man is but the political child writ large. Quite the contrary. All agree that political socialization continues throughout the life cycle; that not all childhood learning influences adult behavior; and that, in dynamic modern societies, political attitudes are rarely transmitted unchanged from one generation to another. The childhood focus stems instead from an interest in exploring how political attitudes *develop*. Fred Greenstein nicely summarizes this concern as an attempt "to identify who learns what, from whom, under what circumstances and with what effects." See *Children and Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), p. 12.

[3] Once again, Greenstein has succinctly summarized this position: "In general, the more important a political orientation is in the behavior of adults, the earlier it will be found to emerge in the learning of the child" (p. 56). In fact, a widely accepted belief holds that many politi-

is relatively enduring has secured a firm foothold as a working assumption for socialization studies. It has been characterized as the *primacy principle*. Although everyone subscribes to this principle in varying degrees,[4] no one has categorically claimed unadulterated persistence for orientations acquired in childhood—except, perhaps, in the case of party identification. Each of the better-known studies has simply offered a series of childhood orientations which *may* influence later adult attitudes and behavior. Arguments have been couched in terms of conjecture or suggestive hypotheses. These qualifications reflect recognition that evidence to support such categorical assertions is regretably absent.

Similar qualifications accompany the *structuring principle,* which holds that orientations acquired during childhood structure the later learning of specific issue beliefs. Inasmuch as socialization research began in the United States, a rapidly changing society, it followed that specific political beliefs could not be the concern of these studies. What may be an important issue today often becomes an irrelevancy tomorrow. The times change, issues change, and attitudes toward them change as well. Moreover, it was soon discovered that young children simply do not possess many issue beliefs at all. The goal, therefore, was to identify more integumented orientations which would be less likely to shift with the temper of the times. But the search for such basic orientations did not imply an indifference to specific political attitudes.[5] Rather, it was assumed that the learning of these specific attitudes toward policies, leaders, and events is structured by basic political orientations acquired in childhood. This structuring proceeds through selective perception, cue-giving, and similar processes.

Since the structuring principle is the central notion to be tested in this paper, it should be illustrated by a concrete example from the literature. Thus, Hyman notes that American children acquire party identification at a very early age, and that this identification persists over time for the vast majority of the population. Party identification thereafter serves as a surrogate parental socialization agent. Parents cannot possibly socialize their children to deal with the specific political issues which will confront them during their adulthood: such issues simply cannot be foreseen or anticipated. Parents can and do, however, transmit strong loyalty to a political party. And, since parties will continue to take stands on emergent political issues, the loyal Democrat or Republican can fall back on these issue stances as surrogate parental cues. According to this view, then, the learning of new issue beliefs is *structured* by a more basic political orientation (party identification) which the individual internalized during childhood, and which has persisted over time.[6]

Up to this point, the primacy and structuring principles have been explicated as important components in theoretical justifications for socialization research. The next step is to examine the structuring principle's place in allocative politics and system persistence models. In so doing, we will provide the rationale for our test and will circumscribe the research to which the test applies. First, however, it is necessary to clarify several concepts which are central to the argument.

Concepts: Distinctions Between Political Orientations and Political Attitudes

A major difficulty with the structuring principle concerns the distinction between independent and dependent variables, i.e., between *basic political orientations* and *specific political attitudes*. The socialization literature abounds with such distinctions. Yet differences between these phenomena remain unclear. Easton and Dennis, for instance, define political orientations as perceptions, affect, and evaluations directed toward political objects.[7] These orientations are widely believed to "underlie" more

---

cal orientations have been acquired by the time children leave the eighth grade, and that little change occurs thereafter. The strongest statement of this position is that of James C. Davies: Political socialization "begins at about the age of three and is basically completed by the age of thirteen." See "The Family's Role in Political Socialization," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science,* 361 (September, 1965), 11.

[4] Cf. Herbert Hyman, *Political Socialization* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); Greenstein, *Children and Politics;* Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); Richard E. Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, *Political Socialization* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1969); Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System.*

[5] "This is not to argue that specific political attitudes are not important; indeed they are much more reliable guides to political action than beliefs about politics in general," (Sidney Verba, "Conclusion: Comparative Political Culture," in *Political Culture and Political Development,* ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba [Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965], p. 518).

[6] Hyman, pp. 56–57. Greenstein, Easton and Dennis, Hess and Torney, and others, make a similar linkage argument with particular reference to the system persistence model. Each reports that American school children hold an exceptionally benign image of the President. (For a representative example, see, Greenstein, pp. 27–54.)

[7] Easton and Dennis, p. 5.

specific political attitudes.[8] In addition, they are assumed to be comparatively "central" or more resistant to change than are specific attitudes.[9]

Perhaps the best known operational distinction between the two concepts is associated with the research of public opinion specialists. Prothro and Grigg contrast *general statements* such as "I believe in free speech," with *specific applications* of these statements, e.g., "Freedom doesn't give anyone the right to teach foreign ideas in our schools."[10] Herbert McClosky has elaborated this sort of distinction into a threefold typology: *personality, attitude,* and *issue orientation.*[11] The terms are distinguished by descending level of generality in the attitudinal object: for example, from need for personal autonomy, to affect for freedom of speech, to dislike of speaker-ban rules. This approach can be carried further through social psychologists' attempts to disentangle the terms *value* and *attitude.* One common strategy has been to define value as a broader attitude. *Opinion* is then introduced as a third term, defined as a still more specific manifestation of an attitude.[12]

For present purposes, we suggest positing a continuum by level of generality in the attitudinal object. In political socialization models, items at the more general end of this continuum will be called "orientations." Items closer to the specific pole will be designated "issue beliefs." This, in fact, seems to capture the intuitive meaning accorded such distinctions in socialization research. Thus, examples of issue beliefs relevant to the models involve objects such as political violence, racial situations, paying taxes, and aggressive national behaviors.[13] Examples of orientations are presented in Chart 1. These orientations were identified on the basis of frequency of usage in contemporary socialization research.

We have divided the orientations into participation-demand and persistence-support categories. Anyone familiar with the literature will recognize this as the distinction between learning connected with citizen roles and learning connected with subject roles. They will also realize that the classification is somewhat arbitrary. Several orientations found under the allocative politics category seem equally at home in the system persistence category, and vice versa.[14] This ambiguity reflects, in part, the vagueness with which socialization models have been presented in the literature. It also indicates that some orientations may simply be relevant to both outputs and persistence.

Chart 1. Orientations Frequently Employed in Political Socialization Research Among Children

Allocative Politics Model Demand-Related Orientations	System Persistence Model Support-Related Orientations
*1. Political party identification	*1. Orientations toward authority
*2. Sense of political efficacy	*2. Benevolence of authorities
*3. Sense of political competence	*3. Responsiveness of authorities
4. Duty to participate in politics	*4. Competence of authorities
*5. Orientations toward: electoral behavior; interest articulation; political decision making	*5. Affect for roles such as President, Policeman, and institutions such as Supreme Court
6. Political interest	*6. Trust in government
7. Qualities of the good citizen	*7. Political legitimacy
8. Perceptions of social groups	8. Patriotism
*9. Liberalism—Conservatism	*9. Political cynicism

* Orientations to be examined in the following analysis

---

[8] For example, see Greenstein, pp. 28–31.

[9] Herbert McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," in *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy,* ed. James N. Rosenau (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 51–109.

[10] James W. Prothro and Charles M. Grigg, "Fundamental Principles of Democracy: Bases of Agreement and Disagreement," *Journal of Politics,* 22 (May, 1960), 276–94. See also Herbert McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," *American Political Science Review,* 58 (June, 1964), 361–82.

[11] McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," pp. 56, 92–93.

[12] See William J. McGuire, "The Nature of Attitudes and Attitude Change," in *The Handbook of Social Psychology,* ed. Gardner Lindzey and Elliott Aronson, 2nd ed. Vol. III (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley, 1969), pp. 151–52.

[13] Dawson and Prewitt, *Political Socialization,* pp. 14, 86.

[14] Party identification, for instance, obviously relates to the types of demands citizens make upon the policy process. But party identification may also be viewed as a support for the political system. This point has been argued by Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux: "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," in Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren Miller, Donald Stokes, *Elections and the Political Order* (New York: Wiley, 1966), pp. 269–91.

Theory: Allocative Politics and System Persistence Models

Some investigators, most notably Easton and Dennis, have consciously attempted to relate socialization data to broader models of the political process. More often, however, research has been far from explicit concerning its theoretical relevance. Still, it seems fair to argue that most orientations have been introduced, at least implicitly, under one of two models currently found in the subfield. These are models of a quite abstract order. Their intent is to aid us in thinking about the political process, and the structure of our discipline. They depict causal relationships among classes of variables, in order to evaluate the theoretical relevance of these components. We do not propose to explore these models in their entirety, or even to refine them any more than is necessary for our immediate task.[15] This task is to locate the structuring principle within their schemata.

The allocative politics model is centrally concerned with explaining policy outputs: who gets what, when, how, and why in democratic politics. Classes of variables within its schema are accorded theoretical relevance by showing that they contribute to these outcomes. With regard to mass publics, this promotes a focus upon political participation variables, or *demands* in the political process.[16] The allocative politics model generally assumes that the political orientations of mass publics are significant determinants of *political demands*, and, thereby, policy outputs. Under this assumption, it becomes the task of socialization research to explain the genesis of these adult political orientations.

Clearly, the assumption needs to be examined with considerable care. How might these orientations affect political demands, and, hence, policy outputs? First of all, we should note that the last link, that between demands and policy outputs, is beyond the scope of our inquiry.[17] We begin by considering the prior relationship between orientations and demands. Two alternative linkages are suggested in the literature.

The first is *behavioral constraint*. This attempts to connect orientations with a subclass of demand variables which do not involve issue beliefs. For instance, a voter with a strong Democratic party identification may find his own issue beliefs and the party's policies no longer in tandem. Nevertheless, when he enters the polling booth, he "automatically" pulls the Democratic lever. Similar arguments have been advanced in explaining other aspects of political participation, including the amount of that participation itself. Although behavioral constraint has never been satisfactorily articulated, it does seem a potentially important linkage. And, to the extent that the linkage is demonstrable, it circumscribes the range of allocative politics research to which our test does not apply. It is depicted as segment (c) in Figure 1 below.

We focus instead only upon a second, and alternative, linkage between orientations and demands. We shall argue that the structuring principle is one segment in this chain. Thus, the larger chain relates orientations to demand variables *by way of intervening issue beliefs.* The demand variables include selected aspects of voting behavior and political participation which are mediated by issue beliefs. We wish to emphasize that the issue-belief linkage seems theoretically more important than behavioral constraint. If issue beliefs have no role in political participation and policy formation, then public opinion data would simply be irrelevant to explaining policy outputs for democratic systems. This emphasis on issue beliefs circumscribes the portion of the allocative politics model we propose to examine. The structuring principle is incorporated here as the link between orientations and issue beliefs, segment (a) in Figure 1.

A straightforward statement of the full-blown allocative politics model would begin with childhood learning. Childhood political orientations would persist into the adult years,

---

[15] Models of this sort are, in effect, paradigms which orient research and circumscribe the scope of a discipline, or subfields within a discipline. In the present case, this involves definitions of politics and other equally complex issues. Although these models could benefit from careful reconstruction, such a task is clearly beyond the capabilities of the present essay. We have attempted to take the models as they appear in socialization research, and refine them only to the point necessary for diagrammatic representation and discussion in an intelligible manner.

[16] David Easton defines "demands" as follows: ". . . an expression of opinion that an authoritative allocation with regard to a particular subject matter should or should not be made by those responsible for doing so." (*A Systems Analysis of Political Life* [New York: Wiley, 1965], p. 38).

[17] This is not to say that the relationship between demands and outputs is unimportant; only that its examination is beyond the capabilities of our immediate concerns. Like the relationship between supports and system persistence, this involves the difficult problem of relating individual to system level data. It also necessitates further clarification of the variables involved. See, Fred Greenstein, "A Note on the Ambiguity of 'Political Socialization,' Definitions, Criticisms and Strategies of Inquiry," *Journal of Politics*, 32 (November, 1970), 969–78.



Figure 1. Generalized Political Socialization Model: The Structuring Principle

and thereby be directly related to specific issue beliefs. This simple model is especially familiar in treatments of political party identification: learned in childhood, the orientation persists into adulthood to structure the learning of issue preferences. But during the course of the life cycle, additional socialization experiences intervene so that the original orientations undergo some changes. Hence, it has been suggested that adult experiences and adult orientations be introduced as additional variables.[18] This addition yields the more sophisticated model presented in Figure 1. For these reasons, the direct relationship between childhood political orientations and adult issue beliefs (segment b) is not taken very seriously. Before a citizen has even formulated his issue beliefs, his early childhood orientations, while relatively enduring, have eroded in the process of becoming adult orientations. The dominant flow of effects, then, proceeds through the relationship between adult orientations and issue beliefs (segment a). This is the structuring principle as incorporated within the allocative politics model.

The system persistence model addresses itself to quite different questions. Its focus is system stability and persistence: support rather than demand aspects of political processes.[19] Questions of this nature lead socialization research toward the genesis of mass attitudes which underlie support for the government, regime, and political community. We propose to argue that this model is, in one important respect, similar to the generalized political socialization model in Figure 1. It, too, incorporates the structuring principle. That is to say, the relationship between many support orientations and system stability is mediated by issue beliefs.[20]

Easton and Dennis have differentiated support into two dimensions, specific and diffuse.[21] Support must also be clearly differentiated into its attitudinal and behavioral manifestations. The attitudinal variables, such as trust in government, are depicted in our model as adult political orientations. By contrast, supportive *acts* are depicted under "Political Behavior." They include demonstrations in support of political institutions, or even serving as a member of a "silent majority" whose quiescence contributes to stability and persistence.

Specific support behaviors are defined as mercurial, *quid pro quo* acts. Like diffuse support, they are ultimately determined by favorable orientations toward institutions. But what

---

[18] Dawson and Prewitt, pp. 204–05; Kenneth P. Langton, *Political Socialization* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969), pp. 14–16.

[19] While demands can also contribute to system stability and persistence, the model usually emphasizes support variables when it is discussed in the socialization literature.

[20] For example, citizens with strong affect for the presidency may support this institution, contributing to system stability by being uncritical of presidential actions in domestic and international affairs: Dawson and Prewitt, p. 59. More specifically, Americans are said to support their government by fighting its wars, paying its taxes, and obeying its laws: William C. Mitchell, *The American Polity* (New York: Free Press, 1962), p. 172.

[21] Easton and Dennis, *Children in the Political System*, pp. 61–67. See also, David Easton, *A Framework for Political Analysis* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1965), pp. 124–26.

distinguishes specific support behavior is its contingency upon citizen approval of the institution's policies, i.e., upon intervening issue-belief variables. The theoretical relevance of specific support *orientations,* then, assumes their linkage with intervening policy preferences or issue beliefs. No doubt an orientation might seem to bypass issue beliefs, directly contributing to system persistence through behavior in support of institutions (segment c). But, even so, the orientation must always be accompanied by issue preferences favorable to the policies of these institutions (segment a). And these preferences contribute to system persistence. We say "always" because, *by definition,* where there is no issue-belief approval, there cannot be any specific support at all. This relationship seems adequately represented in Figure 1.

Diffuse support is more complex. It involves two alternative situations, only one of which incorporates the structuring principle. We shall first examine the situation that excludes the structuring principle. Attitudinally, diffuse support is defined as generalized feelings of trust and confidence in objects such as political institutions. This trust is akin to unconditional loyalty in the sense that it is given freely, regardless of perceived inconvenience. In short, the orientation produces behavioral support of institutions even when the citizen does not approve their policies. The citizen's issue beliefs are not, in this case, intervening variables between orientations and supportive behavior. The relationship is confined to segment (c) in our model. This delimits the range of system-persistence research to which our test does not apply.

But the holding of a diffuse support orientation does not necessarily imply indifference towards the institution's policies, or disagreement with them. Indeed, as a result of his diffuse support orientation, the citizen is likely to agree with such policies more often than not. This brings us to the alternative diffuse support situation which does incorporate the structuring principle. When the citizen evinces agreement with the institution's policies, he is expressing an issue belief. Moreover, as with specific support, this issue belief contributes to system stability by expressing preferences supportive of institutional policies. It does so even if no further behavioral acts are involved. And, it does not seem unreasonable to suggest that diffuse support orientations explain, in part, these issue beliefs.

Chart 2 summarizes the range of research which falls within the purview of our inquiry, as well as research which remains beyond it. It would be desirable to be still more precise about the variables involved. But since they have not been sharply delineated in the socialization literature, such precision would require major efforts at theory construction that go beyond the limited concerns of our paper. We have restricted our review to stating the models as they are found in the literature and refining them only so far as necessary to locate the structuring principle within their schemata.

Research to which our inquiry applies is summarized in the upper two quadrants of Chart 2. The theoretical relevance of this research rests upon the structuring principle. All the political orientations considered below have, in part, been accorded importance by the structuring principle's link to demands and supports. The two lower quadrants, by contrast, identify research under the behavioral constraint aegis. Theoretical relevance in this research does not involve the structuring principle, and is therefore beyond the scope of our test. With reference to the allocative politics model, these orientations have been said to pro-

Chart 2. The Structuring Principle's Relationship to Theoretical Relevance in Political Socialization Models

	Allocative Politics Model (Demands)	System Persistence Model (Supports)
Issue Belief Links (Theoretical Relevance Dependent Upon The Structuring Principle)	1. Voting behavior based upon issue preferences 2. Other forms of political participation based upon issue preferences 3. Issue beliefs which are perceived and acted upon by elites	1. Specific support 2. Diffuse support with policy agreement
Behavioral Constraint (Theoretical Relevance) Not Dependent Upon The Structuring Principle)	1. Voting behavior unrelated to issue preferences 2. Other forms of political participation unrelated to issue preferences	1. Diffuse support without policy agreement

mote actions such as "automatic" voting behavior, quite apart from any relationship with issue beliefs. From this viewpoint, orientations may be interpreted not as proximate determinants of issue beliefs, but as remote yet "central conditioners" of political action.[22] Easton and Dennis come very close to limiting the importance of childhood political learning to these diffuse behavioral constraints.

If "behavioral constraint" were the only rationale for childhood socialization research, there would surely be no point to our study. But contemporary socialization models are far more complex than that. Most of this literature, under both the allocative politics and system persistence models, explicitly argues that childhood orientations persist into adult life and thereby "shape," "structure," and "determine" the later learning of issue beliefs.[23] Our research effort is designed to test these claims rather than the more elusive behavioral constraint argument. In the remainder of this paper, our references to allocative politics and system persistence models will concern only those aspects of theoretical relevance dependent upon the structuring principle.

Thus far, we have seen how the primacy and structuring principles provide theoretical justifications for investigating children's attitudes. We have further examined the manner in which the structuring principle has been incorporated in allocative politics and system persistence models. Now we are in a position to make a case for the reasonableness of our proposed test. The argument is as follows:

Children's orientations have been accorded importance in socialization research by virtue of the primacy and structuring principles. The primacy principle links them to adult political orientations. The structuring principle continues the chain by relating adult political orientations to issue beliefs. Issue beliefs are related to demands and supports, which, in turn, affect system outputs and persistence—the touchstones of theoretical relevance. This is a long chain. It is one formulation of what Greenstein has described as the goal of relating childhood experience to adult behavior.[24] When we ask ourselves why children's orientations are an important topic, this is one notably widespread response found in socialization literature.

In order to demonstrate the political importance of children's orientations, each relationship in this chain must be established empirically. The links we have examined most closely are the primacy and structuring principles. We shall test the structuring principle below. This test will utilize data on *adult* orientations and issue beliefs. It may seem strange that we test the relevance of childhood orientations with data on adult orientations. Yet, it is of little immediate consequence whether or not these adult orientations have childhood antecedents, as asserted by the primacy principle. Similarly, it is of little immediate consequence whether demands and supports do indeed contribute to outputs and persistence. The point is that theoretical relevance for childhood data depends upon *every* link in the chain. We propose to test one such link: the structuring principle.

Data and Methodology

The structuring principle will be tested with data from two national cross-section samples: the Survey Research Center's (SRC) 1968 Election Study, and the University of North Carolina's Southeast Regional Survey (SERS). The SRC study interviewed a total of 1559 citizens of voting age both before and after Election Day, 1968. The SERS sample included 1504 adults interviewed in March, 1969.[25] Two data sets were employed for the following reasons. Where orientations and issue beliefs were identical in both studies, our intent was replication. In other cases, the two sets complemented one another, providing a wide range of items similar to those found in contemporary socialization research. We wish to emphasize that many items are either identical or highly similar to those used in socialization studies among children. Such studies seek to trace the genesis of adult orientations which are important in political behavior. They often adopt SRC type items as measures of these orientations. On the basis of the primacy and structuring assumptions, this procedure seems to make good theoretical sense.

---

[22] An example from system persistence research will put this in sharper perspective. Easton and Dennis suggest that early affect for the President may be generalized into high trust toward governmental institutions. This is particularly important for adults who may be dissatisfied with the actions of incumbents such as Supreme Court Justices. At this point the early acquired trust in government can insulate the institution from citizen wrath. It prevents dissatisfaction with incumbents from "spilling over" into acts of hostility toward the institutions themselves. See David Easton and Robert D. Hess, "The Child's Political World," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 6 (August, 1962), 242–46.

[23] Easton and Dennis, p. 9; Hess and Torney, *Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, p. 7; Dawson and Prewitt, p. 43.

[24] Fred I. Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, p. 163.

[25] The SERS sample is a national cross-section stratified by race, region, and size of place. This study was a University of North Carolina survey coordinated by Professors Robert G. Lehnen and Thad L. Beyle. It was supported by a Science Development Grant from the National Science Foundation.

The appropriate test for orientation/issue-belief relationships is not as obvious as it may seem. Thus, it appears foolish to expect every orientation to predict every issue belief. There is little reason, for example, to expect measures of authority orientations, such as approval of policemen, to be associated with opinions about the oil depletion allowance. Converse suggests two types of links (sources of constraint) which might be relevant here: logical and psychological.[26] Logical constraints refer to logically necessary deductions from general principles to specific applications. A more common type of constraint is psychological. Here the sources of constraint do not follow logical rules, but respondents nevertheless perceive attitudes as logically bound together. For example: "We must incarcerate the Vietnamese population in order to liberate it."

Operationalizing these links is a difficult undertaking. Unless our purpose is to determine whether or not people are logical, it makes no sense to examine only logically related statements in the data. For the present test, we are interested in whether citizens display *any* orientation/issue-belief relationships, not whether they see them as we do. This applies equally to psychological constraints: We are interested in how *they* perceive the world, not whether their perception fits an ideal type of our own construction.

It is therefore necessary to proceed as follows. Rather than positing logical or psychological relationships *a priori*, we must begin with the model's dependent variable: issue beliefs. These are the key links to demands and supports in the political system. Fifteen issue beliefs were selected from the SRC 1968 data, and fourteen from the SERS 1969 data. They were chosen for their salience and importance in American politics during these years. Included are domestic policy items such as school prayers and the use of violence to suppress urban unrest, as well as foreign policy items such as alternatives for Vietnam. We reasoned that to produce a meaningful impact upon demands and supports, orientations found in political socialization research must be related to attitudes concerning these key policy issues of the day. Political orientations extracted for analysis include all those items in the SRC data (13) and in the SERS data (6) which were identical or highly similar to items from socialization projects. This selection includes those orientations generally regarded as *most central:* party identification, sense of political efficacy, trust in government, and legitimacy.[27]

Findings

The structuring principle suggests that political orientations structure the learning of specific issue beliefs. In examining this statement, we proceed down a well-trodden path: relationships among elements of mass belief systems. Recent public opinion studies indicate that such elements may exhibit little constraint. Yet, these findings are by no means an adequate test of the structuring principle. For either they are restricted to very few orientations used in socialization research, or they focus upon relationships among issue beliefs alone. Thus, while suggestive, they provide only a backdrop for the present investigation.

Prothro and Grigg, in the first of these projects, found almost unanimous support for general statements expressing approval of abstract principles such as majority rule, minority rights, and democracy itself.[28] But this consensus disappeared on attitudes toward particular applications of the same principles, *e.g.*, "Only the well informed should be allowed to vote." Similarly, McClosky discovered very high agreement on general statements approving free speech and opinion.[29] Again, this consensus contrasted with considerable disagreement over support for applications of free speech principles. Both findings can be interpreted as negative results for political orientation/issue-belief relationships—although the orientations include very few items found in socialization inquiries.

In the same vein, Converse reports quite low relationships among idea elements in the 1958 SRC election sample.[30] And while Luttbeg presents contrary results for two Oregon communities, his measure of association, as well as the items involved (local issues), make comparison with Converse's data quite difficult.[31] In any event, both projects correlated issue beliefs with other issue beliefs, *not with political orientations.*[32] Hence, their results do not bear directly on the model under consideration. One study which speaks more to the point, runs against our interpretation of the Prothro and Grigg, and McClosky findings. In a recent paper, McClosky reports that isolationism, an item akin to political orientations, is related to beliefs on foreign policy issues including immigration, foreign aid, and defense spending.[33] Clearly *some* political orientations are likely related to *some* issue beliefs. Still, the question that needs to be answered is: how are orientations used in political socialization research related to issue beliefs on key policy problems of the day? To this task we now turn.

---

[26] Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in *Ideology and Discontent*, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 109–13.

[27] Several orientations in our analysis have been combined in scales by other studies (e.g., political efficacy). We did not employ such scales for the following reasons: 1) they were rarely used in the socialization studies whose theoretical relevance is under examination; and, 2) as summary measures, they would obscure information about different attitudinal objects (e.g., honesty vs. benevolence of public officials) which we wish to examine separately.

[28] Prothro and Grigg.

[29] McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics."

[30] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," p. 228. See also Lloyd A. Free, and Hadley Cantril, *The Political Beliefs of Americans* (New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers U. Press, 1967), Chapter 3.

[31] Norman R. Luttbeg, "The Structure of Beliefs Among Leaders and the Public," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 32 (Fall, 1968), 401–404.

Kendall's Tau$_c$ is the measure of monotonic association. This is a conservative measure of rank order correlation appropriate for the ordinal data under analysis. It should be noted that we are examining only direct, first-order relationships between orientations and issue beliefs. While it is possible that more complex associations are involved, we believe that contemporary socialization models have usually been restricted to these first-order relationships. Each orientation was correlated with each issue belief in the two data sets. The test was first executed using all categories (three or more) in the independent orientation variables. But the correlations were so low that a decision was taken to rerun the data using only high and low scores on these variables. Thus, the Tau$_c$ test for each orientation/issue-belief pair is quite generous. It asks, what is the difference in issue belief position for those highest and those lowest on an orientation? If any relationship exists at all, it should show up between the high and low scorers. Results are presented in Tables 1 and 2.

Table 1. TAU-c Relationships Between Political Orientations and Issue Beliefs (SRC 1968 Data)

Political Orientations	Issue Beliefs															Row Mean
	Gov't Aid Health Care	Gov't Guarantee Good Living Standard	Gov't Promote School Integration	Approve Pace of Civil Rights Movement	School Prayers	Use of Violence to Suppress Urban Unrest	Evaluate Legal Protests	Evaluate Civil Disobedience (Laws)	Evaluate Civil Disobedience (Obstruction)	Approve Foreign Aid	Trade With Communist Countries	Vietnam Policy Alternatives	China Admission to UN	Overthrow Cuban Gov't	Vietnam Policy Scale	
Party Identification	.32*	.18*	.14#	.11*	.03	.17#	.04	.06	.07*	.01	.02	.03	.04	.01	.00	.08
Sense of Political Efficacy I	.01	.00#	.10*	.08	.01#	.04	.09*	.03	.00	.12*	.10*	.01	.03	.05	.04	.05
Sense of Political Efficacy II	.13*	.08#	.03	.04	.07#	.06#	.13*	.02	.05	.18*	.10#	.11*	.06	.00	.05	.07
Approval of Conservatives	.23*	.17#	.11	.18*	.11#	.19#	.12#	.10	.20*	.10#	.04	.18*	.13	.12	.13#	.14
Evaluation of Gov't Power	.27*	.25*	.27*	.19*	.03	.18*	.15*	.07*	.10*	.08#	.10#	.11*	.06	.02	.12#	.13
Sense of Gov't Complexity	.09#	.02#	.04#	.07#	.02	.09#	.22*	.12*	.14*	.04#	.08#	.01#	.18#	.14#	.05#	.09
Gov't Benevolence (Public Officials Care)	.07	.01	.10*	.06#	.02	.08#	.06	.01	.04	.15*	.04	.03#	.03	.01	.04#	.05
Approval of Policemen	.08	.10	.05	.14*	.11*	.17#	.20*	.15*	.20*	.03	.11#	.14*	.07	.06	.12#	.12
Gov't Responsiveness	.02	.05	.08	.07	.02	.07	.07	.01	.02	.19*	.02	.04#	.04	.01	.02#	.05
Political Cynicism I (Honesty of Authorities)	.08	.03	.11	.07	.05#	.14#	.02	.07	.02	.16*	.11	.12#	.03	.03	.12#	.08
Political Cynicism II (Competence of Authorities)	.00	.02	.09*	.06#	.04	.04	.06	.03	.02	.12*	.01	.00	.01	.03	.02	.04
Trust in Government	.07	.05	.17*	.09#	.03	.10	.04	.04	.00	.11*	.06	.01	.02	.01	.01	.05
Political Legitimacy	.04	.08	.19*	.17#	.00	.16#	.07	.01	.02	.19*	.11#	.01#	.02	.02	.10#	.08

Key: * = χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, no evidence of nonmonotonicity.
= χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, evidence of nonmonotonicity.
All others not significant at $p \leq .01$.

---

[32] Converse, (p. 229) did use one political orientation, political party identification, in his analysis. He *found* that party preference was "relatively unconnected to issue positions."

[33] McClosky, "Personality and Attitude Correlates of Foreign Policy Orientation," pp. 92–103.

Table 2. TAU-c Relationships Between Political Orientations and Issue Beliefs (SERS 1969 Data)

	Issue Beliefs														
Political Orientations	Gov't Aid Health Care	Law Enforcement (Civil Liberties)	Approve Freedom of Religion	Approve Freedom of Speech	Gov't Promote School Integration	Progressive Taxes	Gov't Promote Good Living Standards	Use of Violence to Halt Riots	Gov't Promote Conservation	Evaluate Civil Disobedience	Gov't Restrict Car Manufacturers	Justification for Violence	Cooperation with Communist Countries	Approve Foreign Aid	Row Mean
Party Identification	.22#	.06	.07	.04	.15	.04	.29#	.10	.02	.04#	.18*	.07	.00	.01	.09
Sense of Political Efficacy	.00	.11	.04	.12	.10	.01	.03	.11	.01	.03	.05	.01	.08	.22	.07
Power of Government	.15	.18#	.12#	.05	.02	.05	.15	.16	.05	.13	.16	.13#	.00	.04	.10
Political Legitimacy	.06#	.01	.03	.03	.12	.02	.06	.05	.00	.00	.07	.06	.02	.08	.04
Trust and Approval of City Officials	.05	.03	.07	.07	.17#	.01	.10	.02	.02	.01	.04	.10	.01	.10	.06
Political Cynicism (Competence of Authorities)	.02	.01	.02	.04	.02	.00	.02	.05	.01	.01	.02	.00	.02	.10	.02

Key: * = χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, no evidence of nonmonotonicity.
= χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, evidence of nonmonotonicity.
All others not significant at $p \leq .01$.

The Tau_c scores in Tables 1 and 2 are uniformly low. They afford only a marginal improvement over those from the first test, which used multiple categories in the independent variables. We conclude that *many of the most common orientations in socialization research are generally unrelated to attitudes toward the outstanding political issues of the day.* The only Tau_c exceeding .30 is that between POLITICAL PARTY IDENTIFICATION and GOVERNMENT AID HEALTH CARE (.32) in the SRC data. The correlation is still lower in the SERS sample.[34] This may indicate instability in the relationship, since the surveys were separated by only four months. If we adopt .20 as a marginal but perhaps acceptable relationship, then the pairs meeting this criterion include PARTY IDENTIFICATION—GOVERNMENT AID HEALTH CARE; PARTY IDENTIFICATION—GOVERNMENT PROMOTE GOOD LIVING STANDARD; and SENSE OF POLITICAL EFFICACY—APPROVE FOREIGN AID in the SERS data, and the following pairs in the SRC data:

- PARTY IDENTIFICATION—GOVERNMENT AID HEALTH CARE
- APPROVAL OF CONSERVATIVES—GOVERNMENT AID HEALTH CARE
- APPROVAL OF CONSERVATIVES—EVALUATE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (obstruction)
- EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT POWER—GOVERNMENT AID HEALTH CARE
- EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT POWER—GOVERNMENT GUARANTEE GOOD LIVING STANDARD
- EVALUATION OF GOVERNMENT POWER—GOVERNMENT PROMOTE SCHOOL INTEGRATION
- APPROVAL OF POLICEMEN—EVALUATE LEGAL PROTESTS
- APPROVAL OF POLICEMEN—EVALUATE CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE (obstruction)
- SENSE OF GOVERNMENT COMPLEXITY—EVALUATE LEGAL PROTESTS

It is noteworthy that most orientations in these pairs involve items which are predominantly affective or evaluative rather than cognitive. Furthermore, *post hoc,* many of these relationships appear perfectly "logical." But even a cursory examination of both tables reveals many equally "logical" relationships which failed to materialize. For instance, by similar reasoning it is nothing short of amazing that trust in government has no relationship whatever to Vietnam policy alternatives.[35] Those citizens who best learned to trust their government are apparently not the same ones who support the government's authorities in their most visible and perilous policy decisions (see Table 1). Similarly, legitimacy orientations are unrelated to opinions toward civil disobedience (Tables 1 and 2).[36] And political party identification has no impact on school prayer (Table 1) or progressive tax items (Table 2).[37] This list of counterexamples can easily be extended by perusing the tables. But such "for example" presentations are bound to be inconclusive, whether intended to support or refute the structuring assumption. What is more convincing is that only twelve relationships, and weak ones at that, appeared out of a possible 279. Obviously we cannot expect every orientation to be related to every issue belief. Still, the fact that the relationships are so few and so weak (even when comparing high versus low scorers), indicates to us that these orientations are marginal to demands and supports in the political system. This seems strong evidence against the structuring principle, and *ipso facto,* against theoretical relevance for the childhood socialization orientations involved.

---

[34] The items are quite similar in both studies: (SRC) "Generally speaking do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?" (SERS) "Regardless of how you vote, when it comes to national politics, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, Democrat, Independent, or what?"; (SRC) "Some people say the government in Washington ought to help people get doctors and hospital care at low cost; others say the government should not get into this. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (If yes) What is your position?" (SERS) "The Government ought to make sure that all people have good health care." (Agree—Disagree).

[35] The items were: "How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do

How shall these findings be explained? Converse[38] hypothesizes that relationships between background variables and issue beliefs may be low simply because issue beliefs are quite unstable. He further suggests that, as we drop below the most educated ten per cent of the American populace, all sources of constraint decline rapidly. Constraint presupposes information about the issues. And level of information, in turn, is structured by the importance individuals attribute to these issues. From this viewpoint, it is interesting that a sophisticated belief system has been discovered for the race issue in an American subgroup: Detroit's black community. These respondents care deeply about racial matters. They therefore collect the information needed to develop a constrained belief system on this subject.[39] It may well be that the majority of American adults are insufficiently concerned with key political issues to seek much information on such topics. Perhaps it is even more unusual to find people who consciously attempt to link issue beliefs to their general principles or orientations. This suggests that many citizens have compartmentalized a symbolic set of political orientations having little relevance for their reactions to everyday political stimuli.

On the basis of this overview, let us re-examine Tables 1 and 2 for a closer look at two key theoretical notions from the socialization literature.

Political party identification is widely cited as the outstanding example of how political orientations serve as frames of reference for ordering issue beliefs. *The American Voter* demonstrated that in 1952 and 1956, party identification accounted for some variance in foreign and domestic policy views. Indeed, the structuring principle seems to have been introduced to socialization theory by projecting such party identification findings to cover basic political orientations in general. Thus, party identification is said to function as an organizing cognitive structure. It provides cues for evaluating newly emergent issues. Most issues involve matters which are complex and distant from the ordinary citizen's perspective. These ambiguities are resolved by adopting the party's po-

---

what is right?" Those responding "Always" were contrasted with those responding "Some of the time" and "None of the time" (the middle category, "Most of the time," was dropped from the analysis) for their answers to the following questions: "Which of the following do you think we should now do in Vietnam? 1) pull out of Vietnam entirely, 2) keep our soldiers in Vietnam but try to end the fighting, 3) take a stronger stand even if it means invading North Vietnam."

[36] (SRC) "Would you say the government is pretty much run by a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?" "How about refusing to obey a law which one thinks is unjust, if the person feels so strongly about it that he is willing to go to jail rather than obey the law. Would you approve of a person doing that, disapprove, or would it depend on the circumstances?" (SERS) "The laws of this country treat all people fairly: Agree—Disagree."

[37] (SRC) "Some people think it is all right for the public schools to start each day with a prayer. Others feel that religion does not belong in the public schools but should be taken care of by the family and the church. Have you been interested enough in this to favor one side over the other? (If yes) Which do you think?" (SERS) "Taxes should be based on how much money people earn: Agree—Disagree."

[38] Philip E. Converse, "New Dimensions of Meaning for Cross-Section Sample Surveys in Politics," *International Social Science Journal,* 16 (1964), 19–34, esp. p. 27. It is for this reason that Robert Lane suggests we attempt to explain political issue beliefs by motivational variables (e.g., "Of what use to you is this opinion?") rather than by political orientations. *Political Thinking and Consciousness* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), p. 22. But this would be a largely complementary enterprise: a functional explanation (the role of the issue belief in the self system) as opposed to a predictive or genetic explanation. For further discussion of linkage between orientations and issue beliefs, see Fred I. Greenstein, *Personality and Politics* (Chicago: Markham, 1969), pp. 124–25.

[39] Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," p. 213; Joel D. Aberbach and Jack L. Walker, "The Meanings of Black Power: A Comparison of White and Black Interpretations of a Political Slogan," *American Political Science Review,* 64 (June, 1970), 380–82.

sition rather than struggling with each issue on its own merits.[40]

This cue-giving attribute is conceptualized as *centrality*. In our data, orientations with the highest mean relationships to issue beliefs will be regarded as the most central. The relevant information is presented in row means for both tables. Here we see that party identification is not at all distinguished by unusually strong centrality. In fact, it is surpassed in the SRC data by approval of conservatives, evaluation of government power, sense of government complexity, and approval of policemen. The expectation of a relationship between party identification and issue beliefs assumes, of course, that parties have distinct issue positions—and that these positions are perceived by the individual. It would seem reasonable, then, to expect relationships only where these conditions are met. But regardless of such considerations, if party identification is related to only one out of fifteen leading issues of the day (two out of fourteen in the SERS data), then it is hardly possible to regard it as an organizing cognitive structure for such issues.

Other evidence supports this revised interpretation of party identification's centrality. Hess and Torney found that the item was independent of most political attitudes expressed by elementary school children. And this independence does not seem to wane during the adult years. In Converse's analysis of 1958 SRC election data, party identification was relatively unconnected to preferences on a selection of domestic and foreign issues. Similarly, rank order correlations reported by Converse and Dupeux yielded very low relationships in United States data, though somewhat stronger ones appeared for French voters who are party identifiers (less than half the total sample). Finally, Butler and Stokes argue that their British data provide remarkably little evidence that party identification serves to structure the voter's views on key political issues.[41]

It is an awkward point that the structuring principle's empirical basis appears to have been these putative cue-giving properties of party identification. The original evidence was never fully convincing. For example, issue items in *The American Voter* were introduced through summary measures. Despite the demonstration of some relationships with party identification, the results were unclear regarding discrete links between party identification and separate issue beliefs. Yet these are the most theoretically appropriate links for assessing party identification's impact upon demands and supports in socialization models. In retrospect, the best evidence for party identification's "structuring" or "filtering" properties did not involve issue beliefs, but rather phenomena such as perception of candidates. Since the instability of issue beliefs is complemented by stability in party identification, it would indeed be paradoxical had the two turned out highly related.

Another widespread assertion deserving comment is the argument that the greater a political orientation's importance in adult behavior, the earlier it is learned during childhood. While "importance" has been associated with various denotations, it is often defined as impact upon demands and supports. Here we shall investigate the assertion by examining the portion of this impact mediated by issue beliefs. Following the allocative politics and system persistence models, this can be measured by an orientation's performance on the structuring principle, *i.e.*, by its relationship with beliefs concerning leading political issues of the day. Now, a major finding in socialization research is that benevolent images (affect and trust) of institutions and political leaders are learned by very young children; by contrast, political cynicism is known to be learned later, during adolescence or young adulthood. Thus, for adults, we would expect trust in government to be more important than political cynicism in the sense that it should be more strongly related to our issue beliefs.[42] This is not borne out by the data, which show no substantial differences between the two types of items. In the SERS study (Table 2) trust and approval of city officials has a row mean of .06 compared with .02 for political cynicism.[43] And, in the SRC data

---

[40] Herbert H. Hyman, *Political Socialization*, pp. 46–47, 74–75; Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), pp. 128–36; 194 ff.

[41] Hess and Torney, *Development of Political Attitudes in Children*, p. 211; Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," pp. 228–29; Philip E. Converse and Georges Dupeux, "Politicization of the Electorate in France and the United States," in *Elections and the Political Order*, ed. Angus Campbell, et al. (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 287; and David Butler and Donald Stokes, *Political Change in Britain* (London: St. Martins Press, 1969), pp. 193–94.

[42] See Greenstein, *Children and Politics*, p. 155.

[43] Since city officials have little or no capacity to affect certain types of public policy, the following items were excluded from these calculations: approve freedom of religion, approve freedom of speech, government promote good living standards, civil disobedience, government restrict car manufacturers, cooperation with communist countries, and approve foreign aid. In addition, the political cynicism item refers to national authorities. Given findings on the generalization of authority attitudes, it does not seem too far fetched to use this item as an indicator of attitudes toward local authorities as well.

(Table 1), trust in government displays a row mean of .05 compared with .08 and .04 for the two political cynicism measures.

Our negative findings indicate to us that if the proposition that early learning determines adult importance has any force, it may be restricted to particular types of orientations. Once again, a sweeping generalization seems to have been extrapolated from party identification research. Party identification was found to be learned very early in life. It is also believed important in adulthood for "filtering" issue preferences. The finding and the belief are easily connected and generalized to other orientations. We have already argued that its "filtering" properties are exaggerated. But even were they substantial, the row means in Tables 1 and 2 indicate that party identification is not more strongly related to issue beliefs than are the political cynicism orientations which are learned later in life. The early learning adult importance proposition does not even apply to its party identification touchstone.

Because a large body of research regards nonpolitical personality factors as determinants of political attitudes and behavior, we determined to explore our findings further by analyzing selected personality factors and by performing a multiple regression test on the political orientations. It is assumed that childhood is a period of relatively little direct political learning. At the same time, childhood is characterized by politically relevant learning in the form of various personality factors.[44] These are expected to persist into adulthood and thereupon structure political attitudes and behavior.[45] During the 1930s and 1940s, however, numerous studies experienced very little success in attempting to relate personality factors to political beliefs.[46] The same personality characteristics, it was suggested, produced quite different issue preferences depending upon the issue preferences' functions in an individual's self system. We decided to perform another Tau$_c$ analysis for the same issue beliefs, but this time using personality factors as independent variables. This test provides a baseline for further interpretations of the political orientation Tau$_c$ scores.

In Tables 3 and 4 we see that results are very similar to our earlier tests with political orientations: only nine relationships out of a possible 219 exceeded .20. A single relationship exceeded .30 in the SERS data (CONFORMISM—GOVERNMENT RESTRICT CAR MANUFACTURERS), and only the following two did so in the SRC data: APPROVE NEGROES—GOVERNMENT PROMOTE SCHOOL INTEGRATION, and APPROVE NEGROES—APPROVE PACE OF CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT.[47] The last two issue items seem to be distinguished by references to concrete policy problems particularly salient for the orientations which predict them. Unfortunately, the data are inadequate to support further speculation along these lines. While it is clear that there are other equally "logical" relationships which did not materialize in the data, all the dependent variables involve attitudes toward key political issues of the day; and it is very difficult to see how the personality factors might "underlie" them in any causal sense. We wish to emphasize the similarity between these findings and those for political orientations employed in socialization research. Apparently such political orientations are no more related to issue beliefs than are the sort of personality factors for which negative results were discovered several decades ago.

One suggestion frequently found in socialization literature might go some distance toward explaining why our political orientation/issue-belief relationships are so weak. This is the argument that issue beliefs are determined by combinations of underlying orientations rather than by any single orientation. We attempted to examine this alternative through an exploratory multiple regression analysis between each issue belief and sets of five political orientations. Orientations used in the analysis are the five best predictors for each issue belief. They were entered in the order of their strength as single independent variables. The test is exploratory because data are ordinally scaled and fail thereby to meet the interval scale assumptions of multiple regression analysis. Findings are summarized in Tables 5 and 6.

Results in Tables 5 and 6 show that the "complex substructure" explanation may not be

---

[44] It may appear that the concept "personality factors" as used in this context, does not reflect a distinct set of variables, much less any developed theory of personality and politics. Our choice of "personality factors," and their distinction vis-à-vis "political orientations," was dictated by past literature, availability of data, and the greater *prima facie* distance between these factors and issue beliefs than is the case with political orientations. This "distance" reflects the distinguishing characteristic of personality factors: independence of short term contextual variation.

[45] Easton and Dennis, pp. 77–79.

[46] Greenstein, *Personality and Politics*, p. 19.

[47] The personality items are: Conformist—"When talking with my friends, I should avoid topics that would lead to arguments." Approve Negroes—"There are many groups in America that try to get the government of the American people to see things more their way. We would like to get your feelings toward some of these groups: Negroes" (score on feeling thermometer).

Table 3. TAU-c Relationships Between Personality Factors and Issue Beliefs (SRC 1968 Data)

Personality Factors	Issues Beliefs														Row Mean
	Gov't Aid Health Care	Gov't Guarantee Good Living Standard	Gov't Promote School Integration	Approve Pace of Civil Rights Movement	School Prayers	Use of Violence to Suppress Urban Unrest	Evaluate Legal Protests	Evaluate Civil Disobedience (Laws)	Evaluate Civil Disobedience (Obstruction)	Approve Foreign Aid	Trade With Communist Countries	Vietnam Policy Alternatives	China Admission to UN	Overthrow Cuban Gov't	Vietnam Policy Scale	
Religious Fundamentalism	.02	.03	.01	.05	.18*	.01	.17*	.11*	.07*	.03	.16*	.08*	.21*	.04	.10#	.08
Approve Negroes	.09	.13*	.34*	.35*	.01	.25#	.16*	.09	.10	.19*	.18*	.09#	.11	.05	.15#	.15
Materialistic Optimism (Self)	.04	.00	.05	.01	.09#	.04	.13*	.00	.01	.10	.02	.04	.00	.05	.03	.04
Fatalism	.15*	.09*	.01	.01#	.07#	.03#	.02	.00	.05#	.10#	.01*	.13*	.07	.02	.09#	.06
Personal Efficacy	.11#	.08#	.02	.04	.04	.06#	.04	.04	.03	.00	.06	.03	.06	.01	.02	.04
Personal Security in Environment	.11#	.11*	.05	.00	.02	.08#	.02#	.08#	.09*	.05	.01	.09*	.05	.01	.11#	.06
Personal Competence	.12#	.13#	.05	.03	.07#	.07#	.04	.03	.03	.08#	.02	.11*	.07*	.03	.08*	.06
Personal Contentment	.15#	.18*	.03	.01	.08	.02	.08	.10#	.13#	.01	.04	.12	.03	.04	.09	.08
Trust in Others	.18*	.12#	.01	.02	.06#	.00#	.04	.01#	.08	.15*	.05	.08*	.05	.05	.02#	.06

Key: * = χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, no evidence of nonmonotonicity.
= χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, evidence of nonmonotonicity.
All others not significant at $p \leq .01$.

as sound as it seems by virtue of common sense alone. The highest R^2 (proportion of variance explained) obtained with these orientation combinations is .15 (see Table 5), and the results for most issue beliefs are considerably lower than that. On the basis of this provisional test, our ability to predict issue beliefs does not seem substantially improved by using linear combinations of orientations. The original verdict still stands: Many orientations employed in socialization research appear unrelated to beliefs toward key political issues.

Table 4. TAU-c Relationships Between Personality Factors and Issue Beliefs (SERS 1969 Data)

Personality Factors	Issue Beliefs														Row Mean
	Gov't Aid Health Care	Law Enforcement (Civil Liberties)	Approve Freedom of Religion	Approve Freedom of Speech	Gov't Promote School Integration	Progressive Taxes	Gov't Promote Good Living Standards	Use of Violence to Halt Riots	Gov't Promote Conservation	Evaluate Civil Disobedience	Gov't Restrict Car Manufacturers	Justification for Violence	Cooperation with Communist Countries	Approve Foreign Aid	
Sense of Personal Efficacy	.15#	.05	.02	.07	.02	.08	.21*	.08#	.01	.06#	.16#	.02	.04	.04	.07
Responsiveness of Environment	.11	.00	.04	.04	.09#	.07	.08#	.02	.01	.12#	.14#	.04	.03	.02	.06
Fatalism	.14*	.01	.02	.06	.11*	.03	.16*	.00	.01	.14*	.10#	.01	.07	.05#	.07
Relativism	.04	.01	.06#	.01	.08	.01	.04	.03	.02	.10*	.06	.03	.02	.01	.04
Conformism	.16#	.03	.04	.04#	.06	.05	.28#	.06	.05	.11	.33#	.10	.01	.12#	.10
Personal Conservatism	.20#	.14	.05	.05	.12	.01	.21	.01	.02	.10	.12	.06	.00	.07	.08

Key: * = χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, no evidence of nonmonotonicity.
= χ^2 significant at $p \leq .01$, evidence of nonmonotonicity.
All others not significant at $p \leq .01$.

But theoretical relevance for much childhood socialization data depends on this relationship; otherwise the data lose their significance as anchors in a chain leading to demands and supports, and, ultimately, to system outputs and persistence. Our results therefore cast considerable doubt upon the importance of childhood data collected under allocative politics and system persistence models.[48]

It may be a fundamental error to assume that average citizens possess such highly integrated belief systems in the first place. This reflects a presumption that issue beliefs must always be grounded (logically or otherwise) in "underlying" or "embedded" inner characteristics. But most policy issues are extraordinarily complex. They involve a changing kaleidoscope of situations and symbols. Even a philosopher would have difficulty deducing rigorous issue positions from a set of basic principles or orientations. And intellectual capacities are not the sole prerequisite either. From this viewpoint, what is more surprising than the lack of logical constraints in our data, is the absence of any constraints whatever. The construction of links or constraints requires considerable time and information on the part of the individual. It simply seems chimerical to expect the average citizen to muster the time and information required for serious application to the task.[49]

Table 5. Multiple Regression Analysis: Political Orientations* and Issue Beliefs (SRC 1968 Data)

Issue Beliefs	Multiple R	R^2
Government aid health care	.35	.12
Government guarantee good living standard	.33	.11
Government promote school integration	.39	.15
Approve pace of civil rights movement	.32	.11
School prayers	.25	.06
Use of violence to suppress urban unrest	.30	.09
Evaluate legal protests	.28	.08
Evaluate civil disobedience (laws)	.18	.03
Evaluate civil disobedience (obstruction)	.18	.03
Approve foreign aid	.23	.09
Trade with communist countries	.16	.03
Vietnam policy alternatives	.26	.07
China admission to U.N.	.36	.13
Overthrow Cuban government	.13	.02
Vietnam policy scale	.16	.03

* The political orientations used in this analysis are the five best predictors for each issue belief (see Table 2). They were entered in the order of their strength as single independent variables.

Table 6. Multiple Regression Analysis: Political Orientations* and Issue Beliefs (SERS 1969 Data)

Issue Beliefs	Multiple R	R^2
Government aid health care	.31	.10
Law enforcement (civil liberties)	.20	.04
Approve freedom of religion	.10	.01
Approve freedom of speech	.19	.03
Government promote school integration	.22	.05
Progressive taxes	.15	.02
Government promote good living standards	.32	.10
Use of violence to halt riots	.16	.03
Government promote conservation	.12	.02
Evaluate civil disobedience	.17	.03
Government restrict car manufacturers	.32	.10
Justification for violence	.18	.03
Cooperation with communist countries	.19	.04
Approve foreign aid	.29	.08

* The political orientations used in this analysis are the five best predictors for each issue belief (see Table 3). They were entered in the order of their strength as single independent variables.

Concluding Remarks

Political socialization research seeks to enrich our explanations of political outcomes. This it does by investigating attitudes which determine demands and supports in the political system. Obviously, these attitudes are those of adults; attitudes communicated to political elites. Why, then, we wondered, has socialization research focused almost entirely upon young children? One answer lies in the view that, (a) political orientations are learned in childhood and persist into the adult years; and, (b) they thereupon structure the learning of specific issue beliefs, the immediate determinates of demands and supports. These have remained untested assumptions; untested, in part, due to the absence of longitudinal data on childhood orientations. But the long chain linking childhood learning with political outcomes depends upon the second assumption as much as upon the first. We have characterized this second assumption as the structuring principle. It has been subjected to systematic examination and test in the present paper. Greenstein writes that a long-run goal for socialization research is to relate childhood experience to adult behavior.[50] Our analysis has attempted a modest step in this direction.

---

[48] It should be noted that our results can be generalized only to a national population. It is, of course, still possible that some orientation/issue-belief relationships may be present for distinct subgroups within this population. Thus far, socialization research has usually been directed toward orientations learned by all members of a society. If research were focused upon orientations particularitistic to subgroups, however, the structuring principle's validity would bear further investigation in these contexts.

[49] McClosky, "Consensus and Ideology in American Politics," p. 374.

The exploratory character of most socialization inquiries may lead readers to wonder whether we have constructed a "straw man" here. In particular, it is easy to imagine objections to our account of the structuring principle's role in political socialization models. Such objections are all the more likely because relationships between orientations and issue beliefs have never been stated with satisfactory precision in the literature. The chief difficulty involves the confounding of genetic and predictive explanation. Genetic explanation attempts to set out the sequence of events through which adult issue beliefs have been evolved. Childhood orientations are treated as the first major stages in this sequence. We have not been concerned with questioning such theoretical assertions or their methodology. Indeed, we wish to disentangle this enterprise from the task of predictive explanation in the literature.[51]

Predictive explanation specifies antecedent phenomena which are necessary and/or sufficient to generate adult issue beliefs. We have argued that much socialization literature identifies *adult* orientations as the phenomena which explain issue beliefs in this sense. And, in considering relationships between *adult* orientations and issue beliefs, we are no longer speaking of distant genetic antecedents, but rather of orientations which are said to "shape," "structure," and "determine" issue beliefs. The genetic and predictive enterprises are clearly complementary in socialization research. Yet, the distinction between them is often blurred by metaphorical statements characterizing *both* childhood and adult orientations as "frames of reference" or "political eyeglasses" through which political issues are seen. We believe that, in practice, when these metaphors describe adult orientations, they are interpreted in predictive terms.

Our findings can be summarized as follows: (1) Many of the most familiar socialization orientations are generally unrelated to attitudes toward outstanding political issues of the day. Even when orientations were subjected to a multivariate analysis their explanatory power did not improve. Such an absence of constraint in mass belief systems is certainly not a surprising finding. Similar results have been repeatedly reported in public opinion research, albeit most such inquiries examine relationships among issue beliefs alone. The point of our test has been to elaborate these public opinion findings and to interpret their implications for socialization models. (2) The structuring principle appears to have been generalized from the belief that party identification provides cues for evaluating political issues. But we found that party identification is not at all distinguished in this regard. Other political orientations are more strongly related to issue beliefs—though all in quite limited terms. (3) Evidence has also been presented contradicting the widespread assumption that the more important an orientation is in adult behavior, the earlier it is learned during childhood. (4) Finally, political orientations were found to be no more related to issue beliefs than are the sort of personality factors for which negative results have been familiar for some time.

Yet theoretical relevance in allocative politics and system persistence models appears closely bound up with the structuring principle's validity: otherwise childhood orientations lose their significance as the origin of a chain leading to demands and supports for the political system. Our findings cast considerable doubt upon the structuring principle, and, thereby, upon the theoretical relevance of much childhood research under allocative politics and system persistence models.

These models have never been fully articulated in the socialization literature. Indeed, with a few notable exceptions, a lack of careful attention to theory seems to underly the difficulties unearthed in this paper. This is not intended as an unreservedly critical commentary. When next to nothing is known about an empirical phenomenon, exploratory data collection must be accorded the highest priority. It is only when such data have been assimilated that we can enjoy the luxury of theoretical niceties. For political socialization, we believe that the time has come when we are sufficiently familiar with the terrain to begin mapping it according to explicit theoretical concerns.

What, then, are the implications of our findings for directions in current research? First of all, these findings have no bearing on research which follows the behavioral constraint linkage in allocative politics and system persistence models. Yet, with the exception of the relationship between party identification and voting choice, this relationship remains to be empirically established. Our difficulty in characterizing the linkage underlines the need for further clarification. Such clarification is a prerequisite for tests similar to the one applied to the structuring principle in this paper. Regarding data collected under the structuring principle's aegis, we suggest the following: If this principle is to be taken seriously as a research guide, and, if we are therefore to continue presenting SRC-type questions to young children, then the burden is now upon the principle's proponents to: (a) specify exactly what sorts of orientations are likely to be related to what sorts of issue beliefs, and why; and, (b) demonstrate empirically that these relationships actually exist. The point holds equally for behavioral constraint and structuring principle versions of the models: *An orientation's importance in adult behavior must be demonstrated before we can be sure that its childhood genesis is of interest to political science.*

---

[50] Greenstein, *Children and Politics,* p. 163.

[51] See: Michael Scriven, "Explanation and Prediction in Evolutionary Theory," *Science,* 130 (August 28, 1959), 477–82, reprinted in *The Nature and Scope of Social Science,* ed. Leonard I. Krimerman (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1969), pp. 117–25; Robert Brown, *Explanation in Social Science* (Chicago: Aldine, 1963); and, William Dray, *Laws and Explanation in History* (London: Oxford University Press, 1957).

Wherever our ultimate concern is to explain systemic demands and supports, we also reiterate the need, advanced by several researchers, to examine adult socialization experiences which may mediate, or even replace, the role of childhood orientations in learning issue beliefs. Although everyone acknowledges that socialization continues throughout the life cycle, there has, in fact, been very little empirical attention to adult political socialization. This does not at all entail a turning away from the current focus upon children. Some of their learning may yet be found to contribute to explanations of demands and supports. And even should this contribution prove limited, we believe that the rich data already collected provide a basis for formulating additional theoretical perspectives.

For instance, it is now clear that very young children are much more affected by political symbols and stimuli than had been previously thought. But these data have been projected primarily as contributions to explaining system *inputs:* demands and supports. Here we see reflected the discipline's predominant concern with input processes. At the same time, there is increasing acknowledgement that this has been overdone to the extent that output phenomena are neglected as independent variables. This criticism is as applicable in political socialization as in other subfields of the discipline. The question is, How can system outputs be related to political socialization? It is necessary to stress that output phenomena are not restricted to governmental expenditures. Statutory and symbolic acts are also relevant. From this perspective, an output approach to political socialization might well investigate how the political system affects selected aspects of its citizens' psychological lives.[52] How does it affect their experience of the political and social environment? Thanks to available data, we already know that this influence begins during early childhood. And, we are aware of some of the mechanisms involved. But instead of treating children's attitudes as independent variables, this alternative would utilize them as dependent, as phenomena to be explained. Such an approach, we feel, deserves our attention, not in place of the input focus, but in addition to it.

Methodological Appendix

Kendall's Tau$_c$ was used as the measure of association between basic political orientations and specific issue beliefs. It was chosen as appropriate for the ordinal nature of the data, as well as for its characteristic of correcting to achieve unity when the number of rows and columns are unequal. But as a measure of monotonic association, Tau$_c$ cannot distinguish between situations of no association on the one hand, and nonmonotonic, or crypto-curvilinear associations on the other. Indeed, no satisfactory analogue of curvilinearity tests exists for ordered data. Still, curvilinear functions are possible with ordered as well as continuous variables. By way of assessing the possibility that such relationships were present, but not reflected in the Tau coefficient, we undertook tests of significance and inspections of the cross-tabulations.

χ^2 was used to determine departure from expected cell frequencies. This statistic does not depend upon order properties of the variables in question. In addition, it provides us with a "discount" of apparent nonmonotonicity when this is based on relatively small expected and observed frequencies. We chose p equal to .01 as the level of significance. That is to say, cross-tabulations with a probability of the null-hypothesis being erroneously rejected less than or equal to 1 in 100 were considered evidence of some relationship. These tables were then examined further in an attempt to assess departure from monotonicity.

Examination of Table 1 shows that 101 of the 195 bivariate relationships (52 per cent) were found insignificant by our criterion. Of the 75 significant mis-fits, 48 (25 per cent of the 195 bivariate relationships) displayed evidence of some departure from monotonicity. Such departure was indicated by examining the column proportions in one of the two rows of our tables. In all cases, our political orientations (the independent variables) were two-valued. This means that categories on the dependent variable were used as one coordinate. And, proportions of one of the responses on the orientation variables were then used to plot a histogram. If a noticeable nonmonotonic pattern existed in that plot, and, if the departure from expected frequencies yielded a significant χ^2, the variable was included among the instances of nonmonotonicity.

---

[52] Jack Dennis has noted that thus far this piece of the puzzle remains implicit in socialization research: "Major Problems of Political Socialization Research," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 12 (February, 1968), 109–110.

Similar analyses were performed on Tables 2, 3 and 4. Considering all these tables together, 314 of 498 bivariate relationships (63 per cent) were found insignificant at the .01 level. With the remaining 184 significant relationships, 106 (58 per cent) were found to be evidently nonmonotonic.

Although these findings might suggest some modification of our conclusions, the magnitude of such modification is impossible to ascertain precisely. It is for this reason that we decided to present these comments as a methodological appendix, rather than in the main body of the paper. Actually, we believe it unlikely that our conclusions warrant modification. There seems to be little patterning in the occurrence of apparent nonmonotonicity and significant values of χ^2. It would be difficult to argue that any orientation/issue-belief relationships are manifest, whether monotonic or nonmonotonic, at least at the first-order level.

We have not gone beyond the first-order level for two reasons. One is that our inquiry's purpose is to examine direct linkages between orientations and issue beliefs. Even where the socialization literature has not unequivocally asserted a direct linkage, this has been implicit in analyses concerned with first-order relationships. Then, too, the character of our first-order relationships, where nearly two-thirds are not significant, and better than half the remainder apparently nonmonotonic, makes the task of inductively discovering higher order relationships both epistemologically questionable and difficult.

If we intend to search further for relationships between orientations and issue beliefs, the first task is to improve our measurement instruments. It seems likely that some orientation/issue-belief relationships will be nonlinear. Yet, the ordinal nature of our attitudinal data compels us to apply monotonic models to the anticipated relationships. If interval measurement, or a convincing approximation, could be achieved, then we would be able to test for curvilinearity, and even induce function rules of higher order from our data.

Urbanization and Political Participation: The Case of Japan*

BRADLEY M. RICHARDSON

Ohio State University

The contribution of place of residence as a factor influencing mass political behavior has been ambiguous. Beginning with Tingsten's work on voting turnout, research has shown that urban residence can alternatively be a positive or negative correlate of political involvement and participation, or in some cases it may have no impact at all. Some of the apparent contradictions in research findings are obviously the result of noncomparabilities in units and levels of analysis. These problems notwithstanding, the meaning and impact of urban and rural residence still vary among political systems. Since urban growth is a basic fact of both observed modernization processes and life in the modern period itself, satisfactory specification of the linkage between place of residence and political behavior in different kinds of systems is obviously desirable. It should tell us something about the specific effects of urban-rural variations in community life, as well as adding to more general knowledge of the variables that affect political behavior.[1]

Three distinguishable trends can be seen in the findings of various kinds of research in which urban-rural patterns in political participation or involvement are reported. According to one type of result, urban residence has been associated with higher levels of psychological involvement in politics, as in the United States and Germany.[2] Higher voting turnouts are also found in the urban parts of some countries, and somewhat analogously, turnout levels are higher in the urbanized countries of the contemporary world than in nations where the rural sector is relatively more important.[3]

There are also examples of an opposite tendency, particularly for voting turnout. In the prewar period, going out to vote was more common in the rural parts of Switzerland than it was in the cities.[4] Comparable patterns of higher rural than urban turnouts are found for Germany, France, Britain and Japan in the postwar era.[5] Finally, both political involvement and participation in politics beyond voting itself are independent of the effects of place of residence in some important cases, at least where these attitudes or activities relate to national rather than local politics.[6]

---

* Revised draft of paper presented at the annual meeting of the Association of Asian Studies, Washington, D.C., March 1971. Special appreciation is due colleagues Richard Hofstetter and John Kessel for their generous advice. The writer is also indebted to the staff of the Polimetrics Laboratory, Department of Political Science, The Ohio State University for help in data management.

[1] It is important to note from the very beginning that I am assuming that differences in *community* life or involvement between the urban and rural sectors, or between places of different magnitude of population, are of potential importance to political participation in some circumstances. What these circumstances may be, how they relate to the effects of urban-rural differences in other factors such as political competition or social structure—for example, the distribution of educational attainment—and what the effects may be for different kinds of attitudes and behaviors in one nation are the topics to be discussed.

The urban-rural disparities in turnout may also contribute to a particular configuration of party support. This has probably been the situation in postwar Japan, where it is frequently assumed that high rural turnouts favor Conservatives in specific relevant constituencies, a practice which is linked with mantenance of a dominant party system.

[2] Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960), p. 412; and Edward N. Muller, "Cross-National Dimensions of Political Competence," *The American Political Science Review,* 64 (September, 1970), 792–809, especially 797. Actually, Muller's findings on the United States differed with those of *The American Voter* but were based on different specific question items. The Campbell *et al.* finding, however, was supported by Muller's evidence on differences between rural areas and intermediate size cities.

Although evidence from other places is contradictory, as will be seen, earlier survey evidence on sectoral tendencies in voting turnout in the United States from the Survey Research Center parallels their findings on involvement. See Angus Campbell, Gerald Gurin, and Warren Miller, *The Voter Decides* (Evanston: Row, Peterson, 1954), pp. 128–130.

[3] Herbert Tingsten, *Political Behavior: Studies in Election Statistics* (London: P. S. King, 1937), pp. 211–214, and Daniel Lerner, *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East* (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1958), p. 63. For additional information where nation states are the unit of analysis see Bruce M. Russett, Hayward R. Alker, Jr., Karl W. Deutsch, Harold D. Lasswell, *World Handbook of Political and Social Indicators* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 279–80.

[4] Tingsten, *Political Behavior,* p. 214.

[5] For Britain see *Gallup Analysis of the Election 1966,* pamphlet (London: The Daily Telegraph, 1966), p. 27, and Jean and Monica Charlot, "Politisation et Depolitisation en Grande Bretagne," *Revue Française de Science Politique,* 11 (September, 1961), 609–41, especially 634. German trends are reported by Erwin Faul in *Wahlen and Wähler in Westdeutschland,* ed. Dolf Stern-

Differences in measures of the dependent variable presumably enhance the appearance of contradiction in these findings. Psychological involvement in politics, and also the more active or demanding forms of participation in some cases, correlate differently with place of residence in France, Britain, Germany and Japan than does voting turnout within each of these systems. Nevertheless, there are also still some obvious differences between countries when the same kinds of behaviors are measured.

Differences in levels of analysis among different bodies of research can also be a complicating factor. Voting participation can obviously correlate positively with urbanization levels across countries where measurements are made at the aggregate system level, at the same time that analyses of internal sectoral patterns in some urbanized countries may show higher turnouts in the rural districts than in the cities. This familiar problem further helps explain some of the misleading interpretations that have been given to urban residence as a determinant of political behavior.

Unfortunately, we have no comprehensive theory about the effects of living in the city or the countryside or in small communities. Modernization theory has been tested with survey data on the political behavior of persons from urban and rural residential situations.[7] There was some legitimacy in doing this, even though modernization theory dealt with global processes of change that were believed to affect both urban and rural residents.[8] The original ideas about the effects of massive social change did imply attitudinal and behavioral change at the individual level, and hence it might be assumed that people in social circumstances most affected by modernization would be influenced the greatest.

Accordingly, if we extrapolate predictions about the effects of place of residence from modernization theory, we would anticipate higher levels of political involvement and participation in urban districts. Following Lerner, this increased activity would be the result of higher educational levels and enhanced exposure to mass media more typically characteristic of the urban sector. Or treating the Deutsch interpretations in a similar fashion, we might expect urban residents to have greater awareness of the instrumental potential of political affairs.[9]

Milbrath's center-periphery concept is also applicable to analysis of urban-rural differ-

---

berger, Friedrich Erbe, Peter Molt, Erwin Faul, (Villingen: Ring, 1960), p. 156 and "Das Wahlverhalten verschiedener Bevolkerungsgruppen bei der Bundestagswahl 1965," *Wirschaft und Statistik* 3 (1966), 165–72. French patterns are discussed in Alain Lancelot, *L'Abstentionnisme Electorale en France* (Paris: Armond Colin, 1968), pp. 195–97, Mark Kesselman, "French Local Politics: A Statistical Examination of Grass Roots Consensus," *American Political Science Review*, 60 (December, 1966), 963–73, and Sidney Tarrow, "The Urban-Rural Cleavage in Involvement: The Case of France," *American Political Science Review*, 65 (June, 1971), 341–57, especially 344–46. Japanese voting turnout is discussed in detail in Jun'ichi Kyogoku and Nobutaka Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences in Voting Behavior in Postwar Japan," *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, 9 (October, 1960), Part II, 167–85, especially 170–72.

Comparable tendencies are also found in some American states today, or at earlier points in time. The main sources are James A. Robinson and William Standing, "Some Correlates of Voter Participation: The Case of Indiana," *Journal of Politics*, 22 (February, 1960), 99–106, V. O. Key, Jr., *Southern Politics in State and Nation* (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1950), pp. 510–13, and Walter Dean Burnham, "The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe," *American Political Science Review*, 59 (March 1965), 7–28, especially 15–16.

[6] Norman H. Nie, G. Bingham Powell, Jr., and Kenneth Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation: Developmental Relationships, Part I," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (June, 1969), 361–78, especially 368. The authors conclude that differences in social status and organizational life are the main factors in explaining variations in national participation levels outside of voting.

See also Muller, "Cross-National Dimensions," p. 797.

[7] Nie, Powell and Prewitt, "Social Structure and Political Participation" is the main example of research of this kind.

[8] For the core writings in this area see Karl Deutsch, "Social Mobilization and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 55 (September, 1961), 493–515, and Daniel Lerner, *Passing of Traditional Society*, especially Chap. 2.

Deutsch's analysis treats the various components of the social modernization process as a cluster of interrelated forces and looks for their combined effects on political behavior. Lerner presents a sequential model wherein urbanization plays a special function in the early phases of modernization. The discusson that follows addresses itself primarily to the question of the utilizability of the *participation* elements of developmental models. I am not concerned here with the extensions of the discussion to cover the more elaborate models of democratic performance that have been developed from the Deutsch, Lerner, and other modernization analyses.

[9] Actually, rural residents might develop an awareness of instrumental stakes through the effects of the commercialization of agriculture. See Deutsch, "Social Mobilization," p. 494.

ences.[10] By virtue of their social circumstances, certain kinds of persons including urban dwellers are believed to be closer to critical decision-making centers and inter-personal political communications links, and this closeness is reflected in their higher rates of political involvement and participation.

Isolated hypotheses about the effects of urban-rural residence can also be found in the behavioral literature at various points. Urban-rural differences in population mobility have been seen as underlying causes of sectoral tendencies in turnout in some analyses in Europe. The lower turnouts found in large cities in several major European countries have thus been attributed by Tingsten and other writers to the less stable residential patterns of urban dwellers which reduces their stakes in election outcomes.[11]

The physical aspects of urban and rural life are also important according to some studies of political behavior. Tingsten observes that voting turnout may be facilitated in some societies by the compactness of the urban environment.[12] Lancelot also cites the ease of voting in the parts of rural France where people live in compact villages, in contrast with the difficulties in going out to vote in mountainous districts or in less compact rural residential situations.[13] Somewhat parallel interpretations have been found in the American literature, which places greater stress on the social isolation resulting from the physical isolation of rural life.

It can be seen from this brief review of the relevant theoretical positions that the existing alternative explanations are applicable to both urban and rural dominance in involvement and participation rates. These theoretical anomalies reflect in part the real probability—largely overlooked in comparative research—that place of residence has different meanings in different national and regional settings.[14] It is evident, for example, that life in the compact rural communities found in some places in Europe is very different from that found in the more isolated rural settings common in many parts of North America. The extent of industrialization in the rural periphery also obviously varies between countries as well as within nations. Compare the limited extent of industrial penetration in many rural communes in France, for example, with the much higher levels found in comparable units in many parts of Germany. Such differences can also produce variations in the intensity of organizational life among different residential situations in different countries.[15]

Clarifying the underlying differences in the implications of urban and rural residence in different places could pave the way to identifying basic cross-national uniformities in the roots of political performance. Such exploration is made all the more important by the recent discovery of cross-national uniformities in the effects of social status and organizational memberships on political participation. If the remaining disparities in sectoral participation and involvement between countries can be linked with cross-national differences in, say, the distributions of community or organizational involvement between the cities and the countryside, the present ambiguity could be reduced.

My objective in this article is to explain some tendencies in urban-rural political participation in Japan. In doing this, I will refer back to the different theoretical formulations we have just reviewed, but in a less formal and structured way than is sometimes the case in political science research. Rather than taking various hypotheses and testing them against the evidence and leaving matters there, I have endeavored in a few instances to suggest possible revisions in theory on the basis of my examination of the

---

[10] Lester W. Milbrath, *Political Participation* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 110–114 and 128–30. Robert Lane also uses the concept of centrality in *Political Life: Why People Get Involved in Politics* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1959), p. 196.

[11] See Tingsten, *Political Behavior*, p. 214. Actually, the interpretation is attributed to a study of turnout in the Zurich area of Switzerland.

[12] Tingsten, *Political Behavior*, p. 213.

[13] Lancelot, *L'Abstentionnisme Electorale en France*, pp. 198 and 200.

[14] Jurg Steiner's comments are relevant at this point: "The hypotheses must be complex, and in addition to the number of inhabitants other factors must be included, such as form of settlement, social structure and transportation situation." See *Bürger und Politik* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1969), p. 150. For a brilliant consideration of the theoretical confusion inherent in many approaches to the question of urban-rural differences, see Franz Urban Pappi's criticisms of the urban-rural continuum concept in *Wahlverhalten und politische Kultur* (Meisenheim am Glan: Anton Hain, 1970), pp. 90–101.

Lancelot's distinction between the effects of compact and dispersed settlement patterns in France is a case in point. Stein Rokkan and Henry Valen, in "The Mobilization of the Periphery: Data on Turnout, Party Membership and Candidate Recruitment in Norway," *Acta Sociologica*, 6 (1962), fasc. 1–2, pp. 111–158, also introduce refinements into an analysis of urban-rural participation patterns, and, among other things, pay special attention to the importance of intrafamilial role differences in the two sectors.

[15] For example, higher levels of group memberships are found in small communities in Germany, according to "Die Organisationszugehörigkeit in Westdeutschland," *DIVO Pressedienst*, August 1, 1964, p. 11.

Table 1. Election Turnout, by Place of Residence

	Urban	Rural	All
Local Elections:			
1955 Mayoralty[a]	84%	92%	86%
1955 Assembly[a]	85	92	—
1959 Mayoralty[b]	86	91	88
1959 Assembly[b]	86	93	—
1963 Mayoralty[c]	82	90	86
1963 Assembly[c]	82	92	—
Prefectural Elections:			
1955 Gubernatorial[a]	70	83	75
1955 Assembly[a]	72	83	77
1959 Gubernatorial[b]	76	84	78
1959 Assembly[b]	76	85	80
1963 Gubernatorial[c]	72	82	75
1963 Assembly[c]	74	84	77
House of Representatives Elections:[d]			
1952	66	80	74
1955	72	81	76
1958	74	81	77
1960	70	80	74
1963	67	79	71

[a] Jichichō Senkyobu, *Chihō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, 1956, p. 13. National means are omitted for local assembly elections: city ward assembly elections, which are not strictly comparable with assembly elections elsewhere, are included in the official calculations, and their especially low turnout levels in turn considerably depress the national mean. The category "urban" in the above entries does not include major cities; turnout in the large cities is typically much lower than is the case in the provincial cities for which figures are shown here.

[b] Jichichō Senkyokyoku, *Chihō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, 1959, p. 13.

[c] Jichishō Senkyokyoku, *Chihō Senkyo Kekka Shirabe*, 1963, p. 8.

[d] ———, *Shūgiin Giin Sōsenkyo Saikō Saibansho Saibankan Kokumin Shinsa*, 1964, p. 4.

Japanese findings. I have also chosen eclectically from the ideas developed by other scholars when I saw that particular hypotheses were relevant to the Japanese evidence—in other words, when the evidence alternatively confirmed or rejected one of these propositions. The resulting interaction between theory and data is far less orderly than might be desired. In part this reflects my own reaction to a situation in which theory itself is far from well ordered. But this usage of theory also conforms to my main intention, which is simply to make an in-depth analysis of the Japanese evidence in order to see if we can learn something new which might help unravel the general problem of the relationship between place of residence and political behavior.

Political Participation in Japan

Japan is one of the important examples of a country in which urban residence and political participation are negatively correlated. Voting turnout in the postwar era has been higher in rural than in urban districts at all election levels (Table 1).[16] Similar patterns can be seen over

Table 2. House of Representatives Election Turnout and Urbanization[a]

Year	Correlation (*r*) Turnout vs Level of Urbanization[b]
1925	−.419
1930	−.520
1935	−.535
1940	−.391
1950	−.718
1955	−.591
1960	−.643

[a] The unit of analysis is prefectures, a unit sometimes compared with American states, but having different status in Japan's unitary system. With certain exceptions, elections and census information is from the same year period; however, 1928 election turnouts are matched with 1925 census figures, 1936 election outcomes are paired with 1935 population data and 1942 election participation is compared with 1940 population information.

The sources of the population information is Sōrifu Tōkeikyoku, *Nihon Tōkei Nenkan 1967*, pp. 12–16. Election turnout figures are from Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Shūgiin Giin Senkyo no Jisseki: Dai Ikkai-Dai Sanjukai*, 1968, pp. 39–51.

[b] Turnout = prefectural mean turnout; urbanization = proportion of prefectural population living in cities.

---

[16] The precise meaning of urban and rural designations in Japan should be made clear from the outset. Japanese government publications and survey research groups typically use administrative designations rather than size of population to designate urban and rural locations. The relevant Japanese administrative divisions include a metropolitan prefecture (Tokyo), cities, towns and villages. Tokyo and other large metropolitan centers are also appropriately grouped under the category "large cities" in some official reports and in many survey analyses. The category "city" refers in turn in these cases to intermediate administrative units, whose populations may be largely rural in some cases, as the result of the effects of administrative mergers carried out in the 1950s. Towns and villages are nowadays quite systematically rural in composition. In other words, they contain high ratios of persons employed in agriculture, and population densities are much lower than in particularly the large urban areas.

In the following comments and figures, I have used time in the relationship between prefectural urbanization levels and turnout in House of Representatives elections (Table 2). Moreover, as levels of urbanization have increased, especially since World War II, the negative correlation has also become stronger.

Survey research findings show that other kinds of active participation in politics—discussion of public affairs with neighbors or in meetings, solicitation of other people's votes and articulation of self-interest—are also more common in the rural districts than in the cities in Japan (Table 3).[17] The only kinds of participation in which urbanites match or exceed the levels of rural performance are in discussions of politics within the immediate family and at place of work.

Urban-rural tendencies in voting turnout in Japan have received more scholarly attention than other kinds of participation thus far. Noting that reported interest in politics is typically higher among persons interviewed in the urban centers, most scholars have seen the high rural turnouts as a kind of deviant case in participatory behavior.[18] The rural performance at the polls has been explained on the basis of urban-rural differences in community structure which facilitate mobilization of the vote in the rural areas. Explicit pressures from local influentials to turn out the vote in support for a particular candidate, along with parallel efforts to attain the distinction of high voting rates, certainly are common in rural Japan, and their potential effects cannot be ignored. Nor can the mobilizing potential of rural life be forgotten in considering the roots of sectoral differences in other kinds of behavior.

Nevertheless, it is still legitimate to look for other roots of these urban-rural differences. The effects of pressures to get out the vote in Japan have never been studied adequately by survey research techniques. Much of the research on political attitude structures to date has also focused on a comparatively limited range of orientations, and may have left out measurement of attitudes actually critical to participation. In order to fill this research gap, urban-rural differences in political culture will be examined here as a potential contributant to the observed participation trends. Using unpub-

Table 3. Political Participation, by Place of Residence

	Metropolitan	Urban	Rural	*N*
Discussion of national affairs:[a]				
At home	59%	61%	61%	
With neighbors	24	24	44	
At workplace	42	43	35	
At meetings	27	38	43	5000
Discussion of local affairs:[a]				
At home	56	61	64	
With neighbors	26	38	48	
At workplace	40	43	36	
At meetings	27	38	44	5000
Articulation of interest:[b]				
Often/sometimes	15		26	354
Solicitation of somebody else's vote:				
National election	5		16	
Local election	4		14	354

Note: The category of urban in this table and in Figure 4 refers to provincial cities, where both social and political characteristics are more like those in rural districts than in the large metropolitan centers.

All figures represent percentages of total relevant subsamples.

[a] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Kōmei Senkyo no Jittai*, 1958, p. 83. This is the only national study where frequencies for discussion outside the family are reported.

[b] These data are from a reanalysis of my 1964 survey of political attitudes and voting choice behavior in Yokohama and two rural communities (previously reported in Bradley M. Richardson, "Political Attitudes and Behavior in Contemporary Japan," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of California (Berkeley), 1966.) The findings on interest articulation are supported by the results reported in Miyagi ken Senkyo Kanri Iikai, *Kōmei Senkyo Jittai Chōsa*, 1962, appendix p. 8. Similar patterns in urban-rural vote solicitation were mentioned in Hiroshima ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Senkyo Ishiki ni kan suru Yūkensha no Jittai*, 1965, p. 78.

"urban" where evidence is from samples drawn from metropolitan or city populations, and "rural" for findings on persons living in towns and villages. Information from intermediate sized cities will be omitted for simplicity's sake in most cases where data for metropolitan areas were available. I have indicated this in the table footnotes.

[17] Rural levels of speech attendance also exceeded those in the cities, according to Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Sōsenkyo no Jittai,* 1961, p. 28. Joji Watanuki has reported similar trends using an index of participation that includes turnout, organizational participation, activity in solution of local problems, attendance at rallies and contacts with political elites. See his "Social Structure and Political Participation in Japan," The Laboratory for Political Research, Department of Political Science, The University of Iowa, Report Number 32, May 1970, pp. 4–5. Watanuki's work is the major exception to the comments that follow on emphases in the literature on urban-rural differences in Japan.

[18] See, for example, the discussion in Kyogoku and Ike, "Urban-Rural Differences," pp. 171–72. These and other commentators on rural behavior have developed what is tantamount to a mobilizational or social influence model of participation and voting choice.

lished findings from a large number of Japanese surveys, I will show that there are multiple patterns of differentiation between the urban and rural districts in attitudes about local and national political affairs. Because of their potential explanatory importance, the sources of these differences will be sought by looking at sectoral patterns in community life, social structure, and communications behavior, employing in most cases the Coleman multivariate model.[19] Finally, the relationship between sectoral political culture tendencies and participation will be analyzed, and some suggestions for the theoretical relevance of the Japanese findings will be noted.

More than two hundred reports were utilized in the analysis reported here. The reports were the product of the research activities of the Kōmei Senkyo Remmei. This group, as is well known, is engaged in various kinds of educational activities in connection with campaigns to reduce election law violations. The many surveys conducted by the national headquarters and local affiliates of this group provide a substantial pool of replicative findings. Moreover, considerable creativity has been present in questionnaire construction in especially the case of surveys conducted in cooperation with local scholars. In the research reported here, representative findings from these studies are presented.[20]

Sectoral Differences in Japanese Society

As in most contemporary industrial societies, Japan's modern communications networks and political-administrative structures deeply penetrate the rural sector and influence the nature of rural life. Yet despite these forces toward homogeneity, there are important differences between the large cities and the countryside in the character of community relationships.[21] There are also sectoral variations in the distributions of certain kinds of communication behavior. For example, rural residents feel they depend more heavily on informal communications processes for political information, while urbanites report greater reliance upon the media. This observation is of special importance in the discussion that follows, since it is assumed that there may be some greater differentiation of informal and formal communications processes in at least the rural sector in Japan than has been anticipated by proponents of the theory of two stage communications flow.[22]

Residential patterns in rural Japan are substantially more like those found in many places in Europe than those of the United States, with rural homesteads being typically concentrated in small, compact hamlets rather than being isolated from each other by fields. These rural communities have a very high density of both informal social interaction and group activities. Rural society thus typically encompasses substantially higher frequencies of contacts among neighbors and acquaintances than are found in the cities, along with far higher levels of organized group memberships and participation (Table 4). There is also less overall residential mobility in the rural areas, with far greater numbers of rural people reporting that they have lived in a particular community all of their lives than is the case among urban residents. Students of rural community life, moreover, have repeatedly called attention to the importance of feelings of solidarity and local loyalties in these hamlets, whereas sentiments of these kinds are less commonly remarked upon in descriptions of urban settings.

---

[19] The Coleman approach, known as effect parameter analysis, is discussed in James S. Coleman, *Introduction to Mathematical Sociology* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), chap. 6. It permits multivariate analysis of data that do not meet interval level assumptions. For an application in comparative analysis see Kenneth Thompson, "Cross National Voting Behavior Research: An Example of Computer Assisted Multivariate Analysis of Attribute Data," in *Comparative Politics Series*, ed. Harry Eckstein and Ted Robert Gurr (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1970), Vol. I, publication number 01–003.

The Coleman analysis and more familiar contingency techniques were used with findings of several Prime Ministers' Office studies and my own 1964 data set. The Prime Minister's Office surveys, one of which was conducted under the auspices of the Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, were acquired from the Roper Public Opinion Center, Williamstown, Massachusetts.

My own survey of political attitudes was carried out in 1964 in Yokohama and in two rural areas, one in Kanagawa and one in Shimane. For purposes of economy the sample was stratified, but random sampling procedures were used in each district.

[20] For a discussion of the advantages and shortcomings of these reports in more detail, see Bradley M. Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1973), chap. 1.

[21] The comments here on these matters draw from many sources, among them notably, R. P. Dore, *Land Reform in Japan* (London: Oxford University Press, 1959), chap. 14 and Ezra Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1963), especially pp. 102–13. There are, in addition, substantial differences between the character of neighborhood life in different sections of the large cities, or there were a few years back. Also, provincial cities are in all appearances from the poll data much more like the rural sector in regard to the character of their community life than like the really large cities.

[22] The nature of communications processes in the two sectors was discussed in some detail in Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan*, chap. 6 (including notes 22, 24, 25 and 50). The really substantial variations in per-capita newspaper subscriptions between the cities and many rural districts was also noted.

For discussion of the two-stage theory, see, for example, Daniel Katz and Paul Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence* (New York: The Free Press, 1964), chap. 14.

In addition to these variations, there are also differences in the social and political characteristics of the urban versus rural population. As is typical of advanced countries, there is a higher percentage of better educated people in Japan's cities than in the rural districts, both because more urban natives seek high school and college degrees and the better-educated sons and daughters of rural and small town families regularly immigrate to the cities. This educational advantage in turn helps contribute to greater exposure to the political content of the media in the cities.[23] Finally, there are, not surprisingly, more leftist party supporters in Japan's cities than in the rural areas.[24] Associated with these sectoral differences in community life and sociopolitical structure in Japan is a partial dichotimization of political socialization processes, to be considered in the next sections.

Table 4. Social Characteristics of Urban and Rural Population

	Metropolitan	Urban	Rural	*N*
Education:[a]				
Lower/Middle School	52%	61%	75%	
High School/College	48	39	25	2425
Media Exposure:[b]				
Follow Newspapers	80	70	66	
Follow radio/television	93	87	85	5000
Party Support:[a]				
Leftist Parties	31	22	16	2425
Length of Residence:[a]				
Over 15 years	46	62	72	
15 years and less	54	38	28	2425
Association with Neighbors:[c]				
Associate "enthusiastically"	28	37	50	
Associate without enthusiasm or don't associate	71	60	46	1794
Scope of Acquaintanceships:[c]				
0–29 families	63	51	46	
30 or more families	15	23	36	1794
Group Memberships:[d]				
No groups	31		8	
1–3 groups	67		49	
4 or more groups	2		43	354

[a] Calculated from Prime Minister's Office Survey 1404, May 1963. Figures for education are typical of those in Japanese national surveys.

Length of residence figures refer to specifically the "same ward, city or town." Length of residence data are also representative.

Leftist party support includes responses favoring the Japan Socialists, Democratic Socialists and Japan Communists.

[b] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Kōmei Senkyo no Jittai*, 1962, pp. 13–14. Percentages refer to frequencies of respondents who followed the media "often" and "sometimes."

[c] Calculated from Prime Minister's Office Survey 2060, March 1966.

[d] From Richardson 1964 survey; see also Fukuoka ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kōmei Senkyo Undō no Kōka Sokutei*, 1960, 9, for similar findings.

Political Involvement in City and Countryside

The expectations of modernization theory are certainly met at the sectoral level in Japan in regard to at least attitudes about involvement in the abstract world of national affairs. Just as was predicted by extrapolating hypotheses from the global theories of Lerner and others, urban residence is associated with higher levels of concern for what is going on in cosmopolitan political arenas. In this case, the specific attitudinal dimensions are appreciation of the relevance of national politics, interest in national affairs, and feeling that national politics is easy to understand (Table 5).

Underlying these differences in cosmopolitan involvement, moreover, are sectoral patterns in social structure, especially those differences in educational attainment already mentioned. When controls for educational levels are introduced, the original relationships between residence and feelings that national politics is relevant and easy to understand are substantially diminished.[25] Interest in national politics is also

---

[23] For evidence on the very substantial impact on at least written media exposure of education, see, for example, Tōkyō to Senkyo Kanri Iikai, *Kōmei Senkyo Yoron Chōsa no Gaiyō*, 1958, 12, 17, and 23. Only 20 per cent of primary school graduates and 27 per cent of those who completed middle school, for example, read about politics in the newspapers on a regular basis, in contrast with 78 per cent of college graduates. Differences in television and radio exposure to political content attributed to education were somewhat smaller, however.

[24] For the best discussion of the sources of leftist party support in different population groupings, including attention to the special trends within Japan's salaried middle class, see Joji Watanuki, "Patterns of Politics in Present Day Japan," in Seymour M. Lipset and Stein Rokkan, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments* (New York: The Free Press, 1967), chap. 9.

[25] An initial index of urban-rural differences of .098 for feelings about the relevance of national politics was reduced to .025 by controlling for the effects of urban-

Table 5. Political Involvement Attitudes, by Place of Residence

	Urban					Rural				
	Yes	No	DK	Total	*N*	Yes	No	DK	Total	*N*
National politics is relevant to our lives[a]	78%	15%	7%	100%	175	69%	15%	16%	100%	174
Politics is a topic of interest[b]	60	40		100	unk	50	50		100	unk
Elections are a topic of interest[c]	86	14		100	124	84	15	1	100	170
National election outcome is a matter of concern[a]	73	27		100	175	70	28	2	100	174
National politics is easy to understand[a]	28	69	3	100	175	18	72	10	100	174
Local politics is relevant to our lives[a]	78	12	11	101	175	78	10	12	100	174
Local politics is a topic of interest[a]	58	42		100	175	76	24		100	174
Local election outcome is a matter of concern[a]	64	34	2	100	175	68	30	2	100	174
Local politics is easy to understand[a]	30	64	6	100	175	43	49	8	100	174

Note: Results of significance tests are not presented here nor in subsequent contingency tables. They were not normally available in the original sources, and need not be calculated in most cases since representative tendencies in findings not dependent upon composition of single samples are reported. For discussions of this matter and the process of establishing representative patterns by aggregation of findings from other studies, see my *The Political Culture of Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: The University of California Press, 1973), especially Chapter 1. Findings of significance tests will be presented in the tables that follow, however, when the Coleman effect parameter analysis depends on findings from only one survey, namely my own 1964 study.

[a] Richardson 1964 post-election survey; "urban" is Yokohama.

[b] *Nihon no Seijiteki Mukanshin* (Tōkyō, 1961), p. 41. "Urban" refers in this case to Japan's large cities. For similar results on interest patterns see also Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Seiji Ishiki to Senkyo Kōdō no Jittai: Fukuoka Kenmin no Seiji Ishiki*, 1966, 141, and Prime Minister's Office, Survey No. 1898, July 1965.

[c] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, p. 144.

affected to some degree by educational patterns, although to a lesser extent than the other attitudes.[26] Furthermore, if education is seen as a surrogate for media exposure—an assumption warranted particularly by evidence on the relationship between education and exposure to the written media's accounts of politics—some of the linkages postulated at the individual level in the Lerner modernization model are indeed present in contrasting behavior within the different sectors in modernized Japan.

But something other than the cosmopolitanizing influences of education and media exposure seem to be associated with urban-rural differences in people's attitudes specifically about elections and local politics. Rural residents showed nearly as much interest in national elections—as contrasted with "politics"—as urban residents, and similar tendencies can be seen in concern about national election outcomes. Urban and rural differences are thus minimized when it comes to feelings about the more immediate and tangible aspects of politics. Both the opportunities for personal participation as well as the more tangible implications of electoral outcomes for both local and parti-

---

rural distributions of educational attainment. A sectoral difference rate of .098 in feelings that national politics was easy to understand was reduced to .043. (Underlining in the form of dashes indicates indexes significant at the .05 level of confidence. Solid lines indicate significance at the .01 level. No line indicates indexes that do not meet the .05 confidence criterion.)

The Coleman effect parameters or indexes are extremely simple to understand. In the bivariate case they represent simply the difference between the left and right cells of a normal two by two contingency table. In the case at hand, they are equivalent to the difference when the "yes" categories for rural respondents in Table 5 are substracted from the "yes" responses for urban residents. The plus and minus signs are the result of the numerical coding system assigned to the different categories; in the analysis here a minus sign will indicate that higher frequencies were found in the rural sector. In the multivariate case, the indexes are based on more complicated calculations, but they can be compared to the mean of the relevant differences in the various tables generated by introduction of additional controls in contingency table analysis. In this case, the residual index for the effects of residence is the weighted average of differences attributable to urban-rural residence with the different educational categories held constant. Unlike contingency table analysis, however, multivariate analysis using the Coleman model involves simultaneous controls for two or more independent variables.

[26] Controls for education also substantially diminished urban-rural differences in interest in politics in a secondary analysis of the data from Prime Minister's Office Survey 1898 (1963).

san interests lend a greater saliency to elections than to the more abstract goings on of national politics at the Cabinet or Diet level.[27]

The disproportionately greater involvement of rural residents in specifically local politics and elections, and their enhanced feelings of cognitive competence about local politics, are related to proximity considerations as well as to the special character of rural social structure. Acquisition of information about local politics and direct contact with persons who are involved in local public affairs are facilitated in the intimate rural social milieu. Multivariate analysis shows that sectoral differences in educational levels have little or no effect on the urban-rural tendencies in local political involvement. In contrast, sectoral trends in group membership levels, which constitute a surrogate measure for levels of community involvement in the rural sector in addition to their more general organizational involvement implications, do underlie some of the sectoral variation.[28] The competition between intensely loyal groups of rival community partisans often observed in rural local elections also bears on the sectoral differences in local involvement, as does the comparatively high levels of instrumentalist sentiment found in the rural sector.[29]

Two fairly distinct patterns in political socialization—one in the urban and one in the rural areas—can be identified from the findings I have reported. Tendencies in educational attainment and presumably also media exposure account for some of the sectoral differences in involvement on the more abstract levels of political life, while variations in group memberships, proximity effects and the salience of community loyalties and interests are the main socializing forces where attitudes toward elections and local affairs are concerned. Obviously, many persons in both sectors are exposed to cosmopolitanizing as well as localizing influences. But the differences in social structure on one hand and community life and organizational involvement on the other are of special importance in Japan and contribute to substantially differentiated attitude structures in the two sectors. The meaning of these urban-rural tendencies in involvement for political participation patterns has to be investigated. But it would seem that rural voters in Japan are more politically involved than has typically been assumed, and it is possible that some aspects of their involvement contribute to the high levels of participation found in the rural areas in comparison with the cities.[30]

Evaluative Attitudes

Urban-rural patterns in Japanese voters' assessments of the performance of officials and the quality of public life, which I have called evaluative attitudes here, merit special attention. In response to a wide variety of questions about satisfaction with politics and politicians, estimates of the responsiveness of representa-

---

[27] These relationships between responses to remote and more proximate aspects of politics are also shown in information on people's knowledge about politics. Urban residents felt that they had known about the candidate they supported in gubernatorial elections prior to the election more commonly than rural people, according to my analysis of Prime Minister's Office Survey 1404, while the reverse was the case in regard to prior knowledge about mayoralty and assembly candidates. Moreover, controls for education substantially decreased the strength of the relationship between residence and knowledge at the gubernatorial level, but length of residence was the underlying contributant to development of prior knowledge about local figures. While this is certainly not surprising, the differences in communications and socialization processes for alternative levels of politics implied by these data are of critical importance. But simple proximity in the form of actual participation in electoral processes can be seen as important, too, permitting less educated persons in especially the rural sector to develop an interest in at least some aspects of national political affairs. Compare Lester Milbrath's proposition that "the more stimuli about politics a person receives, the greater likelihood he will participate in politics and the greater depth of his participation." See Milbrath, *Political Participation,* p. 39.

Elsewhere I have shown that variations in proximity to different levels of politics are the the most plausible cause of differential rates of attitudinal change in the postwar period. Proximity and relevance considerations would thus occupy a central position in a theory of mass attitudinal change. See Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan,* chap. 2.

[28] Controlling for group memberships reduced an original urban-rural difference of —.181 in interest in local politics to —.106, concern about local election outcomes was reduced from —.044 to —.008 and comprehension of local politics was reduced from —.132 to —.056. The relative importance of the higher group involvement levels found in the rural sector can be seen from these figures, as well as the residual importance of simply living in the compact, rural communities. Interestingly, length of residence, which is a variable of importance in some Japanese studies, did not affect the basic urban-rural differences, despite the fact that far more persons had lived all of their lives in the rural sector than was the case in the cities.

[29] A factor analysis of attitude structures in Japan reported elsewhere did show that feelings of wanting something (instrumentalism) loaded on the same dimension as interest in politics, and the loadings were higher where specifically local sentiments were concerned. See Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan,* chap. 4, Table 4–5.

[30] It should be remembered at this point that most earlier studies of urban-rural differences in political behavior in Japan have typically relied on only one or two simple measures of attitudes toward national politics; this has resulted in a simplistic view of the nature of urban-rural political involvement.

Table 6. Evaluative Attitudes, by Urban and Rural Residence

	Urban					Rural				
	Positive	Negative	DK	Total	*N*	Positive	Negative	DK	Total	*N*
Satisfaction with politics[a]	12%	66%	22%	100%	102	18%	50%	32%	100%	68
Satisfaction with elected Councillors[b]	51	28	21	100	421	56	13	31	100	905
Quality of recent local assemblymen[c]	20	31	49	100	421	35	21	44	100	780
Politics improves by holding elections[d]	30	42	28	100	773	37	36	27	100	2205
National election went on honestly and fairly[e]	22	33	45	100	254	35	25	40	100	864
National politicians and officials are concerned about our needs[f]	51	35	14	100	175	55	20	25	100	174
Local politicians and officials are concerned about our needs[f]	57	27	14	100	175	75	10	15	100	174

Note: "Positive" responses were those which indicated satisfaction, positive appraisals of electoral processes and favorable perceptions of politicians' responsiveness. "Negative" answers included manifestations of dissatisfaction, pessimism about elections (including the feeling that "politics stays the same"), perceptions that "many" or "all" candidates violated election laws and perceptions that politicians were not responsive. "Urban" in national survey findings refers to large cities, and "rural" is counties or towns and villages; intermediate level population unit data from national surveys were omitted for the sake of simplicity.

[a] Kumamoto ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Senkyo no Jittai*, 1960, p. 34.

[b] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Sangiin Giin Tsūjō Senkyo no Jittai*, 1962, p. 88.

[c] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Dai Rokkai Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo to Yūkensha*, 1967, p. 133.

[d] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Kōmei Senkyo no Jittai*, 1958, p. 72.

[e] Calculated from Prime Ministers Office 1898, July 1965.

[f] From Richardson 1964 survey.

tives, and evaluations of the electoral process, urban residents have typically been either more pessimistic and cynical than their country counterparts, or else they showed contradictory tendencies of both optimism and pessimism (Table 6).[31] Both the greater pessimism about political processes which prevails in the urban areas, as well as the ambivalence seen in some cases, add to our impression of the complexity of urban-rural differences in Japan. Greater pessimism could also be one of the explanations of the lower levels of participation found in the cities.[32]

There are several possible explanations for these patterns in evaluative attitudes. In the first place, people in the cities can be assumed to be more exposed to the media's reports of political scandals and electoral law violations than are persons who live in the country. They may also be assumed to be more aware of the political criticisms voiced in many newspaper editorials.

Modernization theory predicted that the expansion of media exposure accompanying urbanization would help *integrate* people and stimulate political participation through development of an awareness of what goes on in national political processes. Clearly there was no expectation that heightened media exposure could also lead to political *alienation*. Yet this is what seems to have happened in Japan. Data on media exposure which could make a direct test of this hypothesis possible are not available. But it is clear that high education, which typically means high exposure to media communications, is associated in some instances with greater pessimism about politics than is found at lower education levels; elsewhere, it is associated with more ambivalence than might have been anticipated from earlier writings on the political evaluations of well-educated persons (Table 7).

When controls were introduced for education as a surrogate for media exposure, the basic urban-rural differences in appraisals of the responsiveness of politicians—the one evaluative attitude for which I had data that could be analyzed further—remained largely unaffected.

---

[31] Feelings of efficacy regarding national political life showed contrary patterns, as is shown in Richardson, *The Political Culture of Japan*, chap. 6. This is largely the result of educational differences, and in the face of the prevailing cynicism can be seen mainly as constituting a formal normative response to postwar emphases on democratization of Japanese society and politics.

[32] It should be noted that Robert Ward has forecast the presence of tendencies in political negativism of the kind reported here in his "Japan: The Continuity of Modernization" in *Political Culture and Political Development*, ed. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 27–82.

This was in part an artifact of the ambivalence registered among well-educated persons on this measure. Whatever the case, I was unable to pursue this interesting hypothesis further at this point, in spite of its plausibility in the Japanese frame of reference. (It would also be desirable to carry out comparative content analyses of media communications content in order to properly test this proposition.)

A second consideration of possible importance to sectoral differences in evaluative attitudes in the Japanese case is the relative distribution of party preferences in the cities and in the rural districts. Postwar partisan politics in Japan have been characterized by frequent manifestations of rigid oppositionalism and extreme frustration among the parties of the left. There is strong left-right ideological polarization and, as is well known, the left-wing parties have found themselves out of power during much of the postwar era.[33] The presence of both of these factors has led to an extreme negativism among leftist party activists, which in turn can be assumed to have contributed to negative evaluative orientations among leftist party supporters. Since leftist party followers account for a much larger ratio of the electorate in the cities than they do in the country constituencies, some of the sectoral differences in evaluative attitudes may stem, in fact, from the socializing effects of party preference.

This hypothesis was tested by introducing controls for party support, since leftist party adherents were shown to be more negative in their attitudes than Conservative followers were in the various surveys reviewed.[34] Examination of urban-rural differences after controls had been introduced did support the basic hypothesis specifically for assessments of corruption levels in politics.[35] It is consequently obvious that patterns in the distributions of partisan preferences contribute to the basic urban-rural differences in evaluative feelings in some cases. Nevertheless, controls for party preferences using available data sets did not erase urban-rural differences in every case where attitudes were judged as having evaluative content, and there was no indication of systematic tendencies in regard to specific types of evaluations. The effects of place of residence or other related in-

---

[33] The events of the postwar period in Japanese partisan politics are summarized in Robert A. Scalapino and Junnosuke Masumi, *Parties and Politics in Contemporary Japan* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1962), chap. 2.

[34] Leftist party supporters are not *always* more negative in orientation, according to the materials I have studied. But this is the case where national surveys were concerned, as in Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Kōmei Senkyo no Jittai*, 1962, p. 135; Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Kōmei Senkyo no Jittai*, 1958, p. 71; and Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Dairokkai Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo to Yūkensha*, 1967, p. 309.

[35] The analysis in question utilized data from Prime Minister's Office Survey 1898.

Table 7. Evaluative Attitudes, by Educational Attainment

	Low Educational Level					High Educational Level				
	Positive	Negative	DK	Total	*N*	Positive	Negative	DK	Total	*N*
Quality of recent local assemblymen[a]	32%	23%	45%	100%	1540	22%	38%	41%	101%	162
Politics improves by holding elections[b]	38	34	28	100		36	52	12	100	
Candidates obey the election laws[c]	25	24	52	101	560	42	35	23	100	146
National politicians and officials are concerned about our needs[d]	45	23	32	100	74	66	34		100	32
Local politicians and officials are concerned about our needs[d]	54	22	24	100	74	66	28	6	100	32

Note: "Positive" and "negative" have the same meanings as in Table 6. The DK category includes responses such as "can't say" and "unclear." Persons who have completed only primary school are included in the low educational category, and graduates of universities are represented in the high educational grouping. Although this could bias the findings in view of the fact that postwar educational requirements included compulsory completion of middle school, evidence of such bias could not be seen in the findings. Data for high school graduates (which in no way contradicted the picture shown here) were omitted for sake of simplicity.

[a] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Dai Rokkai Tōitsu Chihō Senkyo to Yūkensha*, 1967, p. 134. Primary and middle school graduates were grouped in this case. For comparable trends in general satisfaction with politics see Kumamoto ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Senkyo no Jittai*, 1960, p. 36.

[b] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Kōmei Senkyo no Jittai*, 1958, p. 71; the results are for men only, but those for women were similar.

[c] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Sangiin Giin Tsūjō Senkyo no Jittai*, 1962, p. 71.

[d] Richardson 1964 survey.

fluences are consequently still important in many cases, and patterns in partisanship are not a systematic cause of urban pessimism as far as can be seen. These data must be taken in account along with the earlier evidence which indicated that sectoral educational differences were also not primarily responsible for the trends in popular evaluations of politics.

Both the qualitative literature on urban and rural society and evidence cited earlier in Table 3 call attention to the fact that there are substantial urban-rural differences in both the nature of community life and the levels of individuals' group involvement in Japan. These differences have significance for the analysis here, since contacts between ordinary people and politicians in Japan are often mediated by networks of personal relationship in which community influentials play critical roles. It is thus plausible to hypothesize that the higher frequencies of negative feelings about politics in the cities stem in part from the alienative effects of the comparatively lower levels of social contacts with especially politicians and influentials. Indeed, speculation along these lines seems particularly appropriate in the Japanese case, since dependence on personal contacts to seek access and favorable consideration seems to play an especially prominent role in Japanese behavior.

There was some evidence supporting this hypothesis in answers to open-ended questions in my own survey. Various people in the cities observed that they felt apathetic about politics because they "didn't know any politician" or "felt distant from public affairs."[36] But alienation from politics also occurred in rural situations where a Diet member lacked close local ties, as well as in cities where general social relationships were less dense than they were in rural communities.

If the hypothesis in this case were valid, a fairly strong positive correlation might be expected between levels of group membership and favorable appraisals of political performance. Group membership frequencies represent a direct indicator of some kinds of social involvement and also comprise a surrogate measure for degree of integration into community activities in the rural areas. Were the anticipated kinds of effects present, controls for group memberships should also contribute to a reduction in the urban-rural differences in evaluative feelings.

Examination of these relationships in my own data on evaluations of politicians' responsiveness did in fact show the anticipated results for bivariate linkages. Group memberships showed a substantial positive correlation, as predicted, with feelings that politicians were concerned about people's needs, and it can be assumed that contacts with politicians mediated by group membership helped further these tendencies. Differences in organizational involvement, however, had little effect on the basic urban-rural patterns in a multivariate analysis of the findings about assessments of politicians' responsibility.

This analysis does not lend support to a social involvement interpretation of sectoral trends in evaluative attitudes, in which organizational memberships are seen as the basic and essential linkages with community influence structures. Nevertheless, the residual sectoral differences presumably attributable to differences in the quality of community life were still important here.[37] Simply living in the rural areas rather than being involved in group activities there, may be the critical determinant of posivitive evaluations.

But sectoral differences in normative perspective might also contribute to the observed trends in evaluations of political performance. It is possible to detect the presence of somewhat more permissive opinions among rural residents in contrast with those of people in the cities in Japan. For example, answers to questions about the degree to which violations of the electoral laws "can't be helped," in contrast with feelings that violations are clearly a bad practice, generally indicate the presence of more permissive perspectives in the rural areas (Table 8). Comparatively greater rural permissiveness is also implied in replies to queries about what might be done in the case a favored candidate were found guilty of vote buying (Table 8). Urban-rural patterns in responses to questions about comparatively formal aspects of democratic normative systems also permit the inference that political idealism is somewhat higher in the urban sector, and these differences could contribute to urban negativism in evaluative attitudes.[38] In other words, urban residents are often more demanding in evaluating political performance than are rural residents.

---

[36] Interviews with household association leaders in Yokohama provided some additional evidence on this phenomenon. To be sure, some of the laments about the declining levels of community feeling from these local leaders could be discounted as merely unsubstantiated nostalgia. But the leaders also stated that increasing proportions of persons within particular neighborhoods were unknown to the leaders themselves and had no contact with local organizations. It is noteworthy that these evaluations were concentrated in Yokohama's *shitamachi* (downtown area), where neighborhoods are typically assumed to be more cohesive than in other urban settings.

[37] Interestingly an initial urban-rural index of −.034 in regard to evaluations of national politicians' responsiveness increased to −.088 when education was controlled; analogously, the index for assessments of local responsiveness increased from a basic. −.184 to −.242 after controls for education were introduced.

Something was clearly different about rural residence in these instances, even though organizational involvement was not the contributing element. Perhaps communitywide feelings about responsiveness, reflecting stable linkages between local influentials and specific politicians, are the basis for the differences here.

In my own opinion, this fascinating urban-rural difference in normative perspective stems in part from the self-consciousness which urban residents feel toward being modern in outlook. This leads quite directly to espousal of democratic ideas. The compulsion to be modern also leads to condemnation of older social customs, such as gift-giving in exchange for favors, which in part underlie the practices in Japanese politics which result in charges of corruption. But the urban-rural differences in outlook on politicians' performance are also very likely affected by the overriding loyalties to particular politicians in some rural areas, as well as the greater tolerance for older customs in the countryside.

Attitudes Toward Participation in Politics

Urban and rural residents in Japan differ in attitude toward both the obligation to go out to vote and the appropriateness of more active forms of political participation. The feeling that the vote is a social obligation is more pronounced among persons living in the rural sector than in the cities, as is indicated from the evidence from various sections of the country reported in Table 9.

These urban-rural distributions in feelings about the vote as a duty clearly reflect a variety of factors. In part they can be seen as an extension into political frames of reference of more general feelings of social obligation that are maintained at enhanced levels in the rural sector.[39] To the extent that this interpretation is valid, the analysis showed that these feelings are nevertheless independent of the effects of sectoral differences in organizational involvement. Being active in several groups did correlate positively with dutiful feelings about the vote, but controls for group membership levels did not erase much of the urban-rural distinctiveness in this attitudinal dimension.

It is also possible that the higher frequencies

Table 8. Attitudes Toward Electoral Corruption, by Place of Residence

	Urban	Rural	*N*
Feelings about illegal election practices:[a]			
Can't be helped or 'natural'	22%	32%	
It's a bad thing	75	65	
Unclear	3	3	
	100%	100%	1734
Action in event supported candidate had bribed voters:[b]			
Will not vote for him under any circumstances	71	58	
Would vote for him if no other suitable candidate	11	19	
Will vote for him as he's still an outstanding person	2	6	
Doesn't bother me as bribery is common		3	
Don't know	16	14	
	100%	100%	985

[a] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Kōmei Senkyo no Jittai*, 1958, p. 78.
[b] From secondary analysis of Prime Minister's Office 1898.

---

[38] Evidence on the urban-rural distributions of feelings that accord with democratic postulates—such as "politics moves by our power" or "it's better to pay attention to what's going on in politics than just follow leaders"—supports this observation, and there is clearly some attitudinal ambivalence in the more normative dimensions of efficacy and appraisals of performance. A similar ambivalence can be observed among well educated persons. For relevant findings see Fukushima ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Chihō Senkyo no Jittai*, 1963, p. 176 and Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Seiji Ishiki to Senkyo Kōdō no Jittai: Yamanashi ken Toshi to Nōson*, 1966, p. 35.

[39] There is some indication that this popular expectation is found in reality in the reports from the Institute for Mathematic Statistics' national character study, although urban-rural differences were not enormous. See, as one example, Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūjo, *Kokuminsei no Kenkyū: Dai Niji Chōsa* (Tōkyō: Tōkei Sūri Kenkyūjo, 1959), pp. 55 and 58.

Table 9. Attitudes Toward the Vote and Participation, by Place of Residence

	Urban					Rural				
	Yes	No	DK	Total	*N*	Yes	No	DK	Total	*N*
It's everybody's duty to go out and vote[a]	30%	43%	27%	100%	174	62%	26%	12%	100%	174
It's bad to abstain from voting except under special circumstances[b]	48	41	11	100	unk	64	30	6	100	unk
It's better to vote for the best candidate rather than abstain, when a person you prefer isn't running[c]	54	26	20	100	172	68	27	5	100	79
Disagree with idea that it's all right to abstain when there is no appropriate candidate[d]	43	49	8	100	333	60	29	11	100	167
Would stress group activity to get people's opinions reflected in national affairs[e]	17	77	6	100	249	24	53	23	100	411
Would stress groups or movements to have opinions reflected in local politics[f]	35	61	4	100	163	49	46	5	100	312
Would take an active role in the resolution of local problems[g]	32	67	1	100	187	43	52	5	100	44

[a] Richardson 1964 survey.

[b] Gumma ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kenmin no Seiji, Senkyo Ishiki*, 1963, pp. 63–64.

[c] Gifu ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Gifu ken ni okeru Senkyo to Kenmin no Seiji Ishiki*, 1963, p. 69. The urban sector of the sample was drawn from the population of Gifu City.

[d] Fukuoka ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kiken no Jittai*, 1960, p. 51. The urban respondents lived in Fukuoka City.

[e] Fukushima ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Fukushima ken ni okeru Seiji Ishiki ni kan suru Yoron Chōsa Kekka*, 1962, p. 172.

[f] ———, *Chihō Senkyo no Jittai*, 1963, p. 168.

[g] Miyagi ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kōmei Senkyo Jittai Chōsa*, 1962, appendix, p. 7. The urban sector was Sendai City.

of dutiful feelings in the rural sector represent a continuation into the present of attitudinal patterns that began developing before the war. Voting turnouts have always been higher in Japan's rural sector for many reasons, and it is reasonable to assume that norms of dutifulness could be found there at earlier points in time. But multiple reinforcements also favor rural dominance in this attitudinal area today. High turnouts are valued as an end in many rural communities, and competition between local areas for the distinction of having the highest turnout is not uncommon. Loyalties to community are also converted into feelings that one must go out to vote when community supported candidates are running. Finally, some evidence indicates that rural voters are simply less responsive to the democratic concept of the vote as a "right" or a "chance to express one's interests."[40] This does not mean that rural voters are deficient in comparison with urban dwellers in regard to being aware of their own interests; the contrary is in fact the case, as I will show shortly. It simply reflects the fact that rural respondents think self-consciously of obligation where the vote is concerned more than persons in the city.

Rural residents are also inclined more than urbanites to feel that group action is an appropriate vehicle for articulation of interests, and to express greater willingness to take an active part in local decision-making processes. (Table 9). It was not possible to pursue directly here the nature of the relationship between attributes of rural residence and these preferences for more active and collectivist kinds of political participation. But it is entirely plausible that the higher density of group life in the rural sector makes *collectivist* forms of political activity seem more natural there than is the case in the city. Similar linkages can be postulated for sectoral differences in willingness to take *active* political roles. The existence of higher frequencies of social interaction and group memberships in the rural sector probably reinforce the notion that active participation at the local level is possible. Undoubtedly, the norm favoring active participation in various kinds of community collective efforts also plays some role in making rural respondents feel the appropriateness of taking part in local decisions.

---

[40] See the extensive findings of these matters reported in my *The Political Culture of Japan*, chap. 4.

Instrumentalism in Contemporary Japan

Perhaps the most surprising aspect of urban-rural differences in political orientations in the Japanese case lies in the finding that rural residents are substantially more aware than urbanites of the *instrumental potentialities of politics* (Table 10). Replies to questions about explicit awareness of having "interests that one would like the Diet Member or Local Assemblyman to see about," as well as answers to numerous questions about voting motivations indicate that persons living in the rural areas are much more aware of wanting things done for them than are urban residents.[41] While it would probably be a good idea to systematically compare these attitudes with opinions on salient national issues—this was not permitted by the data used—it is nonetheless important to see that narrowly defined interests are much more salient to rural than to urban voters. These tendencies in concern for representation could prove to be important factors in the comparatively higher levels of both voting and other forms of political participation found in the rural districts.

There are clearly some precedents in the history of American rural life for anticipating high levels of involvement in concerns for narrow interest representation in the rural sector of countries; nevertheless, modernization and center-periphery hypotheses have both failed to forecast the systematic development of sentiments of this kind outside of the areas most influenced by urbanization.[42] Developments of this type undoubtedly depend upon integrational links being forged between the rural districts and national political and economic processes; in Japan these have been built up in periods when representational considerations were probably less relevant than at present, but the character of social structure in rural Japan has clearly provided a favorable setting for enhancing instrumental sensitivities. The community differences of interest and the rivalries common in the rural sector are clearly one means of developing an instrumental awareness

Table 10. Instrumental Attitudes, by Place of Residence

	Urban					Rural				
	Yes	No	DK	Total	*N*	Yes	No	DK	Total	*N*
Want our Diet member to do something for our local or occupational problems[a]	28%	44%	28%	100%	175	60%	26%	14%	100%	174
Want our Assemblyman to do something for our local or occupational problems[a]	36	36	28	100	175	67	24	9	100	174
Considered local or national interest in making voting choice[b]	70	22	8	100	428	74	21	5	100	1026
	(64)	(20)	(7)			(97)	(28)	(6)		

[a] Richardson 1964 survey.

[b] Kōmei Senkyo Remmei, *Sōsenkyo no Jittai*, 1961, p. 42. The figures in parentheses in the lower row are actually more meaningful here, since multiple answers were permitted and each response category was calculated as a separate percentage independent of the frequencies of answers in other categories. Thus, when one adds up the percentages of all of the persons in the urban and rural districts respectively who indicated that they thought about their interests in response to different separate parts of the question, it can clearly be seen that rural residents substantially exceeded urbanites in regard to at least the number of items which concerned them.

---

[41] This pragmatism is also shown in evidence I have discussed elsewhere regarding the content of both discussions of politics and specific requests for one's vote; in all instances, the open-ended questions I used to probe these matters resulted in spontaneous references to local problems more than to broad national issues. See my "Political Attitudes and Behavior in Contemporary Japan," unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, The University of California, Berkeley, 1966, p. 90.

[42] Deutsch's writings are an exception in part, as observed earlier. But Deutsch's model postulates that the important linkage wil be the commercialization of agriculture, with consequent development of concerns relating to general agrarian problems, while the evidence from Japan indicates that specifically local and parochial interests have precedence over other concerns. For evidence suggesting that these themes in rural outlooks have precedents in prewar days, see John K. Fairbank, Edwin O. Reischauer and Albert M. Craig, *East Asia: The Modern Transformation* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 520.

The presence of growing sentiments of an instrumental kind in the rural sector has been reported earlier by Joji Watanuki in his "Political Attitudes of the Japanese People," *The Sociological Review Monograph No. 10* (University of Keele, September 1966), pp. 166–168.

among rural citizens. Moreover, there are influentials in many rural communities whose mere presence and contact with other members of the community provide a leadership potential that is probably less common in most urban settings. The scope of local social involvement and the opportunities for informal communication in both neighboring and group relationships also permit more sharing of information and opinions on instrumental questions than is afforded by the typical metropolitan neighborhood.[43]

The consequences of differences in social context were visible in strong relationships between multiple group memberships and instrumentalism, and controlling for group memberships reduced some of the differences in the simple effects of residence.[44] Even with this control, however, there were still effects attributable merely to living in a rural area, and it is clear that simply residing in the rural districts contributes in part to the observed tendencies in pragmatic feelings. Whatever the mix of these influences, rural voters are clearly more intensely concerned than their urban counterparts about narrowly defined interests, and this concern has potential importance for contemporary urban-rural differences in participation levels.

Sectoral Political Culture Differences in Japan and Political Participation

Some distinctive patterns in attributes of political culture have been identified in Japan's urban and rural sectors. Urbanites are more involved in national affairs, but they are also generally more negative in their evaluations of politics, less aware of self-interest dimensions, and less inclined to feel they would participate in politics either on the basis of the perceived value of activist contributions to political life or on the basis of obligation. Rural residents had more involvement in local affairs, as well as comparatively greater political optimism and awareness of instrumental wants. They also indicated a greater willingness to assume activist roles in at least local politics, but were likewise more likely to see the vote as an obligation rather than a privilege. These sectoral tendencies were in turn linked—sometimes clearly, sometimes only suggestively—with different socializing influences in the two sectors.

Some effects of the urban-rural distinctiveness in political cultural orientations on political participation were also examined. In particular, it was anticipated that some links between sectoral political attitude structures and the higher participation rates observed in the rural districts might be discovered. Since the primary focus was the effects of the various attitudes on several types of behavior yielding only single dichotomous measures of performance, Coleman effect parameter analysis was again employed. The specific kinds of participation examined in this analysis were: voting turnout, attention to the media and speeches during election campaigns, discussion of politics, articulation of needs by talks with politicians or officials, and solicitation of other persons' votes for a particular candidate or party. In addition to the expectation that different attitude-behavior linkages could exist for different kinds of behavior, it was also felt that the linkages might be different for more cosmopolitan processes than they were for more local political processes.[45] In the analysis, therefore, information on attitudes and behavior was treated separately for the national and local political arenas.

The analysis was conducted at two levels. First, the effects of each single attitude on the different kinds of behavior were observed using simple bivariate indicators of effect (Table 11). From these statistical manipulations it could be seen that, in general, involvement in politics, including awareness of the instrumental potential of political processes, contributed more to participation in politics of different kinds than did favorable evaluations of political performance. It could also be seen that involvement and optimism about politics were comparatively more important as motivations for active participation (including campaign attention) than for simply going out to vote.[46] In contrast, going out to vote depended more on feelings that the vote was an obligation, the perception that people in the neighborhood were going out to vote—a measure introduced in the analysis of turnout to try to tap feelings of social conformism—and to some degree interest in politics and reports of wanting something done for one's interests.

---

[43] There are other interpretations for this trend in sectoral feelings of instrumentalism in addition to those advanced already. Feelings of deprivation may motivate acute instrumental sensitivities in many areas of the country, perhaps especially the less affluent ones. It is also possible to speculate on the effects of the higher levels of property ownership that are found in the rural areas, although the only information available in this area is limited to statistics on home ownership. See Sōrifu Tōkeikyoku, *Nihon Tōkei Nenkan 1967*, pp. 434–35.

[44] The basic index for the effects of residence was −.304. When controls for group membership levels were introduced this was reduced to −.244.

The role of organizational involvement here is somewhat analogous to that reported for France by Sydney Tarrow in "The Urban-Rural Cleavage . . . ," 353–355. But the consequence is still locally oriented instrumentalism in Japan in many instances, and this would appear to be different from the more general focus of rural pragmatism in the French example.

[45] I have followed the precedent set by Sidney Verba, Norman H. Nie, and Jae-on Kim, who differentiate between different forms of participation in "The Modes of Democratic Participation: A Cross-National Comparison," in Eckstein and Gurr, *Comparative Politics Series* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1971), Vol. II, publication number 01–013.

Once it was established how important such attitudes are for various kinds of participation, the effects of sectoral differences in attitude structures on participation were observed by controlling for the effects of each attitude and examining the residual impact of place of residence. Finally, in a general multivariate analysis, the remaining independent effects of each attitude and place of residence were indicated after simultaneous controls for all confounding influences from other variables were eliminated. The results of both of these analyses are shown in Table 12.

According to these analyses, the attitudinal patterns in general contributed very little to reducing the effects of place of residence specifically on participation in national elections and politics. This finding suggests that the influence model referred to in earlier studies of sectoral voting trends in Japan does have some validity in explaining turnout in national elections and perhaps other kinds of participation in national politics as well. However, feelings of wants from national politics did contribute to the urban-rural participation patterns to some degree in regard to national voting turnout, attention to national campaigns and solicitation of others' vote in national elections.

Quite different patterns in the results were shown for linkages between attitudes and behavior at the local level. With the exception of solicitation of others' votes, *all* of the urban-ru-

---

[46] Possession of the various attitudinal perspectives was also a little less instrumental in motivating people to go out and ask others for their vote, a tendency that accords with the familiar mobilizational interpretation of participation in Japan.

Table 11. Political Culture and Political Participation, Bivariate Effect Indices

	National Election and Politics							
	Interest	Concern	Responsiveness	Relevance	Comprehension	Wants	Civic Duty	Neighbor's Turnout
Turnout 1963	.127	.053	.067	−.013		.074	.265	.133
Campaign Attention	.352	.265	.165	.203	.126	.227		
Discussion of Politics	.264	.250	.172	.200	.222	.161		
Articulation of Wants	.229	.217	.079	.113	.059	.163		
Solicitation of Vote	.133	.102	.012	−.022	.010	.111		
	Local Election and Politics							
Turnout 1963	.112	.183	.064	.060		.160	.210	.258
Campaign Attention	.404	.275	.308	.246	.229	.285		
Discussion of Politics	.227	.195	.160	.169	.150	.151		
Articulation of Wants	.161	.143	.110	.225	.148	.163		
Solicitation of Vote	.068	.033	−.016	.081	.081	.082		

Note: Figures are Coleman effect parameters or indices indicating the impact on the dependent behaviors of maintaining the various relevant attitudinal perspectives. Turnout and solicitation of the vote were simple dichotomous items; discussion of politics, articulation of wants and campaign attention were dichotomized from scalar measures. All attitudinal categories were also dichotomized, or in the case of wants from politics, based on dichotomous items.

As in earlier citations the results of tests for significance are indicated by underlining; no underlining means not significant at the .05 level, a broken line indicates significant at the .05 level and a solid line represents significance at the .01 level.

The decision to treat individual attitudes as independent variables in this and subsequent analyses, rather than aggregate them into scales where feasible, reflects simply a desire to trace through the effects of different single components of involvement and evaluative structures on behavior. Underlying formulation of this objective is the simple fact that attitudes were similarly treated in the unpublished secondary materials used as a source in much of the analysis, and important variations in sectoral tendencies between individual attitudinal dimensions could be seen in these findings.

Table 12. Political Culture, Place of Residence, and Political Participation, Multivariate Effect Indices

	Residence	Interest	Concern	Responsiveness	Relevance	Comprehension	Wants	Civic Duty	Neighbor's Vote
				National Elections and Politics I					
Turnout 1963	−.144	−.139	−.145	−.141	−.141	−.148	−.128	−.151	−.117
Campaign Attention	−.149	−.135	−.156	−.144	−.172	−.165	−.092		
Discussion	.011	.022	.006	.018	.009	−.010	.014		
Articulation	−.104	−.116	−.121	−.105	−.123	−.114	−.095		
Solicitation	−.103	−.099	−.105	−.103	−.107	−.106	−.076		
				Local Elections and Politics I					
Turnout 1963	−.128	−.112	−.125	−.119	−.127	−.120	−.081	−.123	−.033
Campaign Attention	−.236	−.172	−.222	−.188	−.236	−.209	−.161		
Discussion	−.167	−.136	−.161	−.145	−.167	−.151	−.129		
Articulation	−.104	−.085	−.111	−.120	−.092	−.092	−.095		
Solicitation	−.097	−.088	−.097	−.105	−.097	−.088	−.080		
				National Elections and Politics II					
Turnout 1963	−.128	.084	−.010	.030	−.068		.024	.142	.077
Campaign Attention	−.127	.218	.180	.061	.072	.015	.048		
Discussion	.010	.137	.182	.086	.053	.153	.098		
Articulation	−.156	.174	.214	.010	.041	.023	.083		
Solicitation	−.095	.091	.090	−.022	−.014	.002	.073		
				Local Elections and Politics II					
Turnout 1963	−.016	−.042	.112	−.005	.006		.042	.152	.188
Campaign Attention	−.127	.230	.078	.107	.064	.039	.074		
Discussion	−.114	.111	.096	.003	.116	.002	.033		
Articulation	−.108	.016	.083	−.005	.202	.094	.078		
Solicitation	−.091	.000	.020	−.112	.081	.053	.052		

Note: The explanation for Table 11 also applies here. Numeral I indicates the results of calculations where the effects of place of residence were examined with each of the other categories controlled; the indices thus indicate the residual effects of place of residence. Under II, the results of a multivariate analysis of the effects of residence and the political culture attributes are shown. Comprehension was eliminated from these calculations involving turnout in order to add other relevant variables since the computer program used permitted handling of only eight independent variables.

ral differences in participation were at least partly related to the sectoral disparities in political cultural patterns I have reported earlier. Of particular importance for local participation in the rural areas were voters' concern for representation of wants, interest in politics and feelings that local politicians were responsive. While these linkages do not completely negate the possibility that community endorsements and exhortations to vote for a particular candidate might stimulate turnout and possibly other kinds of local participation, the sectoral attitude structures are still very important in the local context.

Finally, it can be clearly seen from the findings when simultaneous controls are introduced that many of the attitudes still have residual impacts on behavior, at the same time that the statistical controls do not reduce the effects of specifically rural residence (shown by the negative correlations). What this means is that in addition to persons who participate in politics because they are motivated by feelings of interest or positive appraisals of public responsiveness, some rural residents go out to vote or participate on the basis of other influences besides the attitudes identified here. Fragmentary evidence from other Japanese studies has also shown this to be the case: interest in politics, for example, correlates highly with turnout in the city, but not at all in the country in some instances, simply because some politically apathetic persons in the rural areas still go out to vote.[47] Obviously, this observation supplements those already advanced, and is more relevant for turnout than for other forms of behavior, and more relevant for national than for local contexts.

We have seen so far that there are some fairly complex patterns of urban-rural political culture differences in Japan, that these differences can be related to various aspects of community life and sociopolitical structure which vary between the cities and the country, and that the sectoral political culture differences correlate in certain instances with tendencies in political participation. At this point, I would like to summarize some of the analysis in order to consider the implications of these findings for empirical theory. Obviously, the discussion at earlier points was sufficiently complex that only certain salient conclusions can be discussed here. This is particularly true for my comments on the origins of sectoral political culture differences (even though it is also clear that some of the special interpretations of Japanese political culture might suggest profitable avenues for research in other places).

In the first place, while psychological involvement in at least national politics in Japan accords with the predictions about individual behavior extrapolated from social modernization theories of political development, political participation does not. Participation in *national* politics at the sectoral level in Japan was found to be ultimately more responsive to the mobilization potential of rural community life as far as can be seen from the present analysis. Turnout in a national election was especially dependent on this kind of influence or on the activities of candidates and local influentials to mobilize the vote.[48] Participation in national politics at the sectoral level is thus ultimately sensitive in an important degree to influences not predicted in the theory. No one would deny that the integration of rural Japan through some of the processes emphasized in modernization theory has some indirect relevance for contemporary participation rates. But the major points are that the critical attitude-behavior linkages postulated from the theory are absent at the individual level and that less "modern" persons participate more than other categories in a significant number of cases.

Furthermore, exploratory parts of the analysis suggested that Lerner's critical media communication processes might have alienative as well as integrative effects, particularly for sectoral evaluations of political performance. These and other aspects of urban-rural differences are believed to have contributed to the greater pessimism found in the cities in Japan, although the various hypothesis tests using available data were not conclusive. While analysis of the evidence suggested that these sentiments were also less salient for identifiable participation levels than might have been anticipated, the potential importance of widespread pessimism and cynicism about politics in the modern sector of countries should not be ignored.

Modernization theory addresses itself mainly to postulates about individuals' responses to social processes which favor development of an awareness of cosmopolitan political affairs. Consequently, it doesn't seem appropriate to compare sectoral attitudes about local politics in Japan with the Lerner and Deutsch models. The center-periphery conceptualizations seem much more relevant at this point, once certain modifications are made in their formulations. In effect, it seems obvious that the multiple political and social centers at the local level in contemporary Japan constitute the reference point for identifying both social locations and dependent attitudes about local politics. Having said this, one can then appropriately observe that differences in community life and social involvement between the urban and rural districts are reflected in sectoral differences in the proximity of ordinary persons to these local decision making centers. These differences quite clearly favor the rural districts.

This reconceptualization of the center-periphery notion is certainly not a startling observation, but it represents a possibility largely ignored in the earlier discussions of these concepts. Moreover, it can have ultimate meaning for analysis of attitudes toward more cosmopolitan political arenas in places where the myriad of local political systems are closely linked with national processes. In Japan, linkage of this kind does exist in many cases through the intimate contacts maintained between local influentials and elected officials and national politicians. While the effects of these kinds of relationships could not be analyzed directly, these links with national affairs may be an especially critical aspect of the integrational process by which rural voters are aware of at least the instrumental relevance of national political life. While "abstract" appreciations of national political life were highly associated with urbanization and education, rural pragmatism was the product of processes in which local political "centers" were sources of information and cues about narrow but concrete interests, representation for which was sought from national as well as local politicians. These feelings about local interest representation were the sole attitudinal component of sectoral political cultural differences relevant for the urban-rural tendencies in participation in national politics, thus underscoring the importance of the relationships between local centers and national processes in the Japanese case.

---

[47] An example is Aichi ken Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Senkyo Ishiki to Tohyō Kōdō Henyō* (Nagoya: 1963), p. 37.

[48] It is important to remember that the analysis and interpretation focuses on the differences between urban and rural residents not accounted for by the relevant attitudinal patterns. The reader should not forget the fact that many rural as well as urban voters were in fact psychologically involved. Still, more persons who turned out in national elections in the rural districts were not involved than was the case in the city.

Watanuki has presented a similar interpretation of rural participation in his "Social Structure and Political Participation in Japan." The findings were based on a path analysis of data from the Verba group cross-national study.

The findings on Japan have some relevance for the explanations advanced for voting participation and urban and rural living patterns in European settings. The greater transiency of urban residents in Japan certainly contributes to the observed sectoral differences in community and organizational involvement. This urban mobility still seems characteristic even of persons whose lifespans have excluded wartime experiences—people in the age cohorts potentially affected by the war could have moved solely as the result of the bombing of the cities. This finding clearly has consequences for political behavior, according to various Japanese studies; while the evidence is still fragmentary, longer residence is uniformly associated with higher involvement and participation levels, especially where local politics is concerned.[49]

A second kind of mobility also found more often in the cities takes the form of commuting out to work, especially among men, who are consequently more mobile than women. This relatively higher mobility has been shown in several urban studies to contribute to lower levels of involvement and participation in specifically local politics for men.[50] Since there is no direct evidence, however, on the relationship between commuting and behavior that would permit analysis of its impact on urban-rural attitudes and participation tendencies, this line of interpretation must remain untapped for the time being. Nevertheless, future research on the effects of commuting could contribute to further refinements of hypotheses about urban-rural differences.

The compact nature of rural communities and the physical proximity inherent in rural residential patterns in Japan also clearly parallel the characteristics reported for some European rural settings. Nevertheless, this compactness seems to have its primary impact on the character of local social structure rather than on the physical ease of voting. Indeed, the main import of the findings presented here is to call attention to the significance of sectoral community structure variations in the Japanese case. That these variations are in part manifested in urban-rural disparities in organizational involvement is also significant, given the emphasis in recent cross-national research on organizational influences on participation. What is salient in the Japanese case is that forms of social organization emerging from Japan's rural traditions contribute as much to attitudinal structures and behavior as do educational and communicational patterns in a modern society. In addition to the special and direct mobilizational implications of rural residence on political participation at the national level, rural community life contributes to attitudinal outlooks of major importance to the sectoral differences in local participation. Rural residence in Japan also contributes to an awareness of self-interest that underlies in part the patterns of sectoral participation at the national level. Obviously, comparable effects may be found elsewhere, and some of the apparent anomalies in the impact of place of residence could reflect the presence of such mediating influences in other societies.

---

[49] One of the best examples of this kind of relationship is found in Ōsaka fu Senkyo Kanri Iinkai, *Kōmei Senkyo Undō no Kōka Sokutei* (Ōsaka: 1961), 32, 44. Longer residence led in this case to heightened exposure to campaign communications and to higher voting levels in a House of Representatives election. However, the linkages between attitudes responsive to the effects of mobility and various kinds of political behavior were not examined. The implications of the study were also limited by the mainly urban composition of the sampled population. It should also be noted that length of residence in my own study did not prove to have a strong relation to the urban-rural differences in political culture, but this may have been due to the simplicity of the dichotomous measure which tapped only lifelong residence and its absence.

[50] This tendency is shown by figures reported in my "Political Behavior and Attitudes in Contemporary Japan," p. 39, and by various Japanese sources. For a qualitative assessment of women's comparatively greater involvement in local community life in some urban districts see Ezra Vogel, *Japan's New Middle Class*, pp. 102–13.

Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies*

ERIC C. BROWNE
University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee

MARK N. FRANKLIN
University of Strathclyde

One important aim of many political parties in parliamentary democracies is to obtain control of the governing apparatus of the state. Put another way, some parties seek to become governing parties.[1] If a party participates in government, not only do the psychological rewards of wielding power accrue to the party elite and its backbenchers, but also the party is in a position to use the power of the state to reward its friends and punish its enemies.

Normally, a party gains control of the government in one of two ways. Either an election returns a single party with a parliamentary majority, in which case that party usually governs alone, or it produces the result that no single party receives a majority, in which event a coalition of political parties commonly forms a government. At some point in the process of government formation, it becomes necessary to share out the rewards of office—to divide the pie among the winners, so to speak. How is this done—that is, who gets what reward as a result of winning a place in government? This question will occupy our attention in the remainder of the paper.

We have chosen to examine the problem using data drawn from thirteen European parliamentary democracies: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, German Federal Republic, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden. Further, all of the cases selected concern only the division of rewards (or the payoff) in formal government coalition situations. The decision to concentrate only on coalition governments was taken largely because of considerations of data availability. In governing coalitions, the perquisites of government are usually divided among an unambiguous set of bargaining partners—the political parties represented in the coalition. In single party governments, while the payoff will often be divided among formal and informal factional groupings, these are somewhat less easy to identify.

The Nature of Payoffs in Cabinet Coalitions

If we are to formulate and test propositions relating to the distribution of payoffs in governing coalitions, we need some fairly precise understanding of what payoffs are. Essentially, payoffs are resources which are distributed among coalition partners and used by them to advance their individual goals. Viewed this way, governing coalitions are tactical alliances of political parties, each one of which is seeking to achieve its own set of goals by using the resources it obtains as a result of coalition membership.

What are the payoffs which accrue to parties which are included in governing coalitions? On the most elementary level, the payoff contained in any governing coalition is, abstractly, the government. The payoff, then, to individual coalition partners is membership in the government. While not ordinarily sufficient by itself, inclusion in the government may be quite an important payoff to parties seeking to achieve particular goals (e.g., parties seeking to legitimize their status as constitutional, or "pro-system," parties).

Most parties, however, surely seek and expect, in exchange for their participation in government, more tangible payments than merely the status benefits which attach to governing parties. Since most political parties have policy goals, such expectations will reasonably include payoffs in the form of policy prerogatives. The potential availability of such tangible benefits to coalition partners is evident since the government embodies the decision-making apparatus of the state.

---

* This paper was first presented at the Eighth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, Munich, September 1970. The authors would like to thank Karen Ann Feste (Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver), Roger A. Hanson (University of Wisconsin, Milwaukee), and Richard Rose (of the University of Strathclyde) for helpful comments made during revision of the original manuscript.

[1] It is worth pointing out that not all parties expect and/or seek to be included in a government. This is because their strategic position in the party system either makes inclusion unlikely (e.g., the British Liberals), and/or their ideological position precludes participation (e.g., the Irish Sinn Fein).

The value of policy payoffs to parties is obvious. Essentially, parties which exercise a measure of control over the policy output of government are in a position to influence the distribution of rewards (or values) within society in ways which they believe will advance their individual goals. The extent of a party's influence over such distributions will vary, of course, depending on the strength of its position as a coalition partner. But the crucial point remains that governing parties are able to call upon the resources of the state to advance their individual goals.

The possible policy payoffs available to partners in governing coalitions range in kind from the very diffuse to the quite specific. Perhaps the most diffuse of all policy payoffs might be the access accorded party leaders to all the various policy-making sites of government. Even if these leaders bear no formal responsibility for (or overt control over) policy made in specific issue areas, the opportunity for them to exercise personal influence on policy made in these areas is facilitated greatly by government partnership.

Another, more specific, way in which parties may exercise influence over the general flow of public policy is through a grant by their partners of what are known as "policy promises" (or, alternatively, policy vetoes) over certain legislative matters (e.g., a selective tax exemption or the construction of some public facility). In this case, the party, while not actually being given institutional control of the policy made in a given issue area, is allowed to control the content of specific policies in that area. Unlike mere access to policy-making sites, policy promises carry with them a contractual expectation of successful control, and a party may legitimately interpret failure of delivery as a breach of faith.

The most important policy payoff, however, is the distribution of public offices among the various governing parties. Here, each party is awarded one or more of the government ministries (and/or sub-ministerial posts) in exchange for bringing its parliamentary support to the government, thereby establishing its formal responsibility for and primary influence over individual policy areas. Government ministries are the most tangible manifestations of policy payoffs to governing parties in that they give parties an institutional base from which to attempt to influence the entire flow of public policy. Insofar as parties controlling ministries are responsible for specific policy outputs (policy making in specific issue areas), they are in a position to shape the content of governmental legislative proposals to suit their own policy goals. In addition, control over policy in specific areas also gives parties bargaining capital to trade with parties controlling other issue areas, so that mutual accommodation will often profit both partners, and each will then expand its scope of policy influence. In short, the control of a given set of ministries confers upon a party a particular set of institutional resources which it can manipulate in an effort to advance its policy goals.

If by now we have a more or less clear idea of the kinds of payoffs which may accrue to governing parties, we have as yet no clear notion of the way in which they are distributed. How are payoffs to governing parties shared out? Are there any observable regularities influencing the distributions of the payoff, or, rather, are payoffs haphazardly distributed among the parties? If certain patterns of distribution do emerge, what variables might account for them? What patterns might we expect in payoff distributions to governing parties?

Payoff Distribution in Cabinet Coalitions

All empirical research is dependent upon the generation of hypotheses to give meaning to the quantities of data which are collected about any given subject. In this respect the study of political coalitions is in some ways facilitated, for the existence of a sophisticated body of theory concerning coalition formation provides a rich source from which hypotheses may be extracted and tested.[2] But unfortunately, these theories of coalition formation are vague and incomplete in their treatment of coalition payoffs. Nevertheless, the field is not altogether barren, and we may start our analysis with reference to one or two of the conclusions of these theories.

Generally speaking, coalition theorists conceive coalitions as being a joint use of resources by some defined set of actors (or players) to achieve a common goal. Using this definition, they attempt to build models of the coalition formation process which depend upon the assumptions of rational behavior as their princi-

[2] See, for example, William H. Riker, *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), Michael A. Leiserson, "Factions and Coalitions in One-Party Japan," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (September, 1968), 770–787, and William A. Gamson, "A Theory of Coalition Formation," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (June, 1961), 373–382. For methodological discussion and empirical illustrations of coalition formation, see also Sven Groennings, E. W. Kelley, and M. A. Leiserson, eds., *The Study of Coalition Behavior: Theoretical Perspectives and Cases From Four Continents* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970).

pal motivation component. As such, coalition formation is viewed as a payoff maximization game in which all players are assumed to be actively seeking inclusion in some winning coalition which will yield them their greatest payoff. The "solution," or outcome of the formation process is predicted to be that winning coalition (among the many possible winning coalitions) which yields to *all* individual participants their greatest payoff. Further, once players discover this optimal coalition, they will be constrained by the situation from demanding an excessive payoff from their partners, since such behavior would likely result in their exclusion from the coalition in favor of some other less greedy player.

While conceiving the problem in this way has led to some important propositions about the processes of coalition formation, very few of these are directly concerned with specifying the exact nature of payoff distributions. Since the assumption of payoff maximization behavior is central to these theories, the lack of derived propositions about payoff distributions constitutes a serious weakness in their explication.

Of the three theories of coalition formation surveyed (those of Riker, Leiserson, and Gamson), only Gamson's makes an unambiguous prediction about the distribution of the payoff. Riker maintains that payoff distributions are in some way a function of the "weight" of the various partners in a winning coalition. He declines, however, to specify the exact meaning of "weight," and he does not indicate how such a concept might be utilized in the prediction of payoff distributions.[3]

Leiserson deals with payoff distributions in two ways. First, he states that payoffs to partners in a winning coalition will be directly proportional to their "weights." While he does not specifically elaborate the concept of weight, his own application indicates that weight is defined by the seat/vote resources of the players expressed as proportions (the specific reference is identified factional groupings in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party) plus certain "intangible factors," which include the extent of financial backing and subjective assessments of support from nonaligned Dietmen.[4]

Second, Leiserson attempts to deal with the question of which payoffs (in this case government ministries and high party posts) accrue to which partners (LDP factions). This assignment is accomplished by making a complex series of calculations which involve consideration of an ordinally scaled set of payoffs, certain maintenance considerations involving strategy preoccupations whereby partners are constantly reassessing their positions vis-à-vis the upcoming or next coalition formation, and, of course, the weight of individual players including the "intangible factors."[5] The main problem with Leiserson's treatment is that the criteria established for the measurement of his major variables are based for the most part on the subjective interpretations of the analyst. This in turn poses grave problems of comparability across coalition situations and makes replication of his technique virtually impossible. In short, Leiserson's contribution to the explication of the process of payoff distributions is minimal, since his treatment does not adequately meet the requirements of generalized theory.

The most straightforward proposition concerning coalition payoffs derives from Gamson's theory of coalition formation. Gamson seeks to predict discrete coalition formation outcomes by specifying certain conditions which must be present for a *bona fide* coalition situation to exist (an essential game) and by postulating certain behavioral assumptions about actors in these situations.

The major conditions which operate in coalition situations according to Gamson are as follows:

(1) That there is some initial distribution of resources among the actors which aid them in bargaining.
(2) That there is some payoff for the successful formation of a winning coalition and that this payoff is the same regardless of which of the possible winning coalitions actually forms.
(3) That all actors have ranked preferences among the other actors as prospective coalition partners based on criteria other than their respective resource holdings (nonutilitarian strategy preferences).
(4) That there be an "effective" decision point at which a winning coalition is able to control decisions (a point at which a losing coalition becomes winning).[6]

Given these conditions, Gamson proceeds to make one major assumption relating to the level of information present in the game:

> All actors have the same information about the initial distribution of resources and the nature of the payoff.[7]

---

[3] See Riker, especially Chapters 5 and 6 where he discusses the nature of side payments and indicates that smaller players are likely to be more advantaged in the distribution process than "weightier" ones.

[4] Leiserson, p. 774.

[5] Leiserson, pp. 777–782.

[6] Gamson, pp. 375–376.

[7] Gamson, p. 376.

Having reached this point, Gamson states what he calls "the general hypothesis" of his theory. This is:

> *Any participant will expect others to demand from a coalition a share of the payoff proportional to the amount of resources which they contribute to a coalition.*[8]

This hypothesis, of course, also serves Gamson as an additional behavioral assumption, for without it he is unable to predict coalition formation outcomes. With it, however, Gamson is able to predict that "the cheapest winning coalition" will form. The reason for this is explained by Gamson thus:

> When a player must choose among alternative coalition strategies where the total payoff to a winning coalition is constant, he will maximize his payoff by maximizing his share. The theory states that he will do this by maximizing the ratio of his resources to the total resources of the coalition. Since his resources will be the same regardless of which coalition he joins, the lower the total resources, the greater will be his share. Thus, where the total payoff is held constant, he will favor the 'cheapest winning coalition.'[9]

We may observe immediately that Gamson's "general hypothesis" (read assumption) not only allows us to predict coalition formation outcomes, but it also allows us to predict payoff distributions in an unambiguous, generalizable manner. Gamson is plainly stating that *payoffs to partners in winning coalitions will be proportional to their resource contributions.* This, if verified, is a theoretically meaningful proposition about coalition payoffs, and it will serve as the point of departure in our analysis of payoffs in European cabinet coalitions.

While Gamson has offered us a suspected relationship, he has not formulated it in such a way as to admit verification. What is a payoff? What does Gamson mean by the amount of resources parties contribute to the coalition? The first task which confronts us, then, is operationalizing both of these variables.

We have already dealt in a general way with the concept of payoff. Now we need to know how we can measure the amount of payoff received by each coalition partner. It must be obvious that there is no entirely satisfactory way to do this. If, as we have suggested, payoffs in governing coalitions vary in their content from the specific to the diffuse, we have little hope of being able to specify the value which attaches, for example, to something as conceptually murky as the ease of access to decision-making sites. Indeed, the only payoff to parties which is at all well documented is the actual distribution of ministries and subcabinet posts.

Leiserson, in his work on factionalism in the Japanese Liberal Democratic Party, has recognized this difficulty of specifying the content of payoffs, but has at the same time minimized its importance. He has argued that, while there may be several kinds of payoffs available to coalition partners, all of them are ". . . roughly equivalent to, or are reflected in the acquisition of Cabinet and high party posts."[10] This view is justified by Leiserson's belief that parties will not accept diffuse payoffs without tangible evidence of good faith from their bargaining partners. The expectation, then, is that negotiating coalition partners will expect and insist on their fair share of ministries *in addition to whatever other payoffs are distributed.* This strategy will ensure that each party in the coalition retains continuing control over its tangible payoffs even in the event that its more intangible payoffs are for some reason not forthcoming. Because we accept this argument, we shall, for the purpose of analysis, take ministerial shares to partners as constituting our indicator of the level of payoff to partners.

This leaves us to deal with the problem of specifying the nature of party resources. What contributions do parties make which merit their inclusion in governing coalitions? The concept of party resources, like that of payoff, is complex, because parties are capable of bringing a wide variety of resources to a government. For example, some parties may list among their parliamentary leadership certain eminent and popular political figures who may be valuable to a government wishing to enhance its standing among the population at large. This kind of resource might be seen as valuable to some governments, particularly in times of crisis. The presence of such legitimacy-conferring personnel, then, may have an important bearing on the chances for a party's inclusion in government on terms which might be seen as favorable. In our universe perhaps the best example of this effect is the presence of the Rafi Party in recent Israeli cabinets. Here, the commanding figure of Moshe Dayan undoubtedly accounts in large part for his party's present status.

Another resource which parties contribute is their cooperation with rather than opposition to the government. While all parties contribute this resource when they join a government, some are in a better position to profit from it than others. This is because it will be important to the government to neutralize the opposition of some parties, while it can function perfectly well with the opposition of others. Again the Israeli case furnishes us with our best example. Here, the religious implications of a Jewish state have made the religious parties potentially a very effective opposition force. That is, a religious opposition in Israel carries with it the potentiality of opening a serious religious/secular division in society which would probably produce bitter and protracted governmental and legislative crises, and perhaps ultimately threaten the constitutional foundation of the state. The Israeli response to this situation is evident in the inclusion of the National Religious Party (and its predecessor, the United Religious Party) in every cabinet since the founding of the Israeli state. In effect, then, what the dominant governmental party, Mapai, has done is to buy off religious opposition by co-opting it into the government.

---

[8] Gamson, p. 376.

[9] Gamson, p. 376.

[10] Leiserson, p. 778. Note: Leiserson's reference to the receipt of "high party posts" is only germane to factional bargaining and should not be considered appropriate in our context.

But the most obvious, and probably the most important, set of resources a party brings to the government is its share of parliamentary seats, which may then be translated into votes on government policy. If the government is to survive as a viable decision-making unit, it must maintain a stable law-making majority in parliament. This majority is normally (though not necessarily) achieved through the combined voting strength of the coalition partners. Hence, if each partner is generally satisfied with the content of public policy, the government will continue to function through the instrument of its parliamentary majority. If, on the other hand, one or more of the partners becomes dissatisfied with the government's performance, it may decide to withhold its votes, thereby jeopardizing the continued existence of the government.

It may be argued that the various resources contributed to the government are "roughly equivalent to, or reflected in" the voting strength of the governing parties. This is exactly analogous to the case of ministries and payoffs. In the final analysis, a government can withstand every kind of adversity except the loss of its parliamentary majority. For example, if a coalition crisis is precipitated by the withdrawal of a partner which had contributed a large measure of, say, legitimacy (Moshe Dayan in our earlier example), one of several outcomes are possible. Three of the most obvious are:

(1) the government falls due to the loss of its law-making majority (withdrawal of the party's necessary parliamentary votes),

(2) the government falls because other partners also withdraw from the coalition feeling that government continuation without the party in question is intolerable.

(3) the government continues because even without the party in question, the government maintains its necessary majority.

In two of these cases, the government falls not because of the loss of legitimacy but because it ceases to have a law-making majority. Of course, the government may well have lost its law-making majority because it ceased to be legitimate, but that only means that legitimacy, in this case, is reflected in the voting strength of the party. In the third case, the government continues because, even though it loses the party's contribution to legitimacy (and its votes), this loss is not so severe as to bring down the government. In view of this "life-and-death" property of voting strength (the ability of parties, through the use of their votes, to insure either the continuation or the fall of a government), we have decided to take it as our measure of party resources, or contribution to the coalition.

An Empirical Test of Gamson's Proportionality Proposition

At this point we are ready to reformulate Gamson's proportionality proposition in operational terms:

> The percentage share of ministries received by a party participating in a governing coalition and the percentage share of that party's coalition seats will be proportional on a one-to-one basis.[11]

The manner in which this proposition predicts distribution outcomes can be shown easily with the aid of the following table.

Table 1

Party	Seats	Possible Winning Coalitions	Proportional Payoff		
			A	B	C
A	45	A, B	.56	.44	.00
B	35	A, C	.75	.00	.25
C	20	B, C	.00	.64	.36
		A, B, C	.45	.35	.20

Here, the predicted percentage payoff to each partner is found by dividing its seat holding by the total number of seats represented in the particular coalition.

---

[11] Notice that we have altered Gamson's proposition to postulate that the proportionality must be one-to-one. Naturally, a relationship may be proportional on any basis, 1:1, 2:1, 3:1, etc. It was obviously Gamson's intention that the relationship be 1:1 since any other interpretation is contrary to the logic of his theory.

Although logically we are now ready to conduct an empirical test of an important proposition about ministerial distributions, we shall do well first to consider the implications of the suspected relationship. As it is presently formulated, the proportionality proposition will, when tested, provide us with information which is strictly quantitative: a party will receive a given number of ministries for the contribution of a given number of seats. But while this quantitative dimension is certainly important in our understanding the distribution process, it is clearly not the only dimension in which distributions are taking place. In addition to bargaining over how many ministries each party is to receive, coalition partners are also interested in which specific ministries they are. If, for example, the proportionality equation demands that a party receive two ministries for its contribution to the coalition, it will surely make a difference to that party whether the ministries it receives are, say, the Prime Ministership and the Ministry of Finance, or if they are Sport and Tourism. In addition to a quantitative dimension operating in the bargaining context, then, we may reasonably expect that a qualitative one operates as well.

If bargaining between coalition partners takes place in two dimensions as we have suggested, what might the consequences be? The answer to this question depends largely on the degree to which the dimensions are interrelated. It is quite plausible, for example, that if the Prime Ministership is worth considerably more to a party than any other ministry, that party might be willing to compensate its coalition partners for receiving this prize by accepting less than its proportional share in the distribution. If this behavior is common, we are placed in the difficult position of having to decide whether: (1) the party was underpaid in the quantitative dimension because it was able to receive more than its due in the qualitative dimension, or (2) that no norm of perfect proportionality governs the distribution process. In this latter case, the party in question may in some sense really have received its "fair share," based not on proportional distributions but on such other factors as blackmail and bargaining skill.

One indication of the possible relationship of the two dimensions may be gained by testing the proportionality proposition. Suppose that over the entire universe, we find a symmetrical distribution such that the percentage of seats in the coalition held by parties and the percentage of ministries they receive genuinely approximate 1:1 proportionality; then we will be justified in concluding that the particular ministries a party receives has a negligible effect, if any, on the number it receives. This would not necessarily mean that ministries are not valued differently by the parties. Surely they are. Rather, what perfect proportionality would tell us is that, even though parties consider some ministries more important than others, they are unwilling to pay for the receipt of ministries they want by accepting less than their fair share of the distribution taken as a whole. On the other hand, any remaining variations unexplained by the proportionality proposition will suggest that some of these variations were in fact due to bargaining over specific ministries in the manner postulated above.

Let us now proceed to test the proportionality proposition. The data are drawn from the thirteen parliamentary democracies already listed, and consist of the proportion of seats contributed by each of 63 parties to each of the 114 coalitions in which they participated between 1945 and 1969, together with the proportion of ministries they received in return.[12] The proposition, it should be noted, suggests two features of the data which are predicted to occur simultaneously. These are that there should be a high positive relationship between the two variables (if one party contributes more seats than another, it should also receive more ministries), and that this relationship should be proportional on a one-to-one basis. Because the postulated relationship is linear, both predictions can be tested by means of a single-stage least-squares regression analysis, with its associated Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient.[13] These analyses will establish how closely the individual cases, taken together, conform to a best-fitting line that could be drawn through the plotted coordinates of the variables, and will identify the location and slope of this line. The expectation to which the prediction gives rise is that all of the coordinates will fall on a forty-five degree line intersecting the axes at their origin. This means (a) that the correlation coefficient (Pearson's r) should approach its best possible value of 1.0 (indicating that none of the plotted points deviate at all from the best-fitting line), (b) that the slope of this line should be close to 1.0 (indicating that a movement of one unit along one axis corresponds to a movement of one unit along the other), and (c) that the vertical displacement of this line in relation to the origin (the intercept point) should be close to 0.0 (indicating that there is no systematic bias in the relationship in that no seats yield no ministries). In short, we expect a regression equation of $Y = 0 + 1.0\ X$ which (in the statistical sense) explains all the variance in Y.

---

[12] Regarding each party in each coalition-forming situation as one "case" gives us 358 such cases. However, 32 of these cases in fact represent ministerial distributions made to individuals who served in a nonparty capacity. The proportionality proposition is not relevant to these cases, and they were therefore excluded. Of the remaining 326 cases, two represent parties that received no ministries at all in return for the seats they contributed. These were parties which lent support to a coalition during a period of crisis, while refusing the responsibilities of office. Since it was not the bargaining process that led them to receive no ministries, these are cases where the proportionality proposition is again not relevant; these were again excluded, leaving us with a final universe of 324 cases.

[13] These techniques are so well known as to require a minimum of documentation. The computing formulae used were taken from William L. Hays, *Statistics* (New York: Rinehart and Winston, 1963), 490–538.



Figure 1. Seat Shares Plotted Against Ministerial Shares.*

* Note: Each of the numerals pictured represents the number of points occupying the space upon which it stands; 324 cases included in this plot.

We shall begin by reporting the strength of the relationship found, since if the variables had not been related the question of proportionality would have retained little theoretical interest. In fact the correlation coefficient over the whole universe of 324 cases examined attains a value of 0.926. This means that, of all the variance in the percentage of ministries received,[14] 85.5 per cent was explained by the variation in the percentage seats contributed. Concerning the question of proportionality, we find that the best-fitting line calculated for these cases has an equation of

$$Y = -0.01 + 1.07\,X \qquad \text{(Equation 1)}$$

which is very close indeed to the relationship predicted by the proportionality proposition ($Y = 0.0 + 1.0\,X$). The observed relationship is presented visually in Figure 1, which is an ordinary scattergram upon which has been superimposed a continuous line, representing the least-squares regression line, and a broken line drawn at forty-five degrees to each axis, indicating the coordinates that would have exactly corresponded to proportionality on a one-to-one basis. The extent to which these two lines approximate each other, and the extent to which the observations cluster about them can be readily appreciated.[15]

From a research point of view, this result is quite surprising, if not staggering. Seldom in the social sciences does one find a simple bivariate relationship which is both theoretically meaningful and also able to explain such a high proportion of variance. Only 14.5 per cent of the variance in the dependent variable remains to be explained by all other factors whatsoever. It can therefore be affirmed, with few reservations, that the number of ministries received by partners in a governing coalition is indeed explained, almost on a one-to-one basis, by their contribution of parliamentary seats to that coalition. This relationship is so strong that it would seem to preclude any qualitative exchanges of the kind postulated earlier. Parties may indeed value one ministry more than another, but it is evidently not customary for them to exchange one valued ministry for several others.

Explanations of Deviations from Proportionality: The Relative Weakness Effect

Multivariate analysis of data in social science often takes the form of maximizing the variance in some dependent variable that can be explained by some combination of independent variables. But in a situation such as ours, where all but 14 per cent of the variance has been explained by a simple bivariate relationship, a search for additional variables to add statistical explanatory power does not appear particularly fruitful.[16] Hence, in the remainder of this paper we shall not pursue this research strategy, but rather concentrate our efforts on attempting to determine why this relationship differs from proportionality on a one-to-one basis.[17]

Perhaps the most interesting characteristic of our observed relationship is a marked tendency for small coalition partners to do better in the exchange process than do large ones. That is, the deviation from one-to-one proportionality has the effect of causing small parties to receive additional or "bonus" ministries to be distributed above their proportional shares, while large parties tend to surrender such ministries. This we shall call the "relative weakness effect."[18] (Scan the scatterplot for visual confirmation of this tendency.)

---

[14] The values taken on by both variables in fact vary all the way from 1 per cent to 99 per cent.

[15] Readers who are left unimpressed by correlation coefficients and regression equations are invited to apply to Figure 1 what has been named the "interocular trauma test": a relationship is significant if it hits you between the eyes. See Edward Tufte, "Improving Data Analysis in Political Science," *World Politics*, 21 (July, 1969), 641–654.

[16] For example, an additional independent variable which might be considered potentially fruitful in explaining additional variance is a partner's relative size or position in the coalition. Regardless of its absolute size, the largest coalition partner might be able to exercise exceptional influence over distributions, relative to his other partners. When relative size was treated as an interval-level variable and correlated against ministerial distribution, controlling for absolute size, it yielded a correlation coefficient of −0.25. Yet, when brought in as an additional term in the basic regression equation already presented, the total of the variance explained rose by only 1 per cent.

[17] In another context, Hubert Blalock has argued that correlation coefficients are affected by factors that may be considered "accidental" to specific populations, so that in stating general laws or comparing populations (both of which we do in this paper) attention should be concentrated rather upon the more stable regression coefficients. H. M. Blalock, Jr., "Causal Inference, Closed Populations, and Measures of Association," *American Political Science Review*, 61 (March, 1967), 130–136.

[18] The relationship is not quite reflexive. The displacement coefficient of −0.01 tells us that the smallest parties in general only contribute about 1 per cent fewer seats than they receive ministries, while the slope coefficient of 1.07 tells us that the very largest parties can expect on average to contribute about 6 per cent more seats (seven per cent more than the smallest parties) than they receive ministries. (See Equation 1.) Because there are many more small parties than there are large ones, however, the difference averages out, and about as many parties gain somewhat from the bias (155) as lose (166).

The extent of the relative weakness effect can be demonstrated more effectively if we create a new variable (called the index of overpayment) by subtracting the proportion of seats contributed by a party from the proportion of ministries received by that party. This index will be negative when the party contributes more seats than it receives ministries, and positive when it receives more ministries than it contributes seats. The more positive it is for any party, the higher the proportion of bonus ministries among that party's portfolios. The fact that it is small parties on the whole that receive bonus ministries and large parties that surrender them is demonstrated if this index is correlated against party size. Such an analysis yields a coefficient (Pearson's r) of −0.54, showing that the smaller the party the greater the overpayment.

How can we account for the success of small parties in extracting bonus ministries from their larger partners? In fact, the literature on coalition theory suggests that small partners will be disproportionately advantaged in terms of their strategic position in coalition situations.[19] Two explanations consistent with these theories will be advanced. First, a small party may be more likely to be a "pivotal partner" in the sense that its addition to a coalition will be sufficient to cause the coalition to win. Since this addition is at least psychologically more crucial to the success of the coalition than the addition of any other partner, that party will be in a position to extract a high price for its entry. Second, small parties may be more desirable coalition partners than larger parties because they are not as likely to be able to inhibit the activity of their larger partners, at least not to the extent that might be possible for other sized parties.

The first explanation will not be tested here because our data are not able to substantiate it in any way, and because it is at least logically possible, if not probable, that pivotal parties may be of any size instead of the implication that they will be predominantly small. We leave the possibilities of this explanation to further research. The second explanation is more interesting and can be inferred from our data. The logic of this second argument leads to the prediction that largest parties will characteristically be avoided as coalition partners. We shall have to reject this implication of the second explanation also, since it appears to have no basis in observed reality.[20] This evidence, however, does not prejudice the notion that small parties are more desirable than larger ones as coalition partners.

The line of argument we wish to pursue states that coalition formation outcomes characteristically produce a set of partners in which one (or occasionally more than one) of the partners assumes a position of overall coalition leadership (it is responsible for the overall direction of the government), while others assume less prominent positions in general policy direction. Since coalition leaders are expected to control a large number of ministerial portfolios (in general a large plurality and often far in excess of an absolute majority), and since their position ensures them effective control over the flow of public policy, we might expect that the surrender of one or two ministries (bonus ministries) at the margin of coalition control would not seriously detract from this position. Further, we expect that coalition leaders will be willing to surrender these ministries in order to obtain the necessary support to form a viable government. In short, coalition leaders probably can afford or tolerate the cost of surrendering bonus ministries to small partners.

For the small parties, the situation is quite different. Since they cannot expect to play a dominant role in policy direction, it is reasonable to expect that small parties will seek to expand their area of influence at all costs. What we are arguing here, essentially, is that the gain of one ministry by a small partner is *not* equal to the surrender of that ministry by a coalition leader (all other things being equal). The reason for this is obvious. If a party holds one portfolio and receives another as a bonus, its ministerial share has increased 100 per cent. If, on the other hand, a coalition leader holds nineteen portfolios and surrenders one to the small party, its holding is diminished by only 5 per cent. Consequently, it is reasonable to expect that small parties will be eager to expand their payoff share to compensate for their relatively weak position in general policy control. By the same token, coalition leaders should be willing to surrender a portfolio or two in order to obtain the support of a small coalition partner which is no threat to their leadership position. What has occurred, we are arguing, is that the coalition situation has created a bargaining advantage for small coalition partners which allows them to demand and receive bonus ministries so long as they remain unable to challenge effectively the overall policy control of coalition leaders.[21]

---

[19] It is impossible in a footnote to demonstrate the manner in which the major coalition theorists arrive at this conclusion. We may say, however, that in general, large parties appear to suffer under certain limitations which are imposed on them *because* of their size. See, for example, Theodore A. Caplow, *Two Against One: Coalitions in Triads* (Engelwood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969), and Anatol Rappoport, *N-Person Game Theory: Concepts and Applications,* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: University of Michigan Press, 1970).

[20] In fact, more than 85 per cent of the coalitions in our universe included the largest party represented in parliament.

Limitations on the Relative Weakness Effect

While our data have shown that the relative weakness effect operates generally in the context of ministerial distributions (small parties do in fact tend to receive bonus ministries), it is not obvious that it operates uniformly in all coalition situations. In other words, are there particular sets of circumstances where the demands of small parties are less likely to be successful?

If, as we have argued, the bargaining context affords smaller parties an advantage in their dealings with coalition leaders, it might reasonably be hypothesized that this advantage will be variable according to the size of (number of parties in) the coalition. Thus we would expect that small parties will be most successful in extracting bonus ministries when there are relatively few parties represented in the coalition (two or three) and less successful as the number of coalition partners increases (four or more).

The reason for this expectation follows directly from the argument already advanced about the receipt of bonus ministries in the general case. If coalition leaders are disposed to reward their smaller partners with bonus ministries as long as such behavior does not significantly jeopardize their leadership positions, they are most likely to do so when the size of the coalition is small. This hypothesis can be supported by two lines of argument and tested with our data.

The first argument for the validity of the hypothesis may be expressed by the following syllogism:

(1) The fewer the small parties in a governing coalition, the fewer the bonus ministries that will have to be distributed.

(2) The fewer the bonus ministries distributed, the more likely it is that coalition leaders will maintain effective control over the flow of public policy.

(3) Therefore, the fewer the small parties in the coalition, the more likely is the coalition leader to maintain control over the flow of public policy.

This argument needs some explication. Since we already have established that the overwhelming number of bonus ministries are in fact distributed to small parties, the first premise has been demonstrated to be the case. The second premise depends upon the assumption that coalition leaders maintain control over the policy process through the control of ministries. Since the size of each party's ministerial holding is finite, each ministry surrendered to other parties by coalition leaders propels them toward some critical point where they will lose effective control over the policy-making process. Therefore, the implication of the conclusion to the syllogism is that coalition leaders will be progressively reluctant to surrender bonus ministries as their rate of distribution increases. Consequently, coalition leaders will be more likely to distribute bonus ministries to small parties when only a few distributions are necessary than would be the case in large coalitions where the distribution of more bonus ministries would likely be necessary.

The second line of argument states that the greater the number of parties in coalition (regardless of the sizes of individual participants), the less likely are coalition leaders to agree to distribute bonus ministries. The reasoning behind this hypothesis may also be presented in the form of a syllogism.

(1) The more parties comprising a governing coalition, the less likely coalition leaders are to maintain effective control over the flow of public policy.

(2) The less this control by coalition leaders, the less likely they are to surrender their instruments of control (ministries).

(3) Therefore, the more parties comprising a governing coalition, the less the likelihood of coalition leaders agreeing to distribute bonus ministries.

This argument also requires explication. The first premise seeks to establish a linkage between the number of coalition partners and the maintenance of control over policy by the coalition leader. Implicit in this relationship is the assumption that intracoalition agreement (and hence greater opportunities for mutual adjustment) is relatively more difficult to achieve with a large rather than small number of actors.[22] Where mutual adjustment is difficult, requiring a great deal of bargaining and compromise of policy positions, the level of control over the policy process by coalition leaders should diminish.

---

[21] We do not wish to advance this explanation as definitive since it is inferred from our data rather than being tested by them. Instead, we offer it as a tentative explanation which awaits further testing.

[22] Leiserson makes much the same point when he adds to his theory of coalition formation a "bargaining proposition" which states that in the universe of minimal winning coalitions, smaller rather than larger ones will form *regardless of which is closer to the decision point*, since bargaining difficulties among large numbers of partners are dysfunctional to the viability of the coalition.

The second premise seeks to establish a linkage between the level of control over the flow of public policy and the ministerial share of partners. Implicit here is the assumption that control of policy is exercised through the ministerial holding of parties in governing coalitions. Since we have assumed that coalition leaders are highly motivated to control the flow of public policy (i.e., to direct the policy of the government), it follows that, in situations characterized by intracoalition disagreement, coalition leaders will be more reluctant to surrender their instruments of overall policy control than would be the case in situations exhibiting a higher degree of intracoalition agreement. If both these premises are tenable, it then follows that coalition leaders are less likely to agree to distribute bonus ministries when coalitions are large (operationally defined as comprising four or more parties) then when they are small (two or three parties).

In sum, we expect to observe that the relative weakness effect (small parties are disproportionately advantaged in payoff distributions) will operate in small coalition situations. As the size of the coalition increases, however, this advantage to small parties should diminish demonstrably. In such coalitions, there should be no relationship between size and the index of overpayment, and the observed regression slope relating the number of ministries to the number of seats contributed should decline toward one-to-one proportionality.

Table 2 summarizes the relationship between coalition size and ministries received for the five different coalition sizes actually found in our universe (coalitions of five and six parties have been taken together because there was only one coalition of six parties). Although there are differences between the coefficients, the pattern is quite clear. Where there are two or three parties in a coalition, the slope coefficients are markedly higher than in the universe as a whole (which yielded a coefficient of 1.07), and the displacement coefficients are markedly lower than in the universe as a whole (−0.01). On the other hand, where there are more than three parties these characteristics are reversed; the slope coefficients decline to just below 1.0, and the displacement coefficient becomes positive.

Because of the rather low correlation found in the two-party situation, and the small number of cases comprising the five and six party situations, it is probably safest to aggregate together all small coalitions on the one hand, and all large coalitions on the other. When this is done, the regression equation describing the relationship between seats (Y) and ministries (X) in the case of small coalitions is:

$$Y = -0.05 + 1.16X \qquad \text{(Equation 2)},$$

which explains 83.8 per cent of the variance in Y ($r = 0.915$), while for large coalitions it is:

$$Y = +0.02 + 0.97X \qquad \text{(Equation 3)},$$

which explains 83.9 per cent of the variance in Y ($r = 0.916$). This means that any small party in a small coalition can expect to contribute some seven per cent fewer seats in exchange for one ministry than a small party in a large coalition. If we consider a hypothetical government with as few as twenty ministries, a small party in a small coalition can expect to receive one ministry more than would have been its due on the basis of strict proportionality (a bonus ministry). On the other hand, a very large party in a small coalition might expect to contribute some ten per cent more in terms of seats than it would receive in terms of

Table 2. Relationship Between Ministries and Seats for Coalitions of Various Sizes

Number of parties in coalition	Number of coalitions this size	Number of parties (N)	Variance explained	Correlation (Pearson's r)	Displacement (a)	Slope (b)
Two	54	114	77.6%	0.881	−0.05	1.12
Three	24	72	88.3%	0.940	−0.07	1.26
Four	26	104	81.0%	0.900	+0.02	0.98
Five & six	7	34*	96.5%	0.982	+0.02	0.92

* Two parties receiving no ministerial payoff excluded.

Table 3. Average Differences From One-to-One Proportionality Sustained Over All Parties

Size of coalition	Parties gaining in the exchange of ministries for seats		Parties losing in the exchange of ministries for seats	
	N	Mean overpayment	N	Mean underpayment
Small (2–3 partners)	90	+0.07	91	−0.10
Large (4 or more partners)	76	+0.03	64	−0.06

ministries. In our hypothetical government this would amount to a loss of two ministries.[23]

In large coalitions the relative weakness effect (the underpayment of large parties and overpayment of small parties) seems not to operate at all. The small deviation from one-to-one proportionality in the equation for such coalitions is in the opposite direction from that in the universe as a whole, but this deviation is almost certainly an artifact of the least-squares estimating procedure adopted, which underestimates the slope coefficient to some extent when a correlation is not perfect. When the index of overpayment in terms of ministries for seats (calculated by subtracting the latter from the former, as explained earlier) is correlated against size of party, the coefficient (Pearson's r), which reaches a value of −0.66 in the case of small coalitions, vanishes entirely in the case of large coalitions. Small parties in coalitions of four or more members are no more likely to receive bonus ministries than are large parties in these coalitions.

It follows from all this that if we were trying to predict the probable payoff in terms of ministries that would be received by a particular party's joining a governing coalition, we really need to know only two facts: (1) the size of the party and (2) the size of the coalition it was intending to join. From the first of these facts we could estimate the number of ministries the party might expect to receive if proportionality on a one-to-one basis were to obtain, and from the second (in conjunction with the first) we could estimate the extent to which the party was likely to do better or worse than this in the distribution. By knowing the exact number of seats a party holds, payoffs in terms of ministries can be estimated by applying the appropriate regression equation from Table 2.

Of the two factors (size of party and size of coalition), the most important is without doubt the size of party. The regression lines only differ from one another to any marked extent at their extreme ends, and few parties are either large enough or small enough to feel the full effects of this bias. Nevertheless, it can be shown that the average extent to which different parties gain and lose is quite large. Table 3 shows the average extent to which underpaid parties suffer, and the average extent to which overpaid parties gain, in the exchange of ministries for seats.

It can be seen that parties in large coalitions differ from one another to the extent of about one ministry in ten and, because we have discovered no trace of the relative weakness effect in such coalitions, these differences may be regarded as disturbances unexplained by the effect (in this analysis we treat them as random disturbances, although of course their causes may be sought in future research). In small coalitions, parties differ from one another to the extent of about one ministry in six, and the difference between this situation and that pertaining in large coalitions may be regarded as indicating the stakes of the bargaining process, which are not small.

The thrust of the two syllogisms we presented earlier was to regard gains and losses of this kind as being made in the bargaining process, rather than resulting from differences in the resources that parties contribute to the coalitions they join; but it is now evident that the resulting differences in the payoffs to different parties are almost entirely beyond the control of the parties themselves. They seem to arise from features of the party system rather than from the effects of ideology, personnel, or variations in bargaining power. Indeed, we would perhaps do well to regard those parties that gain as being the beneficiaries of fortune rather than of skill. There is room, within the variance left unexplained by our findings, for some parties to affect their fate; but not many, and not by much.[24]

---

[23] In three-party coalitions in our universe, there happens to be a much greater polarization in party sizes than in two-party coalitions, and, as can be seen from Table II, the loss to large parties amounts to an astronomical 20 per cent: fully a fifth of the ministries to which they might otherwise have been entitled, or five ministries in our hypothetical example. The figures are arrived at by subtracting the displacement coefficient from the slope coefficient for large parties, and taking the displacement coefficient itself for small parties. This procedure yields hypothetical values for parties which hold 100 per cent and 0 per cent of seats, respectively, and provides fairly accurate estimates for the largest and smallest parties in our universe.

The Distribution of "Bonus" Ministries

One last question remains to be confronted concerning payoff distributions in the quantitative dimensions. If, under certain circumstances larger parties surrender portfolios from their proportional shares to smaller partners as bonus payments, is there some typical set of such ministries, or does the payoff share of overpaid parties vary randomly as between ministerial types? That is, are there *specific* types of bonus ministry which accrue to overpaid parties such that bonus ministries may be differentiated from other portfolios included in their shares?

Parties receiving bonus ministries are those gaining in the exchange of ministries for seats: they receive proportionally more of the former than they contribute of the latter. By subtracting the proportional share of ministries received from the proportional share of seats contributed, for each party in each coalition, we may generate the same index of overpayment that we have used before. This index is positive when parties receive more ministries than they contribute seats and negative when they receive fewer ministries than they contribute seats.

In order to discover which ministerial types tend to be associated with parties overpaid and underpaid in the exchange of ministries for seats, we have correlated the proportional share of each ministerial type received by each party with the index of overpayment for that party.[25] The resulting coefficients will be positive when the ministerial type concerned tends to go to parties overpaid in the exchange of ministries for seats, and negative when that type tends to go to parties underpaid in the exchange.

When we look at the universe as a whole, the results of this analysis are not impressive. But our search for differences between individual ministerial types can be refined by looking only at those coalitions in which we know there to be a relationship between number of ministries of all kinds received and the index of overpayment. These are the small coalitions, which, as we have established, are the only ones in which bonus ministries are distributed on a systematic basis to small parties. In this subset of our universe the correlations are still not high.[26] Most

---

[24] For those who insist that party ideology is an important, if not the crucial, variable associated with coalition behavior, these results will be discouraging. Clearly, ideology can have little effect upon the quantitative distribution of government ministries. However, since it may be of more than passing interest for some scholars to know the extent to which particular ideological types of parties fare in ministerial distributions, the following table summarizes the experience of those parties which were not more or less equitably treated. The table depicts those parties which formed a sufficiently large concentration within an advantaged or disadvantaged situation as to affect noticeably the position of their ideological type taken as a whole. The numerals before the party labels indicate the number of parties concerned, and the percentage these constitute within their ideological type. Numerals following the labels indicate the average index of overpayment (proportional excess of ministries received over seats contributed) to the ideological type taken as a whole (not just for the individual parties depicted).

Ideological Types Gaining and Losing in the Exchange of Ministries for Seats

Size of Party	Size of Coalition	
	Large	Small
Large	——	7 (30%) Conservative (−0.04) 27 (41%) Religious (−0.04) 6 (21%) Agrarian (−0.05)
Small	——	23 (34%) Radical/Lib (+0.05)

Socialist and Communist parties do not figure in the table. Their distribution into different size categories was so even as to preclude any significant gain or loss to their ideological type taken as a whole. The Conservative, Religious, and Agrarian parties all had a disproportionate number of large parties in small coalitions, and this, it has been demonstrated, accompanies heavy ministerial loss. It should be clear that the only ideological type to profit in the distribution is the Radical/Liberal. This type is the only one which contains a large concentration of parties in the strategic position that characterizes small parties in small coalitions (i.e., they benefit most from the relative weakness effect). Their gains are substantial. Radical/Liberal parties, on average, provide five per cent fewer seats than they receive ministries. This represents about one ministry in twenty as a bonus in return for nothing more than their presence as coalition partners. Moreover, it is important to remember that these figures are averages and that a number of parties do even better (or worse) than they might suggest.

[25] Since larger parties are more likely to receive ministries of all types than are small parties, it is necessary to standardize the data by dividing the number of ministries of each type received by the total number of ministries of all types received by that party. This calculation yields the proportion share of each ministerial type that each party receives.

[26] Essentially this is because (as explained earlier) we are seeking to gain the maximum descriptive power from the analysis rather than to maximize the variance explained. Descriptive power is gained from simple bivariate relationships, while most variance is explained in complex multivariate relationships. We have chosen to take account of the fact that larger parties are more likely to receive a ministry of any type by dividing M (the number of any particular ministerial type received) by N (the number of all ministries of any type received). We would have done better, from

Table 4. Relationship Between Ministerial Types and the Index of Overpayment in Small Coalitions

Ministerial type*	Total distributed	Correlation (Pearson's r) with index of overpayment
Group 1		
Prime Ministership	8	−0.313
Group 2		
Finance	24	−0.086
Transport	54	−0.077
Agriculture	22	−0.068
Social Affairs	57	−0.066
Defense	8	−0.038
Justice	34	−0.031
Foreign Affairs	29	+0.012
Internal Affairs	46	+0.047
Specialized Portfolios	12	+0.079
Education	23	+0.082
Group 3		
International Trade	22	+0.134
Economic Affairs	92	+0.152

* Excludes Religious Affairs (N = 15) and Intergovernmental Affairs (N = 5)

ministries appear just about as likely to go to underpaid parties as to overpaid parties. In comparing different ministerial types with each other, however, quite small differences may be interesting.[27] The various coefficients are presented in Table 4.

The ministerial types listed are divided into three groups. The first group contains the one ministerial type which tends *not* to go to parties overpaid in the exchange of ministries for seats (parties receiving bonus ministries). The second group contains those ministerial types which go to such parties about as often as not. The final group contains the only ministerial types which are at all likely to be found among the portfolios distributed to parties overpaid in the exchange. Within group two, those ministerial types accompanied by positive coefficients are somewhat more likely to be distributed to overpaid parties than those ministerial types accompanied by negative coefficients.[28]

The major finding to be derived from Table 4 is that most ministerial types are about as likely as not to go to parties overpaid in the bargaining process. Only International Trade and Economic Affairs are noticeably more often distributed to overpaid parties than are other ministerial types. At the same time, one ministerial type—the Prime Ministership—is most unlikely to be found among the portfolios distributed to overpaid parties.

In order to gain some idea of the actual extent to which overpaid parties were more likely to receive those ministries in Group 3 than they were to receive ministries in Groups 1 and 2, the mean proportion of each ministerial type received by small parties in small coalitions was calculated. This proportion was then standardized according to the relative number of ministries of that type distributed in the whole universe (obviously, any party is more likely to find a ministry of Economic Affairs among its portfolios, when 92 of these ministries were distributed). A party's mean probability of receiving any one of the ministries in each of the three groups is presented in Table 5, in which the parties are divided between those which were overpaid in the distribution and those which were underpaid.

Table 5. Mean Proportion Shares of Standardized Ministries Distributed to Second and Third Parties in Coalitions of Less Than Four

Ministerial types	Overpaid (N = 75)	Underpaid (N = 34)
Group 1	1.28%	0.96% (N = 2)
Group 2	5.64%	7.08%
Group 3	8.82%	6.28%

---

the point of view of explaining variance, to take out N as a separate term in a multiple regression equation of the form

$$M = a + b_1N + b_2I + b_3NI + e,$$

where M and N are as described above, I is the index of overpayment, and NI is the interaction term for the joint effect of size and overpayment. Such an analysis in fact explains between 3 per cent and 43 per cent of the variance in the distribution of different ministerial types; with a low multiple correlation of 0.176 for specialized portfolios, and a high multiple correlation of 0.660 for prime ministerships. The relationship we are interested in, however, then becomes some function of b_2 and b_3 which is relatively hard to describe.

[27] It should be borne in mind that because we are dealing with a universe rather than with a sample, there is no question of whether our coefficients are statistically significant. Even the smallest r describes a real relationship.

[28] It should be borne in mind that ministries have been assigned to types on the grounds of their area of concern, not their value in any ordinal sense. When several portfolios have the same area of concern, all were assigned to the same category, though only one of them would normally be honored with the title of the category concerned. This is particularly important in the case of the Foreign Affairs ministerial type, which often contains a number of portfolios other than that actually called the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. If these additional portfolios are excluded from the analysis, this ministerial type correlates negatively with the index of overpayment, though not strongly enough to take it out of group two.

From this table it can be seen that small overpaid parties in small coalitions were more than four times as likely to find one of the ministries in Group 2 among their portfolios than to find the Prime Ministership, and about seven times as likely to find one of the ministries in Group 3. By contrast, underpaid parties were no more likely to find a Group 3 ministry among their portfolios than one from Group 2.

But while small overpaid parties may be more likely to find one of the ministries in Group 3 among their portfolios than any other individual ministerial type, nevertheless, since this group is small, all parties will in aggregate receive most ministries from Group 2. This fact is reflected in the low correlations reported in Table 4.

Even had the correlations in that table been higher, however, we would not, strictly speaking, have been justified in drawing final conclusions about whether or not any particular ministerial type tended to be distributed as a specific bonus ministry. (If several ministries are distributed to one overpaid party, which of these ministries is responsible for the overpayment of that party?) If, however, any ministerial type always formed part of the set of ministries distributed to overpaid parties, it would be *quite likely* that this ministerial type was distributed as a specific bonus. Thus we would have been prepared to infer that any ministerial type correlating strongly with the index of overpayment was a ministerial type that could be specifically identified with the notion of bonus ministries. Failing any such high correlations, we cannot tell whether parties distinguish sharply between their proportional share of ministerial payoffs and the addition to that share which constitutes a specific bonus ministry. So we tentatively conclude that, while some ministerial types are more likely to be distributed to overpaid parties than others, all ministries going to such parties partake equally of the attributes of bonus ministries.

But we have found that some ministerial types partake of these attributes more often than others. This raises the question whether parties overpaid in the quantitative dimension (receive proportionately more ministries than they contribute seats) are compensatingly underpaid in the qualitative dimension. This would be the case if those ministries most likely to be distributed as bonus ministries were also those of least value to the recipients. Since we do not know how parties rank different ministries (or, indeed, whether different parties have similar preference orderings) we can do no more than speculate upon this point. It is noteworthy, however, that if one splits the list of ministries presented in Table IV in half, dividing it in the middle of Group Two at the point between Foreign Affairs and Internal Affairs, those ministerial types below the line (correlating more than 0.04 with the index of overpayment) might generally be regarded as being less valuable to the recipients than those above the line (correlating less than 0.04 with the index of overpayment).

Thus the qualitative differences between the values of different ministries are likely to mitigate some of the inequities in the numerical payoff accruing to coalition patterns that we have found to exist in small coalitions. Confirmation of this hypothesis, however, must await further research.

Summary Propositions

In this paper we have been preoccupied with the exploration of one overriding problem: How can we account for payoff distributions in governing coalitions? The findings of our research verify a number of propositions describing the structure of coalition payoffs which may now be stated more explicitly.

P_1 The percent ministries received by parties in governing coalitions is, over all cases examined, directly proportional to the percent seats they contribute to the coalition.

This proposition is the general finding of the research and is the major hypothesis (or assumption) issuing from Gamson's theory of coalition formation. What it states is that, in general, we find the proportionality proposition operative in the ministerial distributions of governing coalitions. Our findings also disclose, however, that there are a number of limiting factors operating in governing coalitions which, in some cases, produce results other than direct proportionality.

P_2 The size of the party, and the size of the coalition it joins, will determine the extent to which the percent ministries it receives are directly proportional on a one-to-one basis with the percent seats it contributes.

Proposition Two lists the major variables which determine the exact nature of the numerical distribution of ministries in governing coalitions. Here, variation between the parties on these two variables will determine the extent to which they receive their directly proportional share of ministries.

P_{2a} Large parties in small coalitions are underpaid (receive less than their proportional share) in the distribution of government ministries.

P_{2b} Small parties in small coalitions are overpaid (receive more than their proportional share) in the distribution of government ministries.

P_{2c} Medium-sized parties in small coalitions (less than four partners) tend to receive a share of government ministries directly proportional to their seat shares.

P_{2d} All parties in large coalitions tend to receive a share of government ministries directly proportional to their seat shares.

It should be noted that the effect of overpayment or underpayment is most pronounced at the extremities of variation in party size. This means that many of the deviations from direct proportionality which are found occuring *between* these extremes of variation are more likely to be computational—they do not necessarily result in the actual distribution of a bonus ministry.

A third proposition, relating to the nature of bargaining over the distribution of ministries in governing coalitions, may be inferred from our research.

P_3 Parties in governing coalitions restrict their bargaining over the distribution of ministries to the question of which ministries each partner is to receive.

It is important to note that this proposition is not demonstrated by the data. Rather, it is a logical inference which follows from the premise that the basic nature of payoff distributions in governing coalitions is two-dimensional, and the fact that the number of ministries distributed to parties is proportional to their seat holding.

Since, in general, proportional distributions in the quantitative dimension indicate that exchanges across both dimensions do not occur frequently, it seems reasonable to conclude that bargaining over the number of portfolios each partner is to receive does not occur. Rather, it is more plausible to think of such distributions as institutional features, or "givens," of the bargaining context. In Schelling's terminology, proportional distributions in the quantitative dimension would constitute "focal point solutions"—outcomes mutually agreeable because they are obvious or natural.[29]

But while we may reasonably expect that cross-dimensional bargaining is rare when the proportionality relationship operates, it was pointed out that in some cases parties are overpaid in the quantitative dimesion and in some they are underpaid (Propositions $2_{a,b}$). When such imbalances occur we may expect some kind of cross-dimensional bargaining to occur.

P_4 Depending on whether or not parties in governing coalitions are quantitatively overpaid (underpaid), they will tend to receive a disproportionate share of particular ministries in the distribution.

This proposition, while generally consistent with our findings, is not itself sufficient to demonstrate the existence of cross-dimensional bargaining. What it does tell us is that a particular set of ministries goes disproportionately to those parties which are most likely to receive bonus ministries, and that at least one type of ministery tends to go to parties which surrender ministries. What it does not tell us is the preference ordering each party holds for the set of ministries distributed. If we knew this ordering, we would be able to make a judgment about the extent to which most preferred ministries accompanied the surrender of bonus ministries (indicating overpayment on the qualitative dimension for these parties) and the extent to which least desired ministries accompanied the receipt of bonus ministries (indicating underpayment on the qualitative dimension). While we have no objective method of ranking the ministries according to the degree of party preference, our ranking of the ministries supports intuitive judgments about the values of particular portfolios. In general, parties which receive bonus ministries tend also to receive a disproportionate quantity of "less valued" ministries, and those surrendering bonus ministries, a disproportionate quantity of "more valued" ministries. This would seem to indicate that, in effect, the lower value of the surrendered ministries serves to mitigate the degree of inequality (negative deviation from proportionality) suffered by coalition leaders when they surrender bonus ministries. Too much should not be made of this conclusion, however, since, strictly speaking, our data are insufficient to demonstrate it.

Unresolved Issues

While we may now know a great deal more about payoff distributions in governing coalitions than when we started, a number of interesting problems remain unresolved. Two of these strike us as being particularly important. First, we still know very little about ministerial distributions in the qualitative dimension. If the number of ministries distributed in governing coalitions is a given in the bargaining context, this means that most of the politically relevant activity which occurs in distributions of the payoff is relatively unexplored. Which ministries go to which parties? What variables are responsible for distributions in the qualitative dimension?

---

[29] Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963), especially Chap. 3.

Our research has only been able to illuminate a small corner of this question. By discovering that a particular set of ministries is disproportionately received by parties overpaid in the numerical distribution, we may initiate an inquiry into the question of why this particular set was received rather than some other. Does the fact that Radical/Liberal parties make up a sizable proportion of the parties in this group influence the composition of the particular set of ministries it receives? If Communist parties constituted a large proportion of this overpaid group of parties, would the Interior Ministry have been included in this particular group of ministries? In short, is ideological status an important variable in determining the qualitative distribution of government ministries, or has it no effect?

The second problem which warrants investigation is the connection our research has with the development of coalition theory. We began our analysis with a proposition derived from Gamson's theory of coalition formation. Our findings have vindicated the accuracy of his judgment regarding the proportional nature of payoff distributions in governing coalitions. However, the fact that Gamson's major hypothesis has been at least partially verified empirically does not in itself justify our confidence in the ability of his theory to explain coalition formation. In fact, using the same universe of coalitions to test the ability of Gamson's theory to predict coalition formation outcomes, one of the authors has shown that the theory is deficient in this respect.[30] If the theory is unable to predict formation outcomes, but, at the same time, the major assumption upon which its predictive ability rests has been empirically verified, how can these apparently contradictory findings be reconciled?

These are difficult questions for the study of political coalitions. The importance of finding answers for them, however, must not be underestimated. After all, payoffs, and the assumptions made about them, are the foundation upon which coalition theory is built, and until we are informed by more systematic research in this area, the explanations provided by theories of coalition formation will remain somewhat ambiguous and incomplete.

[30] See Eric C. Browne, "Testing Theories of Coalition Formation in the European Context," *Comparative Political Studies,* 3 (January, 1971), 391–410. Here, we are concerned with determining the extent to which the theories of Gamson, Riker, and Leiserson are able to predict coalition formation outcomes in our universe of thirteen European democracies. Gamson's theory (and Riker's) only had about two chances in a hundred of predicting correctly the formation of an actual winning from sets including all possible winning coalitions. Leiserson's theory, while somewhat better a predictor than the others, also performed poorly.

The Concept of Organizational Goal*

LAWRENCE B. MOHR
University of Michigan

Much has been written in recent years about the concept of organizational goal, some of it rather discouraging; the most frequently cited papers offer little hope that the concept will have any real utility for social scientists. This is a most unfortunate state of affairs, for the idea would appear on the surface to have great potential value in political science, as well as in other modern disciplines with an interest in the development of organization theory. A good conceptualization is needed, first of all, as a criterion against which organizational effectiveness and efficiency may be evaluated. Second, the organizational goal is important as a dependent variable. We are interested in whether organizations have goals or not, under what conditions they have goals, and under what conditions some kinds of organizational goals are more probable or more salient than others. In addition, the goal concept could be useful for classifying organizations into categories demanding different explanatory models of behavior.

No doubt, a large proportion of what organizations and their members do is best explained with models that do *not* include the notion of organizational goals, or even, perhaps, of any sort of goals as independent variables.[1] Organizational behavior is Hardyesque; it depends upon the fortuitous, complex, and obscure confluence of many distantly related streams; it depends upon the solutions that happen to be there when the problems arise. There is utility in developing models for the explanation of behavior at this level, if only to drive home the point that so much of organizational behavior is not clearly goal-directed. On the other hand, some of the most important questions we have about organizational behavior are: (a) Is this organization turning out a good product or service? Is it doing a good job? and (b) What kind of an institution is it? What values does it stress in order to remain a viable structure: its professional prestige? its good relations with the local community? its attractiveness to the managerial class? For these kinds of questions, the organizational goal concept and satellite concepts to be discussed below may indeed be useful components of empirically based explanatory models. But further, to neglect to come to terms with the concept may well be to neglect substantially these significant areas of research.

The two primary purposes of the present paper are dovetailed in succeeding sections. One purpose will be to review critically some important views of the organizational goal concept presented by social scientists. In so doing, the attempt will not be to catalog every work that mentions "goal" conceptually, but rather to select for more careful, critical analysis those views that contribute to perspective and that have set important definitional trends. The second purpose is to weave some of these strands together in order to produce a more concrete and comprehensive conceptualization than those presently available. Operationalization will also be discussed, as well as several implications of the kind of goal model offered. Specifically, organizational goals will be viewed as multiple rather than unitary, empirical rather than imputed, and as dichotomized into outwardly- and inwardly-oriented categories, here to be labeled "transitive" and "reflexive," respectively.

Some Seminal Conceptualizations

Cartwright and Zander draw a valuable distinction between the goal of an individual in a group, the goal of an individual *for* a group, and the goal *of* a group, or a group goal.[2] The first refers to individual attainment, while the latter two refer to group or organizational attainment. In addition, the first two are *held* individually, while the last is held collectively. We will be concerned here primarily with the last, the group goal, collective in both of these senses.

---

* The many colleagues and students who commented helpfully on earlier versions of this paper are far too numerous to mention individually, but I should like to acknowledge my collective debt to them all. Work on this paper was begun while I was a Research Associate at the School of Public Health, with support from the Public Health Service grant no. CHS 00044, and continued during my present affiliation with the Institute of Public Policy Studies, both at The University of Michigan.

[1] See, for example, Michael D. Cohen, James G. March, and Johan P. Olsen, "A Garbage Can Model of Organizational Choice," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 17 (March, 1972), 1–25.

[2] Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, "Motivational Processes in Groups: Introduction," in *Group Dynamics*, 3rd ed., ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), pp. 403–407.

Without being very systematic about it, the writing of early organizational analysts such as Weber[3] and Michels[4] was permeated with the idea that organizations have identifiable goals, intuitively perceived to be concerned with the organization's official mission or function in society. The idea was strengthened when Parsons made goal orientation in this sense a defining characteristic of organization.[5] Terms like "the organizational goal," "the goals of the organization," "achieving its goals," and so on, still appear commonly in this sense of primary function within the superordinate social system. This view has weaknesses that make it highly vulnerable. For one, it is nonspecific, nonoperational. For another, it tends to confuse imputed social function with empirical organizational purpose.[6]

An attack on the "goal model" of organizational analysis was launched by Etzioni in 1960[7] and sustained subsequently by himself[8] and by other organization theorists, especially Seashore and Yuchtman.[9] Etzioni does not say what he means by the "goal model," but he appears to refer to the evaluation of organizations in terms of their primary mission or function. His chief criticisms are (a) that such analyses are not worthwhile because they always predictably find organizations to be ineffective, (b) that empirical analysis generally shows organizations to be pursuing objectives not contemplated by the goal model, and (c) that ascribing a particular societal function to an organization is simply a matter of the value bias of the analyst.

Etzioni's conclusion is that the concept of organizational goal should be abandoned, as an evaluation criterion, in favor of what he calls a "system model."[10] The criterion of effectiveness replacing goal achievement in this model is either (1) an "optimum" or "balanced" allocation of resources[11]—the "system survival model"—or (2) "a pattern of interrelations among the elements of the system which would make it most effective in the service of a given goal"[12]—the "system effectiveness model." In the first instance, Etzioni offers us no criteria for determining an optimal balance of resources and even suggests that organizational analysts make their own independent determinations![13] In the second instance (the system effectiveness model), Etzioni returns explicitly to goal attainment as the criterion of effectiveness. There is a difference from former views, however, in that the central concept is no longer simply assumed to be "primary mission" or "social purpose." Etzioni defines an organizational goal as "a desired state of affairs which the organization attempts to realize," and as "that future state of affairs which the organization as a collectivity is trying to bring about."[14] He recommends operationalizing this concept by asking participants what the organizational goals seem to be and by making certain behavioral observations, such as of budgets and the minutes of board meetings.[15] It is the official mission concept that must apparently be abandoned, then, in favor of an empirical determination of the goals of organizations.[16]

In spite of having suggested this different and promising conceptualization, Etzioni does not advocate a focus on goals either for evaluating or for "studying" organizations.[17] Instead, he proposes that we rely upon the system effectiveness model (which, however, contains the concept of organizational goal as its central element). Etzioni's position is not clear. Although he explicitly derogates the utility of the goal concept even after redefining it, let us conclude that he does not foreclose the possibility that it may profitably be used in organizational analysis.

To Etzioni's notion of the optimum *allocation* of resources, Yuchtman and Seashore have added the idea of ability to acquire resources. In lieu of a focus on goals, they propose defining an organization's effectiveness "in terms of its bargaining position, as reflected in the ability of the organization, in either absolute or relative terms, to exploit its environment in the acquisition of scarce and valued resources."[18]

---

[3] Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, trans. A. M. Henderson and ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: Oxford, 1947), pp. 337–341.

[4] Robert Michels, *Political Parties*, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Dover, 1959).

[5] Talcott Parsons, "Suggestions for a Sociological Approach to the Theory of Organizations—I." *Administrative Science Quarterly* 1 (June, 1956), 64–67.

[6] Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, 3rd ed. (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 114–115.

[7] Amitai Etzioni, "Two Approaches to Organizational Analysis: A Critique and a Suggestion," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 5 (Sept., 1960), 257–278.

[8] Amitai Etzioni, *Modern Organizations* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. 1964).

[9] Stanley Seashore and Ephraim Yuchtman, "Factorial Analysis of Organizational Performance," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 12 (Dec., 1967), 377–395; Ephraim Yuchtman and Stanley Seashore, "A System Resource Approach to Organizational Effectiveness," *American Sociological Review* 32 (Dec., 1967), 891–903.

[10] Etzioni, "Two Approaches," p. 261.

[11] Etzioni, "Two Approaches," p. 262.

[12] Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*, p. 19.

[13] Etzioni, "Two Approaches," p. 270.

[14] Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*, p. 6.

[15] Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*.

[16] Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*, pp. 14–16.

[17] Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*.

Unfortunately, without the concept of organizational goal, resource acquisition fails to satisfy as a criterion of effectiveness. Yuchtman and Seashore themselves admit that "a crucial problem in this context is the determination of the relevant and critical resources to be used as a basis for absolute or comparative assessment of organizational effectiveness."[19] In truth, the determination of which resources one should count either must be arbitrary or must appeal to the concept of organizational goal. It is possible to find in some manner that the goal of a specific organization is, purely and simply, to acquire certain resources. If that is not the case, then one must identify other goals in order to establish which resources are important for attaining them. Either way, the concept of goal is essential, although in the second case the goals themselves may often be assumed or implicit.

A third view calling the utility of the organizational goal concept into question comes from Simon and his colleagues.[20] The basis of the attack is, in essence, that no goal is *the* goal—that in order to understand why people do the things they do in organizations, one must take into consideration a whole host of goals. Instead of a goal, then, a set of constraints is offered; which of these, if any, might be considered principal or major depends upon one's vantage point from within the organizational coalition.

> In the decision-making situations of real life, a course of action, to be acceptable, must satisfy a whole set of requirements, or constraints. Sometimes one of these requirements is singled out and referred to as the goal of the action. But the choice of one of the constraints, from many, is to a large extent arbitrary. For many purposes it is more meaningful to refer to the whole set of requirements as the (complex) goal of the action. This conclusion applies both to individual and organizational decision making.[21]

This conceptualization has been helpful in building detailed simulations of organizational decision making,[22] but it is unsatisfying as a general definition for two reasons. First, it is cumbersome. For example, to evaluate organizational effectiveness in terms of the organizational goal, or goal set, one must first determine the composition of the set, which will generally be impressively large, and then sum across the levels of attainment of all constraints in the set. This task would rarely if ever be undertaken by an analyst, thus rendering the idea of the effectiveness and efficiency of an organization almost completely useless. The same may be said for the goal concept as an element of behavioral hypotheses. For example, it would be most awkward to test the proposition that, "The less the subjective operationality of organizational goals, the greater the differentiation of individual goals in the organization."[23] The constraint set that constitutes "organizational goals" in this hypothesis would be unmanageably large for research, except in the simplest of organizations. Such research is therefore very unlikely to be carried out. Second, and more important, Simon's conceptualization merely shifts the need for definition from the term "goal" to the term "constraint." We have no rule for determining what is or is not a constraint that is part of the set of constraints that comprises the organizational goal. There is a modicum of further specification in terms of "the goals and constraints appropriate to the role,"[24] but this is only slightly less precise than the term "constraint set" itself.

Although the theoretical treatments reviewed thus far intentionally lead away, in many respects, from a clear conceptualization of the organizational goal, they also make several constructive contributions. One is that a useful conceptualization of this concept is likely to call for the empirical determination of goals, not for the declaration of an official mission or some imputation of goals by the analyst. Another is that organizations may and often do seek to achieve not just one but a great variety of goals. No unitary definition or conceptualization is likely to be useful.

Indeed, there are overwhelming numbers of intentions swarming in, over, and around organizations, all potentially eligible to be considered an organizational goal. The problem is to impose order upon them productively so that not everything is admissible, for in that case nothing is useful. This problem further divides into two subproblems, as follows:

Common usage, as indicated by all leading dictionary definitions, suggests that a goal is *an intent to achieve some outcome*. To determine what is an organizational goal, then, one must separate out (1) what is *organizational,* i.e., how *intent* is to be considered at the collective level, and (2) what is a *goal* rather than, say, a subgoal, function, motive, or activity, i.e., what *kind of outcome* is to be admitted. Each of these subproblems will be considered with some care.

---

[18] Yuchtman and Seashore, p. 898.

[19] Yuchtman and Seashore, p. 901.

[20] Richard M. Cyert and James G. March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), pp. 26–43; Herbert A. Simon, "On the Concept of Organizational Goal," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 9 (June, 1964), 1–22.

[21] Simon, p. 7.

[22] Cyert and March.

[23] James G. March and Herbert A. Simon, *Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1958), pp. 125–126.

[24] Simon, p. 13.

Intent

Let us recall some of the surprisingly few attempts to define the term "organizational goal" directly and fully. Etzioni: "An organizational goal is a desired state of affairs which the organization attempts to realize;"[25] Cartwright and Zander: "A *group goal* specifies a preferred state for the group as an entity and guides collective action toward achieving it;"[26] Warner: "By an organizational goal I mean a state of affairs or situation which does not exist at present but is intended to be brought into existence in the future by the activities of the organization."[27]

Considering the question, "Whose intent?" it is quite clear upon close inspection of the wording of these definitions that they do not directly meet the personification, or reification problem,[28] that is, they do imply that the collective body "desires" or "intends" or "prefers" something but they are evasive when it comes to communicating what is meant by such notions when attached to a group, which is but an abstraction, rather than to some individual person with the physiological capacity to "intend."

Thompson provides a definition that purports to overcome the personification problem. He considers the goals *of* the organization, or organizational goals, to be the goals *for* the organization held by those in the dominant coalition.[29] Thus, the element of intent is transferred from the abstract group to specific individuals. Upon close inspection, Thompson's definition of organizational goals is troublesome in two respects. First, it discreetly attempts to substitute for the burden of defining the goals of an organization the equally difficult task of defining the goals of a group within it. Second, it imposes another difficult and heavily burdensome chore—that of successfully defining and identifying the group that is dominant, that has power.[30] Moreover, Thompson is frank to say that he does not really define the collective purpose; rather, he attempts a substitution. Let us, instead, constitute the collective goal in part by naming and employing a *collective analog* of individual intent, thus meeting the personification problem directly and specifically.

Collectivities have two relevant kinds of measured characteristics—let us call them "global" and "analytical," after Lazarsfeld and Menzel.[31] A global characteristic is one that inheres in the collectivity itself and is not some statistical combination of the traits of individuals. Organizational size and growth, for example, are global characteristics; we cannot measure them by taking the size or growth of organizational members and somehow adding them up. Organizational professionalization and morale, on the other hand, generally are analytical, or aggregated characteristics; we determine their levels by summing or averaging the professional attainment or the morale of the individual organizational members. Organizational prestige exemplifies a characteristic that might be of either type.

If we are to retain the idea of intent in the idea of goal, then an organizational goal must be an analytical characteristic, for only the individual human members can intend anything. Thus, we must aggregate, and it remains only to select a convincing mode of aggregation, such as average intensity, unanimity, or majority opinion. The choice is essentially arbitrary, but the best candidate would seem to be the concept of consensus, as in Thompson's "domain consensus."[32] It is preferable because it connotes a certain unanimity, but it does not necessarily imply enthusiasm, spontaneous selection, top priority or exclusive preoccupation. Consensus means explicit or tacit agreement among those concerned that a certain behavior will under the circumstances be followed, notwithstanding the possibility that some might prefer other available alternatives.[33] A group goal, then, connotes collective intent, e.g., *a consensus of intent.*

---

[25] Etzioni, *Modern Organizations,* p. 6.

[26] Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, "Individual Motives and Group Goals: Introduction," in *Group Dynamics,* 2nd ed., ed. Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander (New York: Row, Peterson, 1960), p. 349.

[27] W. Keith Warner, "Problems in Measuring the Goal Attainment of Voluntary Organizations," *Journal of Adult Education* 19 (Fall, 1967), 5.

[28] Cf. James D. Thompson, *Organizations in Action* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), pp. 127–128; Simon, p. 1.

[29] Thompson, p. 128.

[30] See James G. March, "The Power of Power," in *Varieties of Political Theory,* ed. David Easton (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), p. 70.

[31] Paul F. Lazarsfeld and Herbert Menzel, "On the Relation Between Individual and Collective Properties," in *Complex Organizations,* ed. Amitai Etzioni (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1961), pp. 422–440.

[32] Thompson, pp. 28–29.

[33] Cyert and March, *A Behavioral Theory of the Firm* (p. 28), reject the idea of consensus, but only because, undoubtedly, there is rarely if ever a common preference ordering among organizational members. Surely, this is asking too much. Even an individ-

Perrow's concept of "operative goals" is closely allied, though not identical: "Operative goals designate the ends sought through the actual operating policies of the organization."[34] Both Thompson and Perrow are suggesting a force that would appear to be as important in research as the goal concept itself. What they emphasize is not a definition of organizational goals, but an empirical assessment of the objectives, of whatever kind, that determine main streams of organizational behavior. The goals for the organization held by certain individuals or sets of individuals can be extremely influential; chief executives, to take just one example, commonly are able to impose their wills upon much of the behavior of their organizations. In the sequel, we will refer both to true organizational goals, which connote collective intent, and to operative goals.

Outcome

Having considered intent, let us turn to the second essential element in the definition of goal, the idea of an outcome. At this point, several terms will be introduced as they are discussed in a most helpful paper by Deniston, Rosenstock, and Getting.[35] Their concern was with the evaluation of public health programs. A *program* they define essentially as an objective plus the collection of resources and activities organized to attain it. An *objective* in their terminology is some state or condition of people or other components of the environment of the program that is deemed desirable for the program to attain. An important distinction is also made in their analytical framework between objectives and *activities*—an objective is a condition; an activity represents some effort of program personnel to bring that condition about. For example, the program objective can be "clean restaurants," but not "inspecting restaurants." A final significant distinction is drawn between a program objective and a subobjective. The latter is an instrumental condition; it is a prerequisite that must be attained in order that the program objective may be attained.

Thinking of a program, for the moment, as the collectivity of concern, the program goal would be the collective intent of program members to achieve some outcome. We may follow Deniston et al.,[36] Warner,[37] and others in specifying that this outcome must be a state or condition, but of what? Deniston and his colleagues concentrate almost exclusively on conditions external to the program, but they do also mention the possibility of "survival programs."[38] It is well that they do, for a very substantial proportion of organizational effort is often unmistakably oriented in this direction. On the other hand, Gross[39] and Cartwright and Zander[40] specify a state or location of the group itself, but this criterion alone is not adequate either. Considering that one of a health agency's important goal types, for example, may be framed in terms of better health status within the community, it would be stretching matters considerably to consider this objective somehow to refer to a state of the organization.

Perrow has suggested classifying goals into two groups according to whether their referent outcomes are internal or external to the organization.[41] At about the same time, Gross also identified the dual goal concept and included it in research. He has suggested that organizations may be considered as having *output* goals and *support* goals.[42] Output goals are "reflected in" some product or service that will affect society outside the organization.[43] Support goals have to do with attaining the conditions necessary for system survival—that is, with maintaining the organization itself.[44] In a survey of American universities, Gross specified 47 separate goals, divided them into these two categories, and further allocated them to subcategories. The output goals are misleadingly stated in terms of organizational activities or product characteristics, but they tend to suggest an im-

---

ual may well not have a clear preference ordering among his values, yet each value in the list is undeniably a value nonetheless. In the same sense, there may be a consensus on several goals within a group, but little interpersonal consensus on their *ranking*.

[34] Charles Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals in Complex Organizations," *American Sociological Review*, 26 (Dec., 1961), 855.

[35] O. L. Deniston, I. M. Rosenstock, and V. A. Getting, "Evaluation of Program Effectiveness," *Public Health Reports* 83 (April, 1968), 325–326.

[36] Deniston.

[37] Warner, p. 5.

[38] Deniston, p. 330.

[39] Edward Gross, "The Definition of Organizational Goals," *British Journal of Sociology* 20 (Sept., 1969), 293.

[40] Cartwright and Zander, "Motivational Processes," *Group Dynamics*, 2nd ed., p. 401.

[41] Charles Perrow, "Organizational Goals," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, ed. David Sills (New York: Macmillan and Free Press, 1968), Vol. 11, pp. 306–309. These ideas have been substantially elaborated by Perrow in his recent book, *Organizational Analysis: A Sociological Review* (Belmont, Calif.: Wadsworth, 1970), pp. 133–174.

[42] Gross, pp. 282–286.

[43] Gross, p. 287.

[44] Gross, pp. 282–283.

pact of the organization upon something outside of itself. The support goals are also stated primarily in terms of activities, but with few exceptions each denotes the objective of keeping the organizational coalition together by providing the members of a subgroup some inducement to remain and contribute.[45] Thus, it appears that we may with great profit consider goals to be of two basic types, those referring to a state of the program or organization itself and those referring to a state of its environment.[46] Accordingly, we will consider that *a program and an organization may have two distinct types of goals: a "transitive," externally oriented, or functional goal, and a "reflexive," internally oriented, or institutional goal.*[47] Moreover, it is important to note that this dichotomy applies not only to true collective goals, but to operative goals and other "goals for" the organization, as well.

We may now specifically define a program goal as *the collective intent of program members to bring about some specific state of the program itself or of its environment.*

One begins by identifying any product or service that is collectively produced, such as restaurant inspections, refrigerators, or antitrust prosecutions. The program is the collectivity, including human effort and other resources, that is oriented toward producing it. The program goal is its intended impact. If the intended impact is a condition outside of the program (e.g., the good health of people drinking inspected milk), then the goal is transitive in character; if it is the program itself (e.g., the prestige of the political science department or the profitability of the firm), then it is reflexive.

Optionally, one may define *organization* as being precisely synonymous with program. Let us accept that definition here. For terminological convenience, however, we will want to consider an organization as "complex," that is, as a program containing several other programs. In this sense, then, what is an *organizational* goal?

An organizational goal is the goal of a program occurring within the organization and under its auspices whose direct referent is either the organization itself as an institution or some aspect of the organization's environment. For example:

(a) That the line units in a manufacturing firm find their equipment dependable may be a goal (transitive) of the equipment maintenance program, but it is not an organizational goal for the firm, since its referent is neither the whole organization nor its environment.

(b) The survival goal of the heart disease control program of the New York City Health Department may be a goal (reflexive) of the program, but not of the department, for its referent is, again, suborganizational.

(c) The goal specifying improvement in the level and severity of heart disease in New York City is an organizational goal (transitive) of the health department, since its referent is indeed the environment of the health department; so, in precisely the same sense, is the product quality goal of the manufacturing firm, insofar as this is directed toward the utility of the product for the consumer.

Elaboration of the Goal Concept

Before turning to operationalization and implications, let us elaborate briefly on several key aspects of the concept of organizational goal.

Transitive Goals. A transitive goal is one whose referent is outside of or in the environment of the organization in question. Several aspects of the concept of organizational goal in general are important to bear in mind when considering what would and what would not qualify as a transitive organizational goal. Particularly, the referent is a condition, not an activity of organizational personnel, and it must be at the organizational level, so that subgoals are excluded. *A transitive goal is thus an intended impact of the organization upon its environment.*

---

[45] Edward Gross, "Universities as Organizations: A Research Approach," *American Sociological Review*, 33 (Aug., 1968), 518–544. Gross suggests that these two types of goals are co-equal ("Organizational Goals," pp. 291–292), but his discussion in general, especially as it includes the label "support goals," implies that these latter are subordinate and instrumental to the output goals. What is lacking is explicit recognition of what may be deduced by careful scrutiny of the goals he investigated, viz., that the "support goals" are in fact oriented toward benefitting the members of the organization itself.

[46] See Robert F. Bales and Philip E. Slater, "Role Differentiation in Small Decision-making Groups," in *Family, Socialization and Interaction Process*, ed. Talcott Parsons and Robert F. Bales (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955), pp. 259–306; Chester I. Barnard, *The Functions of the Executive* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1938), pp. 55–56; Dorwin Cartwright and Alvin Zander, "Leadership and Performance of Group Functions: Introduction," in Cartwright and Zander, *Group Dynamics*, 3rd ed., pp. 306–307; Karl W. Deutsch, *The Nerves of Government* (New York: Free Press, 1963), pp. 92–93; James K. Dent, "Organizational Correlates of the Goals of Business Management," *Journal of Personnel Psychology* 12 (Autumn, 1959), 365–393; Amitai Etzioni, *A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations* (New York: Free Press, 1961), pp. 89–126; Frank Friedlander and Hal Pickle, "Components of Effectiveness in Small Organizations," *Administrative Science Quarterly* 13 (Sept., 1968), p. 292; and Daniel Katz and Robert L. Kahn, *The Social Psychology of Organizations* (New York: Wiley, 1966), p. 66.

[47] The usage of the terms "transitive" and "reflexive" here is somewhat closer to their application in grammar than in mathematics. "Transitive" has the sense of a verb taking a direct object—the organization has an impact on something else. "Reflexive" refers to what the organization does for itself.

An organization providing goods or services (a "transitive" organization) has as a final activity the exportation of a product or service to its environment: inspecting restaurants, selling refrigerators, lending library books, disseminating antiwhiskey propaganda. These interface transactions do not quite extend into the area that may be considered "impact." Rather, it is the *program hypothesis* that this transaction will have a certain result—that restaurants will be clean, food will be unspoiled, people will be informed and entertained, alcoholism will be controlled. These dependent variables are the transitive goals, and testing this hypothesis is what program evaluation is all about.

It is useful to refer at this point to a concept from Deniston et al.,[48] that we may call the "transitive objective line." Clearly, the program goal may always be rationalized in terms of some further objective.[49] For example, a possible organizational goal of a highway department such as "more traffic to and from this specific area" may be seen as a subobjective of goals further to the right along the objective line, such as "increased commercial activity in the area." One may well want to select only the most immediate impact of a program as its transitive goal. At times, however, justification of a program's existence or budgetary support may require that one also consider a further objective—one that might make the validity of the resulting program hypothesis much more dubious. For example, wiretapping may clearly increase the rate of convictions in narcotics cases (a "proximate" goal), but does it reduce traffic in narcotics (an "ultimate" goal)? Restaurant inspections may result in cleaner restaurants (proximate goal), but do they result in a reduction in the incidence of food-borne diseases (ultimate goal)? Awareness of the concept of objective line may inform both policy debate and organizational planning.

Reflexive Goals. Turning to reflexive considerations, one readily concludes that the idea of internally oriented goals, institutional goals, maintenance goals, system goals, or support goals, as they have been variously called, is ultimately best expressed in terms of inducements-contributions theory.[50] Thus, we may identify as the general reflexive goal of an organization that *inducements will be sufficient to evoke adequate contributions from all members of the organizational coalition.* The term "adequate" in this context can only mean adequate for survival.

This broad statement in no way precludes or questions the utility of various subclassification schemes, such as those used by Perrow[51] or Gross.[52] For example, one might strive for a productive classification of reflexive subobjectives into categories such as organizational prestige, growth, and profitability (or "fair share" of appropriations).[53] Furthermore, within the general framework of the reflexive goal, each organization works out its own rules of the game. The criteria used in partitioning organizational resources and the resultant distribution of inducements—money, power, status, psychological experience, etc.—will certainly differ from organization to organization. It is largely these differences that make each organization an *institution* and provide it with an ethos. The manner and nature of this distribution of inducements, then, constitute an alternative characterization of the program whose objective is the organization's survival goal.

Coequality. The transitive and reflexive goals are best considered as being coequal—neither is conceptually major[54] and each may be viewed both as a limitation upon and a subgoal of the attainment of the other. In trying to accomplish some transitive purpose, it is plain that reflexive concessions must almost invariably be made; survival is necessary for effectiveness. On the other hand, where there is consumption by others of organizational output, some concessions toward transitivity will also generally have to be made, at least to the extent of giving the *appearance* of being functional, of producing a product or service of acceptable quality. Legitimacy is necessary for survival.

Existence and Importance of Goals. The above should in no way be construed to imply that all organizations offering a product or service have transitive and reflexive goals. Whether an organization has a goal and how important it is are empirical matters. For example, if a manufacturing firm has little or no transitive purpose in the sense of putting out a good and serviceable product—a "public service" goal in Dent's terminology[55]—then that is the simple fact. We must accept this organization as having a self-seeking or primarily reflexive orientation. We should expect participants and close observers to see this fact reflected in the dominance of reflexive over transitive considerations in the making of certain decisions. Nor is it claimed that members of all organizations have a strong interest in organizational survival. For any number of reasons they may not, and to the extent that they do not, the organization is simply weak in reflexive intent, or institutionally weak.

---

[48] Deniston, "Evaluation of Program Effectiveness," pp. 325–330.

[49] Abraham Kaplan, *The Conduct of Inquiry* (San Francisco: Chandler, 1964), pp. 394–396.

[50] See March and Simon, *Organizations,* pp. 83–88.

[51] Perrow, *Organizational Analysis,* pp. 133–174.

[52] Gross, "Organizational Goals," p. 287.

[53] Aaron Wildavsky, *The Politics of the Budgetary Process* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 16–18.

[54] Cf. Gross, pp. 291–292.

Federated Organizations. Let us examine more closely the nature of transitive and reflexive organizational goals when the organization is composed of many component programs. The reflexive goal of a component such as the Frigidaire Division or the Heart Disease Control Division forms no logical part of the reflexive goal of the parent organization. In fact, its own strength may serve to divert and weaken reflexive goal strength in the organization as a whole. An organization will almost always have a survival goal, i.e., some measurable consensus of intent to survive as an entity, but this may be either weak or strong. The reflexive goal strength of a "federally" organized or multi-product organization, for example, is likely to be less impressive than that of a "unitary" organization because of the priority of loyalties to its component bureaus.[56] The case with transitive goals is different in form but similar in import. It is different in that the transitive goals of certain component programs (e.g., the major subunits of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) are indeed organizational goals. If one wishes to speak of *the* transitive organizational goal, it can be nothing but the aggregate of these components. As in the former case, however, transitive goal strength in a large, federally organized company or agency may be small—consensus on the attainment of its whole collection of heterogeneous goals may be low and is likely to be located exclusively in the organization's central leadership and bureaucracy. Some individuals may barely have heard of the programs to which they do not belong.

Both transitively and reflexively, then, many entities that are organizations in the legal sense are only barely organizations in the sociological sense; they are lacking in general commitment to outcomes that are truly organizational.

Product Goals. In the terms introduced above, a small number of the goals of universities listed by Gross would not be in the same category as the remainder. They would be seen as subobjectives or perhaps activities, but not as organizational goals. For example, to "Keep up to date and responsive," or "To make sure the university is run by those selected according to their ability to attain the goals of the university in the most efficient manner possible."[57] This is not to say that these preöccupations are unimportant, just that they are on a different level. They are instrumental to the achievement of other organizational purposes.

Product goals must be seen in the same light; "production of automobiles" is no more an organizational goal than "inspection of restaurants." Some may find this difficult to accept, but it is eminently reasonable. An organizational goal must be a *guide to action*,[58] but a product, pure and simple, is an empty affair. It does not guide action. It will never cause changes in itself. Consider, for example, an organization that manufactures and markets lunch bags. Why does it not put a long metal handle on each lunch bag it packages? Surely, the answer is not to be found by examining the bags themselves. If members of the organization were asked this question they would no doubt respond either (1) that people would then not buy the lunch bags and the business would fail, or (2) that lunch bags with metal handles would be less serviceable than those without, or both. Lunch bags, it appears, are being made for *reasons*, and the reasons dictate whether or not they might have long metal handles. It is these reasons and not the product itself that indicate either organizational goals or operative "goals for." In truth, the organization that concentrates exclusively on its product is probably guilty of displacement of goals—substituting means for the ends of impact on the public or system survival.[59]

---

[55] See Dent.

[56] See Herbert A. Simon, Donald W. Smithburg, and Victor A. Thompson, *Public Administration* (New York: Knopf, 1950), pp. 269–272.

[57] Gross, "Organizational Goals," p. 290.

[58] Cartwright and Zander, "Motivational Processes," in *Group Dynamics*, 3rd ed., pp. 409–411; Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*, p. 5; March and Simon, pp. 155–156; and Mayer N. Zald, "The Comparative Analysis and Measurement of Organizational Goals: The Case of Correctional Institutions for Delinquents," *Sociological Quarterly*, 4 (Summer, 1963), 206–230.

[59] Rensis Likert, *New Patterns of Management* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1961), pp. 71–76; Merton, pp. 249–260; and W. Keith Warner and A. Eugene Havens, "Goal Displacement and the Intangibility of

Operationalization, Identification

It is not desirable to attempt to specify in detail how concepts such as the foregoing shall be operationalized. Optimally, this will be done in different ways by different scholars for different organizational circumstances. There are, however, a few available guidelines and distinctions concerning operationalization and goal identification that may be helpful.

We will often be interested in salient operative goals and will not want to confine research attention to goals that qualify conceptually as organizational goals. One may also want to collect information on various subgoals, "goals for," individual goals, and inducement priorities. In using such information in organizational analysis, however, it should be more productive of insight to categorize it systematically into the classes suggested, rather than simply to lump all of these objectives indiscriminately under the rubric, "organizational goals."

There are several ways to get information about goals in organizations. One way is to hypothesize the existence of a specific goal and to test this hypothesis by documenting organizational behavior predicted from it, subsequently revising the goal hypothesis if necessary. This might be done, for example, in what Cohen and Cyert call "descriptive" simulations.[60] Several commentators have suggested that goal information may be obtained by a combination of observing certain organizational behavior and asking people directly about goals.[61] Although there is some evidence that observation helps ascertain organizational goals,[62] there is also reason to believe that such observation is unreliable. Warriner notes from his research experience that activities have many, many consequences and that it is most difficult to demonstrate which were intended.[63] Furthermore, if comparative research across many organizations is contemplated, direct observation will usually be prohibitively expensive. At present, direct observation of organizational behavior may be of greatest value in hypothesis generating or exploratory studies, where it need not be entirely systematic, rather than in hypothesis-testing research. For the latter, and for most multiorganization studies, the social scientist will probably have to depend upon the judgment and report of participants.

The next relevant question, then, is which participants shall be selected to provide information. The most valid strategy at present is probably to use "informants" rather than "respondents."[64] That is, one does not ask for the intent or priorities of all program or organizational members and simply aggregate the lot. Rather, one asks for the perceptions of selected knowledgeable individuals with a variety of vantage points and goes along, so to speak, with *their* collective measurement. In essence, one does not elicit the informant's own objectives and priorities, but rather his view of the organization's characteristics. In pursuing this measurement strategy, program and organizational members will no doubt be considered to make excellent informants because of their acquaintance with relevant behaviors. However, one need not confine oneself to members of the organization alone, and one certainly need not use all of them.

To determine the relative importance of goals, one might well ask knowledgeable individuals, as did Gross,[65] a question such as "How important is each of the listed aims in this organization?" with responses scaled from very important to not important at all. To determine existence, two strategies are suggested. One is to ask knowledgeable individuals whether a consensus exists among the specific group identified with the program, that is, whether there is some basic explicit or tacit agreement that this specific goal is one of the ends to be attained as a result of the collective effort of these individuals, within their organizational roles. (The existence of operative goals is then determined by elimination: "goals for" and other objectives that do have substantial importance in determining behavioral directions, but that are not true collective goals, are operative goals of the organization.) Alternatively, the nonexistence of goals may at times be indicated within tolerable limits of error by zero or near zero importance.

There are basically two ways in which one may compose a list of goals for questions about relative importance. The more expensive way is to conduct the research in two stages—a first in which possible goals are discovered through a

---

Organizational Goals," *Administrative Science Quarterly*, 12 (March, 1968), 545–549.

[60] Kalman J. Cohen and Richard M. Cyert, "Simulation of Organizational Behavior," in *Handbook of Organizations*, ed. James G. March (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1965), pp. 308–314.

[61] Etzioni, *Modern Organizations*, p. 6; Warner, "Problems in Measuring," p. 8; and Charles K. Warriner, "The Problem of Organizational Purpose," *Sociological Quarterly* 6 (Spring, 1965), 139–146.

[62] For example, see Perrow, "The Analysis of Goals," p. 856.

[63] Warriner, p. 142.

[64] See Morris Zelditch, Jr., "Some Methodological Problems of Field Studies," *American Journal of Sociology* 67 (March, 1962), 569–572.

[65] Gross, "Universities as Organizations," p. 523.

survey of the organization itself, followed by the primary stage in which priorities within the resultant list of goals are judged by the same or different informants. The other method of developing the list is to use armchair techniques and library research on such organizations in general. Since the first method is organization-specific one can perhaps have more confidence in it, but in neither case can one be sure of having identified a proper list of major aims and orientations out of the infinity of possibilities. No method can give such assurance.

Implications

In this concluding section, let us briefly note some research directions and some normative implications of the foregoing discussion.

Evaluation Research. Evaluation of organizational effort has different implications depending upon whether the concern is with transitive or reflexive effectiveness. In the former case, program evaluation becomes essentially a challenging application of experimental design, in which the operation of the program is the independent variable and attainment of the transitive goal is the dependent variable.[66] When certain subobjectives have been spelled out, the evaluation may also serve to inform program personnel where they may have failed to achieve a necessary precondition, or perhaps where they have been overexpending resources.[67] If an organization has several programs, the transitive effectiveness of the organization is best expressed as a profile: For example, health department A is highly effective in its communicable disease surveillance, moderately effective in both heart disease and cancer control, but ineffective in the abatement of air pollution; or housing authority B is highly effective in its urban renewal program but ineffective in its efforts to improve race relations.[68]

A further consideration tends to enter into evaluation of transitive effectiveness in the case of a multiprogram organization, and that is the efficacy of its priority system for achieving an overall or "umbrella-type" goal, such as "better health for the community."[69] In most cases, such a goal is merely imputed by the observer-appraiser; no true organizational objective or operative goal exists empirically whose function is to maximize some ultimate transitive condition by means of judicious priority setting among component programs. On the other hand, there may upon occasion actually be a transitive program of this nature within an organization. The members of this program are not at all likely to belong to specific transitive components but rather to be confined to central leadership personnel. The goal of "better health for the community," for example, might indeed induce a health department's leadership to put more resources into air pollution control than into well-baby clinics, and so on. Such umbrella-type organizational goals, however, are generally quite difficult if not impossible to operationalize satisfactorily, and this difficulty should make the organizational analyst look twice at any claim for their existence or their utility.

Reflexive effectiveness presents different problems entirely. We are able to see without research that the organization has survived; the question is, How well? It is here, it seems to me, that the method introduced by Seashore and Yuchtman would prove most valuable,[70] for we may answer this question by measuring the organization's success in exploiting its environment in the acquisition of resources. Note that the question, "Which resources?" is now answered by *identifying both the requirements for pursuing transitive goals and the kinds of inducements sought by members of the organizational coalition.* In addition, the satisfaction of members with the distribution of inducements provides a measure of the extent to which the allocation of resources is optimal, which is at least part of the system effectiveness model advocated by Etzioni.

It is important to recognize whether organizational activity is to be appraised in terms of organizational goals or, alternatively, of goals for the organization held by particular individuals or groups. The former would seem in general to make more sense, but the latter is by far the more prevalent selection. Even if "goals for" are to be the criteria, however, there is still reason to have information on actual organizational goals. For example, the "official mission" of a federally funded antipoverty project can be considered the federal government's goal for that organization. The project must generally, by grant regulation, be evaluated in those terms. However, the relative importance of this objective as an empirically determined organizational goal not only might be problematic, but, if known, might also shed light on why the "goal for" was not effectively attained or, perhaps, why this was an inappropriate goal to impose in the first place. Similarly, we frequently evaluate organizational activity in terms of "goals for" held by the chief executive. When we do so we must recognize that there are two questions involved—not only that of the soundness of his plan of means to achieve the ends, but also his effectiveness in getting the rest of the organization to follow the plan. If at an early stage his "goal for" is not also an organizational goal of substantial importance, his task is more difficult than it could be. If the same is true at a later stage, it may certainly help to explain his failure.

---

[66] Donald T. Campbell, "Reforms as Experiments," *American Psychologist* 24 (April, 1969), 409–429.

[67] Deniston, "Evaluation of Program Effectiveness."

[68] Cf. Edward C. Banfield, "Ends and Means in Planning," in Sidney Mailick and Edward Van Ness, eds., *Concepts and Issues in Administrative Behavior* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1962), pp. 75–79.

[69] Cf. the term "appropriateness" as used by Deniston, pp. 323–324.

[70] Seashore and Yuchtman, "Factorial Analysis of Organizational Performance"; Yuchtman and Seashore, "System Resource Approach to Organizational Effectiveness."

Other Behavioral Research. Gross has already pointed the way to a research strategy in which goals are identified, compared in importance, and examined in connection with other variables for the existence of theoretically relevant relationships.[71] It is of great interest, it seems to me, that among the top seven goals of universities reported in his research, as marked off in standard deviation units from the mean, the first two are apparently reflexive goals (academic freedom for the faculty and university prestige), while the next three are indefinite, and only the sixth and seventh are transitive in character (the scholarly training of students and the conduct of pure research). On the other hand, in the respondents' ranking of the goals according to the importance they *should* have, transitive concerns receive much greater emphasis and university prestige slips from second place to eleventh.

Gross treated the goals as dependent variables and explored the predictability of their importance from type of university ownership, university prestige, and the relative power of various groups within and outside of the formal organization. Many other variables may have a theoretically significant relationship with the importance of goal types, e.g., the size of the organization, its growth rate (as in Dent's research), its security within its environment, its category within a federal-unitary classification, its age or stage of development (as in Perrow's research on hospitals), and the personal values of hierarchical leaders. The goals may also be considered as causes rather than effects of a great many salient organizational characteristics. A hypothesis of considerable interest, for example, would be that the greater the relative importance of the transitive goal, the more the organization will be characterized by rational rather than political decision-making processes. Dalton's excellent book[72] provides supporting evidence at least in one cell of the table—the "Low-Low" cell. In the organizations he considered it appears that almost all decision-making was political and at the same time that actors were rarely if ever motivated by transitive concerns—the quality or serviceability of the product.

The distinction between transitive and reflexive goals *within* an organization suggests a similar distinction *among* organizations, that is, we may say that whole organizations are primarily either transitive or reflexive.[73] Zander, for example, has recently documented some structural differences in the characteristics of transitive and reflexive voluntary associations.[74] Essentially, a transitive organization is one that is oriented toward the exportation of a product or service to its environment; a reflexive organization is one that exists primarily for the mutual benefit of its members. The latter category includes not only fraternities, recreational clubs and criminal gangs but also other kinds of groups that have been extremely important in the development of both organizational and political theory—professional societies, trade associations, marketing associations, political interest groups, labor unions and even Marxian social classes. The most important reflexive organization of all is the society itself: In general, a society has no output, no transitive goal. Many highly significant works—by Michels,[75] Lipset et al.,[76] Olson[77]—that seem to be about organizations in general actually concern only reflexive organizations. Their contents are not necessarily wrong when applied to transitive organizations, but essentially irrelevant.

It may be objected that the transitive side of the dual goal concept is of little value because it hardly exists in reality, especially in private, profit-making organizations. The objection is not valid. First, it is apparently not true, at least as evidenced by responses to direct questions. Gross did find a substantial, though perhaps secondary, transitive orientation in universities.[78] Moreover, 42 per cent of the top executives interviewed by Dent did mention a transitive goal as one of the major concerns of their (private) organizations.[79] Second, the importance of transitive goals is a variable, not a supposition, and as such it is apparently correlated with a number of other important organizational structures and behaviors—power distribution, conflict, decision-making style, size, growth rate, type of ownership, etc. In short, the *degree* of outward orientation is a theoretical element of consequence. Third, the transitive goal category is significant normatively, that is, it is well to retain it simply *because* it may be underemphasized in modern organizations.

---

[71] Gross, "Universities as Organizations."

[72] Melville Dalton, *Men Who Manage* (New York: Wiley, 1959).

[73] Cf. Tom Burns, "The Comparative Study of Organizations," in *Methods of Organizational Research*, ed. Victor Vroom (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1967), pp. 132–133.

[74] Alvin Zander, "The Purposes of National Associations," Research Center for Group Dynamics, The University of Michigan (Ann Arbor: 1970).

[75] Michels.

[76] Seymour M. Lipset, Martin Trow, and James S. Coleman, *Union Democracy* (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1956).

[77] Mancur Olson, *The Logic of Collective Action* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965).

This latter, normative research implication should not pass unnoticed. Few will deny that they would prefer transitive organizations actually to supply a societal good, but recent treatments of the organizational goal tend to distract us from this orientation. With the goal concept as rendered in terms of systems, system resources, and constraint sets, for example, we have begun to view transitive organizations as existing for themselves alone, and the notion that they are supposed to be doing something is all but forgotten. Seashore and Yuchtman are explicit: ". . . conceptual schemes that link organizational effectiveness solely to the values of some element in the environment must be rejected; instead the standards of effectiveness are to be sought with reference to the organization itself."[80] Simon is less explicit, but his orientation leads in the same direction. The opposing view, however, is taken here. It cannot be detrimental to view ordinary private, public, and voluntary organizations as doers, as well as existers, and to question how well they are doing. Do they have transitive goals? Are they meeting them?

The extent to which the transitive goals of individuals and organizations are unimportant has significant social implications. Although it would be difficult to demonstrate, it appears that members of a society derive a sense of fulfillment in the occupation of transitive roles that may well be a sine qua non of successful long-term social living. This orientation comes easily during the nation-building period and in crises of threatened destruction from without; it is perhaps difficult to sustain in a relatively safe and affluent culture. Although there is a definite transitive side to the things we commonly do, there unfortunately appears to be a tendency to emphasize the reflexive, instead. Let me refer first to my own professional milieu. The academician could mention the student he inspired, but prefers instead to talk about the pressures upon his time, the recognition he received, the relative progress of his colleagues, and other reflexive concerns. What is true in general of us seems to be equally true of builders, manufacturers, electricians, physicians, and so on. We do not provide much manifest social support for transitive roles—in fact, the individual who takes pride in his own transitive function is embarrassing. As a practice this must certainly inhibit us in grappling with the problems we still face as a society and as an aspect of socialization it cannot help but contribute to a sense of futility and resentment among many young people in the culture as they scan the menu of possible adult roles. Whereas to be exclusively transitive is hardly possible, to be exclusively reflexive may be suicidal; a society that does not honor the transitive roles of its members may not be viable.

---

[78] Gross, "Universities as Organizations," p. 529.

[79] Dent, pp. 365, 366, 369, 388, 391.

[80] Seashore and Yuchtman, p. 395.

Attitudes of the Arab Elite Toward Palestine and Israel*

MICHAEL W. SULEIMAN
Kansas State University

The behavioral revolution in the study of politics and the concomitant emphasis on political socialization have had their greatest impact in the economically advanced societies and Western democratic countries in particular.[1] For one thing, it is more feasible to do such research, especially survey analysis, in these countries. But it is also true that in the so-called developing areas, a large percentage of the population is politically inactive or unimportant in influencing policy decisions. In such countries, therefore, the political attitudes and behavior of the elite deserve and have received special attention.[2] Particularly in the Arab world, however, such accounts have tended to be impressionistic or descriptive or both. Concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict, for instance, hardly any studies have been carried out to delineate explicitly the attitudes of the Arab public or any sector of it. Furthermore, the determinants of those attitudes are generally not investigated at all. In this paper, an attempt is made to help fill this gap.

While it is necessary to present a cursory statement of the main attitudes of the Arab elite concerning Palestine and Israel, the major thrust of this study is to pinpoint the factors which have been most significant in shaping those attitudes. It is a pioneering investigation of the forces of political socialization which have a bearing on the most difficult issue facing the Arab and Middle East region today. Although we are dealing with a Middle Eastern problem, the determinants of political attitudes discussed here, such as age, religion, etc., have been shown to be of importance in many other countries, a fact that will facilitate comparative analysis.[3]

The "Arab elite" under consideration were those resident in the Asian part of the Arab world plus Egypt as well as those of their colleagues who came to the U.S. for work or study. Among them were journalists, lawyers, engineers, doctors, and members of other professions, as well as university students. Those with a modern education do in fact constitute an elite in the sense that they must have been favored to have received that education at all; and by virtue of that education, they occupy or will occupy high positions in society and government. For the purpose of this paper, however, the terms "intelligentsia," "intellectuals," and "the educated classes" will be used interchangeably and in substitution for the word "elite."

Methodology

An adequate study of the Arab elite must take account of three broad sources of data. The influential writings by the intelligentsia, especially since the 1967 war, constitute a primary and essential source. Interviewing is another useful means of gathering data on Arab intellectuals, but since several important ideological movements are banned in the Arab world, and since political dissenters are often jailed, arrested, exiled or executed, it has not been feasible to interview a representative or a properly random sample of the elite in the region. Nevertheless, more than 60 nonrepresentative, nonrandom depth interviews with Arab intelligentsia from Egypt, Jordan (including Arab Palestine), Iraq, Kuwait, Lebanon, and Syria were conducted in the summers of 1968, 1970, and 1971. The sessions ranged from one to three hours and proved useful in yielding insights not easily obtainable through formal structured interviews.

---

* This is the revised version of a paper presented at the Middle East Studies Association Meeting, November 6–7, 1970, Columbus, Ohio. It is part of a larger study of the political attitudes of the Arab elite. Much of the research was conducted during my tenure as a Ford Foundation Faculty Research Fellow. I also thank Kansas State University for providing computer time and other assistance. Michael C. Hudson, Malcolm H. Kerr and William L. Richter read an early draft and made many valuable suggestions.

[1] For bibliographic references in the area of political attitudes and socialization, see John P. Robinson, J. G. Rusk and K. B. Head, *Measures of Political Attitudes* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Survey Research Center, 1968); Richard E. Dawson, "Political Socialization," in James A. Robinson, ed., *Political Science Annual,* 1966 (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966), pp. 1–84; Kenneth P. Langton, *Political Socialization* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1969); and Norman Adler and Charles Harrington, *The Learning of Political Behavior* (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman & Co., 1970).

[2] Since parties and elections are usually corrupt or nonexistent, the "political dynamics" in many developing countries are described in terms of elite competition for the top offices in the state. Three good studies of elites in the Middle East are: Frederick W. Frey, *The Turkish Political Elite* (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1965); Marvin Zonis, *The Political Elite of Iran* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1971); and R. Hrair Dekmejian, *Egypt under Nasser: A Study in Political Dynamics* (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1971).

[3] See Donald R. Matthews, *The Social Background of Political Decision-Makers* (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1954); Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); and the various election studies in Western democracies.

A more structured sample survey, however, was possible with regard to another group, namely the Arab students and professionals in the United States. In April, 1968, a questionnaire was mailed to 1,800 Arab or ex-Arab nationals resident in the United States. Of these, 363, or slightly more than 20 per cent of the sample, filled out and returned the questionnaire. Different sources were tapped for the names and addresses of the persons to be interviewed, though the mailing list of the Organization of Arab Students in the United States (O.A.S.) constituted the basic source. The questionnaire was mailed to alternate individuals on the list, after having excluded those names which did not sound like Arab names.

The survey sample was composed of individuals from nine Arab countries, namely Egypt (76), Saudi Arabia (63), Iraq (57), Palestine (51), Syria (41), Kuwait (30), Lebanon (23), Jordan (9), Libya (5), and others (8), i.e., those from sheikdoms or those who gave no answers. In round figures, 95 per cent of the respondents were males, almost two-thirds (65 per cent) were under 30 years of age, and 43 per cent were married. Moslems outnumbered Christians by a ratio of 3:1. Overwhelmingly, the respondents were born or raised in the city. Not unlike the intelligentsia in the Arab world and developing countries generally, the respondents primarily came from middle- and upper-class families.

The question arises, How representative are the survey respondents of Arab elite generally? It should be pointed out that Arab students and professionals in the United States are not cut off from the political ferment in the Arab world. Some of them, in fact, actively participate in the debate by contributing articles to various magazines and journals. The Nasser-Kassem conflict, for instance, was clearly reflected among the Arab students in North America. More recently, the split between the advocates and opponents of the cease-fire resolution and the so-called Rogers plan for ending Arab-Israeli hostilities spilled over to the U.S., where two "official" meetings of the O.A.S. were held. It should also be mentioned that those on the O.A.S. mailing list are, by and large, more interested, informed, and active in matters dealing with Arab affairs than those who are not on the list. The same argument applies in particular to those who participated in the survey. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the views of the survey respondents are not unrepresentative of the political ideas of Arab intelligentsia in general. In fact, they are probably a truer reflection of Arab opinion on certain issues than are the views of the interviewees in the Middle East, since the answers were given "without the fear of ending up in jail," as one respondent put it.

Nevertheless, the data from the survey are obviously not sufficient for testing or developing hypotheses about Arab intelligentsia in general. The purpose is to utilize these data in conjunction with the personal interviews and the political literature to help us better understand the political attitudes and behavior of Arab elite. Until the situation changes and research can be conducted freely, this appears to be the best approach.

Results

Four questions in the survey dealt directly or indirectly with the Palestine-Israel dispute. Respondents were asked, for instance, whether or not Arabs should make a distinction between Jews and Zionists in considering who their enemies are. Some 75 per cent unequivocally stated that there definitely should be a distinction, and an additional 14 per cent argued that it would depend on the circumstances involved. In other words, less than 10 per cent of the Arab intelligentsia sampled indiscriminately referred to "the Jews" as the enemy. Also, *all* interviewees (and here it is not important to name any of them but simply to record their attitudes) made the distinction. Furthermore, Arab political writers are generally eager to differentiate between Jews and Zionists. It is among the religiously-oriented of both Christians and Moslems that a blanket denunciation of "the Jews" may occasionally be found.[4] It is interesting to note, however, that the propensity

---

[4] The usual technique employed is to "describe" the character of the Jew by using quotes and references from the Old Testament, the Koran, the Talmud and the "Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion," an anti-Jewish tract. Among books of this nature, almost all of which appeared since the 1967 war, are: Abduh al-Rajihi, *al-Shakhsiyya al-Isra'iliyya* [The Israeli Personality] (Alexandria: M.K. Press, 1968); Ibrahim Khalil Ahmed (an ex-Anglican minister converted to Islam), *Isra'il wa-al-Talmud* [Israel and the Talmud] (Cairo: al-Wa'i al-Arabi Press, Oct., 1967); and Kamal Yusuf el-Hajj, *Hawl Falsafat al-Sahiuniyya* [On Zionist Philosophy] (Beirut: n.p., late 1967).

Table 1. Association Between Elementary Schooling and Propensity to Differentiate Between Jews and Zionists

Jew and Zionist Differentiated?	Elementary Education	
	Govt. or Moslem	Private Christian
Yes or depends	91.6%	81.2%
No	8.4	18.8
	100% N=214	100% N=64

$\chi^2=5.5$: $p<.02$

to differentiate between Jews and Zionists is not so much affected by religious affiliation of the Arab elite as it is by the type of school they attended. This is not unusual, since other studies have demonstrated the importance of the school, especially on the elementary level, as a socializing agent.[5] It is intriguing, however, to discover that, among the Arab elite, those educated in a private Christian elementary school are more likely *not* to make the distinction between Jews and Zionists than are those who attended a government or Moslem elementary school. Nonetheless what should be emphasized is that a very small percentage of Arab intelligentsia was willing to lump all Jews together as enemies.

The firm belief expressed by the overwhelming majority of Arab intelligentsia in this sample is that Zionism and Israel constitute the most important problem and the gravest threat facing the Arab world today.[6] In fact, the threat is so great that any and all others appear to be of minor significance. Also, serious concern was expressed about future Israeli encroachments. This is quite apart from, and in addition to, the great sense of loss experienced when Palestine was first partitioned. Especially since the 1967 Israeli conquests, the feeling is strong and widespread among the Arab elite that Zionist-Israeli aims go beyond "little Israel" to eventually encompass "greater" or "Eretz" Israel. This fear is also articulated in personal interviews and in the writings on the subject. Even moderates who advocate a Lebanese nationalism, for instance, have expressed great concern in the past four years lest Israel expand to incorporate the southern part of their country.[7]

These fears were clearly reflected in the responses to the survey question: "What do you believe to be Israel's goals in the Arab world?" About 75 per cent of the respondents were thoroughly convinced that Israel harbors grandiose expansionist designs—perhaps running as far as from the Nile to the Euphrates. What is more significant is that these views are equally shared by the young and the old, the Egyptians as well as the Saudis, the rich and the not so rich, the married and unmarried, the highly educated and the university students. A significant difference, however, was noted between the views of the Christian and Moslem Arab elite. Thus, Table 2 shows that more Christian than Moslem intelligentsia were likely to give Israel the benefit of the doubt. Nonetheless, it is strik-

Table 2. Association Between Perceived Israeli Goals and Religious Affiliation

Perceived Israeli Goals	Religious Affiliation	
	Moslem	Christian
Expand and take over the area from Nile to Euphrates or as much as possible and/or be an agent for imperialism	91.3%	79.5%
Seek a negotiated settlement with only minor border adjustments	8.7	20.5
	100% N=254	100% N=73

$\chi^2=8.0$: $p<.004$

---

[5] The importance of the school as a socializing agent has been studied extensively. See, for instance, Robert D. Hess and Judith V. Torney, *The Development of Political Attitudes in Children* (Chicago: Aldine, 1967); and James S. Coleman, ed., *Education and Political Development* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965). See also the selections on the school in Roberta S. Sigel, *Learning about Politics* (New York: Random House, 1970). It is worth noting, however, that Kenneth Prewitt and Joseph Okello-Oculi argue that manifest political socialization in schools is not sufficient to "help resolve the critical needs of nation-building" in Uganda and other new nations. See their "Political Socialization and Political Education in the New Nations," in Sigel, p. 609.

[6] Two related questions were asked, one of them open-ended, the other not. They were (1) List in the order of their importance, beginning with number one for the most important, the major issues facing the Arab world today; and (2) List in the order of their importance, beginning with number one for the most important, the major threats facing the Arab world today: Communism and communist infiltration ——; Reactionary and traditional forces ——; Zionism and the state of Israel ——; Fascism ——; Military dictators and adventurers ——; Imperialism ——; Other (please specify) ————————.

[7] See, in particular, Basim el-Jisr and David Sayegh, *Lubnan wa-at-Tahaddi al-Isra'ili* [Lebanon and the Israeli Challenge] (Beirut: Dar al-Funun Press, 1968); and *Lubnan wa-al-'Amal al-Fida'i al-Filistini* [Lebanon and the Palestinian Commando Movement] (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1969)—the latter being a collection of essays by some members of the Development Studies Club.

ing that almost eighty per cent of the Christian respondents believed the Israelis either have expansionist designs or tend to act as imperialist agents in the area or both.

Once more these results are not unrepresentative of opinion in the Arab world proper, although the more moderate views are generally unpublicized except by members of fairly well-established groups such as the Maronites in Lebanon.[8]

Although there is general agreement on the existence of a formidable enemy and a singular threat to the Arab world, much debate focuses on the disagreements about how to deal with Zionism and Israel. There seem to be five distinct and different approaches to the problem of confronting the Israeli challenge, namely, Arab unity, communism, a return to Islamic faith, development, and the Palestinian revolution as expressed in the resistance movement.[9]

While these five positions represent the main approaches now popular among Arab intelligentsia, it would be a serious error to think that the advocates of one particular stand are so committed to that view that they are not prepared to entertain others if the situation changes, or even under the same circumstances at a later date. In fact, it is not unfair to state that an educated Arab is likely to be simultaneously anti-imperialist and pro-development, -unity *and* -armed Palestinian struggle. This, indeed, is the main tragedy of the situation, namely that the Zionist-Israeli issue spotlights all the weaknesses of Arab society while at the same time preventing the Arabs from tackling their other problems because of their crippling preoccupation with Israel. Israel cannot be ignored, nor can it as yet be defeated, nor can an influential Arab majority psychologically come to terms with it. The survey responses to the question, "What is the best way for the Arabs to deal with Israel?" probably reflect Arab elite opinion generally. Almost two-thirds were willing to continue the struggle to eventual victory, while another 8 per cent were not yet ready for a settlement, favoring continued economic boycott and nonrecognition indefinitely. Still, some 25 per cent expressed a desire for an end to the conflict in some form.

Our next task, then, is to delineate as much as possible the "characteristics" of the Arab elite which incline them to an attitude of compromise or to a more militant stance on the Palestine-Israel question. Four variables were employed to measure respondents' background, namely, the father's social status, his occupation, his annual income, and his education. In the survey study, there was no statistically significant correlation between attitudes toward Israel and the social status, educational level, or yearly income of the respondents' fathers. This finding was not unexpected since personal observation and interviews in the Arab world had indicated that extreme hostility toward Israel was not confined to certain socioeconomic classes rather than others. A similar situation may be observed in the United States with regard to the Jewish vote in national elections.[10] In both cases, the emotional and ideological factors are more important than are status and income.

There was also no measurable difference concerning policy suggestions *vis-à-vis* Israel between those who were raised in the city and those brought up in the countryside. Here it is important to remember that we are confining our remarks to educated Arabs. For them, the city and the city's political milieu have become the accepted norms, and the village and its parochial attitudes have been abandoned as "backward" and "uncivilized."[11]

---

[8] In particular, see the publications of Al-Kataeb (Phalanges Libanaises) political party.

[9] A good collection of Arab nationalist writings in English may be found in Kemal H. Karpat, ed., *Political and Social Thought in the Contemporary Middle East* (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968). For the opinions of Arab communists and Marxists, see Fuad Qazan, *al-Thawra al-Arabiyya wa-Isra'il* [The Arab Revolution and Israel] (Beirut: Dar at-Talia, 1968). The Moslem fundamentalist viewpoint may be gleaned from Salaheddine al-Munajjid, *A'midat al-Nakba* [The Pillars of the Disaster] (Beirut: Dar al-Kitab al-Jadid, 1968); and Ramadan Lawand, *al-Insan al-Arabi baad al-Karithetein*, 1948–1967 [The Arab Personality after the Two Catastrophes, 1948–1967] (Kuwait: Maktabet al-Amel, n.d., late 1967?). The main spokesman for development as a solution is Constantine Zuraiq, *Ma'na al-Nakba* [The Meaning of the Disaster] (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1948); and *Ma'na al-Nakba Mujaddadan* [The Meaning of the Disaster Renewed] (Beirut: Dar al-Ilm lil-Malayin, 1967). A good brief account of the resistance movement in English is found in Michael C. Hudson, "The Palestine Arab Resistance Movement: Its Significance in the Middle East Crisis," *Middle East Journal,* 23 (Summer, 1969), 291–307.

[10] Since the 1930s, American Jews have strongly supported the Democratic Party. See Lawrence H. Fuchs, *The Political Behavior of American Jews* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1956). See also Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1960), pp. 301–302.

[11] In a 1960 study, it was found that Republicans and Democrats in the U.S. manifested less disagreement on foreign policy than on any other issue. The questions at the time, however, concerned attitudes toward the U.N., military alliances, and foreign aid. A more viable comparison with the Middle East situation would be the attitudes of Americans toward the Second World War. See Herbert McClosky, Paul J.

Table 3. Association Between Attitude Toward Israel and Age, Level of Education, and Marital Status

Policy Suggestion	Age Level		Educational Level			Marital Status	
	Up to 30 yrs.	Over 30 yrs.	Student-B.A.	M.A.	Ph.D.-M.D.	Married	Unmarried
Prepare for its defeat	71.3%	59.5%	74.0%	65.3%	50.7%	60.8%	72.3%
Continue economic boycott	8.5	8.3	8.1	8.4	9.9	7.4	9.2
Compromise and recognize it *de facto* or *de jure*	20.2	32.2	17.9	26.3	39.4	31.8	18.5
	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N=223	N=121	N=173	N=95	N=71	N=148	N=195
	$\chi^2=6.3$: $p<.04$		$\chi^2=13.9$: $p<.01$			$\chi^2=8.1$: $p<.01$	

Differences in political opinion between the young and their elders have been noted in various election studies in the West, with the older citizens generally being more conservative in their views.[12] This is also true of the Arab elite, as is shown in Table 3, with regard to the survey respondents. The more "radical" stance of the young Arab intelligentsia is not merely the product of a lower degree of sophistication or the absence of responsibility. It can best be explained by the general atmosphere in which these young members of the intelligentsia were raised, namely, extensive and intensive indoctrination against the acceptance of an Israeli state in the area. None of them was more than ten years old when Israel came into being. Thus all spent their formative years in a period of active hostility between Israel and the Arab world.

While age is itself important in the espousal of certain beliefs, other attributes related to age are also significant. The relevance of education, for instance, to political efficacy and to political orientation has been shown in various country and crosscultural studies.[13]

The survey results generally substantiate these impressions. Furthermore, those with graduate degrees, in addition to being older and more educated, are probably beginning to worry about a career and a family. Also, those who had their undergraduate training in the Arab world are likely to have received an education that is not up to Western standards, with a heavy dosage of political propaganda. A graduate education, however, is a clear indication of a serious commitment to a profession.[14]

Married people everywhere tend to be more conservative socially and politically than those who are unmarried. This is also true among the Arab elite, as shown in Table 3 concerning the survey respondents. On the whole, married members of the Arab elite both at home and abroad display a kind of political quietism, and an absence of enthusiasm for any grandiose projects in the area. On the question of Israel, while more of them are willing to contemplate a compromise solution, the majority agree with their unmarried colleagues about the necessity of continued struggle.

Among the Arab elite in the U.S., one observes a monotonic and positive relationship between length of residence in the host country and the willingness to negotiate an end to the dispute over Palestine-Israel. Furthermore, as Table 4 shows, there is a definite increase in the desire to conciliate around the sixth year of residence and another one after that.

Both attitude changes are in part the result of living away from the scene of the conflict and from the generally anti-Israeli atmosphere. Furthermore, these educated Arabs find themselves in a country in which the reporting of Middle East news is generally pro-Israeli and anti-"radical" Arab regimes.[15] Consequently,

---

Hoffmann, and Rosemary O'Hara, "Issue Conflict and Consensus Among Party Leaders and Followers," *American Political Science Review,* 54 (June, 1960), 406–427.

[12] For election studies in the U.S., see Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954); and Campbell et al.

[13] Almond and Verba, *Civic Culture;* and Coleman, *Education and Political Development.*

[14] For a critical evaluation of the state of Arab colleges and universities as well as the educational process generally, see Antoine Zahlan, "Traces of the Defeat and Our National Universities" (Arabic), *Arab Studies,* 11 (Sept., 1968), 61–76; "Science and Backward Countries," *Scientific World,* 6 (1967), 5–12; and *The Brain Drain: Lebanon and Middle Eastern Countries* (Beirut: mimeographed, Nov., 1969).

[15] For an analysis and discussion of pro-Israel and anti-Arab bias in the Western press during and after the 1967 war, see American Institute for Political Communication (AIPC), "Domestic Communications Aspects of the Middle East Crisis," A Special Report (Washington, D.C., July, 1967); and Michael W. Suleiman, "American Mass Media and the June Conflict,"

they become sympathetic to the "moderates" and favor their willingness to compromise.

The second major increase in compromise might also be the result of a somewhat deliberate effort to spare oneself the agony of continuous conflict in the old country and its ramifications in the new one—since after six years' residence, it is certain that the decision has been made to stay permanently in America. This explanation is further supported when we compare Arabs already employed with those who are still studying. It is quite clear that when the idealism and lack of responsibility of youth are replaced by definite commitments and responsibilities, a more "realistic" and compromising attitude emerges.

Students of the Middle East generally and of the Arab world in particular have long been struck by the importance of religion in the area's political affairs. The pervasive influence of Islam not only as a religion sacred to the overwhelming majority of the Arabs but also as a cultural force has already been noted. Under Moslem rule, the "national" unity or identity group was the religious sect, with the Moslem collectivity constituting the *umma* (nation) and the various non-Moslem (primarily Christian and Jewish sects) allowed to function as somewhat autonomous subunits under the *millet* system. With the collapse of the Ottoman (Moslem) empire, a new basis for identification and solidarity became available, namely local, regional, ethnic, or Arab nationalism articulated in Western terminology even when it was not the same product. But the transformation could not take place overnight, and apart from a very tiny minority of Western-educated Arabs, the bulk of the population continued to think and act on the basis of sectarian solidarity. Even among the educated, however, it was not easy to shed the traditions and habits of centuries, especially since Western values were more easily accepted by the Christian Arabs than by their Moslem counterparts.

Gradually, however, the idea of a secular state, the division of the Arab world into numerous political units and the increasing popularity of nationalism as well as other Western ideologies—all these developments weakened the religious bond. The question of how much weakening has taken place thus far is not entirely clear, however. Thus, a recent study showed that educated Arabs are beginning to experience some alienation from religion.[16] Also, while in 1935 religious solidarity was still very strong even among the Arab elite, by the early 1950s the social distance among *national,* i.e., country, groups became greater than that among religious sects. When the study was replicated in the early 1960s, both religious and national social distances were found to be still slightly higher. On the other hand, a study using a different, and in my opinion better, method of measuring group affiliation found that the religious bond is far stronger than mere citizenship in a particular Arab country.[17]

Table 4. Association Between Attitude Toward Israel and Length of Residence in North America, and Employment

Policy Suggestion	Length of Residence in N. America			Employment Status	
	2 yrs.	6 yrs.	More than 6 yrs.	Student	Professional
Prepare for its defeat	84.3%	68.7%	55.1%	73.6%	54.7%
Continue economic boycott	6.3	8.6	8.7	7.4	10.3
Compromise and recognize it *de facto* or *de jure*	9.4	22.7	36.2	19.0	35.0
	100% N = 32	100% N = 233 $\chi^2 = 11.2$: $p < .02$	100% N = 80	100% N = 216	100% N = 117 $\chi^2 = 12.7$: $p < .002$

---

in *The Arab-Israeli Confrontation of June 1967: An Arab Perspective*, ed. Ibrahim Abu-Lughod (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970), pp. 138–154.

[16] Habib Hamam, "A Measure of Alienation in a University Setting," M.A. thesis (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1969), cited in Halim Barakat, "Alienation and Revolution in Arab Life," (Arabic), *Mawaqif* (Beirut), 1 (July-Aug., 1969), 14–44.

[17] E. Terry Prothro and Levon Melikian, "Social Distance and Social Change in the Near East," *Sociology and Social Research*, 37 (Sept.-Oct., 1952), 3–11; Levon Melikian, "Social Distance" (Arabic), *al-Abhath* (Beirut), 18 (March, 1965), 64–77; and Levon H. Melikian and Lutfy N. Diab, "Group Affiliations of University Students in the Arab Middle East," *Journal of Social Psychology*, 49 (May, 1959), 145–159. In the latter study, Christian Arab students generally ranked the ethnic bond second and religion third, whereas the Moslem respondents generally reversed those rankings.

Table 5. Association Between Attitude Toward Israel and Religious Affiliation

Policy Suggestion	Religious Affiliation	
	Moslem	Christian
Prepare for its defeat	71.3%	47.4%
Continue economic boycott	8.5	9.2
Compromise and recognize it *de facto* or *de jure*	20.2	43.4
	100% N=258	100% N=76
$\chi^2=17.6$: $p<.001$		

The above studies concentrated on the individual's sense of solidarity with a particular social unit. What interests us here, however, is to determine whether or not mere membership in a religious group or a political entity predisposes the individual to internalize certain attitudes or to behave in a particular manner. One study, for instance, found that though the political culture of the area is generally authoritarian, members of the Moslem Arab elite scored higher on the authoritarian scale than did their Christian counterparts.[18] But in another study, no significant difference was found between Christian and Moslem Jordanian teachers concerning their political alienation or achievement orientation.[19] This is not surprising or unexpected. We now need to consider the various political and social attitudes of Christian and Moslem Arab elites of different professional backgrounds. The two groups will also be compared cross- "nationally," i.e., on a country-by-country basis.

When asked how the Arabs should deal with Israel, as Table 5 shows, more Christians than Moslems among the educated Arabs are willing to accept the state of Israel as an unpleasant but nevertheless real fact in the Middle East.

It might be recalled from Table 2 that some 80 per cent of the Christian survey respondents believed Israel to be bent on further expansion. That more than 20 per cent of those who hold such belief are nevertheless willing to compromise might well mean that, in their view, this is the best way to *contain* Israeli expansion. It is also true, of course, that it is psychologically easier for a Christian Arab than it is for a Moslem Arab to "accept" the Israeli reality. This is because the dominant culture-religion in the area since the seventh century has been Islam.

It should be pointed out, however, that the difference in the feeling and thinking of Moslem and Christian Arabs on the question of Israel is a matter of degree and not of kind. Neither is religion the only or indeed the most important factor. When we analyze the attitudes of Christian and Moslem Arabs on the basis of their country of birth, as in Table 6, we find that a Palestinian or an Iraqi Christian is likely to be more militant on the Israeli question than a Lebanese—be he Christian or Moslem. Also Egyptians of both religious faiths appear to be among the most willing to compromise.[20]

Table 6. Attitude Toward Israel, by Country and Religion

Country of Birth	% Moslem			% Christian			N	
	Defeat	Boycott	Compromise	Defeat	Boycott	Compromise	Moslem	Christian
Palestine	81%	4%	15%	55%	20%	25%	26	20
Iraq	76	11	13	83	0	17	45	6
Saudi Arabia	76	6	18	—	—	—	63	—
Kuwait	70	19	11	—	—	—	27	—
Syria	70	15	15	41	6	53	20	17
Egypt	63	2	35	27	13	60	54	15
Lebanon	44	22	33	33	0	67	9	12
	N=174	N=21	N=49	N=31	N=7	N=32	244	70

---

[18] E. Terry Prothro and Levon Melikian, "The California Public Opinion Scale in an Authoritarian Culture," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 17 (Fall, 1953), 353–363.

[19] Robert B. Cunningham, "Political Alienation Among Jordanian Teachers," paper delivered at the Middle East Studies Association (MESA) Meeting in Chicago, Ill., Dec. 9, 1967 and "Patterns of Achievement Orientation Among Jordanian Teachers," paper delivered at the MESA Meeting in Austin, Texas, Nov. 15, 1968.

[20] Although the N's are very small in Table 6, our primary interest is in the *trend* indicated. Personal interviews and on-the-spot observation strongly support these findings. It should be noted that the political literature is not likely to be much of a guide here because (1) censorship laws and political repression in several Arab countries often discourage, if not com-

Table 7. Association Between Attitude Toward Israel and Country of Birth

Policy Suggestion	Country of Birth						
	Iraq	Saudi Arabia	Kuwait	Palestine	Syria	Egypt	Lebanon
Prepare for its defeat	78.6%	76.2%	72.5%	71.4%	60.0%	55.1%	38.1%
Continue economic boycott	8.9	6.3	17.2	10.2	10.0	4.3	9.5
Compromise and recognize it *de facto* or *de jure*	12.5	17.5	10.3	18.4	30.0	40.6	52.4
	100% N=56	100% N=63	100% N=29	100% N=49	100% N=40	100% N=69	100% N=21

$\chi^2 = 33.1$: $p < .001$

Up to now, it has been implicitly assumed that an Arab nation does exist, an assumption that is often made both in the West and in the Arabic-speaking countries. Recent studies have also indicated that affiliation with and attachment to Arabism is generally stronger than local or regional nationalism in the eastern part of the Arab world. Melikian and Diab, for instance, found that citizenship ranked below family, ethnic group, and religion as a source of solidarity among Arab students at the American University in Beirut.[21]

Despite popular notions of the oneness of the Arab world, students of the area have long observed variations in character, sentiments, and bonds of solidarity. Militant Arab nationalists attribute these differences to imperialist machinations and claim that they will disappear once the Arab world is completely independent and united. Evidence from other countries, however, shows that "sectionalism" is quite likely to persist even after unification.[22]

Table 7 shows that significant differences of opinion exist among the survey respondents from the various Arab countries. The Lebanese and Egyptian elites are clearly the most eager for a political compromise. Personal interviews and the extensive political literature support these findings. The Syrian sample is apparently more representative of the alienated and disgruntled intelligentsia who have left their homeland than of those who are in control of the country's affairs. This conclusion gains credence when the responses of the young (under 30 years of age) and the old are compared. In each country, except Saudi Arabia, the young are more militant. The most striking difference, however, is to be found among the Syrian respondents, where 85 per cent of the young opted for boycott and eventual defeat of Israel, as opposed to 47 per cent of their elders.

The least compromising are the Iraqis, followed by the Saudis and Kuwaitis. Thus, the longer the conflict lasts, the more radicalized the fringe areas of the Arab world apparently become.

Conclusions

The results of this study essentially substantiate research in other, especially economically advanced, countries where religion, sectionalism, age, and level of education were shown to be important determinants of political attitudes and behavior. Among the Arab elite, marriage, residence and employment in the West are factors which contribute to moderation on the Palestine-Israel question. Neither locale (urban-rural) nor socioeconomic background, however, was found to be a significant factor. It is suggested that, with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict, the emotional and ideological commitments of Arab elite far outweigh the influence of class, status or locale.

---

pletely silence, any unpopular views; and (2) political writers do not always or necessarily reflect accurately the opinions of their coreligionists. Only in Lebanon, where freedom of expression is fairly well tolerated and where sectarian attitudes flourish, is it possible to attempt an ascertainment of the views of the differentiated public from the published political literature.

[21] Melikian and Diab, p. 159.

[22] For evidence from the U.S., see V. O. Key, *Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964); and for Britain, see J. Blondel, *Voters, Parties, and Leaders: The Social Fabric of British Politics* (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1965).

Parties as Utility Maximizers*

DONALD A. WITTMAN

University of California at Santa Cruz

This article introduces two new models of political party decision making. Both models assume that political parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. In one, the parties are competitive, while in the other the parties collude. The main result, in either case, is that the parties tend to be unresponsive to the interests of the voters.

This analysis is in marked contrast to the work by Anthony Downs and others (henceforth referred to as the traditional model), which assumes that the political parties are only interested in winning the election.[1] An important implication of this literature is that parties are very sensitive to the interests of the electorate because both parties take a position close to the preferred position of the median voter.

In order to compare the three models I shall first discuss the traditional model.

The Traditional Model

In this model the following assumptions about political parties are made: (a) *The party is a team*—a group of individuals which acts as a single decision maker. The reason for assuming a team, instead of a coalition, is that this makes the analysis easier, but does not greatly distort the results. (b) *The goal of the party leaders is to win the election*—so that they may enjoy the prestige and income of office. (c) *There are infinite barriers to entry of a new party.* This assumption is justified on empirical grounds, for the set of parties which wins elections is quite stable over a long period of time. (d) *The incumbent party makes known its platform first* (platform stands here for policies and actions of a party); i.e., the incumbent implements policy to which the opposition responds by agreeing with the proposals or suggesting alternatives. It is also usually assumed that the world is single peaked, meaning that there exists an ordering of all possible platforms such that every voter's utility function is a single peaked function of it. This ordering can be conceived of as a left-right continuum. Any position to the left (or right) of a person's most preferred position will be less favored the farther it is to the left (or right). (See Figure 1.)

Under these conditions, both parties will "look alike," each taking a position close to that of the median voter.[2] The proof can be

---

* I would like to thank George Akerlof, Michael Leiserson, George Von der Muhll, and Benjamin Ward for their helpful comments.

[1] This refers to the following works: Duncan Black, *The Theory of Committees and Elections* (Cambridge University Press, 1958); Otto A. Davis and Melvin J. Hinich, "A Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," in *Mathematical Applications in Political Science,* II, ed. J. Bernd (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1966), 170–208; Davis and Hinich, "On the Power and Importance of the Mean Preference in a Mathematical Model of Democratic Choice," *Public Choice,* 5 (Fall, 1968), 59–72; Davis and Hinich, "Some Results Related to a Mathematical Model of Policy Formation in a Democratic Society," *Mathematical Applications in Political Science,* III (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 1967); Robert Dorfman, "General Equilibrium with Public Goods," IP 95 (Berkeley: Institute of Business and Economic Research, Center for Research in Management Science, June 1966); Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1957); Gerald Garvey, "The Theory of Party Equilibrium," *American Political Science Review,* 60 (March 1966), 29–38; Melvin Hinich and Peter Ordeshook, "Plurality Maximization vs. Vote Maximization: A Spatial Analysis with Variable Participation," *American Political Science Review,* 64 (September, 1970); 772–791; Harold Hotelling, "Stability in Competition," *The Economic Journal,* 39 (March, 1929), 41–57; Jerome Rothenberg "A Model of Economic and Political Decision Making," (Rothenberg has a number of models; in one the party is interested in platform, and thus similar to the alternative model, but it does not take into account counter moves by the other party), in *The Public Economy of Urban Communities,* ed. J. Margolis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1965); Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy* (New York: Harper Bros., 1950); Arthur Smithies, "Optimum Location in Spatial Competition," *The Journal of Political Economy,* 49 (June, 1941), 423–439; Gordon Tullock, "A Simple Algebraic Logrolling Model," *American Economic Review,* 60 (June, 1970), 419–426.

A number of these articles assume that the party either maximizes the number of votes it receives or maximizes its plurality (these are not equivalent to maximizing the probability of winning the election). Consequently some of them are not meant to be a description of winner-take-all elections (as in the U.S.) but of an ideal type (such as a benevolent dictator) or of a coalition government.

[2] With single peakedness the incumbent need not present its platform first. While Downs and others have claimed that abstention will pull the parties apart, this is not true if the parties want to maximize the probability of being elected (although it is possible to have other globally stable equilibria with both parties having a 50 per cent chance of winning and the parties not being identical). See Donald Wittman, "Theories of Optimal Political Party Decision Making," unpublished Ph.D. thesis in Economics, University of California, Berkeley, 1970.

characterized as follows: Each party's platform places the party on some part of the left-right continuum. All the voters whose most preferred position is to the left of the Left Party's platform will vote for the Left Party, because they prefer the Left to the Right. Since the Left Party is solely interested in winning the election, it is to the advantage of the Left Party to move right, as it will not lose the vote of those citizens to its left, but will be more sure of attracting the voters who stand between it and the Right Party. The same logic applies to the Right Party. The result is that each party has a platform close to the desire of the median voter, and therefore the two parties look alike.

The model has a number of interesting implications. If a left-right continuum exists, then the notion of an extremist is created and well defined. An extremist is a person who is at one of the two ends of the continuum. If the voters are clustered in the middle, the extremist's view is a minority view; for him to have his way would be undemocratic. A left-right continuum also defines who a voter's political enemies are: Enemies are people whose positions are farther away, while friends are closer to your most preferred position. The extremes can share no common interest with each other that are not shared with the middle. The friends of the Left are always the moderate Left, while the enemies of the Left are always the Right.[3]



Figure 1. The world is single peaked if there exists a continuum such that each voter's utility function is a single peaked function of the continuum.

Table 1. Intransitivity of Majority Rule[a]

	Voter X	Voter Y	Voter Z
First Choice	A	B	C
Second Choice	B	D	E
Third Choice	C	E	D
Fourth Choice	D	C	A
Fifth Choice	E	A	B

[a] No platform exists such that a majority of voters do not prefer another platform; i.e., a majority prefers A to B, B to C, C to D, D to E, and E to A. Furthermore there are several platforms preferred to any one platform. E.g., a majority of voters prefer D to E, C to E and B to E.

In the traditional model, each party works for its own self-interest, yet each ends up presenting the same platform—which is preferred by a majority of voters to any other one; selfishness and competition by the parties are shown to lead to an optimal result. Adam Smith's "Invisible Hand" has been applied to politics.

The traditional model yields very meager results if the world is intransitive. In an intransitive world, no platform exists which is preferred to all the others.[4] This can best be seen in the following chart (Table 1). A majority of voters prefers A to B, and a majority prefers B to C, but a majority does not prefer A to C. Instead a majority prefers C to A; thus whatever platform the incumbent chooses, the opposition can always find another platform which a majority of voters prefers. Consequently, the incumbent always loses. The traditional model does not predict which platforms either the incumbent or the opposition will choose.

Intransitivity not only makes the model uninteresting but also undermines the assumption that each party's goal is solely to win the election. An intransitive world may mean that for any given set of policies of the incumbent party, the opposition has a large number of platforms, any one of which is preferred to the incumbent's platform by a majority of voters (e.g., in Table 1; B, C and D are all preferred to E). Since the opposition has so many ways of defeating the incumbent party, *the problem is not how the opposition party will be able to obtain a majority but which majority it will choose.* Thus the opposition will find some other objective besides just winning the election. The incumbent party knows that it will lose the election no matter which platform it presents, therefore it too will have some other objective than winning. Uncertainty (or imperfect information) does not reduce the problem, for it allows situations to arise where the majority votes for a party, even though perfect information would result in the majority voting against. Consequently, the leaders have a choice of many platforms which, owing to lack of information, look just alike to the voters. *Again* they will have some other rule besides just maximizing the probability of winning the election.[5] Therefore it cannot be said that the goal of the leaders in the political parties is to get elected or reelected so that they may enjoy the prestige and income of office.

---

[3] If the parties present lotteries it is possible for the extremes to prefer a risky lottery and the median voter to prefer a nonrisky (degenerate) lottery; but then there always exists another risky lottery which the median voter and one (and only one) of the two extremes prefer to the original risky lottery.

[4] For a more detailed presentation see Kenneth Arrow, *Social Choice and Individual Values*, Cowles Commission for Research in Economics, Monograph No. 12 (New York: Wiley, 1951).

Since the lack of transitivity is so devastating to the model, it is important to investigate whether the world is single peaked or not.[6] Arguments against single peakedness have been made on theoretical as well as on empirical grounds yet many still accept the notion, probably because it seems reasonable (i.e., people who are Left on one issue are often Left on another). Unfortunately, the concept of single peakedness is extremely restrictive, and thus, even if a liberal were liberal on every issue and a conservative conservative on every issue, it would not necessarily imply single peakedness. The reason is that the voters may weight the issues differently, i.e., there may be a great deal of difference to the Left voter between a liberal and moderate position on the first issue, and a relatively small difference between a liberal and conservative position on the second and third issues. Thus the Left voter prefers a platform which is liberal on the first issue and conservative on the second and third to a platform which is moderate on the first and liberal on the second and third issues. Similar possibilities arise for the conservative and moderate voters. Thus even if all the Left voters are consistently left on each issue and the Right voters consistently right, this still does not imply single peakedness or transitivity.[7] All this can be seen in Table 2, where the ranking of each platform by L (left), R (right) and M (middle) are given.

Even the strongest cases for single peakedness often fail to hold when actually tested. For example, most political scientists would place Wallace, Nixon, Humphrey, and McCarthy in that order from right to left. In fact, 40 per cent of those Californians who were going to vote for Wallace in the election requiring a choice among Wallace, Nixon, and Humphrey would have voted for McCarthy if he had run.[8] This means that for at least two-fifths of the Wallace supporters, Wallace and McCarthy

---

[5] Other ways of making the model more complicated do not change the essential point that the parties have a wide variety of platforms which will yield the same probability of winning, and thus the parties will have some other criterion for choosing among platforms than just winning the election. For example, if the voters are very hesitant to vote against the incumbent, then the incumbent can win on almost any platform. The interesting question becomes: which winning platform will the incumbent choose?

[6] Actually single peakedness does not imply transitivity if lotteries are allowed (see Richard Zeckhauser, "Majority Rule with Lotteries on Alternatives," *Quarterly Journal of Economics,* 83 (November, 1969); 616–703. Nor does lack of single peakedness imply a lack of transitivity; however, it is not clear when these cases such as (1) Latin-squarelessness or (2) closed compact sets would arise.

For theoretical arguments against single peakedness see David Chapman, "Models of the Working of a Two-Party Electoral System, Part I," *Papers on Non-Market Decision Making,* 3 (Fall, 1967), 19–38; Amartya Sen, *Collective Choice and Social Welfare* (San Francisco: Holden-Day, Inc.); Benjamin Ward, "Majority Rule and Allocation," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 5, No. 4 (December, 1961), 379–389; for empirical arguments see Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State,* trans. Barbara and Robert North (London: Methuen and Company, 1954); Donald E. Stokes, "Spatial Models of Party Competition," in *Elections and the Political Order,* A. Campbell, P. Converse, W. Miller, and D. Stokes (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1966), 161–179.

For articles on the other side see Kenneth J. Arrow, "Tullock and an Existence Theorem," *Public Choice,* 6 (Spring, 1969), 105–112; Duncan Black, "On Arrow's Impossibility Theorem," *The Journal of Law and Economics,* 12 (October, 1969), 227–248; Richard G. Niemi, "Majority Decision Making with Partial Unidimensionality," *American Political Science Review,* 63 (June, 1969), 488–497; and Gordon Tullock, "The General Irrelevance of the General Impossibility Theorem," *Quality Journal of Economics,* 81 (May, 1967), 256–270.

[7] It should be noted that all the work concerned with a multidimensional issue space has had to put restrictions on the weighting of the issues or on the distribution of voter attitudes in order to avoid intransitivity.

[8] See *San Francisco Chronicle* (Final edition, September 23, 1968), p. 1, col. 2. It is also very likely that a considerable number of the 60 per cent who still would have voted for Wallace had McCarthy as their second choice.

Table 2. Intransitivity of voting even when the individual voters are consistently on the left, right, or in the middle on each issue

Each Voter's Ranking of the Platforms

Left Voter L				Middle Voter M				Right Voter R			
Rank of	Issue			Rank of	Issue			Rank of	Issue		
Platform	1	2	3	Platform	1	2	3	Platform	1	2	3
1	L	L	L	1	M	M	M	1	R	R	R
2	L	L	M	2	R	M	M	2	M	R	R
3	L	L	R	3	L	M	M	3	L	R	R
4	L	M	L	4	M	L	M	4	R	R	M
5	L	M	M	5	M	R	M	5	M	R	M
6	L	M	R	6	R	L	M	6	R	R	L
7	L	R	L	7	L	L	M	7	L	R	M
8	L	R	M	8	R	R	M	8	M	R	L
9	L	R	R	9	L	R	M	9	L	R	L
10	M	L	L	10	M	M	L	10	R	M	R
11	M	L	M	11	R	M	L	11	R	L	R
12	M	L	R	12	L	M	L	12	M	M	R
13	M	M	L	13	M	M	R	13	M	L	R
14	M	M	M	14	R	M	R	14	L	M	R
15	M	M	R	15	L	M	R	15	L	L	R
16	M	R	L	16	M	L	L	16	R	M	M
17	M	R	M	17	M	R	L	17	R	L	M
18	M	R	R	18	M	L	R	18	M	M	M
19	R	L	L	19	M	R	R	19	R	M	L
20	R	L	M	20	R	L	L	20	M	L	M
21	R	L	R	21	L	L	L	21	R	L	L
22	R	M	L	22	R	R	L	22	L	M	M
23	R	M	M	23	R	L	R	23	M	M	L
24	R	M	R	24	L	R	L	24	L	L	M
25	R	R	L	25	L	L	R	25	M	L	L
26	R	R	M	26	R	R	R	26	L	M	L
27	R	R	R	27	L	R	R	27	L	L	L

The preceding information can be put into the following format:
Rank of Platform by Voter

Platform	L	M	R	Platform	L	M	R	Platform	L	M	R
LLL	1	21	27	MLL	10	16	25	RLL	19	20	21
LLM	2	7	24	MLM	11	4	20	RLM	20	6	17
LLR	3	25	15	MLR	12	18	13	RLR	21	23	11
LML	4	12	26	MML	13	10	23	RML	22	11	19
LMM	5	3	22	MMM	14	1	18	RMM	23	2	16
LMR	6	15	14	MMR	15	13	12	RMR	14	14	10
LRL	7	24	9	MRL	16	17	8	RRL	25	22	6
LRM	8	9	7	MRM	17	5	5	RRM	26	8	4
LRR	9	27	3	MRR	18	19	2	RRR	27	26	1

I.e., L ranks LLL as his most preferred platform, LLM as his second most perferred platform, etc.; M ranks LLL as his 21st choice, etc. For any given platform there exists another platform preferred by two of the voters. For example, LRM is preferred to MMM by L and R while LLM is preferred to LRM by L and M.

Table 3. Presidential Preference Polls, 1968 (Harris)[a]

	Per cent Preferring Democrat Contender / Per cent Preferring Republican Contender			Given that Wallace is a Third Party Candidate
	A $\frac{\text{McCarthy}}{\text{Nixon}}$	B $\frac{\text{McCarthy}}{\text{Rockefeller}}$	C $\frac{\text{Humphrey}}{\text{Rockefeller}}$	D $\frac{\text{Humphrey}}{\text{Nixon}}$
June 10–17	$\frac{44}{36}$	$\frac{41}{35}$	$\frac{40}{36}$	$\frac{43}{36}$
July 8–14	$\frac{42}{34}$	$\frac{38}{32}$	$\frac{34}{37}$	$\frac{37}{35}$
July 25–29	$\frac{43}{35}$	$\frac{34}{40}$	$\frac{34}{40}$	$\frac{41}{36}$

[a] In each poll McCarthy did better than Humphrey against either Nixon or Rockefeller, and Rockefeller did better than Nixon against either McCarthy or Humphrey. The Electoral College might have given Rockefeller an even better chance of winning the election than Nixon. If McCarthy, Humphrey, Rockefeller, and Nixon (in that order) represents an arrangement from left to right, then both parties chose their right-leaning candidates and each party would have done better if it had moved to the left. The results of the Gallup Poll tended to contradict the Harris Poll, while the Crossley Poll tended to support the Harris Poll.

were not poles apart; that is, there was no universally accepted definition of what constituted Left and Right.

Unfortunately no polls have been designed in order to test directly for the existence of intransitivity; however, the results of several Gallup polls do indicate that intransitivity is fairly prevalent. For example, in October 1967 a poll asking the voters whether they preferred Richard Nixon or Nelson Rockefeller to be the presidential choice of the Republican Party yielded the following percentages: Nixon—47 per cent, Rockefeller—45 per cent, and no opinion—8 per cent.[9] It is reasonable to infer from this poll that a majority of voters preferred Nixon over Rockefeller not only for the Republican candidacy but also for the presidency. In November 1967 a presidential preference poll between Lyndon Johnson and Rockefeller resulted in the following percentages: Rockefeller—54 per cent, Johnson—40 per cent, and no opinion—6 per cent;[10] while a presidential preference poll taken in December 1967 had the following results: Johnson—47 per cent, Nixon—43 per cent, and no opinion—10 per cent.[11] This is an intransitive situation, for Nixon is preferred to Rockefeller, and Rockefeller is preferred to Johnson, and Johnson is preferred to Nixon. Similar results were obtained in March 1968 when all three of these polls were repeated; however, the two presidential contests included George Wallace as a third party candidate, making the results more ambiguous.[12] These, as well as other Gallup polls, suggest that intransitivity is not just a mathematical oddity, but rather a fact of political life.

In addition to the evidence against single peakedness, there is also considerable empirical evidence against the assumption that the parties are only interested in winning the election. For example, in the 1964 U.S. presidential election, it was clear that Barry Goldwater was not the best choice for the Republican Party (if the ultimate goal was to win the election). The same situation occurred in 1968, when although the polls had shown that Nixon would do worse than Rockefeller against either Humphrey or McCarthy and that Humphrey would do worse than McCarthy against either Nixon or Rockefeller, nevertheless, Nixon and Humphrey won their party nominations (See Table 3). Kenneth Prewitt has shown that on the local level, most office holders do not intend to run for reelection.[13] There are also many offices in which the official is legally prevented from being reelected (e.g., a second term president). In both these cases it is unreasonable to assume that they make political decisions while in office based on maximizing the probability of being reelected.

---

[9] *Gallup Opinion Index,* No. 30, 4.

[10] *Gallup Opinion Index,* No. 32, 8.

[11] *Gallup Opinion Index,* No. 32, 7.

[12] Nixon—36, Johnson—44, Wallace—12, No Opinion—8. (*Gallup Opinion Index,* No. 33, 11); Rockefeller—40, Johnson—37, Wallace—13, No Opinion—

A large body of political science literature claims that the President is very important in molding public opinion. If this is true, then he can mold it toward his own purposes. The *Pentagon Papers* revealed how President Johnson tried to manipulate both the events and the news of the war so that the American people would be willing to fight in Vietnam.[14] He was trying to get the will of the people to coincide with his policies more than he was trying to make his policies coincide with the will of the people. Certainly if he only chose those policies which maximized the probability of his reelection he would not have made so great an effort to conceal the nature of the war (if this is what the American people wanted).

In conclusion, considerable evidence suggests not only that the world is not single peaked but also that the parties are not solely interested in winning elections. It appears that the traditional model rests on a very weak foundation.

The Alternative Competitive Model

The alternative competitive model assumes that the parties are solely interested in policy and that winning the election is just a means to that end. Some insight into the differences between the alternative competitive model and the traditional model may be found by looking at the analogous models in the business world. The traditional model of political party decision making is a sales maximization model: the firm which has sold the most cars is the winner (similarly, the party with the most votes is the winner).[15] This interpretation, however, is incorrect in both cases. The firm is interested in maximizing its profits, so, depending on the structure of the market, it might sell fewer cars at a higher price or perhaps sell none at all. Because we may observe that firms are trying to sell more cars does not mean that this is their goal; rather, it is a method of maximizing profits.

In the alternative model it is assumed that the parties are trying to maximize their expected utility. In so doing they will sometimes use the method of increasing the expected probability of winning the election, but winning the election is still the method and not the goal. Some political scientists see the parties as having two contradictory goals when choosing a platform. On the one hand, the party wants that platform which will maximize the probability of the party's winning the election; on the other hand, the party wants that platform which gives the party the most utility if it wins. The problem involved with this view of the parties can best be seen by again looking at a similar situation in economics. We could say that an automobile firm has two contradictory goals: (1) to have as great a profit per car as possible and (2) to maximize its sales; however, a more correct view is that the only goal is to maximize total profits. Similarly, a party chooses that platform which maximizes its expected utility. This will become clearer as the model is developed.

As in the traditional model, it is assumed that there are infinite barriers to entry of a new party, that the incumbent party presents its platform first, and that the party is a team.

An election that is only concerned with income distribution will be analyzed first. In this situation the voter wants as much income as possible for himself and does not care how much any of the other voters receives. This is similar to a constant sum game—characterized by conflict.

The allocation of income is intransitive (i.e., no one platform is preferred by the majority to every other platform) as Table 4 shows. A majority (X and Y) prefers platform B to A; a majority (Y and Z) prefers C to B; similarly D is preferred to C, and A is preferred to D; so whichever platform the incumbent chooses, the opposition can always find another platform to defeat it. What is the optimal strategy for the parties in a case like this? In a situation

---

10. (*Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 33, 13); Nixon—48, Rockefeller—42, No Opinion—10. (*Gallup Opinion Index*, No. 34, 9). It should be noted that in earlier surveys, the relative ranking of the two major party candidates was not affected by the inclusion (or omission) of George Wallace as a third party candidate.

[13] Kenneth Prewitt, "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (March, 1970), 5–17. On page 10 Prewitt says, "Among the nearly 500 men who govern the cities of the San Francisco Bay Area, about one-fifth will be planning to retire voluntarily at the end of the present term and another 30 to 50 per cent will be planning to retire after only one more term." Furthermore, he shows that the councilmen do not worry about going against the majority and thus they do not seem to formulate policies in order to win elections.

[14] *Pentagon Papers*. (New York: Bantam Books), 1971.

[15] There are some other variants. For example, Riker in *The Theory of Political Coalitions* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) suggests that the parties are only interested in a minimal winning coalition. This is in response to the usual formulation of the traditional model which assumes that parties maximize the numbers of votes they receive. One reason for forming a minimal winning coalition is that the rewards are divided among fewer people. These rewards may be of office or of policy.

where the incumbent knows that he is bound to lose the election, the incumbent will choose that platform which will result in the greatest benefit to himself by forcing the opposition to give the incumbent as much as possible. The incumbent thereby "wins" even in losing the election. The following example will show the underlying concepts. Let there be five voters—X, Y, A, B, and C (where X and Y not only vote, but also present platforms; henceforth X will be referred to as the incumbent party and Y as the opposition party). For any given platform presented by the incumbent, the opposition will offer himself more income than he was offered by the incumbent (which might have been zero) and just enough income to the other participants in order to win the election. The opposition will offer income to those $(N - 1)/2$ players besides himself who were offered the least by the incumbent, and to each of these he will only offer a small amount more—to offer more to these players or to other participants would mean that he would have less for himself, but would not mean that the probability of his winning the election would be any higher as he is already winning the election with probability 1 (because $(N - 1)/2 +$ the vote by Y is a majority). The incumbent, realizing that the opposition will take the above strategy, will make sure that he offers himself as much as possible and still be one of the $(N - 1)/2$ voters who is offered the least by the incumbent. With five players, this means that X will offer the following platform:

X	Y	A	B	C
$1/3 - 2e$	0	$1/3 + e$	0	$1/3 + e$

(e an infinitesimally small number).

And in response Y will offer the following platform:

X	Y	A	B	C
1/3	$2/3 - d$	0	d	0

(d an infinitesimally small number).

If Y had offered any other platform, he would not have received as much, while if X had offered a platform such as the following:

X	Y	A	B	C
1/2	1/2	0	0	0,

X would have ended up with nothing as Y would have presented the following platform:

X	Y	A	B	C
0	$1 - 2e$	0	e	e.

The parties end up with all of the income and the voters with nothing.[16] Although this example is an extreme simplification of reality, the result itself is very robust; i.e., whether there is one election or an infinite series of elections, perfect information or imperfect information, one issue or many issues, an advantage to being the incumbent or a disadvantage, transitivity or intransitivity, the parties tend to have their way. For example, in a single peaked world with perfect information (note: it is not necessary to assume the incumbent presents his platform first in this case) even if the voters were to the left of both parties, neither party would present a platform to the left of the Left Party's preferred position.[17] To do so would make both parties worse off, as both are interested in policy and not in winning the election. Of course when the preferred position of the parties are more extreme than the preferred positions of the voters, (i.e., the voters are between the positions of the parties), then the situation looks very similar to the traditional model, and both parties will have platforms close to the median voter's preferred position.

If the voters are uninformed, then they may receive some income, but the parties always have the option of offering nothing to the voters; e.g., with *totally* uninformed voters, whichever platform a party offers has the same chance of winning the election, so each party would offer itself 100 per cent of the income. Similarly, in a single peaked election the par-

Table 4. Intransitivity of Allocation of Income

Platform	Voter		
	Allocation of Income to Voter		
	X	Y	Z
A	1/3	1/3	1/3
B	1/2	1/2	0
C	0	3/4	1/4
D	1/4	1/4	1/2

X and Y prefer B to A; Y and Z prefer C to B; X and Z prefer D to C; X and Y prefer A to D.

---

[16] This example also shows why the concept of extremist may not be very useful. The notion of extremist is no longer well defined nor can friends and enemies be as easily distinguished as in the single peaked case. To have been in a minority in an election does not imply that had your most preferred position been offered as a choice to the voters it would not have been preferred by a majority. Thus the "extremist" position may not be extreme.

[17] This probably characterizes the 1968 U.S. presidential election where each party would have had a greater probability of winning if it had moved "left" (see Table 3).

ties would present their own most preferred position. Unlike the traditional model, competition does not lead to an optimal result (except for the parties).

In the single peaked case, as the voters become less informed, the parties become less similar.[18] Again assume that each party's most preferred platform is to the right of all the voters. Then, if the voters are slightly uninformed, the Right Party will be slightly to the right of the Left Party, hoping that the voters will mistakenly vote for it. The Right Party will not move very far right as it knows that the greater the difference between the parties, the less likely the voters are going to vote for it. If, however, the voters are totally uninformed, the Right Party will move all the way to its most preferred position.

The Restricted Competition Model

If parties are only interested in winning the election, there cannot be collusion, as winning the election is a zero-sum game.[19] But in a situation where the parties are interested in policy, collusion may bring great rewards.

In an election solely concerned with income distribution, when the voters are imperfectly informed, marginal rewards lose their potency. This may mean that the parties will offer more than infinitesimally small amounts to the voters (as a whole) and thus the parties will receive less. Much more important, the outcome becomes very risky. To illustrate, if the voters are totally uninformed, then the optimal choice of each party is to offer itself all of the income and nothing to any of the other participants. The result is that each party has a 50 per cent chance of receiving all the income and a 50 per cent chance of receiving nothing; but if the parties have decreasing marginal utility of income, then they would prefer a 100 per cent chance of receiving one-half (or perhaps one-third). See Figure 2.

Whenever the outcome is uncertain and the parties are risk averters, there exists a collusive agreement with both partes presenting the same platform, which results in both parties being better off.[20] Thus if the voters are completely uninformed, both parties have a higher expected utility if each presents a platform offering one-half to each of the two parties than if each offers everything to itself. Once again it is shown that the parties will receive all of the income. The model also predicts that the parties will look just alike (to reduce risk): the same results hold when the election is concerned with issues. It "pays" the parties to collude and to present similar platforms.



Figure 2. The Party's utility as a function of income. With decreasing marginal utility of income, the party is a risk avoider, preferring a sure thing to the gamble which, on average, gives the party the same percentage of income.

When oligopolists collude, competition is, for the most part, limited to advertising and product differentiation—price competition is avoided. The parties, too, avoid "price competition" and compete only in relatively unimportant areas. Major issues rarely become "issues" as the parties are unlikely to offer a choice to the voters on more fundamental questions. The collusion between the parties can be seen as a major coalition. To the degree that the parties compete with each other, a party makes a minor coalition with some of the voters. The distinction between major and minor coalitions is very useful, for often in political science literature the parties are seen as two coalitions against each other. Suppose the election is concerned with income allocation, and suppose also that party B, the big business party, offers 53 per cent of the income to itself, 47 per cent to L (the unionized labor party), and 0 to M, the cultural minority, while L offers 50 per cent to itself, 47 per cent to B, and 3 per cent to M, then it is not correct to say that L and M are in a coalition against B, for B is better off than M, even though it loses the election. It is more useful to say that L and B are in a major coalition and L and M are in a minor coalition for L and B never "lose" very much.

---

[18] Given certain restrictions on the utility functions of the parties and on the probability of the voters making an incorrect choice, it can be shown that the platforms that the parties end up choosing will result in each party's having a 50 per cent chance of winning the election.

[19] Unless there is more than one office, in which case the parties may agree to split the offices. There may be limited collusion with respect to campaign spending. See R. Curry and L. Wade, *A Theory of Political Exchange* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall), 1968.

[20] Whenever collusion occurs no assumption about the order of presentation of the party's platforms need be made.

Although there may be explicit agreements (such as between the Conservatives and Liberals in Colombia), it is much more likely that collusion is implicit. The parties may find many ways of restricting competition with each other; bipartisanship, promotion of mutually acceptable ideologies, marginal changes in the previous administration's policies, and recruitment of those who are not antagonistic to the other party. Even the belief in the impossibility of certain platforms being able to win the electon may be a form of implicit collusion if there is more fiction than substance to the belief. Thus, the parties compete more *with* the voters than *for* the voters or *with each other*.

Conclusion

This article suggests that the traditional approach has taken the wrong economic model to explain political party behavior. The traditional model views the parties as being similar to perfectly competitive sales-maximizing firms. This is in contrast to the restricted competition model which sees the parties as being analogous to profit-maximizing oligopolists. Just as oligopolists often collude against the consumers, the parties may collude against the voters. In such cases the distinction between multiparty systems and one-party systems may not be very great.

Both the alternative competitive model and the restricted competition model assume that the parties are only interested in policy. If these models are correct, then political scientists will have to do more than just count votes in order to see who won the election. For it is which party's policy is implemented, not which party receives the most votes that determines the winner.

Finally, both models have a number of interesting results—the most important one being that the political parties are not very accountable to the electorate.

The Learning of Legislative Norms*

HERBERT B. ASHER
Ohio State University

Studies of legislatures have uncovered the existence of informal norms or folkways or rules of the game that are presumed to be important for the maintenance of the legislative system.[1] It is often argued that the institution, be it the House or the Senate or a state legislature, must transmit its norms to legislative newcomers in order to insure the continued, unaltered operation of the institution, and that the member himself must learn these norms if he is to be an effective legislator. Whether or not this be necessary, it certainly is plausible to view freshman members of the legislative body as undergoing a socialization process which involves the learning of legislative norms. Yet previous studies have largely concentrated on the identification of legislative norms and have devoted little attention to their transmission to the newcomer. Is the freshman legislator aware of the expected types of behavior prior to taking his seat or does he learn them while in office? If he learns them in office, who actually are the agents of transmission? Or is the socialization process so informal that we cannot even speak of well-defined agents?

These questions and others have not been fully addressed, and thus the focus of this paper is on the learning of norms by freshman members of the United States House of Representatives.[2] My interest is in individual learning of legislative norms, regardless of whether the content learned is in conformity or opposition to the norms. Too often the emphasis in socialization research has been on system maintenance rather than individual adaptation, leading one to dismiss findings of deviance too readily. The data come from a broader panel study of the learning that freshman members elected to the House of Representatives in November, 1968, underwent with respect to perceptions of their job, legislative norms, and sources of voting cues.[3] Since a research inter-

---

* I am grateful to John Kingdon, Herbert Weisberg, Richard Fenno, John Kessel, and Randall Ripley for their helpful comments and suggestions.

[1] The literature on legislative norms is quite extensive. For a discussion of Senate norms, see Donald R. Matthews, *U.S. Senators and Their World* (New York: Random House, 1960) and William S. White, *Citadel: The Story of the U.S. Senate* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957) and two articles by Ralph Huitt, "The Outsider in the Senate: An Alternative Role," *American Political Science Review,* 55 (September, 1961), pp. 566–75 and "The Morse Committee Assignment Controversy: A Study in Senate Norms," *American Political Science Review,* 51 (June, 1957), pp. 313–29. For information on House norms, see Charles L. Clapp, *The Congressman: His Work as He Sees It* (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1963); Donald G. Tacheron and Morris K. Udall, *The Job of the Congressman* (Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1966); and Clem Miller, *Member of the House: Letters of a Congressman* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1962). Also relevant to the House is the growing body of literature on committee integration and the norms that promote it. The foremost articles in this area are Richard F. Fenno, Jr., "The House Appropriations Committee as a Political System: The Problem of Integration," *American Political Science Review,* 56 (June, 1962), pp. 310–24 and John F. Manley, "The House Committee on Ways and Means: Conflict Management in a Congressional Committee," *American Political Science Review,* 59 (December, 1965), pp. 927–39. See also the broader studies by these authors: Richard F. Fenno, Jr., *The Power of the Purse: Appropriations Politics in Congress* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1966) and John F. Manley, *The Politics of Finance* (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970). At the state legislative level, the reader can turn to John Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1962); Malcolm E. Jewell, *The State Legislature: Politics and Practice* (New York: Random House, 1962); and James D. Barber, *The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). Finally, for an example of research in a non-American setting, see Allan Kornberg, "The Rules of the Game in the Canadian House of Commons," *Journal of Politics,* 26 (May, 1964), pp. 358–80.

[2] Recently, there has been a greater emphasis on the legislative newcomer and his adaptation to the institution, with one article specifically concerned with the rules of the game, although from a different perspective than employed herein. In a panel study of freshman California assemblymen, Bell and Price found that norm learning did take place. They wrote: "A whole host of 'in-house' norms were cited after legislative experience had been acquired. Rules pertaining to committee decorum and management of bills were frequently cited in the second and third interviews; they were not often cited in the first interview." See Charles M. Price and Charles G. Bell, "The Rules of the Game: Political Fact or Academic Fancy?" *Journal of Politics,* 32 (November, 1970), p. 855. For more general discussions of freshman adaptation, see Charles G. Bell and Charles M. Price, "Pre-Legislative Sources of Representational Roles," *Midwest Journal of Political Science,* 13 (May, 1969), pp. 254–70 and Irwin N. Gertzog, "The Socialization of Freshman Congressmen: Some Agents of Organizational Continuity," Paper prepared for delivery at the 66th annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Biltmore Hotel, Los Angeles, September 8–12, 1970, pp. 1–26.

[3] Herbert B. Asher, "The Freshman Congressman: A Developmental Analysis" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1970).

est in learning is a longitudinal concern, a two-wave panel design was employed, the first set of interviews conducted in late January and February of 1969, and the second set the following May. The purpose of the panel was to capture the changes that the 91st class members underwent in the first few months of their legislative service, a period that seemed *a priori* to be crucial in talking about learning. Of the 37 freshmen in the 91st Congress, 30 were interviewed at t_1 (late January and February) and of these 30, 24 were reinterviewed at t_2.[4]

A norm has been defined herein as a rule or standard of conduct appropriate to a person in a specified situation within a group. The norm describes the type of behavior expected by almost all of the other members of the group and often, though not necessarily, has associated with it sanctions for deviance. Since concepts such as role and norm are useful because of their normative or mutual expectations component, and since a definitional attribute of a norm is that it be shared to a high degree by the members of the group, a sample of nonfreshman members of the House was also interviewed. Certainly if incumbent representatives agreed to the norms there would be an environment more supportive of freshman learning them. Conversely, if there were marked disagreement about the norms on the part of nonfreshmen, we might then wish to reformulate or even reject these "norms."[5]

A variety of approaches can be used to ascertain information and attitudes about legislative norms. Wahlke and his colleagues employed an open-ended question that asked the respondents to identify the rules of the game in their respective state legislatures.[6] Such an approach is particularly valuable for identifying those norms most salient to the representative, but it may fail to elicit the nascent attitudes that freshmen early in their careers are likely to possess. Hence, freshmen and nonfreshmen were queried about specific norms, the determination of which was based upon a survey of the existing literature. The main norms investigated were specialization, reciprocity, legislative work, courtesy, and aspects of apprenticeship including learning the House rules, restrained participation, and attendance on the floor and in

---

[4] The selection of the times for the two waves, particularly the first, was no easy matter. Since a prime concern of my research was freshman attitudes to legislative norms, I wished to interview sufficiently early so as to ascertain these attitudes while uninfluenced by House service. But seminars for freshman representatives were held early in the session (January 8 through January 13) and at these meetings a large amount of material, some of it relevant to legislative norms, was presented to the freshmen. Thus, it would have been advantageous to talk to the newcomers before these seminars were held. But in terms of my interest in internal House voting cues, interviewing in early January would have made little sense as almost no legislative business was underway. In retrospect, the problem was not very serious as evidenced by a question included in the interview schedule designed to measure the impact of the freshman seminars. Freshmen generally indicated that the seminars were interesting and highly informative with respect to parliamentary procedures and the services available to congressmen, but generally attributed little influence to the seminars vis-à-vis House norms. Similar opinions were expressed by freshman participants in the 1959 seminars. My thanks go to Representative Morris Udall for allowing me to rummage through his files on previous freshman seminars.

There remains the possibility that substantial norm learning may have occurred in the postelection period prior to the freshman's formal entry into the House, a "waiting period" during which many freshmen took some action with regard to their future committee assignment or journeyed to Washington to handle personal business. Thus, there was certainly opportunity for norm learning to have occurred in this period, although freshmen indicated little such activity in response to questions about the waiting period. Unfortunately, resource constraints prevented a third wave of interviews shortly after the November election.

[5] The nonfreshman members of the House were stratified according to party, region, and seniority, and proportionate samples were selected randomly within these strata. The interviews obtained were very representative of Republican House membership, while they underrepresented Democrats in general and senior, southern Democrats in particular. The following figures indicate how well the nonfreshman sample matches the overall population in terms of party and seniority where a threefold classification of seniority based on the number of terms served prior to the start of the 91st Congress is used. Low seniority was defined as three or fewer terms, moderate as four and five terms, and high as more than five terms.

	Republicans		Democrats	
	% of population	% of sample	% of population	% of sample
Seniority				
Low	55	49	36	48
Moderate	18	20	22	26
High	27	31	42	26
Total %	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	(174)	(35)	(224)	(31)

Despite the underrepresentation of senior Democrats, there were no significant ideological differences between the samples selected from each stratum and the corresponding parent stratum as measured by CQ conservative coalition support scores and ADA and ACA ratings.

[6] The actual question that Wahlke and his colleagues used was: "We've been told that every legislature has its unofficial rules of the game—certain things they must do and things they must not do if they want the respect and cooperation of fellow members. What are some of these things—these 'rules of the game'—that a member must observe to hold the respect and cooperation of his fellow members?" See Wahlke et al., *The Legislative System,* p. 143.

committee.[7] A focused interview approach was selected to collect information about these norms, although this procedure raises certain problems. For example, one cannot simply ask the representative whether a norm of reciprocity exists in the House, for such a label may be without meaning to the legislator. We must attach some behavioral tag to reciprocity, and in so doing we have a wide leeway. Thus, we might ask the representative whether he thought members should do favors for one another, but unless the representative was particularly misanthropic, we would expect unanimously affirmative responses to such an item, thereby reducing the discriminatory capacity of the question to zero. Therefore, reciprocity was operationalized in this study by placing it in the context of a voting situation, with all the attendant ambiguities and pressures. The actual question was: "Would you vote a certain way on a bill that you cared little about in order to gain the vote of a fellow representative on a bill that you did care about?" The general point to be made here is that questions seeking to uncover information about norms are best framed within a fairly specific behavioral situation. If we cannot observe behavior directly (and most often we cannot), then our questions should be as behaviorally oriented as possible.

Nonfreshman and the Norms

Table 1 presents the level of agreement expressed by our sample of nonfreshman members of the 91st Congress to a series of items about House norms.[8] The highest level of agreement was reached on the importance of maintaining friendly relationships, with the importance of committee work running a close second, while the weakest consensus was found on the norm of apprenticeship. Some detailed analysis of the nonfreshman responses is very illuminating.

Specialization. Among the norms, specialization appeared to be adhered to largely because of certain properties of the House: Many members asserted that the heavy and varied workload of the House, as well as its large membership, made specialization mandatory. Of the eight incumbents who did not agree that Congressmen should specialize rather than generalize, six said that the member must do both because of the interdependence of issues, while two opted for being a generalist. The two representatives who cited a generalist orientation were both extreme liberals within their party and viewed the standing committees of the House as "the hand-maidens of special interest groups."

In an attempt to learn whether their attitudes toward specialization had changed since their first term, the nonfreshmen were asked whether they had felt the same way (about specialization) when they were freshmen, and, if not,

Table 1. Nonfreshman Attitudes to the Norms

	% Agreeing	N
Friendly relationships important	97	40
Important work of House done in committee	95	40
House rules important	82	40
Would not personally criticize a fellow representative	82	40
Would be likely to trade votes	81	21
Congressman should be a specialist	80	40
Freshman should serve apprenticeship	38	65

---

[7] The norm of institutional patriotism was also investigated, but its operationalization was so narrow that the responses obtained were not very interesting. Members were asked whether they would ever criticize the House, and, not unexpectedly, most said that they would which presumably implies that institutional patriotism is not a viable norm. But institutional patriotism is far more complex than merely refraining from criticism so that nothing more will be said about the norm in the remainder of this paper.

[8] Some of the nonfreshman interviews were taken at t_1 and the others at t_2. There was very high agreement on some of the norms questions asked at t_1 and these were omitted at t_2 so that more attention could be devoted to other items. This accounts for the various N's on the norms questions. There was no reason to believe that the responses to the norms questions that were omitted at t_2 contained any systematic biases. The actual questions for each of the norms were: Do you think congressmen should specialize in a field or should try to be generalists? Do you think most of the important work of the House is done on the floor or in committees? How important do you think it is to maintain friendly relationships with your fellow congressmen? Do you think that freshman congressmen should serve a period of apprenticeship, that is, be more an observer than an active participant in the legislative process? How important do you think learning the House procedural rules is? Would you ever personally criticize a fellow representative on the floor of the House? Would you vote a certain way on a bill that you cared little about in order to gain the vote of a fellow congressman on a bill that you did care about?

It should be noted here that the question about where the important work of the House is done does not tap a norm in the same sense as the other items, but rather elicits a belief or opinion. Once we have found marked disagreement with certain items thought to be legislative norms, then by definition these items no longer are norms. But for simplicity of presentation, the word norm will be used in the subsequent analysis to apply to those items such as apprenticeship about which there was substantial disagreement.

what had led them to change their views. Twenty-six said yes, eleven said no, and two could not recall their earlier opinions. All eleven whose views about specialization had changed said that when they entered Congress, they did not realize how necessary specialization was, but that subsequent legislative and committee experience in the House had taught them differently. Two of the eleven said they initially thought it was possible to be knowledgeable on most important issues, but that the energy and time required for this was prohibitive.

Committee Work. While 38 of the 40 incumbents interviewed claimed that most of the important work of the House was done in committee rather than on the floor, the remaining two representatives felt that neither place was crucial. Their responses revealed skepticism about the House's effectiveness as an arena for legislation.

> Most of the important work is done neither on the floor nor in committee. The most important work is done in the submission of bills to Congress by an administration when it has a majority in Congress. They get sorted and acted upon and we just screw around with them. Every time Congress tries to initiate legislation, it does a bad job—Smith Act, Taft-Hartley, Landrum-Griffin. Congress legislates in the heat of emotion as it is threatening to do now on campus unrest and did on draft resisters.

> If one means by the important work of the House constituent services and the like, which I do, then it is done neither on the floor nor in committee.

Six of the incumbents who asserted the preeminence of committee work stated that they had not held that point of view when they were freshmen. A midwestern Republican claimed that his previous state legislative experience had misled him, for he "came from a state Senate where the important work was done on the floor, where the substance of bills was often changed on the floor." This suggests that in some situations previous political experience may be dysfunctional and hence may have to be unlearned. Two representatives said that it was legislative experience in general that led them to recognize the primacy of committee work. Finally, a southern Republican gave a very interesting reply as to his perception of the importance of committees when he was a freshman.

> To some extent I felt that committees were most important. It became clear to me early that if you do not have the power, then you have to go to where the power is. It is difficult for a freshman to do much on the floor, but if he goes to his committee chairman or ranking minority member and has already proven his worth to him, if he makes a suggestion and leaves it at that and does not try to grandstand, he can influence legislation from the outset through the senior member of his committee.

Friendly Relationships. The level of agreement on the importance of friendly relationships was truly impressive. One reason cited for this attitude was instrumental: friendly relationships would presumably make one more effective in getting his ideas accepted and bills passed. The other reason was the vague belief that life in general was more pleasant when friendly relationships were the rule. Some responses exemplifying these reasons were:

> Friendly relationships are important because you never know when you'll need others' help or votes. For example, I've been working on a bill on the hijacking of airplanes and got a good reception from friends while testifying at the Interstate and Foreign Commerce committee hearings.

> Friendships are extremely important; that's why the gym is so valuable. You meet guys from the other side of the aisle, people you normally would not get intimate with.

But a number of representatives qualified what was meant by friendly relationships:

> It depends on what you mean by friendly. In terms of operating as a club, I'm not attracted by the sort of thing in which the gym is the key to friendship or advancement. But if by friendship, one means courtesy and respect, then, sure, it's important.

> Friendly relationships are important, but they do not require camaraderie. There's not too much of that that bears directly on getting things passed. One should be a person one feels he can deal with, one who will keep his word. But representatives recognize that one may have to violate this, that one may have to be a demagogue on an issue important to the district. Being buddy-buddy is not as important in the Congress as it is in the state legislature which is less sophisticated.

House Rules. A fairly high consensus was attained on the importance of learning the House rules. The few cases of disagreement, however, are quite interesting. One representative well known to his colleagues for his ambition and career plans beyond the House delcared that the rules were not very important to learn. He said that he had not taken the time to learn them, that he worked around the system rather than within it, and that he had not been hurt by this approach so far. It may very well be that members who do not view the House in career terms will consider the rules to be less significant. This viewpoint was expressed by another representative, who said that the importance of the rules depended on what you wanted to do; if you wanted to get into the leadership, then they were "damned important." Another incumbent thought that the rules were not important for freshmen:

> The rules are important, but those used most often are those used in legislative actions. If one is in a position of power, then the rules are important. Most members never come close to knowing the procedures at all, yet they can do a lot. Freshmen need know only the amenities and not the rules.

A northern Democrat thought that the rules were not all that important as the will of the majority usually prevailed; members did not use the rules against you. Another representative voiced a contrasting opinion; he said that the rules were unimportant because they were so often flouted.

Personal Criticism. While the level of agreement on the norm of refraining from personal criticism of fellow representatives was quite high, this item proved to be very difficult to answer for some members. Almost one-third of the responses were conditional or hypothetical: "I don't think I would," "I shouldn't," "It's not likely," "Not unless someone drove me to it." One representative admitted to having engaged in personal attacks, but vowed never to do it again because of the severe social consequences that he had suffered.

Reciprocity/Trading Votes. Most representatives were willing to trade votes, a manifestation of reciprocity, but many attached provisos to this type of action. Typical responses were:

> Yes, I'd trade votes, but this does not happen often. It is not a specific trade, but more a matter of good will. I never had a specific trade; this happens more in the Senate.
>
> It depends on the importance of the bill. On local bills, I think I would. For example, I am interested in a potato referendum bill in 48 states and I'm sure that my good friend ——— of New York couldn't care at all about the bill, but he'll probably support it because we're friends. And I'd do the same for him.

The negative responses to this item were usually spoken sharply and intensely, indicating an almost moral disapproval of this type of action. Unfortunately, the N involved here is only 21.

In summary, friendly relationships and the importance of committee work were the most commonly agreed upon norms. A somewhat lower level of consensus characterized attitudes toward specialization, reciprocity, restraint in personal criticism, and the importance of the House rules. The marked disagreement on apprenticeship calls into question the very existence of this norm.

Freshman Attitudes Toward the Norms at t_1

Table 2 presents the replies of the newcomers to the same norms questions asked of incumbents, as well as to some special freshman items; the nonfreshman figures are repeated as an aid to the reader.

The responses of the newcomers are quite similar to those of their more senior colleagues, suggesting a generally shared set of expectations. Both groups agree most strongly with the importance of friendly relationships; perhaps this implies that this norm, rather than being specific to the House, is carried over from general life experience. The freshmen also unanimously believed the rules to be important. The major difference between the newcomers' and incumbents' responses concerned the norm of apprenticeship; an additional 20 per cent of the freshmen agreed that it is necessary. This may reflect a caution on the part of freshmen early in their incumbency.

Since the concept of norms involves shared

Table 2. Freshman Attitudes to the Norms at t_1

	% Freshmen Agreeing	N	% Nonfreshmen Agreeing	N
Friendly relationships important	100	30	97	40
House rules important	100	30	82	40
Important work of House done in committee	90	30	95	40
Congressman should be a specialist	73	30	80	40
Worthwhile to spend time on House floor	73	30		
Would be likely to trade votes	72	29	81	21
Senior members favor the specialist	71	28		
Would not personally criticize a fellow representative	71	28	82	40
Freshman should serve apprenticeship	57	30	38	65

expectations, the freshmen were queried about their perceptions of nonfreshman attitudes. They were asked whether they thought that more senior representatives favored the specialist or the generalist. All the newcomers who could answer said that senior members favored the specialist, which in effect confirmed their own earlier endorsement of specialization and committee work, but 29 per cent (8 of 28) said that they did not know the preferences of senior members. And while the newcomers generally cited committee work over floor work, fully 73 per cent thought it worthwhile, especially for freshmen, to spend time on the House floor. Attendance on the House floor was deemed important because it enabled the freshman representative to learn the procedures and thereby complete his apprenticeship much sooner.

Deviant Responses of the Freshmen. One can conclude from this brief outline that freshmen shared to a similar degree the norms of nonfreshmen, a situation certainly conducive to the learning of norms, but not one that automatically implies that norms were formally transmitted from senior to freshman members. It is interesting to examine some of the deviant responses given by freshmen. Numerous hypotheses were entertained about the causes of noncompliance to the norms. For example, it was thought that freshmen with prior political experience, especially in the state legislature, would be more apt to give "correct" responses. It was also thought that freshmen with a strong dedication to a career in the House would be more sensitive to the norms. These hypotheses and others were neither confirmed nor refuted because of the very small number of cases involved. The most fruitful approach to the problem is a norm-by-norm analysis of the deviant responses.

Specialization. Eight of the thirty freshmen interviewed at t_1 did not unqualifiedly opt to be specialists. Two freshmen asserted that Congressmen should be generalists, five said that it depended on the individual or that a member must be both, and one did not know. One representative who chose to be a generalist cited the heterogeneous nature of his district as the determining factor in his decision. This representative had the most extensive state legislative experience of any freshman in the 91st Congress, thereby leading one to reject the too facile linkage of state legislative service with specialization. The other generalist appeared to be motivated by two forces: a suspicion of accepting others' advice and a recognition that congressmen had to vote on a wide range of issues and should therefore be broadly informed. The theme of distrust occurred throughout this interview; the representative was very much an ideologue with little confidence in the judgment and motives of his colleagues and with a very rigid view of his job. This suspiciousness was reflected in his responses to questions on voting cues: he was very wary of members giving him wrong information and was generally expecting his votes to be uninfluenced by his colleagues. Newcomers who said that a member had to be both a specialist and a generalist argued that assignment to a committee forced one to specialize, while floor voting on a wide variety of issues compelled one to be a generalist. Another representative rejected specialization partially because of the narrowness of his committee assignment. He said:

> One has to do both. I can tell you now that I will not spend the rest of my time becoming an expert on the price of hayseed oil.

An analysis of such background variables as prior political experience uncovered no systematic differences between specialists and nonspecialists.

Committee Work. Only three of thirty freshmen did not assert that most of the important work of the House was done in committee. One member, a southern Democrat with state legislative experience and highly directed toward a career in the House, said that he did not know where the work was done since the committees had only just organized. Another freshman, our distrustful ideologue mentioned above, said without qualification that most of the important work was done on the floor, since that was where the actual passage or defeat of a piece of legislation occurred. For him, voting was the crucial aspect of the job with the events preceding any vote being of only minor importance. The third freshman who failed to assert the primacy of committee work thought, in fact, that neither the committees nor the floor was the most significant arena:

> The important work is not done in either. It is too early to say where the important work is done, if, in fact, important work is done. The important work is to stir up public opinion about the important issues.

This representative more than any other freshman had an active national constituency. His energies were constantly spread thin over a number of liberal causes that were outside the immediate context of House legislative activity.

He was one of the most active and reformist freshmen, yet his behavior very much followed the traditional, accepted patterns even though he denied the importance of committee and floor work. For example, in the interview, he coupled a stinging attack on the proceedings on the House floor with a statement and explanation as to why it is important to spend time there.

> Yes, it is worthwhile to spend time on the House floor. This is where the member lobbies, where he talks to others about bills, trades information, does logrolling. People will think you are arrogant if you don't spend much time there. Debate on the floor is a sham; it's dishonest. People get things in the *Record* without saying them in debate as happened in the HUAC controversy.

And his response to the item about the importance of friendly relationships probably best typifies the difference between the activist who is careful to observe the amenities and the would-be reformer who allows personal relationships to deteriorate.

> It's very important to maintain friendly relationships. I think a big mistake is made when people who come up here hoping to change things, are frustrated and allow their frustrations to create personal animosities. I get along with everyone here; I like everyone. I even get along well with Mendel Rivers; I tease him a lot.

This same freshman's remarks on the House floor on the occasion of Speaker McCormack's announced retirement further illustrate proper, yet dissenting behavior.

> Mr. Speaker, I want especially to join in this tribute to the Speaker today because it is no secret that on some questions we have disagreed, and it is important—if this occasion is to be what it should be—that those of us who have not always agreed with him make it clear that we are no less grateful for having known him than those who have agreed with him.
>
> . . . I will always be grateful that we overlapped here so I could have the opportunity to know this man, generous, considerate, and fair to everyone, never vindictive no matter how great his disagreement or disappointment.
>
> The rules of this body continue to dismay many of us who find them neither democratic nor conducive to efficient procedures. But within these rules, the Speaker has done everything he could to protect the rights of every Member . . .[9]

Personal Criticism. There were eight freshmen out of twenty-eight who said they would personally criticize a fellow representative. For three of these representatives, this willingness to criticize their colleagues seemed to be rooted in a certain outspokenness of personality and intensity of belief that they realized would surface at some point in their congressional careers, although they did not consciously intend to make personal criticism a regular occurrence. Included among these three is our distrustful ideologue; he said that it was possible he would criticize a fellow representative "if he needed it." None of the five other freshmen had served in the state legislature, so perhaps their earlier experiences had not taught them that personal attacks were normally out of bounds. For one of these five, the lack of state legislative experience was probably less influential than the member's own weak attachment to the House. Two factors that lessened his commitment to the House were his age and his relative financial independence: he perceived himself to be too old to have any lengthy career in the House, and therefore far removed from the worries of career advancement; furthermore, as he mentioned more than once, he had a lucrative business to return to if House service ever became too compromising. Even if he were to criticize, he said that he would do it "with velvet gloves."

Reciprocity/Trading Votes. A striking similarity emerges among the freshman representatives who were not likely to trade votes: All six were Republicans. And the three members of the nonfreshman sample who unqualifiedly refused to trade votes were also Republicans.

---

[9] It is very difficult to gather systematic information on the "proper" activist who observes the rules of the game vs. the one who does not, but scattered references to various individuals in the course of interviewing suggested that these two general types were meaningful for some members of Congress. For example, specific comparisons twice were made between the "proper" liberal described above and another liberal Democratic freshman from the same region and with similar issue concerns. These comparisons were unfavorable toward the latter freshman because of his excessive behavior. He was criticized for shooting off his mouth too much and for making too many entries in the *Congressional Record*. An examination of the actual number of entries indicated that the perceptions of his behavior were accurate: he was the most verbose newcomer with nearly twice as many distinct items in the *Record* as his "proper" freshman colleague. It is noteworthy that such behavior is salient to Congressmen and that reputations, whether good or bad, can be created by such activity. In one of the rare attempts to talk in systematic and quantitative terms about the sanctions invoked against nonconformists, Wayne Swanson found that liberals, and especially anti-establishment liberals, lagged behind in advancing up the committee hierarchy in the Senate. See Wayne R. Swanson, "Committee Assignments and the Non-Conformist Legislator: Democrats in the U.S. Senate," *Midwest Journal of Political Science*, 13 (February, 1969), pp. 84–94.

Four of the freshman responses were resounding "No's," while another was "I hope not," which seemed to imply that vote trading was wrong, but that somehow the Representative might be tempted to participate in it. The only respondent who tried to explain the negative opinion toward vote-trading stated that ten years earlier in the state legislature he had been "burned" because he did not anticipate the consequences of the bill to which he had given his vote. Perhaps what we have here is a tendency by Republicans to view politics more moralistically or ideologically so that trading votes becomes tantamount to catering to unworthy special interests and to abdicating one's own sense of right and wrong.[10]

The Usefulness of Time Spent on the House Floor. The final two norms to be investigated for deviant responses were the ones asked only of freshmen. One inquired whether they thought that senior representatives favored the specialist or the generalist. As mentioned earlier, while eight freshmen did not know the answer to this at t_1, none answered "generalist." The second item was concerned with the value of spending time on the House floor. At t_1, five representatives (four Democrats and one Republican) said that it was not worthwhile because so little was going on. Since we are interested in behavior as well as in attitudes, a crude measure of time spent on the House floor was constructed; it is simply the percentage of the quorum call votes that the member answered in the first session of the 91st Congress. This measure has severe limitations, including our expectation that members from districts relatively close to the Capitol would score low because of the extensive amount of time they would spend in their easily-reached constituencies.[11] And, obviously, members who do answer quorum calls regularly may spend very little time on the floor. Be that as it may, there was a weak, yet consistent relationship between attitudes and behavior. The 22 freshmen who felt floor-time was worthwhile missed 13 per cent of the quorum calls; the 3 who were neutral missed 19 per cent; and the 5 who felt floor experience was not worthwhile missed 28 per cent.[12]

Forces Contributing to Deviant Responses to the Norms. From this discussion of deviant responses, we can winnow out a number of influences that promote compliance and noncompliance to the norms, but we cannot weight these influences in any quantitative fashion because of the very small N involved. Career orientation to the House appeared to be important in furthering adherence to the norms, while aspirations to other office encouraged nonadherence. Also reducing the salience of the House for the newcomer were financial security and age; older freshmen realized that they would be less likely to advance to any great degree up the House hierarchy. Finally, the extremism of the member's ideological views was related to norm compliance: The more ideological members, whether of the left or right, were somewhat more willing to violate the norms, especially those on speaking out in proper fashion. It was significant that only one representative—the distrustful ideologue—gave responses that repeatedly departed from the norms. Personality traits in combination with his view of politics seemed to account quite well for his beliefs. But for most other freshmen, deviant responses were very infrequent, so that it was impossible to talk of types of freshmen who generally did not abide by the norms. In other words, noncompliance to one norm did not predict very well attitudes toward other norms. Probably the most important finding overall is that noncompliance was minimal, implying that by one means or another, freshmen had learned the norms well, the topic to which we now turn.

---

[10] There are numerous other plausible sources of party differences toward vote trading; unfortunately, we do not have adequate data to check these out. One explanation concerns the recruitment of candidates by each party. It may be that Republicans in general turn to less political types, often businessmen, who may be naive about politics and therefore not recognize the validity and usefulness of such activities as vote-trading, bargaining, compromise, and the like. While four of the six Republican freshmen in this group did not serve in the state legislature, it is interesting to note that four of the six also had as their primary occupation a business-related activity rather than the legal profession which was by far the most common occupation of the 91st class. Another explanation of this possible party difference is the position of the Democrats and Republicans as fairly permanent majority and minority parties in the House. This may mean that the responsibility for the passage of legislation is left more to the majority Democrats who must then engage in the vote trading and logrolling necessary to forge a majority coalition. It may be that Republicans tend to see this activity as illegitimate since they so often come out on the losing side, but this is purely speculative.

[11] Contrary to my expectation, it turned out that members from districts closer to Washington did not have higher absentee rates. But then one might argue that their scores would have been even higher had their districts been more distant from the Capitol.

[12] Overall, Republican freshmen missed 13 per cent of the quorum votes and Democrats 17 per cent. Southern freshmen in each party had the lowest absentee rates on the quorum votes—13 per cent for Democrats and 8 per cent for Republicans. This may be due to the fact that southern freshmen were more oriented toward the House in career terms and were therefore more likely to perform those tasks that promote a legislative career. Although I do not have data on this, there is no reason to believe that southern freshmen returned to their districts less often than their nonsouthern colleagues which then would have accounted for their higher attendance rates. In fact, five of the 11 southern districts were easily within three to five hours of Washington by car. Thus, it appears that there were regional differences in attendance rates which may reflect differing career views of the office of representative.

Freshmen and the Learning of Norms

As already mentioned, and in contradiction to initial expectations, most of the freshmen at t_1 were giving "correct" responses to the norms items. This observation has implications for the amount of learning that the panel can uncover. If learning be defined in terms of attitude change, then we would expect little learning from t_1 to t_2 because of the correctness of the t_1 responses. While learning might come in the form of strengthening initial attitudes, the inappropriateness of Likert items for elite populations such as legislators makes it difficult to get a handle on changes in attitudinal intensity. As it was, the responses to the unstructured norms questions were coded to incorporate direction and intensity of attitudes, and changes in both are reflected in the coefficients presented in Table 3.

The low incidence of later norm learning may mean that the freshmen knew the norms before entering Congress. If this be true, it is an interesting datum in and of itself. Or perhaps freshmen learned the norms in the short interval between taking office and being interviewed by this investigator, although this possibility appears unlikely (see fn. 4). One way of demonstrating the minimal learning of norms from t_1 to t_2 is to cross-tabulate the t_1 and t_2 responses to each item and examine the intra-item correlations. This is done in Table 3 for those norms questions that were coded in an ordinal fashion with at least four valid codes; the measure of association is tau-b.

Table 3. Intra-Item Correlations on the Norms Question (t_1 and t_2)

	Tau-B	N
Friendly relationships important	1.000	24
Would be likely to trade votes	.721	20
Freshman should serve apprenticeship	.696	24
House rules important	.693	24
Would not personally criticize a fellow representative	.310	22
Worthwhile to spend time on House floor	.169	24

As one can observe, all of the items except two—personal criticism and spending time on the House floor—were very stable. Of the 22 representatives who responded to the personal criticism question at t_1 and t_2, 13 did not give identical answers at the two time points. Eight of the 13 gave answers at t_2 that made it less likely that they would engage in personal criticism, but the other five indicated a greater willingness to criticize which runs counter to the learning or reinforcement of "proper" behavior. There were no background variables that explained the changes on this item, nor did the freshmen volunteer any information that was helpful in accounting for the shifts. What we may have here is response unreliability elicited by a question whose wording left in doubt just what was meant by personal criticism.

The situation was very different on the other unstable item; here half of the 24 responses were identical from t_1 to t_2. Four of the six Republicans who changed thought it more worthwhile at t_2 to spend time on the House floor, while five of the six Democrats felt just the opposite, and each group was able to justify its own position. The Democrats were all active liberals dismayed by what they considered the scarcity of significant floor work. Republicans, however, generally cited the instructional value of being on the House floor. Thus, a part of the reason for the low intra-correlation on this item was the growing dissatisfaction on the part of some Democrats. As this discontent was basically programmatic, it did not affect the less issue-oriented Republicans, whose changes on this item in the opposite direction were less easily explained.[13]

Subdividing the freshmen according to characteristics such as party and district competitiveness does not change the tau-b's very much. There is, however, some tendency for freshmen with state legislative experience to exhibit greater stability than those without such experience, and this is especially pronounced on vote-trading. While the correlation for this item for all freshmen was .721, it rose to .792 for newcomers who had had state legislative service and plummeted to −.200 for those who had not had such service. Attitudes on vote trading, therefore, appear to be more stable if one has already had the opportunity to confront the situation in reality (as in a state legislature) and

---

[13] The issue orientation of the freshmen was determined by impressionistically content-analyzing their responses to a series of questions dealing with their legislative goals, the specific pieces of legislation, if any, that they planned to introduce or work for, and the kinds of legislative matters about which their districts were most concerned.

Table 4. Level of Agreement to the Norms at t_1 and t_2

	Freshmen				Nonfreshmen	
	% Agreeing t_1	% Agreeing t_2	Change	N	% Agreeing	N
Freshman should serve apprenticeship	58	42	−16	24	38	65
Congressman should be a specialist	83	70	−13	23	80	40
House rules important	100	88	−12	24	82	40
Important work done in committee	96	87	− 9	23	95	40
Friendly relationships important	100	92	− 8	24	97	40
Would be likely to trade votes	68	68	0	22	81	21
Worthwhile to spend time on House floor	71	75	4	24		
Senior members favor specialist	70	78	8	23		
Would not personally criticize a fellow representative	69	82	13	22	82	40

not just hypothetically. That is, members who had experienced vote trading first-hand were more consistent in their attitudes toward it, an intuitively appealing result.

Finally, let us examine the percentage agreement with each of the norms at t_1 and t_2, looking only at freshmen interviewed at both t_1 and t_2. This will indicate whether support for the norms increases or decreases (erodes) over time. The appropriate figures are presented in Table 4.[14]

The striking point about Table 4 is that support for the norms more commonly decreased than increased, although most of the percentage changes were small and probably mean little. The norm that suffered the greatest and most real erosion was apprenticeship; this finding will be analyzed in depth in the next section. Also suffering erosion of more than 10 per cent were the items on specialization and the importance of the rules. What may be happening here is that at t_1 freshmen knew the "right" responses and uttered them automatically but that subsequent legislative experience enabled them to take a more sophisticated, knowledgeable, and qualified view of the norms. The norm showing the greatest gain in support was restraint in personal criticism, but no ready explanation comes to mind except that attendance on the House floor would indicate to the freshman, if he did not already know, that personal attacks were very rare, indeed.

The other interesting result in Table 4 is that the t_2 freshman responses are somewhat closer to the nonfreshman replies than are the t_1 answers. This does not hold for specialization, committee work, and friendly relationships; here the t_1 answers come closer to the incumbent responses, but the differences involved are small. But for the other norms, the t_2 freshman responses are substantially closer than the t_1 responses to the nonfreshman replies. For apprenticeship, the difference between the t_1 and nonfreshman responses was 20 per cent, but only four per cent when the t_2 replies are used. Eight and 13 per cent differences between the t_1 and nonfreshman replies on House rules and personal criticism drop to six per cent and zero when the t_2 responses are substituted. Thus, the freshmen were basically similar to their more senior colleagues at t_1, and by t_2 the coincidence of views toward the norms was even closer, suggesting that informal socialization to the norms was still occurring at t_2.

The Norm of Apprenticeship

It is the norm of apprenticeship that is most relevant to freshmen. If the traditional descrip-

Table 5. The Norm of Apprenticeship

	t_1 Freshman Responses	Nonfreshman Responses
	%	%
Agreement	40	24
Qualified Agreement	17	12
Qualified Disagreement	17	20
Disagreement	26	44
Total %	100	100
N	(30)	(66)

---

[14] The percentages of Table 4 are for freshmen in the aggregate. Thus, zero per cent change does not necessarily mean that all the freshmen interviewed at t_1 and t_2 remained perfectly stable; shifts in one direction may have balanced out those in the other. As it was, there was general stability in the replies except for the two items discussed in the text (personal criticism and spending time on the House floor) so that the percentage differences in Table 4 do not mask much additional shifting.

tion of the freshman representative as unsure in his actions and ignorant of House rules and procedures is correct, then apprenticeship is obviously the crucial norm for newcomers to follow. The natural expectation is that apprenticeship would be a very commonly accepted norm given the widespread familiarity of the adage about freshmen being seen and not heard. But as Table 5 indicates, the very existence of a norm of apprenticeship as defined herein must be called into question.[15] Almost half of the nonfreshman sample flatly denied the necessity of serving an apprenticeship, and if the qualified disagreements are added to this figure, almost two-thirds of the incumbents rejected apprenticeship. And while there was majority agreement to the norm at t_1 on the part of freshmen, a sizable minority of 43 per cent deemed it unnecessary. Those freshmen who saw the need for serving an apprenticeship were asked how long they felt it would take in their own particular cases. Four newcomers said that they could not set a specific time limit, two said a year, and only one said the full two years of his first term in office. The remaining ten all indicated that apprenticeships between two and six months would be desirable. Thus, even for freshmen who agreed to apprenticeship, the learning period was usually seen as relatively short, most often under six months. The range of freshman responses to the apprenticeship item is illustrated by the following replies:

> Yes, I'll serve an apprenticeship. Its length depends upon the individual; it will probably take me less time because of my previous legislative experience. A newcomer needs to be informed to be effective.

> Yes. The length depends, probably a few months. You can't lead the army the first day. But you do represent a district that elected you for two years and you can't just sit and do nothing.

> There is no reason for an apprenticeship. You learn best by jumping right in.

> No, you don't have to serve an apprenticeship. But one should not just jump into things. A freshman Congressman is not like a freshman in college; he is a man of some special competence. Senior people will listen to you if you have something to say.

Table 6. Freshman Apprenticeship Responses by Party

	Republicans	Democrats
"Apprenticeship Necessary"	73	40
"No Apprenticeship Necessary"	27	60
Total %	100	100
N	(15)	(15)

An examination of the apprenticeship replies by party indicates some party differences, as shown in Table 6. Seven of the nine freshman Democrats who rejected apprenticeship were urban liberals from districts with heavy constituent demands. These men were generally active and concerned with programs, and, for them, apprenticeship implied a severe restriction on the activities that they deemed most important, particularly speaking up on the floor on such issues as Vietnam, national priorities, and school desegregation. The intention to engage in specific legislative activity, shared by a number of Democratic freshmen, itself runs counter to the image of the bewildered newcomer. For most Republicans, the idea of an apprenticeship or limited participation was not as restrictive, mainly because they were not as concerned with programs and problems. Thus, one's view of the job of the representative appears to influence one's opinions about apprenticeship.

It is reasonable therefore that freshmen who agreed to the importance of apprenticeship would be less active. Table 7 presents some evidence on this point using as measures of activity three simple indices constructed from the *Congressional Record*.[16] As expected, Democratic nonapprentices were substantially more active than their apprentice colleagues across all three measures. But this pattern does not hold for Republicans; here the differences between apprentices and nonapprentices are small and inconsistent. Interestingly, Republican and Democratic apprentices had comparable levels of activity, but Democratic nonapprentices were far more active than their GOP

---

[15] As a reminder to the reader, the actual apprenticeship question was: Do you think that freshman Congressmen should serve a period of apprenticeship, that is, be more an observer than an active participant in the legislative process? In the subsequent discussion, apprenticeship will be treated as a dichotomous variable by collapsing the agreement and qualified agreement categories and by combining the disagreement and qualified disagreement categories.

[16] These measures are merely counts of the total number of entries in the *Record* and the total number of nonrelief bills and resolutions introduced. They could be refined by grouping remarks in the *Record* according to issue area or by dividing bills according to their scope of impact. But the expenditure of resources in such an endeavor seemed prohibitive. As sponsorship of bills is so prevalent in the House, the number of bills introduced may be a highly misleading measure of legislative activity. A better indicator might be the number of amendments introduced. But since amendments from freshmen are relatively rare (only about one-fourth sponsored any), they cannot provide us with sufficient information.

Table 7. Levels of Activity vs. Apprenticeship by Party

	Republicans		Democrats	
	App.	No App.	App.	No App.
Mean Number of House Remarks	22	17	22	39
Mean Number of Extension Remarks	15	19	21	40
Mean Number of Nonprivate Bills and Resolutions Introduced	54	53	56	81
N	11	4	6	9

counterparts. Thus, Democratic freshmen are less likely to welcome serving an apprenticeship than Republican newcomers, and only for Democrats is the decision to choose or reject an apprenticeship reflected in varying levels of activity.

To help explain this finding one must recall that the Democratic party is the entrenched majority party in the House. The decision to serve an apprenticeship may be more salient for majority party members in general, since it is the majority party that sets the legislative pace, controls the committee, and the like. But more consequential for the freshman Democrat is the domination of his party by senior members, many of them Southerners, who comprise a much larger proportion of his party than senior Republicans do of the GOP.[17] The common perception of the Democratic party is that it is run by its elderly patriarchs. Hence, in making a decision about apprenticeship, the Democratic freshman is choosing a course of action that does have immediate consequences for his legislative career. He is deciding in effect whether "to go along" as Sam Rayburn used to advise freshmen or to strike out on a more hazardous path. And the freshman Democrat is often forced to make this conscious decision about apprenticeship because he may enter Congress with strong intentions to promote a wide range of legislative activities and at the same time realize that his position as a freshman member in a senior-dominated party works against such conduct. The question of an apprenticeship is not nearly as salient for Republican freshmen—members of a relatively junior, minority party, who early in their House careers had the vaguest legislative plans, a condition that would make serving an apprenticeship less onerous.

In addition to one's programmatic intentions, the other variable that was often cited by freshmen as influential in their apprenticeship decision was their perception of their own legislative competence. Three members specifically stated that because of their previous experience in the state legislature, their period of apprenticeship could either be shortened or be totally unnecessary. The relationship between state legislative service and attitudes toward apprenticeship is presented in Table 8. For all freshmen, service in the state legislature does not materially affect opinions about apprenticeship. Table 8 further indicates that party differences with respect to apprenticeship remain even when previous state legislative experience is considered, thereby suggesting that previous experience is less important than one's own legislative goals in the decision whether or not to serve an apprenticeship. Again, Democratic

Table 8. Apprenticeship vs. State Legislative Service and Party

	State Service			No State Service		
	R	D	All	R	D	All
"Apprenticeship Necessary"	70	43	59	80	38	54
"No Apprenticeship Necessary"	30	57	41	20	62	46
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(10)	(7)	(17)	(5)	(8)	(13)

---

[17] At the start of the 91st Congress, 21 per cent of the 243 Democrats had served more than 20 years (ten terms) in the House as compared to under six per cent of the 192 Republicans. Or to restate the figures, the Republicans had only eleven members with more than 20 years of service, while the Democrats had 51 such members. Furthermore, 46.4 per cent of the Republicans had served three or fewer terms as opposed to 31.7 per cent of the Democrats.

freshmen were more oriented to legislation than their GOP colleagues.

The nonfreshman responses to apprenticeship are truly surprising in the extent of their disagreement with the norm. The common political lore has it that nonfreshmen, particularly the more senior among them, would be the strongest advocates of an apprenticeship norm. The nonfreshmen responses to the apprenticeship item were usually brief and to the point, indicating little difficulty in replying to the item. A few of the more detailed, qualified responses are given below:

> Apprenticeship is necessary for a period of time, but I have encouraged them [freshmen] to participate as soon as possible. I suggest that they choose as their area of expertise an area that they've had experience in previously which will let them participate earlier.

> I don't think freshman congressmen should serve a period of apprenticeship. As a matter of fact, I don't think that term can apply in Congress. Any member has an equal right with any other member. The very nature of the legislative process does require that new members take more time to become acquainted with committee activities than those who have served for many years.

> This is a difficult question to answer because of the varying backgrounds of the new members of Congress . . . Hence, it seems to me that it would be difficult to establish any rule of thumb . . . I am frank to say that I have observed instances of overenthusiastic freshman congressmen who would have done well to have been a bit more observant of the processes and legislative procedure before offering the panacea to a particular problem.

Table 9 presents the nonfreshman replies to the apprenticeship item by seniority and party.

The results in this table are somewhat unexpected. Overall, the more senior one is, the less likely he will say that apprenticeship is necessary. For all groups except Republicans with less than six years of service, a sizable majority of respondents were against apprenticeship, and even for this group of Republicans the division was almost even. The reader should have greater confidence in the Republican figures than in the Democratic ones which do not include sufficient senior representation, especially from the South and border states.

Table 9 seems surprising because we have been led to believe that it is senior members who keep junior men in their place. But perhaps only a subset of senior members perform this function. The probable candidates would be the senior southern and border (Democratic) members and others who also dominate the committees. After all, it was Texan Sam Rayburn who was credited with the terse description of apprenticeship as "being seen and not heard" and who advised members *to go along in order to get along.* There are only four southern and border Democrats in the sample with more than ten years of service in the House (in a representative sample, there would be about twice that number), and three of the four said that no apprenticeship was necessary. These figures are too small to be conclusive, especially since it is almost impossible to interview the real patriarchs of the House. We can, however, divide the sample into gross regional categories to see whether apprenticeship is more common in the South, the likely home of a disproportionate number of carriers of the creed. The results of such a division reveal no substantial regional differences; 4 of 12 southern members said that apprenticeship was necessary as compared to 38 per cent of the nonsouthern members ($N = 54$). This conclusion must be hedged a bit because of shortcomings in the southern subsample.

Thus, apprenticeship is far from being a universally accepted norm. Indeed, one wonders why a majority of the freshmen at t_1 still subscribed to the norm, unless it represents a false anticipation. As one newcomer observed, "It may be that freshman classes have been browbeaten before they ever got here by the establishment." The browbeating may very well take place through the widespread circulation of such political lore as Speaker Rayburn's advice cited earlier. Such information about their status may be the only kind available to freshmen at first. Thus, in a sense, freshmen may have to

Table 9. Nonfreshman Apprenticeship Responses by Party and Seniority

	6 or fewer years of service			7 to 10 years of service			More than 10 years of service		
	R	D	All	R	D	All	R	D	All
Apprenticeship	53	27	41	43	13	27	36	25	32
No Apprenticeship	47	73	59	57	87	73	64	75	68
Total %	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
N	(17)	(15)	(32)	(7)	(8)	(15)	(11)	(8)	(19)

be socialized *out of* the norm of apprenticeship. Two freshmen at t_1 said that Speaker McCormack himself had urged them to participate fully right from the outset of their service. Yet because of their prior conditioning, they were leery of such advice; they thought the Speaker was "just being nice." As noted earlier, there was erosion in support for apprenticeship from t_1 to t_2 by the 91st class; perhaps this is indicative of learning that is really unlearning. Freshmen may have seen some of their colleagues participate early, observed that no sanctions were levied, and therefore altered their views about apprenticeship. Of course, it is possible that senior members who deny the importance of apprenticeship are saying one thing and believing another. A sophomore Republican argued:

> . . . [M] any senior congressmen might say that a freshman should not serve an apprenticeship, but when it came to actual practice, the situation was quite different. I know of numerous instances of senior members grumbling when a freshman member spoke on a subject. Typical comments were: "What's he doing talking, he's a freshman," "What does he know about it, he's only a freshman."

But it seems unreasonable to consider the senior members' responses against apprenticeship as largely misstatements of the members' underlying beliefs.

This argument does not mean that apprenticeship is unnecessary or unexpected. There will be many topics about which the freshman will be uninformed because of his inexperience, and in such areas, his more senior colleagues will expect him to proceed cautiously and to learn gradually. But this type of apprenticeship is a far cry from one in which the newcomer is expected to remain silent in all situations, even when he has a contribution to make. Some years earlier, Charles Clapp came to a similar conclusion, although his evidence was incomplete since his roundtable participants tended to be disproportionately liberal, reformist, and receptive to academicians. At that time, Clapp wrote:

> The old admonition that new members should observe but not participate in debate was swept aside long ago. Apprenticeship may still precede full partnership, but the increased volume and complexity of the problems with which the Congress is compelled to cope dictate more efficient use of the membership. Freshmen are now advised to defer speaking only until the moment arrives when they have something significant to say—indeed, colleagues counsel them not to wait too long—although they are cautioned to be sure they are well informed about their topic.[18]

Finally, it is clear that the House is not alone in its skepticism about apprenticeship; the norm of apprenticeship has fallen into bad times in the United States Senate as well, especially since 1964. The "Inner-Club" has declined in recent years and a new type of Senator, less concerned with internal Senate operations, has become more prominent.[19]

Conclusion

The main finding of this paper is that the amount of norm learning between January and May by the freshman members of the 91st Congress was unexpectedly low. As the concept of norms incorporates the notion of shared expectations, the attitudes of a sample of nonfreshmen were first analyzed to insure that we were studying genuine norms. Apprenticeship was found to be less restrictive on freshmen than originally thought, while other norms were largely adhered to. It appeared that freshmen largely knew the general House norms prior to entering Congress, which made it impossible to talk about the formal agents of socialization involved in transmitting the norms to newcomers. And the extent of change once in office was minimal.

Now this finding may be an artifact of the particular freshman class under investigation, in the sense that the 91st class was unusually well-prepared by prior political experience for House service. Of the six most recent freshman classes, the 91st class had the largest proportion of members with state legislative experience—51 per cent. But an alternative explanation seems more satisfactory, that is that freshman representatives would generally know many of the norms simply because they are rules of behavior appropriate to many institutional settings. Thus, one does not have to be a member of Congress to know that personal criticism and unfriendly relationships may be dysfunctional to one's institution or group or one's own career. This argument asserts that almost any type of prior experience would make the freshman sensitive to the basic rules of behavior. Overall, it was difficult to link compliance and noncompliance to the norms to any particular characteristics because of the small number of deviant responses, but a number of plausible influences were suggested.

---

[18] Clapp, *The Congressman,* pp. 12–13.

[19] See Randall B. Ripley, *Power in the Senate* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1969), p. 185 and Nelson W. Polsby, "Goodbye to the Inner Club," in *Congressional Behavior,* ed. Nelson W. Polsby (New York: Random House, 1971) pp. 105–10.

These data do not address the learning of committee-specific norms. These norms may not be as salient or as transferable from other contexts as the ones discussed above, and hence they may actually have to be learned anew by freshmen.[20] Unfortunately, the data in this article span only January to May, 1969, a time of very little legislative action, both in committee and on the floor. The 91st Congress in its early months was sharply criticized for the slowness of its legislative pace, a slowness that was due in part to the change in partisan complexion of the national administration. And this slowness of legislative pace may have retarded the learning of committee-specific norms. In their California study, Price and Bell found that the norms cited at their later interviews were most often those that concerned committee work and the handling of legislation.[21]

In summary, then, it seems as if the traditional image of the freshman congressman as ignorant and bewildered had mistakenly led us to expect substantial learning of norms on the part of supposedly ill-informed newcomers. This expectation was unwarranted on two counts: the general House norms were not so abstruse as to require formal learning, and the traditional image of the freshman Congressman was found to be out of date, a theme to be developed in a future paper.

---

[20] A good example of such research is Fenno's treatment of apprenticeship in the context of the House Appropriations Committee. See *The Power of the Purse*, pp. 166–67.

[21] Price and Bell, "The Rules of the Game," p. 855.

The Strange Case of Relative Gratification and Potential for Political Violence: The V-Curve Hypothesis*

BERNARD N. GROFMAN AND EDWARD N. MULLER
State University of New York at Stony Brook

In the United States, in addition to an increase in the level of individual violence against persons, the 1960s also saw an increase in group actions involving coercion and violence directed implicitly or explicitly toward political ends. Scholars have sought to explain attitude toward, and participation in, political protest and civil unrest in various ways. One explanation offered by a number of prominent scholars has utilized the concept of discrepancy between a person's goals—or desired level of achievement—and his actual level of achievement: the greater the achievement discrepancy, the greater the potential for political violence. This Achievement Discrepancy (AD) hypothesis has been labeled variously, "relative deprivation," "systemic frustration," "*J*-curve," and "rising expectations" and it is with this explanation that the present paper will be concerned.

Our AD constructs will be defined and differentiated from other variants in the first section of the paper. These constructs have been built from measures of individuals' perceptions of degree of discrepancy between their own best possible achievement level and their actual achievement level with respect to various welfare values. In the second section we report tests of hypotheses about relationships between these AD constructs and potential for political violence. Here we report a finding that was unexpected (but not just specific to this sample), namely, that potential for political violence does not vary monotonically with direction and rate of change in discrepancy between achievement optimum and achievement; rather, the greatest potential for political violence is manifested both by individuals who perceive negative change (increasing discrepancy) *and by individuals who perceive positive change* (decreasing discrepancy), while those who perceive no change manifest the least potential for political violence. In attempting to explicate this finding through the introduction of various control variables, we find that a nonmonotonic "*V*" relationship is remarkably persistent. Finally, we show that the *absolute magnitude* of change in perceived discrepancy over time is a variable that warrants inclusion in a linear additive model of potential for political violence.[1]

Our data come from a survey of the residents of Waterloo, Iowa, a city with a population of approximately 78,000, located some 200 miles west of Chicago. Waterloo is like many other urban communities in the United States. It developed as a manufacturing center linked to Chicago by the Illinois Central Railroad. Now, although the two major manufacturing plants are still in operation, the inner city includes decaying commercial structures and a black ghetto, while the lily-white residential areas that surround the inner city are serviced by large shopping centers in the standard "airport-modern" architectural style. The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders classified Waterloo as having experienced "serious" disorders in 1967 and on Jules Wanderer's Guttman scale of riot severity[2] Waterloo ranked at the second highest level. Thus, Waterloo was considered an appropriate research site for the testing of explanations of allegiance and opposition to the political regime.

The sample we shall analyze here is a disproportionately stratified (by race) cluster sample of Waterloo residents 18 years of age and older.[3] It consists of 503 respondents to an in-

---

* Data collection for this project was financed principally by National Science Foundation Grant GS-2761 (to John C. Wahlke, Muller's dissertation advisor at the University of Iowa) in support of Muller's doctoral dissertation research. Muller also gratefully acknowledges the financial support provided by an American Political Science Association State Legislative Leaders Scholarship, a Grant from the University of Iowa Graduate College, and State University of New York Research Foundation grant 31-7212A.

[1] See Edward N. Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (September, 1972), 928–959.

[2] See Table 2 at page 504 of Jules J. Wanderer, "An Index of Riot Severity and Some Correlates," *American Journal of Sociology*, 74 (March, 1969), 500–505.

[3] The Survey Division of the Statistical Laboratory at Iowa State University drew the sample and conducted the interviewing between March and May 1970. It is a disproportionately stratified, multistage, random probability sample. On the basis of an update to the 1960 Census conducted by the Waterloo

terview schedule of approximately 80 minutes duration, administered during the spring of 1970 by the Survey Division of the Statistical Laboratory at Iowa State University.

The Achievement Discrepancy Explanation

Proponents of the AD explanation of potential for political violence have been careless on two counts. First, in the AD formulation the achieved state represents an individual's present (or anticipated) actual level of attainment with respect to magnitudes of a desired value; but the optimum state has no unitary meaning. Achievement optima, or goal-levels, have been defined in various ways—e.g., "just deserts," "aspirations," "social expectations," "expected need satisfaction"—which give rise to a series of not necessarily congruent hypotheses; yet scholars commonly have failed to differentiate clearly between the different AD terms in these hypotheses. Second, and perhaps of greater consequence for the present status of the AD explanation, tests of AD hypotheses often have entailed a disparity between verbal and operational definitions of AD terms. Regardless of the particular achievement optimum used in the definition of discrepancy, the key point to be grasped is that the discrepancy is between *perceived* achievement optima and achievement, a discrepancy which in no way necessarily coincides with a person's objective sociological circumstances. Unfortunately, lacking appropriate data, many scholars have proceeded from a verbal definition in terms of perceived discrepancy between some achievement optimum and achievement to an operational definition in terms of objective social, economic, and political conditions; thus, objective sociological circumstances are let in by the back door, resulting in measurement of something other than the AD concept as verbally defined and a test of something other than an AD hypothesis.

It is important, then, that tests of AD hypotheses clearly specify which variant of the AD concept is under investigation. And from the standpoint of building empirically verified theory it is particularly important that such tests include measures of perceived discrepancy at the level of individual behavior; for a claim to have confirmed or disconfirmed an AD hypothesis is hardly warranted if the purported measure of the AD concept actually refers to objective sociological circumstances.

Also, it is important to distinguish between static and dynamic versions of the AD concept. Static versions refer to perception of discrepancy between achievement optima and achievement at a single point in time; dynamic versions refer to change over time in perception of discrepancy. Previously, one of us has built measures of the AD concept that are explicitly differentiated by this distinction.[4] As we shall show in this paper, the form of the relationship between potential for political violence and AD constructs may differ substantially, depending upon whether the AD construct is static or dynamic.

Achievement Discrepancy Hypotheses. Ted Gurr has labeled his version of the AD concept Relative Deprivation, "defined as actors' perception of discrepancy between their value expectations and their value capabilities. Value expectations are the goods and conditions of life to which people believe they are rightfully entitled. Value capabilities are the goods and conditions they think they are capable of getting and keeping."[5] Gurr equates value expectations with individuals' conceptions of their *just deserts:* "value expectations are defined with reference to *justifiable* value positions, meaning what men believe they are entitled to get or maintain, not merely what they faintly hope to attain."[6] Gurr distinguishes between present and future perception of discrepancy between just deserts and capability, and argues that anticipated discrepancy in the future may be a more important source of discontent than perception of present discrepancy.[7] We may derive three Just Deserts hypotheses from the work of Gurr:[8]

> JD_1: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between an individual's estimate of his present achievement level and the level of achievement which he thinks he justifiably deserves.

City Planning Commission in 1967, the area of the city containing most black residents was sampled at a higher rate than the area containing most white residents. Thus, while blacks make up only 8 per cent of the Waterloo population, they constitute 38 per cent of this sample. Within each stratum a response rate of 80 per cent completions was obtained.

[4] These are Short-Term Welfare Gratification and Long-Term Welfare Gratification. See the appendix in Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," pp. 955–959.

[5] Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), p. 24.

[6] Gurr, *Why Men Rebel,* p. 27.

[7] See the discussion at pages 27 and 28 of Gurr, *Why Men Rebel.*

[8] See pages 24 to 28 of Gurr, *Why Men Rebel.* Here Gurr hypothesizes about relationships between relative deprivation and potential for collective violence. Potential for political violence is a subset of potential for collective violence (see page 158).

JD_2: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between the level of achievement which an individual expects to maintain in the future and the level of achievement which he thinks he will justifiably deserve.

JD_3: Potential for political violence will vary more strongly and directly with perception of future Just Deserts discrepancy than with perception of present Just Deserts discrepancy. (Where future and present Just Deserts discrepancy are as defined in JD_2 and JD_1 above.)

The AD concept proposed by Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold is labeled Systemic Frustration. Systemic Frustration differs from Relative Deprivation in that the achievement optimum of the former is conceived as individuals' *aspirations* rather than individuals' perceptions of just deserts. Feierabend et al. state that by aspirations they mean "the goals that people wish to attain."[9] We may derive the following two static Aspiration Level hypotheses from the work of Feierabend, Feierabend, and Nesvold:[10]

AL_1: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between an individual's estimate of his present achievement level and the level of achievement to which he aspires.

AL_2: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between the level of achievement which an individual expects to maintain in the future and the level of achievement to which he aspires in the future.

Still another version of the AD concept is couched neither in terms of aspiration level nor of just deserts, but in terms of reference group theory. Here an individual's achievement optimum is the level of achievement which he believes has been attained by other individuals with whom he identifies. From the generalized formulation given by Anthony M. Orum and Amy Orum, we may derive the following hypotheses:[11]

RG_1: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between an individual's estimate of his present achievement level and the level of achievement which he ascribes to individuals with whom he identifies.

RG_2: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between the level of achievement which an individual expects to maintain in the future and the level of achievement which he expects individuals with whom he identifies to maintain in the future.

We believe that these three sets of propositions ought to be regarded as separate theories. Any or all of the following might be hypothesized: (1) an individual's aspiration is determined by his perception of the achievement of individuals with whom he identifies; (2) an individual's aspiration is for that level of achievement which he thinks he deserves; (3) an individuals' perception of his just deserts is determined by his perception of the achievement of individuals with whom he identifies. But, all such hypotheses are empirical and not tautological.[12] Moreover, we should note that all three sets of propositions are couched in terms of *individual perceptions*, and we must be careful not to take for granted that these perceptions correspond with the scholar's own notion of "objective" reality or "objective" deprivation.[13]

A number of ambiguities and difficulties in operationalizing variables arise when we seek to test *any* of these propositions. Gurr's own major tests of his hypotheses, as he is clearly aware, are extremely indirect and involve aggregate data at a national level. For example, Gurr assumed that "any short-term decline in economic conditions and any governmental policies that restricted political activities or reduced people's socioeconomic status increased deprivation"[14] and he then related Short-term Deprivation (so defined) to levels of civil strife. But, as we can see, it is far from obvious whether what was measured was deprivation vis-à-vis perceived just deserts (as Gurr himself seems to think) or deprivation vis-à-vis aspirations, or deprivation vis-à-vis the perceived status of appropriate reference groups, or, for that matter, none of these. The latter possibility is by far the likeliest, since the measures used by Gurr reflect "objective" circumstances rather than the perceptions of discrepancy between achievement optimum and achievement with which all three of the above versions of deprivation are, in fact, concerned.

---

[9] Ivo K. Feierabend, Rosalind L. Feierabend, and Betty A. Nesvold. "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," in *Violence in America: Historical and Comparative Perspectives*, ed. Hugh Davis Graham and Ted Robert Gurr (New York: Signet Books, 1969), p. 609.

[10] See hypotheses (1) and (2) at page 609 of "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns."

[11] See the discussion and literature cited therein at pages 522 and 523 of Anthony M. Orum and Amy Orum, "The Class and Status Bases of Negro Student Protest," *Social Science Quarterly*, 49 (December, 1968), 521–533. What we call the "reference group" version of the AD concept Orum and Orum label the "relative deprivation" perspective. Since the reference group hypothesis formulated by the Orums is devoid of explicit tense references, we have reformulated it in two parts.

[12] For example, we cannot just take it for granted that because an individual's aspirations are not met he is not achieving what he perceives as his just deserts. Cf. Gurr's statement that "people become most intensely discontented when they cannot get what they think they deserve, not just what they want in an ideal sense . . ." ("A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," in *Violence in America*, ed. Graham and Gurr p. 568).

[13] This particular warning has been made by most proponents of the achievement discrepancy hypothesis. Compare the statement by Gurr at page 568 of "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife": "Relative deprivation is not whatever the outside observer thinks people ought to be dissatisfied with. It is a state of mind. . . ." See also the statement by Feierabend et al. at page 609 of "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," "It should also be pointed out that it is perceived rather than actual social attainment that is important." Finally compare the statement by James C. Davies at page 6 of "Toward a Theory of Revolution," *American Sociological Review*, 27 (February, 1962), 5–19: "It is the dissatisfied state of mind rather than the tangible provision of 'adequate' or 'inadequate' supplies of food, equality, or liberty which produces the revolution."

The Just Deserts version of the AD concept lacks clear-cut operational meaning for "just deserts" at the micro level. Gurr himself has suggested that the top of a Cantril Self-Anchoring scale represents an individual's perception of his just deserts, and Gurr uses data derived from Self-Anchoring scale responses to test his relative deprivation hypothesis.[15] But the top of a Cantril scale, defined by an individual's perception of his *best possible* achievement level, is not *identical* with a "just deserts" position. While an individual's perception of discrepancy between his best possible achievement level and his actual achievement may show a strong empirical correlation with his perception of discrepancy between that achievement level to which he believes he is justifiably entitled, they are, nevertheless, analytically distinct achievement optima, and there is no a priori reason to assume that they would yield discrepancy estimates with a correlation near unity.

The work done by Feierabend et al. also draws on aggregate data and again uses very indirect measures of their Aspiration Level version of the AD concept, by inferring deprivation vis-à-vis aspiration level from a measure of national modernity which "combines GNP per capita, caloric intake, telephones, physicians, newspapers, radios, literacy, and urbanization."[16] Clearly, it is rather far-fetched to postulate that these standard indices of socioeconomic development are *measures* of perceived discrepancy between aspiration level and achievement. As with Gurr, the data on which the Feierabend et al. hypotheses are tested involve indices of objective conditions, such as social and economic development, which need not correspond at all with subjectively perceived deprivation.

An additional ambiguity in the Aspiration Level version of the AD concept is the lack of precision in the definition of an individual's aspiration level. Feierabend et al., as we previously noted, define an individual's aspiration level as the goals that he wishes to attain. But, since the term "goal" is left undefined, it is difficult to know what meaning to assign to aspiration level, for the term "aspiration level," as it is used in the psychological literature, has a plethora of meanings, *each of which can be used to formulate a quite different "aspiration" version of the Gap concept.*[17]

Definition 1: An individual's aspiration level is the utility of that achievement (among those which he can imagine himself attaining) with the highest expected utility.[18]

Definition 2: An individual's aspiration level is the utility of that achievement (among those which he can imagine himself attaining) which separates satisfactory from unsatisfactory outcomes, i.e., that achievement whose attainment leaves the individual neither satisfied nor dissatisfied.[19]

Definition 3: An individual's aspiration level is the utility of that achievement (among those which he can imagine himself attaining) which is the higher in utility of the two utility-wise adjacent achievements between which the rate of change of utility is maximum.[20]

Definition 4: An individual's aspiration level is the utility of that achievement (among those which he can imagine himself attaining) which is the higher in utility of the two expected utility-wise adjacent achievements between which the rate of change of *expected* utility is maximum.[21]

---

[14] Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," p. 572.

[15] See Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, pp. 63–66.

[16] Feierabend et al., "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," p. 627.

[17] The definitions below are adapted from Bernard Grofman, "Utility and Aspiration," Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook, ditto, 1971. For a general introduction to the literature on aspiration theory see W. H. McWhinney, "Aspiration Levels and Utility Theory," *General Systems Yearbook*, 10 (1965), 131–143.

[18] See K. Lewin, T. Dembo, L. Festinger, and P. Sears, "Level of Aspiration," in *Personality and the Behavioral Disorders*, ed. J. McV. Hunt (New York: Ronald Press, 1944), pp. 333–378. By expected utility is meant the subjective probability of an event's occurrence times its utility, where utility is assumed to be expressed on an interval scale which satisfies the Von Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. (See any introductory text on decision theory.)

[19] See Herbert Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice," *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 69 (February, 1955), 99–118.

[20] See Sidney Siegel, "Level of Aspiration and Decision-Making," *Psychological Review*, 64 (1957), 253–261.

Definition 5: An individual's aspiration level is the utility of that achievement (among those which he can imagine himself attaining) which is the higher in utility of the two expected utility-wise adjacent achievements between which the rate of change of expected utility is maximum *and* which lie in the neighborhood of the individual's present level of achievement.[22]

We introduce these definitions simply to exhibit the diverse range of distinct definitions on which one might base an Aspiration Level version of the AD concept.

Also, much of the work done to "test" the reference group version of the AD concept has employed measures of objective deprivation (e.g., nonwhite median family income divided by white family income) rather than subjective perceptions of achievement discrepancy.[23] Moreover, the reference group selected for comparison has been that which the scholar feels to be appropriate, rather than one whose appropriateness as a basis for comparison has been established by research at the micro level.

Attempts to test the AD explanation in any of its many guises with direct evidence from individual behavior have been few, although we regard micro level tests as crucial—given the form in which AD hypotheses have been couched. Most tests of AD hypotheses at the micro level have used Hadley Cantril's Self-Anchoring scale, a device which measures degree of perceived discrepancy between an individual's best possible level of achievement and his actual level of achievement.

The Self-Anchoring scale is a ladder of eleven rungs, numbered from zero to ten. Respondents are shown a picture of the ladder. In the Cantril version, the top rung of the ladder is defined as the respondent's best possible life, the bottom rung as his worst possible life.[24] Respondents are asked to place themselves on the ladder with respect to the present, five years in the past, and five years in the future.

According to Cantril's twelve-nation study, welfare values, or conditions of life that facilitate physical well-being and self-realization, were by far the most salient personal concerns.[25] A variant of the Cantril Self-Anchoring scale, used by Muller, replaces life situation in general as the achievement referent with four categories of welfare values: career satisfaction, economic well-being, satisfactory living conditions, and children's welfare.[26] In the Welfare-Value version, respondents are asked to imagine that the top and bottom rungs of the ladder are best and worst possible levels of "work situation," "total family income," "housing accommodations," and "chances of being able to get your children a good education." Present, past, and future estimates of discrepancy between best possible and actual level of achievement are then obtained for each welfare value.

Position on the Self-Anchoring scale gives, we believe, an operationally unambiguous measure of at least one form of achievement discrepancy—discrepancy defined as the difference between an individual's subjective estimate of his level of achievement vis-à-vis some value(s) and his perception of his best possible level of achievement. The high end of the scale, position "10," indicates complete congruence between achievement optimum and achievement, or a state of perfect relative gratification; the low end of the scale, position "0," indicates complete incongruence between achievement optimum and achievement, or a state of perfect relative deprivation. For the Best Possible version of the AD concept, we may formulate the following hypotheses:

BP_1: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between an individual's estimate of his present achievement level and his perception of his best possible achievement level.

BP_2: Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree of discrepancy between the level of achievement which an individual expects to maintain in the future and his perception of his best possible achievement level.

The relationship between the above propositions and the other three versions of the AD concept is far from clear. There is no good reason to believe—much less is it tautologously true—that the top of a Self-Anchoring scale represents the level of achievement which an individual would regard as his just deserts (at least in the ordinary language sense of that term); nor need it represent the achievement to which he aspires, where aspiration level is defined as in Definitions 1–5; nor need it represent the achievement which he believes has been attained by members of a relevant reference group. Since our measures of achievement discrepancy in this paper are based on the Self-Anchoring scale, the reader must be cautious in inferring conclusions about variants of the AD concept other than the Best Possible version.

---

[21] Suggested by McWhinney, "Aspiration Levels and Utility Theory."

[22] Proposed by Grofman, "Utility and Aspiration."

[23] See pages 640 to 645 of Seymour Spilerman, "The Causes of Racial Disturbances: A Comparison of Alternative Explanations," *American Sociological Review*, 35 (August, 1970), 627–649.

[24] See Hadley Cantril, *The Pattern of Human Concerns* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1965), pp. 22–26.

[25] By Gurr's classification, 62 per cent of all personal concerns had to do with welfare values; if we include the approximately 16 per cent of interpersonal values which relate to the family as part of the welfare value category, then 78 per cent of all personal concerns referred to welfare values. See Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, p. 70.

[26] See the appendix in Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," pp. 955–959.

The empirical linkages among the various forms of achievement discrepancy, and the relative efficacy of each form as a predictor of key variables such as potential for political violence, cry out for an investigation which our data do not allow us to provide. Nonetheless, we do conjecture that any of the particular results we find for the Best Possible definition of the AD concept also will hold true for other micro-level achievement discrepancy measures that might be constructed.

Regardless of how achievement optimum is defined, we shall distinguish between two forms of shift in perceived discrepancy. The most straightforward is one we might label the Rate-of-Change (RC) pattern. RC discrepancy shift ranges from positive change, where discrepancy is perceived to decrease over time, through no change, where discrepancy is perceived to increase over time. The particular dynamics which give rise to a shift in perceived discrepancy over time may vary. Discrepancy shift may result from a change in achievement optimum over time relative to a lesser change in, or a constant, actual achievement. An increase in achievement optimum relative to actual achievement would produce the kind of increase in discrepancy that has been labeled "aspirational deprivation" by Gurr and, as a cause of potential for political violence, is often called the "rising expectations" hypothesis.[27] Alternatively, discrepancy shift may result from a change in actual achievement relative to a lesser change in, or a constant, achievement optimum. A decrease in actual achievement relative to achievement optimum would produce the kind of increase in discrepancy that has been labeled "decremental deprivation" by Gurr.[28] The basic hypothesis relating RC discrepancy to potential for political violence can be expressed as:

> *RC:* Potential for political violence will vary strongly and directly with degree to which perceived rate of change in discrepancy between achievement optimum and achievement is negative.

To our knowledge, the RC hypothesis has been tested only once at the micro-level.[29] The various macro-level "tests"[30] have all used objective measures of achievement; but the connection between changes in objective social, political, and economic conditions and individual perceptions of discrepancy shift, as we have suggested before, is not at all clear.

The other major pattern of discrepancy shift which scholars have proposed as a cause of potential for political violence has been labeled "progressive deprivation" by Gurr and is often called the "*J*-curve" or "rise and drop" hypothesis.[31]

> The *J*-Curve is this: revolution is most likely to take place when a prolonged period of rising expectations and rising gratifications is followed by a short period of sharp reversal during which the gap between expectations and gratification quickly widens and becomes intolerable. The frustration that develops, when it is intense and widespread in the society, seeks outlets in violent action.[32]

The *J*-Curve pattern is one in which positive discrepancy shift (discrepancy is perceived to decrease over time) is followed by negative discrepancy shift (discrepancy is perceived to increase over time). "Tests" of the *JC* hypothesis have been conducted at the macro-level, and have been extremely inferential, since the objective measures of achievement employed have not even been related directly to aggregate measures of political violence.[33]

---

[27] See: Gurr, *Why Men Rebel*, pp. 50–52; James A. Geschwender, "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: An Examination of Some Hypotheses," *Social Forces*, 43 (December, 1964), 248–256, especially p. 249.

[28] *Why Men Rebel*, pp. 46–50.

[29] Don R. Bowen, Elinor Bowen, Sheldon Gawiser, and Louis H. Masotti, "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," in *Riots and Rebellion*, ed. Louis H. Masotii and Don R. Bowen (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1968) p. 187–200. These authors investigated a form of the RC hypothesis in which the measure of perceived change in discrepancy was dichotomized in various ways.

[30] See: Feierabend et al., "Social Change and Political Violence: Cross-National Patterns," pp. 638–643; Gurr, "A Comparative Study of Civil Strife," pp. 572–576.

[31] See: *Why Men Rebel*, pp. 52–56; James C. Davies, "The J-Curve of Rising and Declining Satisfactions as a Cause of Some Great Revolutions and a Contained Rebellion," in Graham and Gurr *Violence in America;* Davies, "Toward a Theory of Revolution"; Geschwender, "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: An Examination of Some Hypotheses."

[32] Davies, "The J-Curve," p. 671.

The *J*-Curve hypothesis is not free from ambiguity when we seek to operationalize it in micro terms, but it clearly seems to require at minimum that:

> JC_1: Mean potential for political violence will be greatest for those individuals who have experienced a perceived decrease in discrepancy between optimum achievement and actual achievement followed by a perceived increase in discrepancy between optimum achievement and actual achievement.

A more stringent version of the *JC* hypothesis incorporates the assumption that, just as the *J*-Curve produces a high degree of dissatisfaction, so will a *reverse J*-Curve produce a high degree of satisfaction.[34] This more stringent—and more complete—*JC* hypothesis requires that:

> JC_2: If individuals are classified according to whether they have experienced a perceived Rise and Drop (*J*-Curve) discrepancy shift, a No-Change discrepancy shift, or a Drop and Rise (Reverse *J*-Curve) discrepancy shift, then mean potential for political violence will be highest for those individuals in the Rise and Drop category and lowest for those individuals in the Drop and Rise category.

Now, just as we pointed out that the Self-Anchoring scale is only one among a number of definitions of achievement discrepancy, we must be careful to emphasize that when we come to test either the RC or the *JC* hypothesis with the Self-Anchoring scale, our observations are only of experienced and anticipated shift over time in *actual achievement level* relative to optimum achievement level. When we observe a pattern of, say, decreasing discrepancy between achievement optimum and actual achievement from past to present, followed by anticipated increase in discrepancy from present to future, this could reflect either one of the following: (1) a pattern of rising experienced achievement and then falling anticipated achievement relative to an approximately constant achievement optimum; (2) a pattern of approximately constant experienced and anticipated achievement, and falling then rising achievement optimum. Unfortunately, as far as we know, there have been no investigations of whether the optimum level of achievement as defined by a Self-Anchoring scale is treated by individuals as a constant, or whether the past, present, and future comparisons are based on different optimum achievement levels.

Despite these difficulties, we believe that the tests we perform based on the Self-Anchoring scale measure of achievement discrepancy afford as good a test of the RC and *JC* hypotheses as any to which these hypotheses have been subjected. Observation of shift in Self-Anchoring scale scores over time does provide an unambiguous measure of direction and amount of perceived discrepancy shift, even though the actual dynamics responsible for this shift—change in actual achievement relative to achievement optimum or change in achievement optimum relative to actual achievement or both—are indeterminate. And both the RC and *JC* hypotheses share the common prediction that direction and amount (or at least direction) of discrepancy shift will be related to potential for political violence.

Tests of Relative Gratification Hypotheses

Since the top of a Self-Anchoring scale is a condition of complete congruence between achievement optimum and achievement, we shall call our Self-Anchoring scale variables measures of *relative gratification.* In this section we shall test hypotheses about relationships between potential for political violence and static and dynamic relative gratification constructs.

Our dependent variable is the Potential for Political Violence (PPV) scale developed by

---

[33] See Davies, "The J-Curve," pp. 698–705.

[34] Actually the *J*-Curve label is somewhat confusing, since the pattern of change which Davies has in mind is really an upside down J, reversed and tilted to the right, as follows:



Thus, what we call a reverse *J*-Curve is really a rightside up J, reversed and tilted to the left, as follows:



In these figures we have adapted the ordinate to our achievement discrepancy concept; in Davies' formulation the ordinate refers to "needs" and the *J*-Curve describes a situation in which expected need satisfaction and actual need satisfaction have been increasing over time, followed by continued increase in expected need satisfaction but decrease in actual need satisfaction.

Muller.[35] This scale ranges from a low score of zero to a high score of ten. It is a summation of scores on an Approval of Political Violence (APV) scale and an Intention to Engage in Political Violence (IEPV) scale. These scales were built from responses to a series of items referencing dissent behaviors which constitute progressively greater degrees of challenge to the customary and legal norms of a political regime.[36] Respondents were asked to report whether they approved or disapproved of each dissent behavior, and whether or not, under present circumstances, they would engage in each behavior. The APV and IEPV variables are Guttman scales which show Reproducibility of .91 and .93, respectively, for this sample, and Reproducibility of .94 and .95, respectively, for a community leaders sample.[37] APV and IEPV range from zero to five. Level "0" involves avoidance of any deviation from customary and legal regime norms; level "1," conformity with legal regime norms and nonviolent deviance from customary regime norms; level "2," nonviolent and generally nondisrptive deviance from legal regime norms; level "3," nonviolent but disruptive deviance from legal regime norms; level "4," relatively unplanned and sporadic violence to attack the regime; level "5," the planned use of violence to overthrow the regime. APV and IEPV are strongly correlated both in this sample and in the Community Leaders sample; both variables also correlate at greater than .90 with the composite PPV scale. Furthermore, APV and IEPV correlate strongly with allegiance to groups known to advocate anti-regime dissent behavior, both for this sample and for the Community Leaders sample.

Static Relative Gratification. The static relative gratification variables (range: 0–10) which we shall use to test BP_1 and BP_2 are:

Achieved Relative Gratification—Degree of consequence between

- W_p: best possible work situation and work situation in the present.
- I_p: best possible total family income and total family income in the present.
- H_p: best possible housing accommodations and housing accommodations in the present.
- C_p: best possible chances of getting children a good education and chances of getting children a good education in the present.

Expected Relative Gratification—Degree of consequence between

- W_{p+5}: best possible work situation and work situation five years in the future.
- I_{p+5}: best possible total family income and total family income five years in the future.
- H_{p+5}: best possible housing accommodations and housing accommodations five years in the future.
- C_{p+5}: best possible chance of getting children a good education and chances of getting children a good education five years in the future.

Assuming PPV and our Achieved Relative Gratification and Expected Relative Gratification variables to be interval scales, we may readily taste the hypotheses:

BP_1': The relationship between PPV and $W_p, \ldots C_p$ will show a relatively close fit to an inverse linear function.

BP_2': The relationship between PPV and $W_{p+5}, \ldots C_{p+5}$ will show a relatively close fit to an inverse linear function.

We shall define "relatively close fit" as an r^2 equal to or greater than .20—i.e., at least 20% of the variance in the dependent variable must be accounted for by the variance in the independent variable according to the function rule.

Table 1 reports the evidence. Both BP_1' and BP_2' are disconfirmed in every instance. For PPV regressed against the Achieved Relative Gratification variables, r^2 ranges from .02 to .05, considerably less than our .20 criterion; for PPV regressed against the Expected Relative Gratification variables, r^2 is zero in every case.

The analysis of variance results presented on the right-hand side of Table 1 do show that there are statistically significant linear relationships between PPV and the Achieved Relative Gratification variables. PPV, however, is only weakly correlated with the Achieved Relative Gratification variables, and PPV scores are considerably underestimated given low scores on these variables.[38]

---

[35] See the appendix in Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," p. 955–959.

[36] The behaviors were: (1) taking part in protest meetings or marches that are permitted by the local authorities; (2) refusing to obey a law which one thinks is unjust, if the person feels so strongly about it that he is willing to go to jail rather than obey the law; (3) trying to stop the government from functioning by engaging in sit-ins, mass demonstrations, take-overs of buildings, and things like that; (4) trying to stop the government from functioning by engaging in violent protest demonstrations, including actions such as fighting with the police and destroying public and private property; (5) trying to challenge the power of the government by arming oneself in preparation for battles with government authorities such as the police and the National Guard.

[37] See Edward N. Muller, "Measurement of Readiness for Unconventional Political Participation," Department of Political Science, State University of New York at Stony Brook, mimeo 1972.

[38] Since both PPV and the Achieved Relative Gratification variables have the same range, if PPV were a perfect inverse linear function of Achieved Rela-

Table 1. Regression of Potential for Political Violence Against Measures of Static Relative Gratification

Regression Equation	r^2	Analysis of Variance			
			df	mean square	F
Achieved Relative Gratification					
1) $PPV = -.166(W_p) + 3.542$	.04	regression	1	97.09	20.99 $p < .001$
		residual	455	4.63	
2) $PPV = -.122(I_p) + 3.166$	.02	regression	1	48.64	10.68 $p < .01$
		residual	483	4.56	
3) $PPV = -.184(H_p) + 3.589$	.05	regression	1	116.23	25.77 $p < .001$
		residual	487	4.51	
4) $PPV = -.156(C_p) + 3.851$	.03	regression	1	44.01	8.81 $p < .01$
		residual	296	5.0	
Expected Relative Gratification					
5) $PPV = .003(W_{p+5}) + 2.518$	.00	regression	1	.03	.01 n.s.
		residual	394	4.74	
6) $PPV = .031(I_{p+5}) + 2.266$	.00	regression	1	3.49	.75 n.s.
		residual	436	4.63	
7) $PPV = .016(H_{p+5}) + 2.358$	.00	regression	1	.88	.19 n.s.
		residual	459	4.68	
8) $PPV = -.017(C_{p+5}) + 2.879$	.00	regression	1	.48	.09 n.s.
		residual	283	5.17	

In previous research, the Self-Anchoring scale has been dichotomized or trichotomized and the measure of violence potential also often has been a dichotomized variable.[39] When we collapse our relative gratification variables into trichotomies by the usual procedure, and dichotomize PPV at the mean, we may test the following hypotheses of inverse monotonic relationships:

> BP_1'': The higher the congruency ranking on $W_p, \ldots C_p$, the lesser will be the proportion of individuals scoring high on PPV.
>
> BP_2'': The higher the congruency ranking on $W_{p+5}, \ldots C_{p+5}$, the lesser will be the proportion of individuals scoring high on PPV.

Table 2 shows the relationships between the dicotomized PPV variable and the trichotomized relative gratification variables. For the cases of W_p and H_p, the BP_1'' hypothesis clearly is confirmed. The percentage comparisons show that the proportion scoring high on PPV does decrease consistently as congruency ranking on W_p and on H_p increases, and the chi square value for these relationships is less than .01, the alpha level we shall select for rejection of the null hypothesis. In the case of I_p, the chi square value is greater than .01, therefore, we conclude that PPV level is unrelated to I_p level and reject BP_1''. For the relationship between PPV and C_p the chi square value is significant at less than .01, but the percentage comparisons show that the effect of C_p on the PPV level occurs from low to medium levels of congruency, where the proportion scoring high on PPV declines fairly precipitously, but not from medium to high congruency, where the proportion high on PPV levels off. Thus, we reject BP_1'' for the case of C_p, although we note that the observed relationship is consistent with an inverse nonstrict monotonic hypothesis of the form, as C_p increases, the proportion high on PPV decreases or remains the same.

The chi square values for the relationships

---

tive Gratification, then a person with a score of "0" on Achieved Relative Gratification should have a score of "10" on PPV and a person with a score of "10" on Achieved Relative Gratification should have a score of "0" on PPV. However, the equation for PPV regressed against W_p, for example, estimates that, given a score of "0" on W_p, a person will have a score of only 3,542 on PPV ($-.166 \times 0 + 3.542 = 3.542$); whereas, given a score of "10" on W_p, a person's predicted PPV score is 1.882 ($-.166 \times 10 + 3.542 = 1.882$).

[39] See: Bowen et al., "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor;" Thomas J. Crawford and Murray Naditch, "Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness, and Militancy: The Psychology of Social Protest," *Psychiatry* (May, 1970), 208–223.

between PPV and the Expected Relative Gratification variables are all greater than .01. For this sample we conclude that PPV level is unrelated to the trichotomized Expected Relative Gratification variables and reject BP_2''

The relationships shown in Table 2 are similar to those found in the Cleveland study reported by Don R. Bowen, Elinor Bowen, Sheldon Gawiser, and Louis H. Masotti.[40] Percentage comparisons for the Cleveland sample were as predicted by BP_1'', although the chi square value for the relationship was significant at only the .10 level. Hypothesis BP_2'' was clearly disconfirmed for the Cleveland sample. Other studies also appear to support BP_1'', but the percentage comparisons do not seem to indicate very strong monotonic relationships.[41]

Thus, key propositions of achievement discrepancy theory, when operationalized in a form recommended by a number of its advocates (to wit, using the Self-Anchoring scale to measure discrepancy) are not confirmed by our data. For this sample, our measure of potential for political violence clearly is not strongly correlated with degree of relative gratification in the present and is uncorrelated with degree of relative gratification expected in the future. When we trichotomize and dichotomize our variables, our findings are quite similar to those reported in earlier studies of different communities, i.e., some—but apparently not very strong—monotonic association between potential for political violence and expected level of relative gratification. We conclude that, at least in American urban communities, it is unlikely that as level of relative gratification expected in the future increases, potential for political violence will decrease; and while it is likely that as the level of relative gratification in the present increases, potential for political violence will tend to decrease, the relationship probably will not be of the predictive strength postulated by proponents of achievement discrepancy theory.

Dynamic Relative Gratification. Given our measures of degree of perceived congruence between achievement optimum and actual achievement for the present, five years in the past, and five years in the future, we may define fourteen different patterns of relative gratification over time. These patterns are depicted graphically in Figure 1. Graphs a, b, and c are clear Rise-and-Drop or *J*-Curve patterns. Graphs d, e, and f all show Decreasing relative gratification from past to future. Graphs g and h show a No-Change pattern of relative deprivation and of gratification, respectively. Graphs i, j, and k show Increasing relative gratification from past to future. Graphs l, m, and n are clear Drop-and-Rise or Reverse *J*-Curve patterns.

Table 3 shows the mean PPV scores for each pattern of relative gratification on the four welfare values. The JC_t hypothesis predicts that individuals characterized by the Rise and Drop

Table 2. Relationships Between Potential for Political Violence (Dichotomized) and Measures of Static Relative Gratification (Trichotomized)

Achieved Relative Gratification

		W_p			I_p			H_p			C_p		
		Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
PPV	Low	61.1	68.8	78.8	64.2	74.0	77.4	52.8	73.1	81.0	39.1	70.6	71.1
	High	38.9	31.3	21.2	35.8	26.0	23.6	47.2	26.9	19.0	60.9	29.4	28.9
		100%	101%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		$\chi^2=10.61$		$p<.01$	$\chi^2=5.26$		n.s.	$\chi^2=22.63$		$p<.001$	$\chi^2=9.93$		$p<.01$

Expected Relative Gratification

		W_{p+5}			I_{p+5}			H_{p+5}			C_{p+5}		
		Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High	Low	Medium	High
PPV	Low	66.1	75.4	72.5	68.2	80.2	71.1	61.2	79.8	72.4	46.7	73.8	67.3
	High	33.9	24.6	27.5	31.8	19.8	28.9	38.8	20.2	27.6	53.3	26.2	32.7
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
		$\chi^2=1.47$		n.s.	$\chi^2=4.05$		n.s.	$\chi^2=6.34$		n.s.	$\chi^2=4.17$		n.s.

---

[40] See Table 2 at page 193 in "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor."

[41] See: Table 1 at page 211 of Crawford and Naditch, "Relative Deprivation, Powerlessness, and Militancy: The Psychology of Social Protest"; pages 136 and 137 in David O. Sears and John B. McConahay, "Racial Socialization, Comparison Levels, and the Watts Riot," *Journal of Social Issues,* 26 (Number 1, 1970), 121–140; Table 1 at page 586 of H. Edward Ransford, "Isolation, Powerlessness, and Violence: A Study of Attitudes and Participation in the Watts Riot," *American Journal of Sociology,* 73 (1968), 581–591.


CONGRUENCE
High
Low
t₁
t₂
t₃
t₁: past
t₂: present
t₃: future
RISE AND DROP
a
b
c
DECREASING
d
e
f
NO—CHANGE DEPRIVATION
g
NO—CHANGE GRATIFICATION
h
INCREASING
i
j
k
DROP AND RISE
l
m
n

Figure 1. Patterns of shift in relative gratification over time

patterns will show a higher mean PPV than individuals characterized by any of the other patterns. The JC_2 hypothesis predicts that individuals characterized by the Rise-and-Drop patterns will show a higher mean PPV than individuals characterized by the No-Change patterns and that individuals characterized by the Drop-and-Rise patterns will show a lower mean PPV than individuals characterized by the No-Change patterns. The bottom half of Table 3 presents the relevant comparisons between means for testing JC_1 and JC_2. Table 3 shows that our predictions are correct in only 14 of 33 comparisons for patterns on the Work variable; in only 16 of 33 comparisons on the income variables; and in none of the possible 11 comparisons on the housing variable. For JC_1 the Confirmation Index (CI) is thus .39: our prediction that the Rise-and-Drop patterns will have the greatest mean PPV is borne out by these data only 39 per cent of the time. Since Rise-and-Drop patterns *do not show* higher mean PPV than other patterns 61 per cent of the time, we interpret this as clear disconfirmation of JC_1.

Table 3 shows that our JC_2 predictions are correct in only 5 of 12 comparisons for patterns on the Work variable, 6 to 12 comparisons on the Income variable, 0 of 8 comparisons on the Housing variable, and 0 of 2 comparisons on the Children variable. The Confirmation Index for JC_2 in .32. Our prediction that Rise-and-

Table 3. Mean Potential for Political Violence Scores for Patterns of Shift in Relative Gratification Over Time

	Pattern	Work	Income	Housing	Children
	a	2.4	3.5	***	***
Rise-and-Drop	*b*	1.5	1.5	1.2	***
	c	3.1	2.0	***	***
	d	1.7	2.0	1.7	***
Decreasing	*e*	3.5	3.6	3.2	4.0
	f	2.5	1.4	2.3	***
No-Change Deprivation	*g*	2.1	1.3	2.2	1.5
No-Change Gratification	*h*	1.6	1.3	1.8	1.6
	i	3.4	3.2	2.6	2.6
Increasing	*j*	2.9	2.8	3.0	3.3
	k	2.1	2.4	2.2	2.6
	l	1.7	2.2	2.6	***
Drop-and-Rise	*m*	2.3	2.9	4.3	***
	n	3.4	2.9	3.0	5.3

*** less than five cases

JC_1 Comparisons:

		Work	Income	Housing	Children
a	*d, e, . . . n:*	6 of 11	10 of 11	—	—
b	*d, e, . . . n:*	0 of 11	3 of 11	0 of 11	—
c	*d, e, . . . n:*	8 of 11	3 of 11	—	—

Confirmation Index = 30 ÷ 77 = .39

JC_2 Comparisons:

		Work	Income	Housing	Children
a	*g, h:*	2 of 2	2 of 2	—	—
b	*g, h:*	0 of 2	2 of 2	0 of 2	—
c	*g, h:*	2 of 2	2 of 2	—	—
l	*g, h:*	1 of 2	0 of 2	0 of 2	—
m	*g, h:*	0 of 2	0 of 2	0 of 2	—
n	*g, h:*	0 of 2	0 of 2	0 of 2	0 of 2

Confirmation Index = 11 ÷ 34 = .32

Table 4. Relationships Between Potential for Political Violence (Dichotomized) and Patterns of Shift in Relative Gratification Over Time

		Work Gratification					
		Rise-and-Drop	Decreasing	No-Change Deprivation	No-Change Gratification	Increasing	Drop-and-Rise
PPV	Low	72.7	66.7	90.0	87.8	68.4	65.5
	High	27.3	33.3	10.0	12.2	31.6	34.5
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N=	22	63	10	49	187	29
		$\chi^2 = 10.11$	n.s.				

		Income Gratification					
		Rise-and-Drop	Decreasing	No-Change Deprivation	No-Change Gratification	Increasing	Drop-and-Rise
PPV	Low	64.0	75.3	100.0	91.7	68.9	65.7
	High	36.0	24.7	0.0	8.3	31.1	34.3
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N=	25	73	20	36	225	35
		$\chi^2 = 17.84$	$p < .01$				

		Housing Gratification					
		Rise-and-Drop	Decreasing	No-Change Deprivation	No-Change Gratification	Increasing	Drop-and-Rise
PPV	Low	81.8	70.0	78.2	89.6	67.8	58.3
	High	18.2	30.0	21.8	10.4	32.2	41.7
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N=	11	50	55	96	180	48
		$\chi^2 = 22.72$	$p < .001$				

		Children Gratification					
		Rise-and-Drop	Decreasing	No-Change Deprivation	No-Change Gratification	Increasing	Drop-and-Rise
PPV	Low	20.0	55.0	85.0	90.6	65.7	33.3
	High	80.0	45.0	15.0	9.4	34.3	66.7
		100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
	N=	5	20	20	53	134	12
		$\chi^2 = 29.32$	$p < .001$				

Drop patterns will show higher mean PPV while Drop-and-Rise patterns show lower mean PPV than No-Change patterns is wrong 68 per cent of the time; therefore, we interpret this .32 index value as providing clear disconfirmation of JC_2. In fact, if we examine the JC_2 comparisons closely, we find a consistent reason for the disconfirmation of JC_2: most of the Rise-and-Drop predictions are correct ($CI = 10 \div 14 = .72$), but almost all of the Drop-and-Rise predictions are incorrect ($CI = 1 \div 20 = .05$). If we hypothesized that both Rise-and-Drop *and* Drop-and-Rise patterns would show higher mean PPV than

No-Change patterns, our Confirmation Index is 29 ÷ 34 = .85.

When PPV is dichotomized into low and high categories, we may test the hypothesis:

> JC_3: If individuals are classified into Rise-and-Drop, Decreasing, No-Change Deprivation, No-Change Gratification, Increasing, and Drop-and-Rise patterns of relative gratification over time, those in the Rise-and-Drop and Decreasing categories will show a greater proportion high on PPV than those in the two No-Change categories while those in the Increasing and Drop-and-Rise categories will show a lesser proportion high on PPV than those in the two No-Change categories.

Table 4 shows the relationships between temporal relative gratification pattern on each welfare value and PPV. For the relationship between the Work variable and PPV we do not reject the null hypothesis, since chi square is not significant at the .01 level. But for Income, Housing, and Children, chi square is significant at well below the .01 level. However, the percentage comparisons show that in each of these instances, while those in the Rise-and-Drop and Decreasing categories do tend to score high on PPV than do those in the No-Change categories. Those in the Increasing and Drop-and-Rise categories never show a lesser tendency to score high on PPV than the No-Change categories. In fact the Increasing and Drop-and-Rise categories always yield higher scores on PPV than do the No-Change categories—as high, in fact, generally as the Rise-and-Drop and Decreasing categories! These data clearly disconfirm JC_3; and they equally clearly confirm (for the Income and Children variables), the alternative hypothesis:

> JC_4: The proportion of individuals scoring high on PPV will decrease from Rise-and-Drop and Decreasing categories to the No-Change Deprivation category and will then increase from the No-Change Gratification category to the Increasing and Drop-and-Rise categories.

The percentage comparisons show the same thing as the comparisons between means presented in Table 3: the *J*-Curve hypothesis is not supported because individuals who perceive a drop and then a rise in congruence between achievement optimum and actual achievement have nearly the same tendency to score high on PPV as those who perceive the *J*-Curve pattern of a rise and then a drop in congruence. If we consider only patterns of relative *deprivation* over time—Rise-and-Drop, Decreasing, No-Change—then the *J*-Curve thesis that the Rise-and-Drop group will be the most violence-prone is supported for two of the four welfare values (Income and Children). But in any society, many individuals will perceive patterns of relative *gratification* over time—No-Change, Increasing, Drop-and-Rise; and among these individuals, the Drop-and-Rise group is the most violence-prone for three of the four welfare values (Income, Housing, Children). In short, it does not seem to be a particular direction of change as exemplified by the *J*-Curve which produces the greatest tendency to violence-proneness; rather, violence-proneness seems to result from any directional change in degree of congruence between achievement optimum and achievement over time.[42]

In contrast to the *J*-Curve hypothesis, which focuses on *change in direction of* achievement discrepancy over time, the Rate-of-Change hypothesis focuses on the *direction* (*and amount*) *of change* in achievement discrepancy over time. Given our past, present, and future Self-Anchoring scale scores for each of the four welfare values, we may construct the following Rate-of-Change variables (range: −10 to +10):

> $PF_{w,\ldots,c}$: Past to Future shift in achievement congruence; as $W_{p+5}-W_{p-5}, \ldots C_{p+5}-C_{p-5}$.
> $AI_{w,\ldots,c}$: Anticipated Increase shift in achievement congruence; defined as $W_{p+5}-W_{p}, \ldots C_{p+5}-C_{p}$.
> $EI_{w,\ldots,c}$: Experienced Increase shift in achievement congruence: defined as $W_{p}-W_{p-5}, \ldots C_{p}-C_{p-5}$.

These variables measure direction and amount of perceived change in the gap between a person's achievement optimum and actual level of achievement with respect to different temporal comparisons: past versus future; present versus future; and past versus present. A positive score indicates that the person perceives a decreasing gap; a score of zero indicates that the person perceives no change in the size of the gap; a negative score indicates that a person perceives an increasing gap.

If we assume that our variables are interval scales, we may test the Rate-of-Change hypothesis:

> RC': The relationship between PPV and $PF_{w,\ldots,c}$, $AI_{w,\ldots,c}$, $EI_{w,\ldots,c}$ will show a relatively close fit to an inverse linear function.

---

[42] When the Long-Term Welfare Gratification measure constructed by Muller (see appendix in "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence") is trichotomized into "low" (−10 to −1), "medium" (0 to 10), and "high" (11 to 20) categories, the same kind of relationship appears: persons in the low (negative change) and high (positive change) categories consistently show higher mean PPV than persons in the medium (very little change) category.

Table 5. Correlations (*r*): Potential for Political Violence with Measures of Rate-of-Change Gratification

Welfare Value	Rate-of-Change Gratification: Past to Future	Anticipated Increase	Experienced Increase
Work	.061†	.135**	−.033†
$N=$	(361)	(394)	(418)
Income	.095*	.146***	.028†
$N=$	(414)	(438)	(457)
Housing	.082*	.225***	−.120**
$N=$	(440)	(461)	(465)
Children	.120*	.160**	.013†
$N=$	(244)	(281)	(260)

* $p<.05$
** $p<.01$
*** $p<.001$
† $p>.05$

In Table 5 we simply report the correlation coefficients, rather than the complete regression equations. As we might expect, given our findings for the tests of the *J*-Curve hypothesis, these data disconfirm RC′ in every instance. The correlations between the Rate-of-Change variables and PPV are consistently minuscule. They indicate that PPV shows no tendency to vary linearly with the PF variables, practically no tendency to vary linearly with the EI variables, and only a slight tendency to vary linearly with the AI variables—and in the case of the AI variables; the slight linear relationships with PPV are all in the wrong direction![43]

Table 6 shows why RC′ is not confirmed. For convenience of presentation, we have trichotomized the Rate-of-Change variables into Negative Change, No-Change, and Positive Change categories. In every case, mean PPV decreases from the Negative Change group to the No-Change group, but then *increases* from the No-Change group to the Positive Change group; and in most instances, the Positive Change group shows about the same mean PPV as the Negative Change group.

For the PPV dichtomy and the Rate-of-Change trichotomies, we may test the following hypothesis of inverse monotonic association:

> *RC″*: The more positive is the shift over time in congruence between achievement optimum and achievement, the lower the PPV.

Of course, on the basis of our examination of the *J*-Curve hypothesis and the distribution of mean PPV scores for the Rate-of-Change variables, we expect that RC″ will be disconfirmed; and we expect that an alternative Absolute Change hypothesis will be confirmed:

> AC: Individuals who perceive any shift over time in congruence between achievement optimum and actual achievement, regardless of whether the direction of shift is positive or negative, will be more likely to score high

Table 6. Mean Potential for Political Violence Scores for Measures of Rate-of-Change Gratification Trichotomized by Direction of Change[a]

Welfare Value	Past to Future (−)	(0)	(+)	Anticipated Increase (−)	(0)	(+)	Experienced Increase (−)	(0)	(+)
Work	2.6	1.8	2.8	2.9	1.8	2.9	2.8	2.1	2.6
$N=$	(79)	(76)	(206)	(67)	(138)	(189)	(96)	(134)	(188)
Income	2.5	1.6	2.7	2.5	1.9	2.9	2.7	1.8	2.6
$N=$	(95)	(77)	(242)	(74)	(148)	(216)	(98)	(129)	(230)
Housing	2.6	2.1	2.7	2.6	2.0	3.0	3.1	2.0	2.6
$N=$	(65)	(174)	(201)	(49)	(227)	(185)	(84)	(243)	(138)
Children's Education	3.4	1.8	3.0	3.8	2.2	3.3	4.1	1.7	3.1
$N=$	(25)	(78)	(141)	(25)	(142)	(114)	(31)	(108)	(121)

[a] (−) = −10 thru −1; (0) = 0; (+) = 1 thru 10.

---

[43] Our alpha level for rejection of the null hypothesis is .01.

> on PPV than will individuals who perceive no such shift over time in congruence.

According to the Absolute Change hypothesis, the proportion scoring high on PPV in Negative Change, No-Change, and Positive Change categories should conform to a "*V*" pattern if we display these proportions on a graph with the percentage high on PPV shown along with ordinate.

The relationships between the Past to Future shift categories and the PPV dichotomy are depicted graphically in Figure 2. For alpha of .01 the chi square for the relationship between PF_w and PPV is not statistically significant, and we accept the null hypothesis —although we note that the chi square value approaches the .01 level of significance and that the percentage comparisons are in accord with the Absolute Change or *V*-Curve prediction. We reject the null hypothesis for every other relationship between a Past to Future shift variable and PPV. The percentage comparisons show that RC″ is disconfirmed for the Income, Housing, and Children variables. And it is evident that the significant differences in proportions scoring high on PPV are between Negative Change as opposed to No-Change and between Positive Change as opposed to No-Change, but not between Negative Change as opposed to Positive Change. The proportions scoring high on PPV conform to the "*V*" pattern indicative of the Absolute Change relationship; thus, in these three instances, the AC hypothesis clearly is confirmed.



Work $\chi^2 = 7.79$ n.s. ($p < .02$)
Income $\chi^2 = 12.00$ $p < .01$
Housing $\chi^2 = 8.82$ $p < .01$
Children $\chi^2 = 11.27$ $p < .01$

Figure 2. Percentage high on potential for political violence by direction of change category on measures of past to future gratification



Work $\chi^2 = 24.30$ $p < .001$
Income $\chi^2 = 17.38$ $p < .001$
Housing $\chi^2 = 21.90$ $p < .001$
Children $\chi^2 = 18.66$ $p < .001$

Figure 3. Percentage high on potential for political violence by direction of change category on measures of anticipated increase in gratification

In Figure 3 we plot the proportions scoring high on PPV for the direction of shift categories on the Present to Future shift variables. Since chi square is statistically significant at well below the .01 level for each of the four relationships, we reject the null hypothesis in every instance. The proportion



Work $\chi^2 = 6.85$ n.s. $(p < .03)$
Income $\chi^2 = 15.45$ $p < .001$
Housing $\chi^2 = 17.72$ $p < .001$
Children $\chi^2 = 24.75$ $p < .001$

Figure 4. Percentage high on potential for political violence by direction of change category on measures of experienced increase in gratification

scoring high on PPV always decreases from perceived negative shift in relative gratification over time to no shift, but it always *increases* from no shift to positive shift. Thus, we reject RC″. It is evident that significantly more of the Negative Change and Positive Change groups are high on PPV; and, excepting the Children variable, the proportion scoring high on PPV for the Negative Change groups is approximately equal to that for the Positive Change groups. Thus, each of the percentage comparisons plots as a distinct *V*-Curve, confirming the AC hypothesis.

Figure 4 depicts the proportions high on PPV for the Past to Present shift categories. With the exception of the Work variable, the chi-square values are well below the .01 level, and we reject the null hypothesis; also, for the relationship between EI_w and PPV we note that chi square is close to the .01 level and that percentage comparisons do plot as a *V*-Curve. On the Income, Housing, and Children variables, the No-Change groups range from 13 to 19 per cent high on PPV, whereas the Negative Change groups range from 31 to 57 per cent high on PPV and the Positive Change groups range from 29 to 39 per cent high on PPV. These relationships clearly conform to the "*V*" pattern, and we again reject the RC″ hypothesis, but accept the AC hypothesis.

Since the percentage comparisons are as predicted by AC for all 12 of these relationships, and since chi square is significant at or beyond the .01 level in 10 of the 12 relationships, we regard these data as providing consistent support for the Absolute Change or *V*-Curve hypothesis. Moreover, the only other test of a Rate-of-Change hypothesis that we know of, reported by Bowen et al. for their Cleveland sample, also disconfirmed RC″ and supported AC, the Absolute Change hypothesis, in the case of the relationship between Protest Orientation and an Anticipated Increase measure built from the "best possible life" version of the Self-Anchoring scale.[44]

Mean PPV by Rate-of-Change Categories and Control Variables. We have found generally consistent confirmation for the Absolute Change hypothesis across the entire sample. Even more dramatic support will be provided if it turns out that the Absolute Change predictions are borne out for various subsamples. In this section we shall examine the relationships between PPV and composite Rate-of-Change variables, controlling for levels of three variables which might produce a specification effect on the Absolute Change relationship.

We shall control for levels of race, age, and education. These variables have been selected because it seems possible that certain correlates of each of these variables might be responsible for the absolute change relationship. In the case of race, blacks, of course, have been severely discriminated against in American society. Perhaps among this group, those perceiving no change have become so inured to their condition that even if they perceive continuing relative deprivation they will be unlikely to believe that anything can be about it, whereas those who have some hope of positive change will be more violence-prone—and, indeed, as violence-prone as those who perceive negative change—because any improvement after a long period of abject subjugation will generate dissatisfaction with the *rate* of improvement. For the age variable, perhaps the absolute change relationship holds only among the old, because among this group those perceiving no change are resigned to their condition, whereas the group perceiving the possibility of any change will tend to include more activists who, regardless of the direction of perceived change, would score higher on PPV. Similarly in the case of education, perhaps among the group with only a grade school education, those perceiving no change would be particularly apathetic toward the possibility of altering their circumstances, whereas the group perceiving the possibility of any change would tend to include more activists.

---

[44] See Table 5 at page 197 of Bowen et al., "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor," present-to-future shift on the Self-Anchoring scale is dichotomized into a change category ("Upward and Downward Mobility") and a no-change category ("No Mobility").

To simplify our presentation we have constructed composite Rate-of-Change variables, and we examine mean scores on PPV for the various combinations of direction of shift categories and levels of control variables. Since the number of cases on the Children variables is so much smaller than the *N* on the other welfare value measures, we have excluded the Children variables from the composite variables (range: −30 to +30), which are:

PFG: Past-to-Future Gratification. Sum of scores on PF_w, PF_i, and PF_h.
AIG: Anticipated Increase Gratification: Sum of scores on AI_w, AI_i, and AI_h.
EIG: Experienced Increase Gratification. Sum of scores on EI_w, EI_i, and EI_h.

If a respondent was missing a score for two or more of the component variables, the case was excluded; if only one score was missing, the mean of that variable was assigned. (The percentage of cases missing on PFG, AIG, and EIG was, respectively, 16 per cent, 12 per cent, and 8 per cent.)

Table 7 shows mean PPV by PFG shift category and levels of the control variables. Regardless of levels of race, age, and education, the Negative Change and Positive Change groups consistently score higher on PPV than does the No-Change group.

Table 8 shows mean PPV by AIG shift category and levels of the control variables. Again, regardless of race and education, individuals who anticipate any change in relative gratification—whether negative or positive—are more violence-prone on the average than individuals

Table 7. Mean Potential for Political Violence Scores for Direction of Rate of Change Gratification Stratified by Test Factors

Past-Future Gratification[a]		Negative Change (−)	No Change (0)	Positive Change (+)
		2.4	1.2	2.6
	N=	(108)	(39)	(274)

By:										
Race		Black			White					
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)			
		3.2	1.7	3.7	1.9	1.1	1.9			
	N=	(46)	(07)	(32)	(62)	(32)	(168)			
Age		18 to 33			34 to 57			58 and up		
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)
		4.1	1.5	3.0	2.8	1.2	2.5	1.6	1.2	1.7
	N=	(15)	(06)	(109)	(46)	(18)	(130)	(47)	(15)	(35)
Education[b]		Grade School			High School			College		
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)
	N=	(41)	(10)	(48)	(49)	(23)	(179)	(18)	(06)	(47)

[a] Rate of Change Gratification: (−) = −30 thru −1; (0) = 0; (+) = 1 thru 30.

[b] Education: Grade School = no schooling, some grade, completed grade;
High School = some high, completed high, or some high + technical, completed high + technical;
College = some college, complete college, completed college + graduate.

Table 8. Mean Potential for Political Violence Scores for Direction of Anticipated Increase Gratification Stratified by Test Factors

Anticipated Increase Gratification		Negative Change (−)			No Change (0)			Positive Change (+)		
	N=	2.2 (86)			1.6 (70)			2.8 (286)		
By:										
Race		Black			White					
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)			
	N=	3.3 (36)	2.4 (18)	3.7 (108)	1.5 (50)	1.3 (18)	2.2 (178)			
Age		18 to 33			34 to 57			58 and up		
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)
	N=	3.5 (10)	1.9 (07)	3.1 (135)	2.8 (42)	1.5 (43)	2.8 (109)	1.2 (34)	1.8 (20)	1.7 (42)
Education		Grade School			High School			College		
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)
	N=	2.6 (30)	1.6 (21)	2.8 (48)	2.1 (46)	1.7 (41)	2.6 (182)	1.8 (10)	1.5 (08)	3.4 (56)

who do not anticipate any change in relative gratification. Also, among the young and the middle-aged, those who anticipate any change in relative gratification show higher mean PPV than those who do not anticipate any change. Only among the old does the Absolute Change relationship disappear (whereas we thought possibly that the Absolute Change relationship might *appear* only among the old); and in this case, both the No-Change and Positive Change

Table 9. Mean Potential for Political Violence Scores for Direction of Experienced Increase Gratification by Race, Age, and Education

Experienced Increase Gratification		Negative Change (−)			No Change (0)			Positive Change (+)		
	N=	2.8 (129)			1.8 (71)			2.4 (264)		
By:										
Race		Black			White					
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)			
	N=	3.2 (69)	4.6 (14)	3.5 (95)	2.3 (60)	1.1 (57)	1.8 (169)			
Age		18 to 33			34 to 57			58 and up		
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)
	N=	4.2 (34)	2.1 (07)	2.8 (94)	2.8 (50)	2.6 (27)	2.3 (129)	1.7 (45)	1.2 (37)	1.7 (41)
Education		Grade School			High School			College		
		(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)	(−)	(0)	(+)
	N=	2.7 (52)	1.6 (28)	2.3 (46)	2.5 (63)	2.1 (36)	2.4 (166)	4.6 (14)	1.3 (07)	2.4 (52)

groups show slightly *higher* mean PPV than the Negative Change group.

Table 9 shows mean PPV by EIG shift category and levels of the control variables. The Absolute Change or *V*-Curve relationship holds up for whites. But for blacks, instead of the negative monotonic relationship which we thought might possibly show up, the No-Change group on EIG shows a higher mean PPV than do the Negative Change and Positive Change groups. When age is controlled for, we see that the Absolute Change relationship holds up among the young and the old; but among the middle-aged the Absolute Change relationship disappears. Mean PPV appears to decrease from Negative Change to No Change to Positive Change on EIG for persons between 34 and 57 years of age; however, the differences between the means—particularly for the Negative Change and No Change groups—is quite small. Finally, when level of education is controlled for, we observe that the Absolute Change relationship holds up among persons with only a grade school education, among those with a high school education, and among the college group.

First of all, none of our expectations about how levels of the control variables might affect the *V*-Curve are borne out. We do not find a negative monotonic relationship between mean PPV and the shift categories on the Rate-of-Change variables among blacks, or among the young and middle-aged, or among persons with high school or college training. For all the Rate-of-Change variables, at all levels of all the control variables we observe only one instance of a possible negative monotonic relationship (PPV by shift category on EIG among persons aged 34 to 57); and in this instance the differences between means are not large enough to warrant confidence in a negative monotonic relationship of real importance. Second, the Absolute Change relationship holds up in every instance for the PFG variable, and in most instances for the AIG and EIG variables, regardless of levels of race, age, and education. Controlling for these attributes generally has little or no effect on the *V*-Curve.

Absolute Change as a Predictor of PPV. If we assume that PFG and AIG are interval scales, we may test two Absolute Change hypotheses:

> AC′: Potential for political violence will tend to decrease at a decelerated rate as change in relative gratification decreases from high negative to zero and will tend to increase at an accelerated rate as change in relative gratification increases from zero to high positive.
>
> AC″: Potential for political violence will tend to increase as absolute magnitude of change in relative gratification increases.

The AC′ hypothesis may be tested by examining whether the relationship between PPV and the rate-of-change variables fits a quadratic function rule; the AC″ hypothesis may be tested by examining whether the relationship between PPV and the absolute magnitude of rate-of-change scores fits a linear function rule. We expected that our data would support both AC′ and AC″. But in examining scatterplots, we conjectured that the relationship between PPV and the rate-of-change variables would resemble a "*V*" pattern rather than a "*U*" pattern, suggesting that the data should show a closer fit to AC″ than to AC′.

Table 10 shows that AC′ and AC″ are confirmed for the three composite Rate-of-Change variables. The *F* values for the quadratic regressions, and for the linear regressions with absolute magnitude PFG, AIG, and EIG scores (range—0 to 30), are statistically significant at less than .01. The r^2 values, however, show that the absolute magnitude PFG scores explain twice as much of the variance in PPV as does the quadratic function on negative to positive scores; the absolute magnitude AIG scores explain one and one-half as much of the variance in PPV as the quadratic function on negative to positive AIG scores; and the absolute magnitude EIG scores explain one and two-thirds as much of the variance in PPV as the quadratic function on negative to positive EIG scores. In fact, the absolute magnitude AIG variable (|AIG|) explains 9 per cent of the variance in PPV. We regard this as only a moderate degree of correlation ($r = .30$) i.e., a barely moderate degree of fit to a linear relationship. (Also, if we treat |AIG| and PPV as only ordinal scales, the Spearman rank-order correlation between them is .31.) The absolute magnitude of anticipated rate-of-change in relative gratification is the only achievement discrepancy variable in this sample which shows a moderate correlation with PPV.

In an earlier report Muller proposed a partial theory of potential for political violence which postulated that potential for political violence would not vary with degree of relative gratification independent of political trust and belief that political violence had been a successful method of goal attainment in the past.[45] As predicted, it was found that a composite measure of present relative gratification indeed showed no correlation with potential for political violence independent of political trust and

---

[45] See Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence."

Table 10. Regression of Potential for Political Violence Against Composite Measures of Dynamic Relative Gratification

Regression Equation	R^2/r^2	*Analysis of Variance*			
				Mean of square	F
Quadratic:					
PPV = .002(PFG)+.003(PFG^2)+2.195	.03	regression	2	30.55	6.84
		residual	415	4.47	$p<.01$
PPV = .060(AIG)+.004(AIG^2)+2.178	.06	regression	2	66.23	14.93
		residual	438	4.44	$p<.001$
PPV = −.030(EIG) +.005(EIG^2) +2.215	.03	regression	2	33.82	7.57
		residual	461	4.47	$p<.01$
Linear (Absolute Magnitude):					
PPV = .086($\lvert PFG \rvert$)+1.741	.06	regression	1	113.61	26.31
		residual	416	4.32	$p<.001$
PPV = .129($\lvert AIG \rvert$)+1.810	.09	regression	1	176.45	40.82
		residual	439	4.32	$p<.001$
PPV = .100($\lvert EIG \rvert$) +1.844	.05	regression	1	109.46	25.12
		residual	462	4.36	$p<.001$

belief in the past utility of political violence.[46] Here we have found that the variable of absolute magnitude of relative gratification correlates with PPV more strongly than do any of the straightforward relative gratification variables. Our question now is: does PPV vary linearly with $|AIG|$ regardless of political trust and belief in the past utility of political violence?

The potential for political violence model developed earlier postulates PPV as an additive linear function of Trust in Political Authorities and Efficacy of Past Violence. The Trust in Political Authorities (TPA) scale is a variable that measures generalized affect for political authorities, i.e., belief in the degree to which government officials, the police, and the courts wield power honestly, justly, and benevolently.[47] Scores were derived from the first component of a principal components analysis of 23 variables, and range from a low of −3.16 to a high of +1.98. The Efficacy of Past Violence (EPV) scale is a summation of scores on three items measuring belief in whether the use of political violence in the past by dissident groups has been helpful to, made no difference to or hurt the cause of the group.[48] EPV ranges from a low of 0 to a high of 6.

The earlier report showed that R^2 for PPV regressed against TPA and EPV equalled .30 for 480 cases with complete data. Table 11 shows that when we take $|AIG|$ into account the sample is reduced to 426 cases with complete data. Model 1 is the original PPV model tested across the 426 cases with complete data on all the variables including $|AIG|$. The R^2 of .285 for model 1 across these 426 cases is slightly lower than R^2 for model 1 across the sample of 480 cases; however, the partial regression coefficients are virtually identical, underscoring the stability of the estimated parameters for model 1.

Model 2 includes the $|AIG|$ term as a describing variable. The F value for $|AIG|$ in the equation is statistically significant at less than .01 and the estimated |AIG| slope is well above its standard error. Also, with |AIG| in the equation, R^2 is raised to .32: thus |AIG| increases that accuracy of prediction by 3½ percentage points. Unlike the composite present relative gratification variable ($W_p + I_p + H_p$), which the earlier report showed had no direct effect on PPV independent of TPA and EPV, |AIG| clearly has some —albeit relatively slight—direct effect on PPV independent of the other describing variables. An indication of the relative importance of |AIG| can be gained from the standardized partial regression coefficients (beta weights) for the describing variables in model 2 which are −.29 for the TPA variable, .30 for the EPV variable, and .19 for the |AIG| variable. Obviously, TPA and EPV are the most important predictors for this sample, but |AIG| is by no means irrelevant.[49] On the basis of our findings for model 2 we shall also add a fourth proposition to the partial theory of potential for political violence proposed earlier:

---

[46] See Figure 5 in Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," p. 952.

[47] See the appendix in Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," pp. 955–959. Respondents were asked to report the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with statements such as the following: "The national government is pretty much run for the benefit of all the people instead of for a few big interests looking out for themselves;" "Most of the people running the national government are crooked;" "The national government can be trusted to do what is right just about always;" "Most policemen in the United States would be willing to take a bribe;" "On the whole, the police in the United States treat everyone equally, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, white or Negro;" "The courts in the United States give everyone a fair trial, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, white or Negro;" "If the courts in the United States find someone guilty of committing a crime, the length of his sentence will depend on whether he is rich or poor, white or Negro."

[48] See the appendix in Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," pp. 955–959. The questions referred to (1) riots that have taken place in large cities; (2) white groups that have fought with the police and destroyed public and private property in the cities in order to protest against American involvement in the war in Vietnam and other things that they dislike about American society; (3) Negro groups that have urged Negroes to arm themselves in order to be ready for shoot-outs with the police.

(4) Potential for political violence will vary directly with absolute magnitude of rate-of-change over time in relative gratification, regardless of belief that political violence has led to goal attainment and regardless of diffuse support for the political authority structure.

We do not expect that any straightforward measures of degree of relative gratification, either static or dynamic, will correlate with potential for political violence, independent of belief in the past utility of political violence and political trust sentiment; but we do conjecture that the *absolute magnitude* of shift in relative gratification—particularly shift in relative gratification from present level to anticipated future level—may be a useful predictor in its own right of potential for political violence.

Conclusion

A common explanation of men's readiness to engage in acts of dissent which constitute progressively greater challenge to the state—their potential for political violence—accords major causal significance to degree of perceived discrepancy between optimum level of achievement and actual achievement with respect to important values. Actually, this achievement discrepancy hypothesis is a series of separate hypotheses, differentiated according to the definition of the concept of optimum achievement level. Tests of the achievement discrepancy hypothesis in any of its forms at the level of individual behavior have not been prolific. Most such tests have measured achievement discrep-

Table 11. Contribution of the Absolute Magnitude of Anticipated Increase Gratification to the Potential for Political Violence Model

Variables	Mean	Standard Deviation	Correlations (r)			
			PPV	TPA	EPV	|AIG|
PPV	2.48	2.17	1.00	−.446	.441	.306
TPA	0.01	0.99		1.00	−.380	−.232
EPV	1.18	1.46			1.00	.154
|AIG|	5.17	4.83				1.00
Number of cases = 426						

	R^2	Describing Variables	Partial Regression Coefficients*	β_0	F
(1) $PPV=\beta_0+\beta_1 TPA+\beta_2 EVP+\mu$	.285			1.935	
		TPA	−.713 (.098)		53.40
		EPV	.472 (.066)		50.92
(2) $PPV=\beta_0+\beta_1 TPA+\beta_2 EPV+\beta_3 \lvert AIG \rvert+\mu$	.320			1.511	
		TPA	−.627 (.097)		41.75
		EPV	.450 (.065)		48.29
		|AIG|	.087 (.019)		21.80

* Standard error in parenthesis.

---

[49] The |PFG| and |EIG| terms also make an independent contribution, although somewhat smaller than that made by |AIG|. But particularly with |PFG| in the equation, the number of complete data cases is quite low.

ancy with the Cantril Self-Anchoring scale, according to which achievement optimum is defined as a person's own perceived best possible level of achievement. In this study, achievement discrepancy with respect to four universally important welfare values—work situation, income, housing accommodations and children's education—was measured by the Self-Anchoring scale for judgments made about the present, five years in the past, and five years in the future. Our findings may be summarized as follows:

(1) *Static Relative Gratification*. As degree of relative gratification experienced in the present increases, potential for political violence shows a tendency to decrease. The relationship, however, does not appear to be of a strength warranting imputation of major causal or predictive significance to relative gratification experienced in the present. Also, as degree of relative gratification expected in the future increases, potential for political violence does not show any tendency to decrease; rather, potential for political violence appears to be unrelated to relative gratification expected in the future. Both of the above findings are consistent with those reported in other studies.

(2) *Dynamic Relative Gratification*. We tested two dynamic relative gratification hypotheses: the *J*-Curve, or Rise-and-Drop, and the Rate-of-Change.

A. *J-Curve*. Individuals were categorized by six general patterns of change in relative gratification from past to present to future: Rise-and-Drop, Decreasing, No-Change Deprivation, No-Change Gratification, Increasing, and Drop-and-Rise. There is virtually no difference between proportions of respondents in the two No-Change categories who score high on potential for political violence.[50] Individuals characterized by the Rise-and-Drop pattern of relative gratification are more likely to have a high potential for political violence than those in the No-Change Deprivation group by 36.0 and 65.0 percentage points on the Income and Children variables, respectively; but individuals characterized by the Drop-and-Rise pattern of relative gratification *similarly are more likely* to have a high potential for political violence than the No Change Gratification group by 26.0, 31.3, and 57.3 percentage points on the Income, Housing, and Children variables, respectively. And on the Income and Children variables, the proportions high on potential for political violence are similar for the Rise-and-Drop and Drop-and-Rise patterns, while on the Housing variable, the proportion high on potential for political violence clearly is *greater* for the Drop-and-Rise pattern than for the Rise-and-Drop pattern. Thus, the findings tend to support an *Absolute J*-Curve hypothesis, to the effect that individuals experiencing either a Rise-and-Drop or a Drop-and-Rise pattern of relative gratification will be more likely to show high potential for political violence than individuals experiencing a No-Change pattern of relative gratification.

B. *Rate-of-Change*. Three measures of direction and degree of shift over time in relative gratification were constructed: (1) past-to-future change scores were defined by subtracting level of gratification in the past from level of gratification expected in the future; (2) present-to-future change scores were defined by subtracting level of gratification in the present from level of gratification expected in the future; (3) past-to-future change scores were defined by subtracting level of gratification in the present from level of gratification expected in the future; (3) past-to-present change scores were constructed by subtracting level of gratification in the past from level of gratification in the present. These variables range from negative change through no change to positive change (−10 to +10) depending on whether, and by how much, a person perceives his level of relative gratification to be decreasing over time, constant, or increasing.

The data provide no support for the Rate-of-Change hypothesis that as degree of relative gratification increases over time, potential for political violence will tend to decrease. However, if we convert the rate-of-change scores into absolute magnitudes, the data consistently support an *Absolute* Change hypothesis that as absolute magnitude of relative gratification increases over time, potential for political violence will show a tendency to increase. Of the rate-of-change variables, the best predictor of potential for political violence is the absolute magnitude of present to future shift.

The absolute magnitude of what men think they are going to be able to get in the future minus what they have attained in the present is a variable that shows a moderate zero-order positive correlation with potential for political violence (and a higher correlation with potential for political violence than any other relative gratification variable); it also is linearly related to potential for political violence independent of degree of political trust and belief that past political violence has led to goal attainment; and it improves prediction of potential for political violence by a slight amount over and above the more powerful political trust and past efficacy of violence predictors.

---

[50] In this respect, the Waterloo sample differs from the Cleveland sample. See Table 6 at page 198 in Bowen et al., "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor."

Why Absolute Magnitude? We entitled this paper, "The Strange Case of . . . ," because we felt like detectives while analyzing these data. On beginning the investigation we did not expect to find the Absolute Change or *V*-Curve relationship between potential for political violence and shift in relative gratification over time. Our first clue occurred when we categorized relative gratification shift into the fourteen patterns depicted in Figure 1 and then computed the mean PPV scores for individuals grouped into each pattern, as reported in Table 3. Initially, we expected that the *V*-Curve pattern would disappear when we constructed other shift variables.

But the *V*-Curve persisted regardless of the kind of shift variable we used, and it continued to persist regardless of the control variables we introduced. At this point we were satisfied that we could explain the zero linear correlation between potential for political violence and the shift variable (labeled Long-Term Welfare Gratification) constructed in Muller's earlier report,[51] as well as the lack of linear correlation between potential for political violence and the shift variables constructed here. Moreover, our review of the relevant literature gave us reason to believe that the *V*-Curve would hold for samples other than this.[52]

It is logical to expect that persons who perceive negative change in their standard of living will be more violence-prone than persons who perceive either no change or positive change. But it is not logical to expect that persons who perceive positive change in their standard of living will be *more* violence-prone than persons who perceive no change, and will be *as* violence-prone as persons who perceive negative change. The comparatively high potential for political violence manifested by persons who perceive positive change is an example of what might be labeled the "de Tocqueville Paradox," after the French social scientist Alexis de Tocqueville, who first called attention to this phenomenon on the basis of systematic observation. De Tocqueville noted that the French Revolution occurred after two decades of steady improvement in standard of living and that those parts of France which had experienced the greatest degree of positive change also showed the greatest popular discontent.[53]

Two different explanations of the de Tocqueville Paradox have been advanced. The most familiar is the *Rising Expectations* thesis, predicated upon the assumption that as a person experiences positive change in his level of achievement, his achievement optimum also will rise, *and rise more rapidly than his attained achievement,* thus producing an increase in the amount of perceived, discrepancy between achievement optimum and achievement.[54] A second explanation, labeled *Present Value of the Past,* is predicated on the assumption that, since a person's level of achievement in the present is based in part on past costs, the degree to which past costs are perceived as having been intolerable will vary proportionately with the magnitude of perceived positive change over time, resulting in the actual devaluation of utility of present achievement by an amount proportionate to the magnitude of positive change.[55] Also, we shall advance as a third alternative a *More to Lose* thesis, predicated upon the assumption that, since a person who perceives positive change has more and more to lose (until such positive change becomes stabilized over a period of time), positive change will produce a readiness to ensure that such change is maintained, by acts of dissent against the state if necessary, among persons who believe that such change could be threatened.

1. *Rising Expectations.* According to this line or reasoning, the achievement optimum of those individuals who perceive increasing relative gratification tends to rise at a faster rate than level of actual achievement.[56] For such in-

---

[51] See Table 4 in Muller, "A Test of a Partial Theory of Potential for Political Violence," p. 938.

[52] See Bowen et al., "Deprivation, Mobility, and Orientation Toward Protest of the Urban Poor."

[53] Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Old Regime and the French Revolution* (New York: Doubleday, 1955). The paradox observed by de Tocqueville is discussed in Charles Wolf, Jr., "The Present Value of the Past," mimeo., The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, 1969. Wolf cites the work of many scholars who have elaborated upon the de Tocqueville Paradox, but notes that "Although they rarely ascribe it to 'irrationality,' . . . they usually are quite unclear . . . about a precise mechanism to account for the paradox" (p. 13).

[54] See Geschwender, "Social Structure and the Negro Revolt: an Examination of Some Hypotheses."

[55] See Wolf, "The Present Value of the Past."

[56] This explanation is offered by Bowen et al., "Deprivation, Mobility and Orientation to Protest of the Urban Poor," to account for their Self-Anchoring scale findings in the Cleveland study.

dividuals, the Self-Anchoring scale would not capture this increase in achievement optimum relative to actual achievement, since it does not explicitly measure shift over time in achievement optimum. Thus, since actual achievement is rising, the Self-Anchoring scale scores would show a decrease in the gap between achievement optimum and achievement; whereas, if variation in achievement optimum were also taken into account, and if achievement optimum were rising at a faster rate than actual achievement, what shows up as a positive shift on the Self-Anchoring scale might actually be a negative shift—i.e., an actual *increase* in discrepancy—on a scale which explicitly took variation in achievement optimum into account.

The problem with this thesis, for these data, is that the top of a Self-Anchoring scale is defined by a person's own perception of his achievement optimum (defined as "best possible"). And it seems warranted to expect, say, that if an individual's achievement optimum for the future is higher than his achievement optimum in the present, he will simply take this into account when estimating degree of future discrepancy on the Self-Anchoring ladder. Furthermore, since the individual is asked to estimate his past, present, and future position on the Self-Anchoring scale with respect to his conception of his "best possible" level of achievement at the time of the interview, it seems plausible that most individuals might place themselves on the ladder with respect to a relatively constant achievement optimum. No experimental evidence, however, is available on these points.

2. *Present Value of the Past.* Charles Wolf has proposed an economic model in which valuation of the past is an important term in a person's utility function. A key premise is that the aggregate value of prior achievement levels will be mediated through a "backward-looking discount rate" or *decay rate.* Further, a decrease or an increase in this decay rate may respectively increase or decrease the effect of prior achievement levels on a person's utility function. If prior achievement levels represent costs, e.g., perceived prior inequities or discrimination, and if the decay rate decreases, then the value (disutility) of past costs may become a heavily weighted argument in a person's utility function.

Wolf discusses a utility function of the form

$$U_t = U(Y_t, \tilde{V}_t),$$

where Y_t is present achievement and $\tilde{V}_t$ is the present value of a set of prior achievement levels which may be either costs, if $\partial U \div \partial V_t < 0$, or benefits, if $\partial U \div \partial V_t > 0$. The $\tilde{V}_t$ term is defined as:

$$\tilde{V}_t = \sum_{\tau=t-1}^{t-m} (1 - r^*)^{\tau - t} V_\tau,$$

where the r^* term refers to the decay rate and the V_τ term refers to past achievement levels over a relevant time span $t-1$ to $t-m$. Now if the V_τ values are costs, raising Y may lower r^* and thus increase $\tilde{V}_t$. Consequently, raising Y may have offsetting effects in the utility function U_t, since raising Y raises Y_t but also lowers $\tilde{V}_t$. Depending on the marginal rate of substitution $(\partial U \div \partial V_t) \div (\partial U \div \partial Y_t)$, U_t may actually fall in proportion to the amount of increase in Y. Thus, an individual who sees himself as doing better in the present may, nevertheless, lower his present utility as a result of a heightened sense of *past* injustice. Analogously, an individual who sees himself as better off in the future may, nevertheless, lower his present utility as a result of a heightened sense of *present* injustice.

3. *More to Lose.* As an alternative to the Rising Expectations and Present Value of the Past explanations, we may postulate that perception of increasing relative gratification will produce a greater readiness for political violence than perception of no change because the person who sees himself as doing better now or in the future also will desire to insure that such increased satisfaction actually is maintained or attained. And if a person believes that his gains could turn out to be ephemeral, then the desire to insure that one gets what one expects, by those who expect to have more and more to lose, will be as much an impetus to political violence as will dissatisfaction generated by perception of decreasing relative gratification on the part of those who expect to have less and less to lose. Also, as positive shift in relative gratification increases, potential for political violence might show a tendency to increase, because the greater the positive change the more desirable insuring such change becomes, if necessary by dissent behavior that constitutes progressively greater challenge to the state.

Of course, to test the More to Lose thesis, one must devise a measure of the degree to which a person believes that his present gains or future expectation of gains reflect perception of permanent or stabilized change. Such a measure was not included in the present study. But we may conjecture that, if belief in the permanence of change were taken into account, among those who perceived positive change but were not strongly convinced of the permanence of such change, and among those who perceived negative change and were strongly convinced of the permanence of such change, the relationships between absolute magnitude of change and potential for political violence would be even stronger than they were observed to be in this study.

Clearly, future research, in conjunction with further tests of the *V*-Curve hypothesis, must explicitly investigate the exact nature of the causal mechanism—be it Rising Expectations, Present Value of the Past, More to Lose, or something else—responsible for the *V*-Curve. Also, the findings reported here call for further testing of the relationships between potential for political violence and these Achievement Discrepancy constructs, as well as the other variants, at the micro-level. Furthermore, the Absolute Change relationship seems to have the following public policy implications. If the state is interested only in reducing the level of potential for political violence among its members, one way is to try to ensure that people do not come to expect, at any given point in time, very marked change in their standard of living, either up *or* down.

However, if the state is interested in pursuing policies which improve living conditions, which lead expectations about improvement in standard of living to increase substantially among some of its members, it must expect, and be ready to tolerate, a certain increase in potential for political violence.

The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems*

EDWARD R. TUFTE

Princeton University

Arrangements for translating votes into legislative seats almost always work to benefit the party winning the largest share of the votes. That the politically rich get richer has infuriated the partisans of minority parties, encouraged those favoring majority parliamentary rule, and, finally, bemused a variety of statisticians and political scientists who have tried to develop parsimonious descriptions and explanations of the inflation of the legislative power of the victorious party.

This paper reports tests of three different models of the relationship between seats and votes against data from 132 elections in six two-party systems. One of these models, the well-known "cube law," meets these tests less well than a rather simple rule of thumb. A more important conclusion from the analysis, however, is that electoral systems differ greatly in both their rate of translation of votes into seats (the "swing ratio") and in their partisan bias. Following the descriptions of the seats-votes relationship are explanations of the observed differences in swing ratio and partisan bias. The political consequences of these differences are assessed over the years for a variety of electoral systems—and it is clear that recent reapportionments in the United States have had dramatic and unexpected effects on the translation of votes into seats. Finally, the measures of swing ratio and partisan bias appear useful for evaluating the consequences of redistricting plans, and might well be used for that purpose by the courts.

The Data and Basic Characteristics and the Relationship

Over a series of elections, the relationship between seats and votes in most two-party systems displays four obvious characteristics (Figure 1 shows the data[1]):

(1) As the party's share of the vote increases, its share of the seats also increases in a fairly regular fashion.

(2) The party that receives a majority of the votes usually receives a majority of parliamentary seats. Such was the case in 93 per cent of the national elections and 53 per cent of the state elections examined here. The points in the upper left and lower right quadrants represent those elections in which the party winning a majority of votes failed to take a majority of seats. New Jersey, like many other states prior to redistricting (and some after redistricting), shows many markedly biased outcomes, with the Democrats often winning fully three-fifths of the votes but less than one-third of the seats.

(3) A party that wins a majority of votes generally wins an even larger majority of seats. This was found in 89 per cent of the 64 national elections in which the party with a majority of votes also won parliamentary control. For the three U.S. states, the comparable figure was 83 per cent. In Rae's study of 117 elections in 20 countries (including multi-party systems), it was 91 per cent of the elections.[2]

(4) In most elections (100 per cent in this series), the winning party receives less than 65 per cent of the votes (although it may receive a much larger share of seats).

Even a casual inspection of the data displayed in Figure 1 indicates that almost any curve with a slope around two or three in the region from 35 to 65 per cent of the vote for a party will fit the relationships rather well. Let us now turn to three models that seek to describe the relationships

---

* I wish to thank Joseph G. Verbalis, Harold George, Nita Rome, Judith Rowe, and Richard A. Sun for their help in the collection and the analysis of the data. Orley Ashenfelter, Stanley Kelley, Jr., John L. McCarthy, Frederick Mosteller, Walter F. Murphy, Richard E. Quandt, and Dennis F. Thompson provided advice and criticism during the course of the work. Edward Franklin Cox, Gudmund Iversen, and David Mayhew generously gave me access to unpublished materials on congressional elections. The Center for International Studies and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University, provided financial support for the work. Computations were performed at the Princeton University Computer Center, operating under NSF grants GJ-34 and GU-3157. None of these individuals or institutions bears responsibility for the analysis or interpretations of the paper.

[1] The election tabulations were collected from state and national yearbooks. The U.S. congressional returns have been collected together in Donald Stokes and Gudmund Iversen, "National Totals of Votes Cast for Democratic and Republican Candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives, 1866–1960," July, 1962, mimeo, Survey Research Center, University of Michigan. *Congressional Directories* (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office) were used to update the Stokes-Iversen compilation and also as the source for tabulations requiring election returns in individual congressional districts. All percentages of the vote were computed from the votes received by the two major parties only.

[2] Douglas Rae, *The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967), p. 73.



Figure 1. Seats and Votes.

more precisely: a straight line, the "cube law," and a logit fit.

The Linear Fit: Estimates of Bias and Responsiveness

The relationship between seats and votes is described most directly by a simple linear equation:

percentage seats for a particular political party
= b (percentage votes for that party) + c.

The estimate of the slope, $\hat{b}$, measures the percentage change in seats corresponding to a change of one per cent in the votes for a party.[3] Thus $\hat{b}$ estimates the *swing ratio* or the *responsiveness* of the partisan composition of parliamentary bodies to changes in the partisan division of the vote in two party systems. For example, the swing ratio during the last twelve U.S. congressional elections is 1.9, indicating that a net shift of 1.0 per cent in the national vote for a party has typically been associated with a net shift of 1.9 per cent in congressional seats for a party.

In addition, the fitted line provides an estimate of another important parameter of the electoral system: the bias for or against a particular party in the translation of votes into seats. Setting the percentage of seats at 50 per cent and solving for the percentage of votes in the equation of the fitted line tells one the share of the vote that a party typically needs in order to win a majority of seats in the legislative body. The difference between this number and 50 per cent is the *bias* or *party advantage*, as illustrated in Figure 2.[4] For



Figure 2. The Fitted Seats-Votes Line.

---

[3] Robert A. Dahl in *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1956), pp. 147–149, estimates the linear model for U.S. House and Senate elections.

[4] Somewhat similar notions of bias have been discussed by Butler and MacRae: D. E. Butler, *The Electoral System in Britain Since 1918* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Second ed., 1963), p. 196; and Duncan MacRae, "Models of Legislative Representation," mimeo, University of Chicago, 1969. This sort of bias can be estimated in four different ways: (1) as described in the text, where the seats-votes line is regarded as a "law"; (2) by regressing *votes on seats* and solving accordingly, (3) by the logit model described below, and (4) by manipulating the distribution of the district vote described below. A brief comparison of the four

example, in recent congressional elections, the Democrats have typically needed only about 48 per cent of the national vote in order to win a majority of House seats; thus the bias or party advantage is about 2 per cent. Later we will explain some of the variations in the swing ratio and bias for different electoral systems over the years.

One minor defect of the linear fit is that in general the fitted line will not pass through the end points (0 per cent votes, 0 per cent seats and 100 per cent votes, 100 per cent seats), which are on the seats-votes curve by definition. Although slightly inelegant, this shortcoming is hardly troublesome—especially since parties in two party systems almost never get less than 35 per cent of the vote nor more than 65 per cent of it. The clear advantage of the linear fit is that it yields two politically meaningful numbers, the swing ratio and the bias, that can be compared over time and electoral systems.

Table 1 records the fitted lines for a variety of elections. The swing ratios and the biases show considerable variation both between electoral systems and within some systems over time. Among the countries, Great Britain has the greatest swing ratio at 2.8. In the United States, the swing ratio has been about two, although, as we shall see later, there is evidence that in the last few elections, the swing ratio has decreased considerably. The U.K. electoral system shows little bias; in the U.S., a persistent bias has favored the Democratic party—partially the result of that party's victories in small congressional districts and in districts with low turnouts. In Michigan, New Jersey, and New York, there have been large biases favoring the Republicans and a great deal of variation in swing ratios. The relationship between votes and seats is weaker for the three states than for the three countries; in fact, in the states during some time periods there was virtually no correlation between the share of seats that a party won in the legislature and the share of votes it had received at the polls! In more recent elections, however, there was a fairly strong relationship between seats and votes in all three states—probably the result of new rules and practices for districting.

Table 1. Linear Fit for the Relationship Between Seats and Votes

	$\hat{b}$ Swing ratio and (standard error)	r^2	Percentage votes required to give the indicated party a majority of seats in the legislature	Advantaged party and amount of advantage
Great Britain, 1945–1970	2.83 (0.29)	.94	50.2% Labour	Conservatives, 0.2%
New Zealand, 1946–1969	2.27 (0.27)	.91	51.4% Labour	National, 1.4%
United States, 1868–1970	2.39 (0.21)	.71	49.1% Democrats	Democrats, 0.9%
United States, 1900–1970	2.09 (0.14)	.87	48.0% Democrats	Democrats, 2.0%
United States, 1948–1970	1.93 (0.29)	.81	48.8% Democrats	Democrats, 1.2%
Michigan, 1950–1968	2.06 (0.41)	.76	52.1% Democrats	Republicans, 2.1%
New Jersey, 1926–1947	2.10 (0.44)	.53	61.3% Democrats	Republicans, 11.3%
New Jersey, 1947–1969	3.65 (0.89)	.63	52.0% Democrats	Republicans, 2.0%
New York, 1934–1966	1.28 (0.19)	.73	54.3% Democrats	Republicans, 4.3%

---

methods revealed small differences in most estimates when the bias was less than 5 per cent and the correlation between seats and votes was fairly high (usually the case); otherwise the estimates diverged. Confidence intervals for the estimated bias, if one believes they are appropriate for these data, can be constructed for the first three methods. For the complex case of method 1, see Albert H. Bowker and Gerald J. Lieberman, *Engineering Statistics* (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1959), p. 253; for methods 2 and 3, the usual confidence intervals in regression apply. Still another interesting bias is suggested by the question: What proportion of the seats does a party receive when it wins 50% of the vote? For the fitted line, this bias is, by the geometry of the situation, the product of the slope and the bias described in Figure 2.

The fitted straight line estimates two measures of the performance of the electoral system—the responsiveness and the bias—from the outcomes of several previous elections. Confusion between the effects of swing ratio and bias sometimes occurs when only one election is considered at a time; thus one noted student of apportionment writes:

> In New Jersey in 1966 the Democrats gained a 9–6 edge in congressional seats, despite a Republican plurality in the popular vote. By contrast, for the state legislature in New Jersey, using a mixture of new single- and multi-member districts, a comfortable but not overwhelming Republican plurality in popular votes in 1967 produced a sweep of two-thirds of the seats in each house. Many other examples could be given of these gross imbalances between popular votes received by a party and the number of legislators elected from that party, both before and after one man, one vote, revisions.[5]

Although there is a "gross imbalance" between votes and seats in these two cases, they differ both with respect to the causes of the imbalance and the appropriate normative evaluation of it. In the case of New Jersey congressional elections from 1964 to 1970, there was a bias of 7 per cent; the swing ratio was 1.6. In elections to the New Jersey Assembly from 1965 to 1969, there was a bias of less than one per cent but a swing ratio of 3.6. Thus, the imbalance between seats and votes in congressional elections was due to bias in the districting arrangements; in elections for the Assembly, in contrast, it was due to a steep swing ratio (a consequence of multimember districts) in what has recently become a relatively unbiased system. The two situations, then, differ: electoral systems biased toward a particular party are hardly defensible, at least in relatively democratic systems; very different swing ratios can be justified, however, depending on the objectives sought in constructing an electoral system.

Before examining the consequences and causes of differences in swing ratios and biases in detail, let us consider some alternatives to the straight line—the famous "cube law," and a logit model.

Disposing of the Cube Law

One well-known description of the relationship between votes and seats in two party systems is the "cube law," which has even become part of the political folklore of Great Britain. Although the law was originally proposed by Edgeworth and Smith near the turn of the century and then frequently discussed by David Butler in the Nuffield series of election studies, the source most widely cited in support of the cubic relationship between seats and votes is the paper by Kendall and Stuart.[6] The most economical statement of the law is that the cube of the vote odds equals the seat odds, where the vote odds are the ratio of the share of the votes received by one party divided by the share of the votes received by the competing party. For example, if both parties win 50 per cent of the votes, then the odds are one to one. Figure 3 shows the line traced out by the cube law.

Since Kendall and Stuart wrote, quite a number of papers have touched upon the law and, in the last few years, the law has enjoyed a certain vogue and has been fitted to electoral outcomes in England, the United States, New Zealand, and, in a modified form, in Canada.[7] With one or two exceptions, discussions of the law are quite sympathetic, suggesting that it is a useful and accurate description of electoral realities. Most studies consider no more than a few data points and conclude that the law fits rather well—although the quality of fit is usually assessed informally and no alternative fits are tried. Let us consider a direct test of the predictions of the cube law. The law is

$$\frac{S}{1-S} = \left(\frac{V}{1-V}\right)^3$$

The ratio of shares of seats and votes won by the two parties represents the odds that a party will win a seat or a vote. Taking logarithms yields

$$\log_e \frac{S}{1-S} = 3 \log_e \frac{V}{1-V},$$

and therefore in the regression of log-odds on seats against log-odds on votes,

---

[5] Robert G. Dixon, Jr., "The Court, The People, and 'One Man, One Vote,'" in *Reapportionment in the 1970s*, ed. Nelson W. Polsby (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971), p. 13.

[6] M. G. Kendall and A. Stuart, "The Law of Cubic Proportions in Electoral Results," *British Journal of Sociology*, 1 (September, 1950), 183–197; Kendall and Stuart, "La Loi du Cube dans les Elections Britanniques," *Revue Française de Science Politique*, 2 (April-June, 1952), 270–276.

[7] D. E. Butler, *The British General Election of 1951* (London: Macmillan, 1952), pp. 275–276 and the other Nuffield College election studies; James G. March, "Party Legislative Representation as a Function of Election Results," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 11 (Winter, 1957–58), 521–542; "Electoral Facts," *The Economist*, January 7, 1950, 5–7; Terrence H. Qualter, "Seats and Votes: An Application of the Cube Law to the Canadian Electoral System," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, 1 (September, 1968), 336–344. Doubts about the cube law are expressed by Samuel J. Eldersveld, "Polling Results and Prediction Techniques in the British General Election of 1950," in James K. Pollock, *British Election Studies* (Ann Arbor: George Wahr Publishing Co., 1951), pp. 75–78; and in Ralph H. Brookes, "Legislative Representation and Party Vote in New Zealand: Reflections on the March Analysis," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 23 (Summer, 1954), 288–291.



S = proportion of seats for one party
1 − S = proportion of seats for the other party in a two party system
V = proportion of votes for one party
1 − V = proportion of votes for other party

Figure follows James G. March, "Party Representation as a Function of Election Results," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 11 (Winter, 1957–58), 524.

Figure 3. The Cube Law.

$$\log_e \frac{S}{1-S} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log_e \frac{V}{1-V},$$

the cube law makes the simultaneous joint prediction that $\beta_0 = 0$ and $\beta_1 = 3$. Table 2 reports the results of tests of these predictions.

The table indicates that the cube law fits poorly in six of the seven trials. It fits quite well for the last eight elections in Great Britain, but otherwise its predictions are not confirmed. In short, it is not a "law." Since previous studies have not tested the exact joint predictions of the cube law (that is, $\beta_0 = 0$ and $\beta_1 = 3$) or used as extensive a collection of data, these results should be decisive in evaluating the empirical merits of the cube law. Even in the case of Great Britain, the linear model (and the rule of thumb replacing the cube law proposed below) fits just as well as the cube law, is simpler in form, and is politically more informative.

"But," a defender of the cube law might reply at this point, "aren't there some sound theoretical underpinnings of the cube law—and even though it may not fit very well statistically, doesn't the law retain some merits at least as approximate quantitative theory?" First, it is not clear from any of the literature that there actually *is* a theory behind the cube law. If there is, what is it? One recent justification begins with a seemingly plausible logit model based on the notion that district swings are "harder" in legislative districts going from, say, 75 to 80 per cent (from one election to the next) than from 55 to 60 per cent.[8] While such a logit percentage transform seems statistically natural, it is counterfactual. Percentage swings are relatively independent of the starting point and are therefore best assessed in terms of untransformed percentage differences—the so-called "paradox of swing."[9] Other theoretical justifications do not

---

[8] Henri Thiel, "The Cube Law Revisited," *Journal of the American Statistical Association*, 65 (September, 1970), 1213–1219.

[9] David Butler and Donald Stokes discuss the issue in detail in *Political Change in Britain* (London: Macmillan, 1969), pp. 303–312.

Table 2. Testing the Predictions of the Cube Law (and Simultaneously Estimating the Logit Model)

	$\hat{\beta}_0$	$\hat{\beta}_1$	Standard error of slope	r²	Does $\beta_0=0$ *and* $\beta_1=3$ as cube law predicts?	Is $\beta_0\neq 0$; that is, is there a significant bias?
Great Britain	−.02	2.88	.30	.94	yes	no bias
New Zealand	−.12	2.31	.27	.91	no	yes, there is a bias
United States, 1868–1970	.09	2.52	.24	.68	no	yes
United States, 1900–1970	.17	2.20	.15	.86	no	yes
Michigan	−.17	2.19	.43	.76	no	yes
New Jersey	−.77	2.09	.59	.29	no	yes
New York	−.23	1.33	.19	.74	no	yes

Note: The simultaneous joint hypothesis of the cube law was tested with the appropriate F-ratio; even the most relaxed standards ($p=.50$) did not lead to acceptance of the predictions of the cube law (with the exception of Great Britain). The statistical significance of the bias was tested by computing the *t*-value on the hypothesis that the intercept of the fitted line does not equal zero. A significant bias (at the .05 level or better) was found in all cases except Great Britain. It is perhaps surprising that the results of the tests are so crisp, given the relatively small number of cases. However, since the data points are rather tightly clustered about the fitted curves, the error variance is small and the results show a perhaps unexpected stability.

lead to specific derivations of the swing ratio predicted by the cube law.[10]

The real theoretical defect of the cube law, however, is that it hides important political issues. The law implies that the translation of votes into seats is

(1) unvarying over place and time, and
(2) always "fair," in the sense that the curve traced out by the law passes through the point (50 per cent votes, 50 per cent seats), and the bias is zero.

As we have seen, these implications are not true. The rate of translation of votes into seats differs greatly across political systems, ranging between gains of 1.3 to 3.7 per cent in seats for each 1.0 per cent gain in votes. Also the results in Table 1 indicate that some electoral systems persistently favor a particular party; the votes-seats curve traced out by the data does not inevitably pass close by the point (50 per cent votes, 50 per cent seats).

It might finally be argued that the cube law still has some faint merit because it is a simple, universal summary of how votes are translated into seats. It is not particularly convenient: how many students of politics can recall that the "cube of vote odds predicts the seat odds" and quickly perform the considerable mental arithmetic required to extract the number of seats predicted by the law? The following rule is a more convenient and more accurate summary of the data than the cube law:

> A 1.0 per cent change in votes for a party leads to a change of 2.5 per cent in seats for a party.

In other words, a rough guess of the swing ratio in two-party systems is about 2.5. This rule generates more accurate predictions for our data sets than the cube law. If one wants (perhaps for teaching purposes) a very crude rule of thumb summarizing the history of votes-seats relationship in two-party systems, then the 2.5 rule is preferable to the cube law.

An Alternative Fit: The Logit Model

A third approach to fitting a curve to the relationship between seats and votes is a logit model, which is fully as effective as the linear model and statistically more graceful. Define the odds in favor of a party's winning a seat as $S/(1-S)$ and the vote odds as $V/(1-V)$. The logit model is the regression of the logarithm of seat odds against the logarithm of vote odds (a regression used earlier to test the specific predictions of the cube law):

$$\log_e \frac{S}{1-S} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \log_e \frac{V}{1-V}$$

Since both variables are logged, the estimate of the slope, $\hat{\beta}_1$, is the estimated elasticity of seat odds with respect to vote odds; that is, a change of one per cent in the vote odds is associated with a change of $\hat{\beta}_1$ per cent in seat odds.[11]

The logit model has the advantage over the linear fit of producing a reasonable predicted value for the share of seats for all logically possible values of the share of votes; the predicted values stay between 0 and 100 per cent seats for any percentage share of votes. As noted earlier, this is only a theoretical virtue since the more extreme values do not occur empirically. The logit model also provides a direct test of the hypothesis that an electoral system is unbiased, since $\beta_0 = 0$ in an unbiased system. As shown in Table 2, there is a statistically significant bias in all cases except Great Britain.

---

[10] David Sankoff and Koula Mellos, "The Swing Ratio and Game Theory," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June, 1972), 551–554. For a formal model taking into account some of the findings of the present paper, see Richard E. Quandt, "A Stochastic Model of Elections in Two-Party Systems," unpublished manuscript, Princeton, 1972.

[11] Logit analysis is described in Henri Thiel, *Principles of Econometrics* (New York: John Wiley, 1971), pp. 632–636.

The logit model is statistically more satisfactory than the linear fit; but its coefficients are not as readily interpretable from a political point of view as are those of the linear model. Thus the straight-line fit was chosen as best suited for our purposes.

Some Explanations and Consequences of Differences in Swing Ratios

Why does the swing ratio vary over time and across electoral systems? Such differences depend, of course, on how voters are distributed over electoral districts. If voters are randomly distributed over all districts—that is, if every district is effectively like every other district—then the swing ratio would be very large, since a party that won even slightly more than half the vote would win all the seats. In effect, the whole nation would be a single member district. Now consider the other extreme in the way districts might be constructed: every voter represents herself or himself in parliament in a two-party system. Such an arrangement yields an exact equivalence of votes and seats along with a swing ratio of unity. This example suggests that the more nationally oriented the politics of a county or the more nationalized the forces prevailing in a given election, the greater the swing ratio—other things being equal.

Another line of argument suggests the same conclusion. Suppose a party gains an average of X per cent of the vote from one election to the next. Consider two different ways in which that gain could be distributed over electoral districts:

(1) The party could gain exactly X per cent of the vote in all districts; that is, a *uniform swing* of X per cent in all districts.

(2) The party could gain X per cent averaged over all districts, but, in some districts, the gain would be less than X per cent and, in other districts, the gain would exceed X per cent—yielding an *averaged swing* of X per cent over all the districts.

Under which distribution of swings, the uniform or the averaged, will the party gain the most seats? In general, a uniform swing across all districts yields more seats than the averaged swing. (Of course, if the same amount of swing were properly distributed over the marginal districts, then a party could maximize the number of seats won for a given amount of swing.) For example, compare the results of a uniform swing of 1 per cent in all districts with those of an averaged swing of 1 per cent that reflects a swing of 2 per cent in half the districts and of 0 per cent in the other half. Define D_{49} as the number of districts in which the division of the vote was between 49 and 50 per cent in the previous election (and thus these districts will change hands with a 1 per cent swing favoring the initially minority party). Define D_{48} similarly. The argument now hinges on the assumption that D_{49} is greater than D_{48} (or more generally that the distribution of districts tails off as the division of vote moves away from 50 per cent). With this assumption, which is generally reasonable, a uniform swing of 1 per cent shifts a total of D_{49} seats; the averaged swing of 1 per cent (half at 2 per cent, half at 0 per cent) shifts a total of $1/2\ D_{49} + 1/2\ D_{48}$ seats, which is less than the gain resulting from the uniform shift, D_{49}.

Once again the argument suggests that the more uniform electoral swings are across the nation, the greater will be the swing ratio. Thus, we would expect the swing ratio in Britain to be greater than that in the United States. We would also expect that, in U.S. congressional elections, the swing ratio will be greater in on-year elections with the presidential contest on the ballot than in off-year elections (when national forces are somewhat diminished). These expectations are borne out in both cases.

Stokes, in his comparison of voting for representatives in the U.K. and U.S., has clearly shown that electoral forces are far more nationalized in parliamentary elections than they are in congressional elections.[12] The standard deviation of electoral swings from the national average has been approximately 1.8 in Britain in recent years; the comparable figure for the United States is 5.4. Thus, it is reasonable to find the swing ratio (2.83) to be greater for Britain than for the United States (1.93), as was shown earlier in Table 1.

A comparison between on-year and off-year congressional elections in the United States reveals a similar, although somewhat more fragile, result: the swing ratio is usually greater for blocs of on-year elections than for blocs of off-year elections, reflecting the presumably greater nationalization of congressional elections when they are held simultaneously with presidential elections. It is also clear from Table 3 that there are other sources of variation in the swing ratio in congressional elections (at least over time). One additional source of such variation is the competi-

---

[12] Donald E. Stokes, "Parties and the Nationalization of Electoral Forces," in *The American Party Systems,* ed. William N. Chambers and Walter Dean Burnham (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), 182–202.

Table 3. Swing Ratios in On-Year and Off-Year Elections, United States, 1872–1970

	Swing Ratios	
	On-years	Off-years
1952–1970	2.1	1.7
1932–1950	3.3	3.0
1912–1930	1.9	1.1
1892–1910	2.8	3.5
1872–1890	6.8	4.0

Note: Aggregated over time, the differences are significant at the .05 level. The results are not an artifact of the particular time periods chosen; other blocs of elections show the same pattern.

tiveness of districts; the presence of many closely contested districts will lead to higher swing ratios, since small shifts in the vote will change the party control in many districts. Thus, the swing ratio is the product of both the distribution of swings and the distribution of the district party share of the votes upon which the swings are operating. Some control over the distribution of the party share of the vote is provided in the test in Table 3 by breaking the elections up into 20-year blocs. The relationship between the swing ratio and turnover in seats will be examined in greater detail shortly.

The larger swing ratio in on-year elections generally benefits the President's party, since the steeper slope in the votes-seats translation associated with on-year elections turns small gains in votes into relatively large gains in seats. In the next off-year election, however, even if the vote returns to normal, the President's party will typically lose fewer seats than it gained because it is now riding down the less steep seats-votes curve associated with off-year elections.

This observation can be stated in more formal terms. Suppose the President's party increases its share of votes in the on-year election by ΔV, thereby gaining $\beta_1(\Delta V)$ seats (where β_1 is the swing ratio in on-year elections). Let β_2 be the swing ratio in off-year elections. It is observed empirically that $\beta_1 > \beta_2$. In the next off-year election, in order for the out-party to regain those seats lost to the President's party in the previous on-year election, the out-party needs to increase its share of votes up to $\Delta V + E$, yielding $\beta_2(\Delta V + E)$ seats, where E is the excess share of votes needed to overcome the reduced swing ratio in off-year elections. Regaining all the lost seats requires that

$$\beta_1(\Delta V) = \beta_2(\Delta V + E)$$

Solving for E, the excess votes, yields:

$$E = \Delta V \left[\frac{\beta_1}{\beta_2} - 1\right]$$

For 1952–1970, $\beta_1 = 2.0$ and $\beta_2 = 1.7$; thus

$$E = .24(\Delta V)$$

In order to regain its seats lost in the previous on-year election, the out-party needs a shift almost one-fourth greater than the shift in votes which originally won those seats for the President's party. For example, if in an on-year election the President's party gained four percentage points in votes over its previous winnings (and consequently about 8.4 per cent in seats, given the swing ratio), then the out-party would need a vote shift of 1.24 × 4% = 5% to regain the lost seats.

Sources of Bias

The party biases computed earlier result from gerrymandering, differential turnout across districts, and the different population sizes of electoral districts. The purpose of gerrymandering is to shift the seats-votes curve and thereby produce a party advantage. A party advantage may also arise when the votes of districts with widely different turnouts or sizes are aggregated, as in the case of many formerly malapportioned state legislatures. Consider, for instance, the total votes and total seats as they are aggregated over districts. For the House of Representatives, each district adds 1/435 to the seats total; but some districts may add a much smaller share to the total votes for each party. If, in the aggregate of all districts, low turnout or small districts are aligned with a particular party, there will be a bias in the seats-votes curve since that party is winning seats with relatively small numbers of votes.

The persistent Democratic advantage in congressional races is partially the consequence of the many low turnout districts in the South which have usually added much to the Democratic seat total, but little to the Democratic vote total. An additional source of Democratic advantage, prior to the equalization of population size of congressional districts, was the tendency for Democrats to come from smaller districts than Republicans, both in and outside the South. For the 1962 congressional elections, Table 4 indicates that Republican candidates tended to win in the larger districts; thus Republican seats were more expensive in terms of votes than Democratic seats.

The relationship between the district population size and party vote has, surprisingly, persisted even after the extensive redistricting of recent years. Although the Republicans now waste somewhat fewer votes in large districts (because of the reduction of variation in district size), there remains, as Table 5 shows, a strong link between oversized districts and Republican dominance.

Variations in swing ratio and bias can be studied much more deeply with data from individual election districts. With disaggregated data, many different seats-votes curves can be fitted for various periods and states in the country. Indeed, for the states with more than a handful of congressional districts, any districting arrangement (proposed or actually realized) can be evaluated for responsiveness and bias.

Why the Swing Ratio Has Declined in Recent Congressional Elections: The Fruits of Redistricting

We now examine changes in the swing ratio in elections for the U.S. House of Representatives. Table 6 shows estimates of swing ratio and bias for congressional elections for the last hundred years. It appears that a shift—in fact, a rather striking shift—in the relationship between seats and votes has taken place in the last decade. The 1966–1970 triplet displays the second lowest swing ratio of the 17 election triplets since 1870. No doubt the recent elections provide a somewhat narrow range of electoral experience; the Democrats won with votes between 50.9 and 54.3 per cent (a range in votes that is the fifth smallest of the 17 triplets). Until the Republicans control Congress or the Democrats win more decisively, the "new" swing ratio and bias will not be well estimated. The bias is a spectacular 7.9 per cent, reflecting the two close votes that yielded the Democrats a substantial party majority in the House. The estimate of the bias for the 1966–1970 election triplet is, however, somewhat more insecure than for previous blocs of elections because the error of the estimated bias is proportional to the reciprocal of the swing ratio—and in this case the swing ratio is moderately small.

Table 4. Population Size of Congressional Districts: 1962 Congressional Elections

Population of Districts	Percentage of seats won by Republicans	Number of Districts
More than 500,000	53%	66
400,000–500,000	44%	152
300,000–400,000	40%	151
Less than 300,000	27%	32

District Size	Percentage of seats won by Republicans	Number of Districts
Outside the South		
Oversized Districts (15% or more above norm of equal population)	61%	59
Undersized Districts (15% or more below norm of equal population)	40%	53
The South		
Oversized Districts	23%	26
Undersized Districts	0%	32

Source: William B. Prendergast, "Memorandum on Congressional Districting," in *Reapportionment*, ed. Glendon Schubert (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1965), p. 202.

Table 5. Population of Congressional Districts by Party Control, 1970

Population of Districts	Percentage of seats won by Republicans	Number of Districts
More than 550,000	58%	57
500,000–550,000	48%	58
450,000–500,000	47%	114
400,000–450,000	38%	133
Less than 400,000	21%	43

Source: Computed from corrected tabulations in Michael Barone, Grant Ujifusa, and Douglas Matthews, *The Almanac of American Politics* (Gambit, 1972).

An alternative method of determining the seats-votes curve, used by David Butler in studies of recent British elections, provides confirmation of the relatively large bias and small swing ratio. Figure 4 shows a seats-votes curve for the 1968 election constructed by taking the distribution of the vote by congressional district and watching what happens when the vote changes by ±1 per cent, then ±2 per cent, and so on in each district. For example, if the Democratic vote in 1968 had increased by 1 per cent across all districts, the Democrats would have gained an additional four seats; if it had decreased by 1 per cent, the party would have lost two seats. Similarly, a uniform Democratic gain of 2 per cent across all districts would be worth a total of nine seats; a loss of 2 per cent would yield a loss of six seats. (Note the low swing ratio implied by these results.) The assumption involved in the construction of this type of seats-votes curve is that there is a uniform and universal swing from the current returns—an assumption somewhat more appropriate to the U.K. than the U.S. Figure 4 shows, in the region of the actual electoral result, a relatively flat slope with a swing ratio around 1.0. And there is a relatively large bias of approximately 3 per cent. Therefore, although lacking in complete statistical security, the estimates of swing ratio and bias in

Table 6. Three Elections at a Time: Estimates of Swing Ratio and Bias

Years of elections	Swing ratio	Standard error of swing ratio	Percentage of votes to elect 50% seats for Democrats	Size of Democratic party advantage
1870–74	6.01	0.99	51.4%	−1.4%
1876–80	1.48	3.21	50.0%	0.0%
1882–86	3.30	2.83	50.8%	−0.8%
1888–92	6.01	1.36	50.9%	−0.9%
1894–98	2.82	0.09	51.7%	−1.7%
1900–04	2.23	1.09	50.1%	−0.1%
1906–10	4.21	1.38	48.8%	1.2%
1912–16	2.39	0.20	48.8%	1.2%
1918–22	1.96	0.08	47.6%	2.4%
1924–28*	−5.75*	0.36*	40.8%*	9.2%*
1930–34	2.28	0.37	45.9%	4.1%
1936–40	2.50	0.52	47.1%	2.9%
1942–46	1.90	0.60	48.1%	1.9%
1948–52	2.82	1.25	49.5%	0.5%
1954–58	2.35	0.83	50.1%	−0.1%
1960–64	1.65	0.84	47.4%	2.6%
1966–70	0.71	0.23	42.1%	7.9%

* The figures estimated for the 1924–1928 election triplet are peculiar because of the extremely narrow range of variation in the share of the vote (42.1%, 41.6%, and 42.8%) during that period. The average range within an election triplet is about 6%.

recent elections certainly seem worth taking seriously.

Compared with all the other performances of the electoral systems examined in this paper, a system with a swing ratio of 0.7 and a bias of 7.9 per cent, describes a set of electoral arrangements that is both quite unresponsive to shifts in the preferences of voters (as expressed in their party votes for their representatives) and, at the same time, badly biased. How did the low value of the swing ratio for 1966–1970 come about? Certainly the Democratic party, after their substantial gain in votes (3.4 per cent) and relatively tiny gain—given the "normal" swing ratio exceeding 2.0—in seats (3.2 per cent) would like to know what happened in 1970. And for Republicans, 1966 and 1968 need explanation: after all, they managed to make national division of the vote very close but in neither year were they able to win even 45 per cent of the House seats.

Table 7. Marginal Seats: House and Senate, 1956–1970

	Proportion of seats in which the margin of victory was less than 5%	
	House	Senate
1956	20%	13%
1958	22%	11%
1966	16%	9%
1968	14%	15%
1970	13%	13%

Source: computed from vote totals in *Congressional Directories*.

The swing ratio indicates the potential for turnover in representation. The smaller the swing ratio, the less responsive the party distribution of seats is to shifts in the preferences of voters. The extreme case is a swing ratio near zero; such a flat seats-votes curve means that the distribution of seats does not change with the distribution of votes. Figure 5 shows the strong relationship between the swing ratio and the turnover in the House of Representatives for election triplets since 1870. Note the steady drift downward over the years in both the swing ratio and the turnover. Since 1948, the swing ratio has shifted from 2.8 to 2.4 to 1.7, and, most recently, to 0.7. Similarly the turnover in the House has declined, reflecting the long-run decrease in the intensity of competition for congressional seats. Table 7 shows the decreasing number of marginal congressional districts since 1956. In the late 1950s, about 21 per cent of House districts were relatively competitive; in 1970, 13 per cent. (Note the unchanged proportion of marginal Senate seats since 1956.) Several students of Congress have documented the situation in greater detail, and there clearly has been a large decline in competition with a concomitant increase in the tenure of incumbents in the House in recent years.[13]

---

[13] See: Stokes; Nelson W. Polsby, "The Institutionalization of the U.S. House of Representatives," *American Political Science Review*, 62 (March, 1968), 144–168; and, for a detailed discussion of congressional competition which was particularly helpful



Figure 4. Seats and Votes in 1968.

Our data indicate that a major element in the job security of incumbents is their ability to exert significant control over the drawing of district boundaries; indeed, some recent redistricting laws have been described as the Incumbent Survival Acts of 1972. It is hardly surprising that legislators, like businessmen, collaborate with their nominal adversaries to eliminate dangerous competition. Ironically, reapportionment rulings have given incumbents new opportunities to construct secure districts for themselves, leading to a reduction in turnover that is, in turn, reflected in the sharply reduced swing ratio of the last few elections. One apparent consequence of reapportionment is the remarkable change in the shape of the distribution of congressional votes in recent elections. Prior to 1964, the congressional vote by district was distributed the way everyone expects votes to be distributed: a big clump of relatively competitive districts in the middle, tailing off away from 50% with some peaks at the ends of the distribution for districts without an opposition candidate.

In recent elections the shape of the distribution of the vote by district has changed; Figure 7 shows the movement of district outcomes away from the danger area of 50 per cent in recent years. Note the development of bimodality in the 1968 and 1970 district vote compared to previous years (the left peak contains the Republican safe seats; the right peak contains the Democratic safe seats). Perhaps the best way to see how this pattern de-

---

in the present analysis, David R. Mayhew, "Congressional Representation: Theory and Practice in Drawing the Districts," in *Reapportionment in the 1970s,* ed. Nelson W. Polsby, pp. 249–290.



Figure 5. Turnover and Swing Ratio.

Note: The election triplets from Table 6 are used here; the date indicates the last year in the triplet. The percentage of new members is averaged over the three elections.

veloped over time is to array the vote distributions over the years and riffle through them—like an old-time peep show—and watch the middle of the distribution sag and the areas of incumbent safety bulge in the more recent elections.

Many states, through recent reapportionments, have practically eliminated political competition for congressional seats—even compared to the relatively small proportion of competitive seats in the past. In the 1970 elections in Michigan, for example, not one of the 19 districts was a close contest; the *most* marginal Republican victor won 56% of the vote and the *most* marginal Democrat won fully 70% of the vote in his district. In Illinois, the most closely contested race in all 24 congressional districts in 1970 was a 54-46 division of the vote; in contrast, in 1960, seven districts had closer races than that. The closest 1970 race in Pennsylvania was 55-45; in Ohio, 53-47.



Figure 6. Democratic Share of Vote by Congressional District.

It might be suggested that reapportionment has little to do with changes in competition; after all, the "bipartisan gerrymander," as Mayhew aptly called it, is hardly a recent contrivance growing out of *Baker* v. *Carr*. Perhaps all we are seeing



Figure 7. Distribution of Congressional Vote by District: 1948, 1958, 1968, 1970.

here is the continuation of the very long-run decline in competition for congressional seats. The evidence, however, tends rather to indicate that reapportionment has made its own independent contribution to the incumbency of incumbents. The decline in competition is not present in some contests in which the outcome is unaffected by redistricting: Table 7 shows that the marginality of Senate seats has not declined since reapportionment started. The independent contribution of reapportionment to the job security of incumbents can also be seen directly in the elections immediately following reapportionment in a state: there is an immediate decline in the competitiveness of the races in the first election after the new districting.

Concluding Practical Implications: Using the Bias and Swing Ratio to Evaluate the Fairness of Redistricting Plans

Ever since Governor Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts designed a salamander-shaped district some 160 years ago, politicians have closely attended to the minutiae of political cartography. Control of districting by one political party can mean many additional congressional seats in the larger states or the difference between majority and minority status in a state legislature—often remarkably independent of voters' preferences. And a "bipartisan" redistricting, as we have seen, can virtually end competition for congressional seats within a state. Redistricting should do more than fill the immediate needs of incumbents; such arrangements should pass at least two tests if an electoral system is to be minimally democratic:

(1) The districting should yield an electoral system that is *responsive* to changes in votes. If many citizens shift their votes from one party to another, then the advantaged party should win an increased share of legislative seats.

(2) The districting should be relatively *unbiased* with respect to political party; the electoral system should treat Democrats and Republicans alike.

For a state with more than a few congressional districts and for all state legislatures, it is possible, by constructing seats-votes curves (using the two methods of the previous section), to assess the bias and the responsiveness of any and all redistricting plans—and thereby judge how well a particular plan meets the two tests.

Although reapportionment eliminated some of the cruder distortions in the translations of votes into seats, we now face the problems arising from partisan and bipartisan gerrymandering. The advertised purpose of districting rules such as equal size, compactness, and contiguity was to produce "fair and effective representation." The rules did not achieve these goals. Many redistrictings, although perfectly satisfactory by current legal standards, have produced quite biased and unresponsive electoral systems.

The conventional wisdom views reapportionment as a *district* problem; if we only make enough rules about the construction of *individual* districts, then we will have fair and effective representation. This view is false in logic and in experience. Districting, as every politician knows, is a statewide problem; the lines of one district affect the lines of other districts. Rules specifying the desired virtues of individual districts merely add a few steps to a computer program that sorts through hundreds of statewide districting combinations; such rules cannot prevent the construction of highly biased and unresponsive electoral systems. Redistricting computer programs now seek to maximize incumbency within the constraints placed on individual districts; limits can be placed on such techniques by specifying minimum standards for the responsiveness and bias of the congressional districting in a state. Thus the achievement of an unbiased and responsive electoral system will require action based on the aggregate assessment of districting arrangements.

Regression Analysis and Discriminant Analysis: an Application of R. A. Fisher's Theorem to Data in Political Science

FRED KORT
University of Connecticut

Multiple regression analysis and discriminant analysis have been frequently used in political science in recent years. In accordance with the respective underlying assumptions, multiple regression analysis has been properly employed where the dependent variable can be regarded as continuous, and discriminant analysis has been appropriately used where the dependent variable can be considered dichotomous. In view of the relatively numerous variables which are involved, the applications of multiple regression analysis and discriminant analysis in political science have made the use of computers imperative. Many computer programs for multiple regression analysis are available. Of course, computer programs which independently perform discriminant analysis also are available, and—in any case—a person with experience in computer programming can write his own program for discriminant analysis. Since, however, many people find it convenient to use the readily available regression programs at computer centers, they can easily convert the results obtained under specified conditions from regression analysis to discriminant analysis. The underlying theoretical relationship and its application will be shown by presenting an example.

Assume that one wishes to examine whether or not the Supreme Court's acceptance of the fact that the defendant was not advised of his right to counsel in an involuntary confession case depends on the appearance of the fact in lower court records and appellate briefs. A similar inquiry can be made, of course, with regard to any other fact. For that purpose, the following function can be formulated:

$$Y_i = a + b_1X_{i1} + b_2X_{i2} + \cdots + b_jX_{ij} + \cdots + b_nX_{in} + e_i.$$

This function has to be interpreted in conjunction with Table 1. The table shows the lower court records and appellate briefs which are submitted to the Supreme Court and in which the fact under investigation may appear. If the existence of the fact is acknowledged in a record or brief j ($j=1, 2, \ldots, n$) in an involuntary confession case i ($i=1, 2, \ldots, N$) $X_{ij}=1$, if the fact is not mentioned in that record or brief $X_{ij}=0$, and if its existence is denied $X_{ij}=-1$. Y_i indicates the acceptance or rejection of the fact for consideration by the Supreme Court in the particular case; its value is 1 if the fact is accepted by the Court and 0 if it is rejected. The values of the X's and the values of Y are reported in Table 2 for 32 involuntary confession cases decided by the Supreme Court prior to *Miranda* v. *Arizona*.[1] From Tables 1 and 2 it can be seen that in this example $n=6$ and $N=32$. The values of the coefficients b as weights of the appearance, nonappearance, or denial of the fact in the various records and briefs are unknown. These values are obtained by employing multiple regression analysis. The equation, stated above as a function of Y, will be restated below as equation (1), the regression equation. The term a is a constant the value of which also is determined by the regression analysis, and e_i is an error term which measures the difference between the observed values of Y and its estimated values, obtained from the regression analysis.

The proposed model is merely tentative, however. Actually, multiple regression analysis is not appropriate for the given example, because the dependent variable Y is dichotomous (acceptance or rejection of a fact by the Supreme Court). The expected value of the dependent variable in this

Table 1. Lower Court Records and Briefs Submitted to the Supreme Court in Involuntary Confession Cases

1. Allegations of the Petitioner in the Transcript of the Record.
2. Allegations of the Respondent in the Transcript of the Record.
3. Opinion of the Lower Appellate Court.
4. Dissenting Opinion of the Lower Appellate Court.
5. Petitioner's Briefs and Statements to the Supreme Court of the United States.
6. Respondent's Briefs and Statements to the Supreme Court of the United States.
7. Opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States.

---

[1] 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The case is purposely excluded from this example, because the particular fact under examination (no advice of the right to counsel) gained significance in a new context as a result of this decision. The example shows the dominant position of this fact in all the involuntary confession cases, and it contributes to the explanation of the immense importance the fact gained in the *Miranda* case and in subsequent developments.

Table 2. Appearance, Nonappearance, Denial, and Acceptance or Rejection of the Fact "No Advice of the Right to Counsel" in the Involuntary Confession Cases

Case	X_1	X_2	X_3	X_4	X_5	X_6	Y
1. *Brown v. Mississippi*, 297 U.S. 278 (1936)	1	0	0	0	0	0	1
2. *Chambers v. Florida*, 309 U.S. 227 (1940)	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
3. *White v. Texas*, 310 U.S. 530 (1940)	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
4. *Lisenba v. California*, 314 U.S. 219 (1941)	0	0	−1	1	−1	−1	0
5. *Ward v. Texas*, 316 U.S. 547 (1942)	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
6. *Ashcraft v. Tennessee*, 322 U.S. 143 (1944)	1	0	0	0	1	1	1
7. *Lyons v. Oklahoma*, 322 U.S. 596 (1944)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
8. *Malinski v. New York*, 324 U.S. 401 (1945)	0	0	0	1	0	1	1
9. *Haley v. Ohio*, 332 U.S. 596 (1948)	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
10. *Watts v. Indiana*, 338 U.S. 49 (1949)	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
11. *Turner v. Pennsylvania*, 338 U.S. 62 (1949)	0	1	0	1	1	0	1
12. *Harris v. South Carolina*, 338 U.S. 68 (1949)	1	0	0	0	1	0	1
13. *Gallegos v. Nebraska*, 342 U.S. 55 (1951)	1	1	0	0	1	0	1
14. *Stroble v. California*, 343 U.S. 181 (1952)	1	1	1	0	1	0	1
15. *Brown v. Allen*, 344 U.S. 443 (1953)	1	−1	0	0	1	0	0
16. *Stein v. New York*, 346 U.S. 156 (1953)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
17. *Cooper v. New York*, 346 U.S. 156 (1953)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
18. *Leyra v. Denno*, 347 U.S. 556 (1954)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
19. *Fikes v. Alabama*, 352 U.S. 191 (1957)	0	−1	0	0	1	−1	1
20. *Thomas v. Arizona*, 356 U.S. 390 (1958)	1	0	0	0	0	−1	0
21. *Payne v. Arkansas*, 356 U.S. 560 (1958)	0	−1	0	0	1	−1	1
22. *Ashdown v. Utah*, 357 U.S. 426 (1958)	−1	−1	−1	0	1	−1	0
23. *Crooker v. California*, 357 U.S. 433 (1958)	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
24. *Cicenia v. Lagay*, 357 U.S. 504 (1958)	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
25. *Spano v. New York*, 360 U.S. 315 (1959)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
26. *Blackburn v. Alabama*, 361 U.S. 199 (1960)	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
27. *Reck v. Pate*, 367 U.S. 433 (1961)	0	0	1	1	1	0	1
28. *Culombe v. Connecticut*, 367 U.S. 568 (1961)	0	0	0	0	1	0	1
29. *Gallegos v. Colorado*, 370 U.S. 49 (1962)	1	−1	0	0	1	−1	0
30. *Lynumn v. Illinois*, 372 U.S. 528 (1963)	1	1	1	0	1	1	1
31. *Haynes v. Washington*, 373 U.S. 503 (1963)	0	0	0	1	1	0	1
32. *Escobedo v. Illinois*, 378 U.S. 478 (1964)	1	0	0	0	1	1	1

instance would have to be in the interval (0, 1), regardless of the values of the independent variables X. This condition is not necessarily compatible with the assumption that the expected value is a linear combination of the independent variables. Furthermore, the assumption in multiple regression analysis that the distribution of the dependent variable around its expected value is independent of the level of that value does not apply to a dichotomous dependent variable.[2]

In view of these considerations, a method appropriate for dichotomous dependent variables, namely, discriminant analysis, must be employed. The object of the method is to find values for a function

$$Z_i = c_1X_{i1} + c_2X_{i2} + \cdots + c_jX_{ij} + \cdots + c_nX_{in},$$

which—depending on whether the numerical value of Z_i is above or below a certain point—will place each observation (case in this example) in one of two groups (acceptance or rejection of the fact under consideration by the Supreme Court). X_{ij} has the same meaning in this equation as in the regression equation. The values of the coefficients c (corresponding to the b's in the regression equation) as weights of the appearance, nonappearance, or denial of the fact under consideration in the lower court records and appellate briefs are unknown. They are obtained as a result of discriminant analysis.[3] The stated equation, which will be restated below as equation (2), is the discriminant function. It will be seen that all the statistics of discriminant analysis can be obtained from regression analysis under the specified conditions.

Before explaining and demonstrating the relationship between regression analysis and discriminant analysis, a brief reference to another example is desirable. The considerations advanced in the preceding paragraphs also would apply, e.g., to examining the vote for President Nixon in the 1972 election as a function—hypothetically speaking—of such variables as age, education, income, etc. The dependent variable—voting or not voting for President Nixon—would be a dichotomous dependent variable, and consequently discriminant analysis rather than multiple regression analysis would be appropriate. Since data for such a study will be available from the Inter-University Consortium for Political Research, at the Center for Political Studies (University of Michigan), the conversion of regression analysis to discriminant analysis could be effectively demonstrated as applied to this example. With more than 2200 observations in the sample for the 1972 election, however, it would be difficult to reproduce all data in this research note, so that the reader can readily replicate the entire procedure. For this reason, a very small sample—consisting of 32 observations and 6 independent variables—purposely was chosen for the illustration presented here.

---

[2] See James Tobin, "The Application of Multivariate Probit Analysis to Economic Survey Data," *Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper No. 1* (July 14, 1955, as revised December 1, 1955), p. 2.

[3] For a concise but complete presentation of multiple regression and discriminant analysis, with a good mathematical exposition, see Gerhard Tintner, *Econometrics* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1952), pp. 83–102.

The theoretical relationship between multiple regression analysis and discriminant analysis, which provides the basis for converting the former to the latter, can be stated in the form of the following theorem: Let b_j $(j=1, 2, \ldots, n)$ be a coefficient in the regression equation

$$Y_i = a + b_1X_{i1} + b_2X_{i2} + \cdots + b_jX_{ij} + \cdots + b_nX_{in} + e_i, \quad (1)$$

$Y=0, 1$, for an observation i $(i=1, 2, \ldots, N)$. Let c_j $(j=1, 2, \ldots, n)$ be a coefficient in the discriminant function

$$Z_i = c_1X_{i1} + c_2X_{i2} + \cdots + c_jX_{ij} + \cdots + c_nX_{in}, \quad (2)$$

where every observation for which Y in the corresponding regression equation is 0 is placed in Group 1 and every observation for which $Y=1$ in Group 2. Then

$$c_j = b_j \frac{N}{N_1N_2}, \quad (3)$$

where N is the total number of observations, N_1 the number of observations in Group 1, and N_2 the number of observations in Group 2.

The relationship expressed by this theorem was originally stated by R. A. Fisher.[4] An outline of a proof of the theorem by the author of this paper, which is different from the one developed by Fisher, is given in the appendix to this presentation.

The similarity between equations (1) and (2) in the theorem can be readily noted. The right side of both equations states linear combinations of the independent variables X and their weights b and c, respectively. In the example under consideration, the following meaning can be attributed to the equations: Depending on the assertion of the presence of the fact under consideration, the absence of any reference to it, or its denial in the lower court records and appellate briefs (the values of X) and the degree of influence of such assertions on the Supreme Court (the weights b or c), the Court will accept the fact as having been present in some cases and reject it in others [the values of Y in equation (1)]. However, in equation (2), which represents the discriminant function, Z should not be regarded as a dependent variable with *observed* values like Y. It is merely an index, which—depending on whether its numerical value is above or below a certain point—places each observation (case in this example) in one of two groups (acceptance or rejection of the fact under consideration). The values of this index are obtained by substituting the values of c, obtained as a result of the discriminant analysis, in equation (2); the values of the X's, of course, are originally known.

On the basis of the stated theorem, discriminant analysis can be performed by first employing multiple regression analysis (for which computer programs are readily available), with values of 0 for Y if an observation belongs in one group (e.g., rejection of the fact by the Supreme Court in the given example) and 1 if it belongs in the other group (e.g., acceptance of the fact by the Court). Accordingly, by applying regression analysis to the example under consideration, with the values for the independent variables X and the temporarily used dependent variable Y in Table 2, one obtains the values of the weights of the independent variables, b, which are reported in Table 3. By substituting these values and the applicable values of the X's in equation (1), excluding the term e, one computes the *estimated* values of Y, which are presented in Table 4.

The conversion to discriminant analysis now can be easily achieved. By inspection of Table 2, it can be readily seen that $N_1=12$ and $N_2=20$. By substituting these values, together with the known

---

[4] See R. A. Fisher, "The Statistical Utilization of Multiple Measurements," *Annals of Eugenics*, 8 (1938), 376–386, and *Statistical Methods for Research Workers*, 13th ed. (New York: Hafner Publishing Company, Inc., 1958), p. 286. The notation used here differs from that employed by Fisher. For another study which compares regression analysis and discriminant analysis, see George W. Ladd, "Linear Probability Functions and Discriminant Functions," *Econometrica*, 34 (1966), 873–885.

Table 3. Regression Coefficients and Discriminant Function Coefficients

$a = .176$		
Record or Brief Identified by Number from Table 1	b	c
1	.120	.016
2	.162	.022
3	.000	.000
4	.379	.051
5	.529	.071
6	.130	.017

value of $N = 32$, and the values obtained from the regression analysis in equation (3), one can compute the values of c, which also are reported in Table 3. The next step is the substitution of the originally known values of the independent variables X and the computed values of their weights c in equation (2). In this fashion, the values of the discriminant function Z, which also are in Table 4, are obtained for all the observations.

The value of Z which separates the values of Z for the two groups (acceptance or rejection of the fact by the Supreme Court) is .051. It is obtained by taking the mean of the respective means of the values of Z in the two groups. In comparing the values of Z in Table 4 with the corresponding values of Y in Table 2 (0 indicating Group 1 and 1 indicating Group 2), in relation to the value of Z which separates the two groups, it will be noted that the values of Z do not place every observation in the proper group. There are a few observations with $Y=0$ which have a value of Z above .051 and a few observations with $Y=1$ which have a value of Z below .051. Nevertheless, the multiple squared correlation coefficient $R^2 = .558$ and $F = 5.254$ (both of which can be computed from the results of the multiple regression analysis with values of 0 and 1 for observed Y). For the applicable degrees of freedom, the obtained value of F exceeds the one which corresponds to the .01 level of significance; i.e., in terms of probability by chance alone, $P(5.254 \leq F) < .01$.[5] The results of the discriminant analysis, therefore, can be regarded as significant. It also can be shown that the value of R^2 increases as other independent variables, such as the acceptance or rejection of other facts by the Court, are included in the analysis. This aspect of the research, however, is substantive, whereas the main purpose of this presentation has been methodological.

Appendix

Outline of the proof of the theorem stating the relationship between regression analysis and discriminant analysis:

For $Y=0, 1$, $y = Y - \bar{Y} = -N_2/N$ if $Y=0$ and $y = N_1/N$ if $Y=1$. By substituting these values in

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{ij} y_i (x_{ij} = X_{ij} - \bar{X}_j,\ i = 1, 2, \cdots, N,\ j = 1, 2, \cdots, n)$$

on the right side in the normal equations for regression analysis [$(x'x)b = x'y$ in matrix and vector form], one obtains

$$\sum_{i=1}^{N} x_{ij} y_i = \frac{N_1 N_2}{N} d_j, \qquad \text{(i)}$$

Table 4. Estimated Values of Y and Discriminant Function Values Z

Cases Identified by Number from Table 2	Estimated Y	Discriminant Function Value Z
1	.296	.016
2	.988	.108
3	.706	.071
4	−.103	−.037
5	.706	.071
6	.956	.104
7	.176	.000
8	.686	.068
9	.988	.108
10	.826	.087
11	1.247	.143
12	.826	.087
13	.988	.108
14	.988	.108
15	.664	.065
16	.176	.000
17	.176	.000
18	.176	.000
19	.413	.032
20	.166	−.001
21	.413	.032
22	.294	.016
23	.706	.071
24	.706	.071
25	.176	.000
26	.176	.000
27	1.085	.121
28	.706	.071
29	.533	.048
30	1.112	.126
31	1.085	.121
32	.956	.104

---

[5] The F-test was presented by R. A. Fisher as a test for significance for discriminant analysis (see note 4), with reference to Hotelling's generalized Student distribution (see Harold Hotelling, "The Generalization of Student's Ratio," *Annals of Mathematical Statistics*, 2 [1931], 360–378). In this connection. Fisher also introduced the applicability of R^2 to discriminant analysis (see the proof outlined in the Appendix).

where

$$d_j = \sum_{i=N_1+1}^{N_2} x_{ij}/N_2 - \sum_{i=1}^{N_1} x_{ij}/N_1.$$

The normal equations for discriminant analysis $[(x'x)c=d]$ are similar to the normal equations for multiple regression. The sums of products on the left side are identical in both systems of equations, the respective notations b and c for the unknowns are arbitrarily selected, and the right side of the normal equations in discriminant analysis consists of d_j instead of the term $\sum x_{ij}y_i$ in the multiple regression normal equations.

By Cramer's rule, the normal equations for discriminant analysis can be solved for

$$c_j = \frac{D_j}{D}, \tag{ii}$$

where D is the determinant of the coefficients of the unknowns and D_j is obtained by replacing the coefficients of c_j in the applicable column of D with $d_1, d_2, \cdots, d_n$. Correspondingly, by substituting $(N_1N_2/N)d_j$ from (i) for $\sum x_{ij}y_i$ in the normal equations for multiple regression, the solution

$$b_j = \frac{N_1N_2}{N}\,\frac{D_j}{D} \tag{iii}$$

is obtained, since the multiplication of each element in a column of a determinant by a constant ($d_1, d_2, \cdots, d_n$ by N_1N_2/N) is equivalent to the multiplication of the whole determinant by that constant. By substituting from (iii) in (ii) one obtains

$$c_j = \frac{N}{N_1N_2}\,b_j. \tag{iv}$$

Thus the theorem is proved.

Furthermore, it can be shown that for discriminant analysis

$$R^2 = \frac{N_1N_2}{N}(c_1d_1 + c_2d_2 + \cdots + c_jd_j + \cdots + c_nd_n). \tag{v}$$

For multiple regression,

$$R^2 = \beta_1 r_{yx_1} + \beta_2 r_{yx_2} + \cdots + \beta_n r_{yx_n},$$

where the β's are the standardized regression coefficients and the r's the product moment correlation coefficients. By substituting for the β's the b's and the applicable standard deviations, and for the r's the sums of products of the applicable variables with $Y=0, 1$, by substituting then

$$\frac{N_1N_2}{N}\,d_j \quad \text{for} \quad \sum x_{ij}y_i$$

from (i), and by simplifying the expression, one obtains (v).

A Research Note on Machine Politics as a Model for Change in a Philippine Province*

LOUIS P. BENSON
Kent State University

For several years political scientists have been concerned with the nature of the ties between leaders and subleaders on the local level. For instance, Robert Dahl noted that in New Haven ". . . the relations between leaders, subleaders and constituents produce in the distribution of influence a stubborn and pervasive ambiguity that permeates the entire political system."[1] This pervasive ambiguity is no less relevant on the subnational level in countries of the Third World. For instance, in the Philippines there has been a growing concern about local political leadership and government since World War II.[2] However, political scientists who have sought to explicate the dynamics of the leader-subleader linkage patterns in Filipino politics have been hampered due to the lack of an adequate leadership framework for analysis.[3]

Those who have tried to apply American models have run into difficulties both conceptually and operationally. Mary Hollnsteiner, who employed a series of items from the Schulze and Blumberg community-power questionnaire, noted that she

> became increasingly aware that something was wrong with the questions. The responses were so unconvincingly given, and clarification was so often sought that finally discounting that particular series of interviews seemed to be the only reasonable thing to do.[4]

Although Hollnsteiner was unsure whether it was the culture or the technique that was the source of the poor reaction, others who have studied Philippine politics warn:

> . . . when working with the common man in the Philippines, it is not enough to take American instruments, such as attitude questionnaires, and merely translate them into the dialect. In using these instruments you are using American conceptualizations which have little relevance . . .[5]

And further:

> However well adapted these models may be to the analysis of their own society's problems, they are ill-adapted to the needs of a prismatic, poly-communal and intelligentsia-dominated society.[6]

Recently James Scott suggested that machine politics might prove to be a useful context within which to develop a framework for the analysis of subnational politics in Third World countries.[7] The purpose of this study is to determine whether the machine model is just another Western conceptualization, or whether it has practical value at the local level in the Philippines.[8]

---

* I am indebted to the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii which made the field research in the Philippines possible. The data used in this article were gathered in a Southern Luzon province during 1970 for my dissertation at the University of Hawaii entitled "Political Leadership Through Political *Liders:* A New Approach for the Analysis of Philippine Provincial Leadership Positions."

[1] Robert Dahl, *Who Governs?* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), p. 102. Arthur J. Vidich and Joseph Bensman, *Small Town in Mass Society* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1958), devote a section of their book to the study of linkages in electoral politics from the local to the state and national levels. One of the best studies of subnational urban politics in America is Samuel Eldersveld, *Political Parties: A Behavioral Analysis* (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1964).

[2] In the Philippines, interest in local government has been reflected in the research done by the Community Development Research Council (CDRC) and more recently the Local Government Center. For an interesting discussion of thinking on local development see Fred W. Riggs, *Administration in Developing Countries: The Theory of Prismatic Society* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1964), pp. 365–396, and Jose Abueva and Raul de Guzman, *Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Government and Politics* (Manila: Bookmark, 1969).

[3] Most of the accounts of subnational politics in the Philippines have been solely descriptive, such as Jose V. Abueva, *Focus on the Barrio Citizens in Iloilo as They Affect Community Development* (Quezon City: Community Development Research Council (CDRC), University of the Philippines, 1960). A series of four monographs published in 1968 from the Local Government Center of the University of the Philippines, College of Public Administration (Tito Firmalino and Nextor Pilar, *The 1963 Local Elections in Aklan;* Gabriel Iglesia and Elena Gazboa, *The 1963 Local Elections in Lanao del Norte;* Aprodicio Laquian and Roberto Pangilian, *The 1963 Local Elections in Manila;* and Romeo and Estrella Ocampo, *The 1963 Local Elections in Davao*) dealing with local elections and political leader recruitment in four localities still lacked a coherent framework since each author pursued his own interest.

[4] Mary Hollnsteiner, *The Dynamics of Power in a Philippine Municipality* (Quezon City: CDRC, University of the Philippines, 1963), p. 163. Robert Schulze and Leonard Blumberg reported their findings in Schulze and Blumberg, "The Determination of Local Power Elites," *American Journal of Sociology,* 63 (November, 1957), 290–296.

[5] Charles K. Warriner, "The Prospects for a Philippine Sociology," *Philippine Sociological Review,* 9 (January-April, 1961), 12–18; quotation on p. 17.

[6] Fred W. Riggs, "A Model for the Study of Philippine Social Structure," *Philippine Sociological Review,* 7 (December, 1959), 1–32; quotation on p. 18. Recently a similar precaution was voiced by Dante C. Simbulan, "On Models and Developing Societies," *Asian Studies,* 6 (December, 1968), 421–430.

The Machine Politics Model

Machine politics occurs predominantly in the early stages of an electoral system such as eighteenth-century England and the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century United States.[9] The political bosses in the systems had to win elections in order to retain control of their machines, and they would rely primarily on particularistic rewards to ensure the loyalty of an otherwise fickle and poor electorate.[10] The political setting within which machine politics occurs is also plagued by a fragmentation of power resulting in the development of multiple centers of power. The social system in which machine politics flourishes is typically in a state of flux characterized by social disorganization and poverty.[11]

According to Scott, this phenomenon has recurred with variations in a number of developing nations, including the Philippines. Drawing on the English and American experiences, Scott suggests three preconditions for the existence of machine politics:

(1) selection of political leaders through elections,
(2) the presence of universal suffrage, and
(3) a high degree of electoral competition over time.[12]

In Scott's framework, as an electoral political system changes, the incentives used by the political leaders to maintain a following adjust to the new conditions. Based on the components of support used by the political leaders, there are three phases through which a political system passes over time. It should be noted, however, that no one phase is exclusive of the others, and that movement from one phase to another is neither rigid nor deterministic.

During *Phase A*, a leader maintains his vertical ties with subordinates through traditional patterns of deference such as family alliances. The inducements are symbolic without material or ideological substance. In *Phase B*, vertical ties are sustained only through concrete, short-run material inducements. Machine politics based on a process of bartering for votes flourishes during Phase B. In the final stage, *Phase C*, subordinates' loyalties to leaders are based on ideological or policy concerns.[13]

Since these three phases are posited to occur simultaneously or independently, for purposes of operationalization, they might be better characterized as three independent dimensions. As such, factor analysis could provide a means by which independence between the phases could be established. Each support phase would essentially become a dimension in a three-dimensional space in which participants in the subnational political system could be located on the basis of their scores on the independent dimensions of support. In addition, the scores could also be used in comparing different systems as well as tracing changes in an electoral



Figure 1. Dimensions of support

---

[7] James Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development," *American Political Science Review*, 63 (December, 1969), 1142–1158.

[8] The research for this study was conducted in a rural Philippine province of Southern Luzon during the first half of 1970. The province had eleven municipalities and was a lone congressional district. The economy was dependent on timber and agriculture, and the literacy rate in the province was the highest outside Manila.

[9] Machine politics in Britain has been characterized eloquently by Sir Ivor Jennings, *Party Politics, Volume I, Appeal to the People* (London: Cambridge Press, 1960); and Robert Walcott, Jr. *English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956). Machine politics in the United States has been described by social scientists like Edward Banfield and James Q. Wilson, *City Politics* (Cambridge: Harvard and M.I.T. Press, 1963); and Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1930); and by practitioners like Edward Flynn, *You're The Boss* (New York: Viking Press, 1947). Machine politics was noted at the local level even in Japan after the Meiji Reformation by Richard Beardsley, John Hall, and Robert Ward, *Village Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960), Chapters 12 and 13.

[10] Interesting and humorous examples of offering particularistic rewards such as jobs, money, and lodging can be found in Lloyd Wendt and Herman Kogan, *Bosses in Lusty Chicago: The Story of Bathhouse John and Hinky Dink* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967).

[11] Scott, pp. 1149–1150.

[12] Scott, p. 1143. These criteria were used in the selection of the province studied. For instance in the province no governor or congressman was ever reelected except for the incumbent congressman in the 1969 election. One political subleader referred to the province as basically an oppositionist province that would not reelect office holders so as to give other people a chance to hold office.

[13] Scott, pp. 1142–1146.

political system over time. Borrowing from the three-phase scheme, the dimensions of support would be labeled deference, material reward, and ideological or issue orientation.

The Political Subleader and the Machine

An important aspect of machine politics is the hierarchy of influence that exists within the machine, and in order to operationalize the machine model, one must consider the hierarchy. In most studies of machine politics the precinct captains or subleaders are shown to be liaisons between the top leaders and the constituents.[14] In some cases "the function of the subleader . . . is to 'go along' loyally and thus provide a suitable facade for the actions of the party leaders."[15] Others contend that the subleaders are not nearly so meek, that the subleaders are favor buyers

> . . . who wish a party to act in some way which benefits them and will in return influence voters to support that party. Favor buyers claim to represent no one except themselves; they are merely engaged in trading their influence over voters for specific acts they want done.[16]

Favor buyers are intermediaries in peddling influence and goods (votes). They are bargainers who swap their influence over voters for preferential treatment for themselves and their constituents. Given the subleaders' importance, then, it would seem that the motivations of subleaders of the machine system who manipulate voters would be as important as studying the motivations of the individual voters.

The Philippine equivalent of the precinct captain or subleader is referred to as a "lider" (pronounced like leader).[17] The *lider* is an actor in the political system who has a following and pledges himself to a candidate in return for favors which he distributes to his followers. A candidate for office calls him "his lider" referring to the subordinate position which the *lider* plays vis-à-vis the leader. Within each Philippine province there is usually a hierarchy of *liders*. At the lowest level one *lider* influences or controls ten to fifteen voters, and at the highest level a *lider* influences several thousand voters. The Filipino *liders* maintain their ties with constituents and lower *liders* by using social and material favors that are not unlike the favors used in early England or America by subleaders operating within a machine context. These favors include being present at baptisms, weddings, and wakes, releasing constituents from jail, and arranging special treatment for constituents in their dealings with government officials.[18] Supposedly, the performance of social favors is intended to reinforce strong feelings of debts of gratitude or, as known in the Philippines, *utang na loob*.[19] In addition to social favors, family connections and fictive kinship or *compadre* relationships are also considered important means of mobilizing support.[20]

Although studies have attempted to describe the motivations of the Filipino voters, the nature of the patron-client associations between the leaders and *liders* has been only marginally investigated, and even among the voter studies there are divergent interpretations of why an individual voter selects one leader rather than another.[21] Yet, given at least the structural framework necessary for machine politics, it can be argued that "control rests with the local political leaders (*liders*) who can deliver the vote in the barrios."[22] The Filipino voter follows the dictates of his *lider* to whom he looks for guidance and from whom, in some cases, he receives sustenance. Therefore, research evaluating the motivations of the *liders* rather than those of the voters differs from studies of voter behavior and attitudes in that the *liders* do not cast anonymous ballots: they are conspicuous in their support by actually campaigning for a leader. Since the *liders* are considered to control or at least influence a number of voters, a *lider's* support is worth considerably more than a single vote. Consequently, the subleader in the rural setting of the Philippines is instrumental in determining the type of incentive used by the leaders.

---

[14] References to the intermediaries are made by authors from Geoffrey Holmes, *British Politics in the Age of Anne* (London: MacMillan, 1967), to Nancy Joan Weiss, *Charles Francis Murphy, 1858–1924: Respectability and Responsibility in Tammany Politics* (Northampton, Mass.: Smith College, 1968).

[15] Dahl, *Who Governs?*, p. 108.

[16] Anthony Downs, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (New York: Harper, 1957), p. 88.

[17] Hollnsteiner, p. 41. Another useful description of *liders* is made in a monograph by Buenaventura Villanueva, "Municipal Government and Politics," (Laguna, Philippines: University of the Philippines, College of Agriculture, June, 1962).

[18] See Walcott and Zink.

[19] Charles Kaut, "Utang na Loob: A System of Contractual Obligations among the Tagalogs," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, 17 (Autumn, 1961), 256–272. The concept of "face" is also involved in *utang na loob*. It is considered disgraceful not to honor one's *utang na loob*. See Hollnsteiner, p. 77 and Jean Grossholtz, *The Politics of the Philippines: A Country Study* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), pp. 86–91, 95–100, and 187–188. The notion of repaying personal favors is the basis of *utang na loob*, and it actually is not peculiar to the Philippines. Others have commented on the importance of debts of gratitude or reciprocity. For instance, William Gamson, *Power and Discontent* (Homewood, Ill.: The Dorsey Press, 1968), p. 78, states: "Many politicians are eager to create obligations to themselves by doing small favors for others; such obligations can be converted into specific inducements at election time or when a crisis occurs." Also Peter Blau, *Exchange and Power in Social Life* (New York: Wiley, 1964), pp. 16–21, points out that in social intercourse reciprocity is usually expected.

[20] Generally, fictive kinship or *compadrazgo* ties take the form of a wealthy patron's sponsoring a poor client. In the Philippines *compadre* ties are made by a wealthy individual's acting as the godparent of a client's child in a baptism or wedding. Hollnsteiner, pp. 63–67; Grossholtz; and Carl Landé, *Leaders, Factions and Parties: The Structure of Philippine Politics* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp. 14–23 and 133–148. For a comparative discussion of *compadrazgo* ties see John Powell, "Peasant Society and Clientelist Politics," *American Political Science Review*, 64 (June, 1970), 411–425.

[21] One group contends that it is personal loyalty which has the greatest effect: Robert Youngblood, "A Study of the 1963 Mayorality Election in Jolo, Philippines," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Honolulu,

It would be logical to hypothesize that as long as the political system is dominated by boss politics the nature of the leader-*lider* (subleader) linkages would depend on particularistic rewards. According to Scott's framework, as a country develops economically and moves toward the ideological support dimension, the subleaders' concern for obtaining particularistic rewards would decrease, since these rewards would be of less value to their constituents. For instance, in the United States the role of the boss and the precinct captain as a "ward heeler" for the individual voter diminished with the advent of such programs as the social welfare system.[23] As the voters placed less emphasis on particularistic rewards, the subleaders lost control over blocs of votes, because the material rewards that they could obtain through their connections with a leader were no longer relevant to the voter.

Application of the Model

Components of Support in the Philippine Setting. On the basis of the discussion above, we might well conclude that the machine political model would be viable where the other Western models were not, but that in operationalizing the model, special attention would have to be given to the Philippine setting. From what has been written about the nature of Philippine politics and the various appeals that are used to gain support, the general consensus is that support of a candidate is based on one or more of ten components: (1) *kinship ties;* (2) *compadrazgo ties;* (3) *utang na loob* (debts of gratitude); (4) *party ties;* offering reward in the form of (5) *positions,* (6) *projects* or *money;* (7) *making threats;* (8) *the capability* of a candidate; (9) *the issues* of a candidate; and (10) a *candidate's chance of winning.*[24] These components of support have additional relevance for Philippine studies. Many of the writings during the early 1960s stressed the importance of the family and *compadrazgo* ties for political leaders, but it has been suggested recently that Philippine politicians have re-evaluated their orientations, and as a result the Philippines is moving away from Phase A (authority through deference and reliance on traditional ties) to Phase B (reliance on particularistic rewards).[25] The components of support model was designed to test that assumption, as well as to determine the degree to which machine politics was present.

The Sample and Questionnaire. In a Philippine province the congressman and governor are considered to be the top political leaders. Beneath them is a hierarchy of *liders* reaching down into the barrios. For this study a list of high level provincial leaders (*liders*) was obtained from the Congressman, the provincial Governor, and their major opponents in the last election (1969, 1967 respectively). From the list of 187 high-level *liders* compiled from the names submitted by the four provincial leaders, 105 political *liders* were randomly selected and interviewed. For the components of support phase of the interview, the *liders* were first asked an open-ended question about why other political *liders* whom they personally

---

1966, pp. 87–90; and Remgio Agpalo, "The Political Elite and the People: A Study of Politics in Occidental Mindoro," Unpublished Manuscript, Quezon City, 1966. A second group places importance on capability and issues: Eufemio Patanne, "Political Opinion," Jose Abueva and Raul de Guzman, eds., *The Foundations and Dynamics of Filipino Politics,* pp. 114–118; and H. Averch, F. Denton, and J. Koehler, *A Crisis of Ambiguity: Political and Economic Development in the Philippines* (Santa Monica: Rand, 1970), pp. 60, 77.

[22] Grossholtz, p. 152.

[23] Scott, pp. 1156–1157; and Banfield and Wilson, pp. 121–125.

[24] It is generally considered that Filipino politics is not based on ideology since politics is highly personalized. According to Agpalo and Villanueva, political support depends on family pattern, status and position, and self-interests. Landé, pp. 141–148, suggests that politics is based on dyadic relationships between patrons and clients. Other authorities such as Hollnsteiner and Grossholtz also emphasize social reciprocity.

[25] As an example, Jose Abueva, "Conditions of Administrative Development: Exploring Administrative Culture and Behavior in the Philippines," CAG Occasional Paper (Bloomington: December, 1966), points out that once they were away from their home province, the administrative personnel in Manila have tended to disregard their traditional family and *compadre* ties.

Table 1. Rotated Factor Matrix of Scale Values for Components of Support

Components of Support	Factors						h²
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	
Capability	0.93	−0.16	−0.03	0.07	−0.03	0.09	0.91
Issues	0.93	−0.01	−0.10	0.07	−0.16	0.05	0.90
Family Ties	−0.08	0.86	0.14	0.05	−0.09	0.10	0.79
Compadre Ties	−0.12	0.86	0.06	0.04	0.00	0.13	0.77
Utang na Loob	0.07	0.57	0.10	0.40	0.41	0.01	0.66
Projects and Money	0.07	0.13	0.94	−0.03	−0.05	−0.09	0.91
Positions and Jobs	−0.39	0.13	0.77	0.24	−0.06	0.17	0.84
Threats	0.10	0.11	0.09	0.95	0.06	0.10	0.93
Party	0.14	0.11	−0.03	−0.03	−0.94	0.13	0.93
Chance of Winning	0.12	0.20	0.01	0.01	−0.13	0.95	0.98
Total Variance	19.5	19.1	15.1	11.3	11.1	10.0	86.1
Common Variance	22.7	22.2	17.6	13.1	12.8	11.6	100.0

knew, would support one political candidate over another.[26] All of the *liders'* answers were covered by the ten components cited above. After the open-ended question, the *liders* were asked to rate each of the ten reasons why "other *liders* support a leader" on a seven point scale from "extremely important" (7) to "not important at all" (1).[27]

Results

The Phases as Factors. The data were first used to test the three-phase model. The scores from the scale ratings were applied in a principal components factor analysis with the varimax solution. Three factors were rotated to test the hypothesis that the three phases outlined by Scott could be represented by three statistically independent dimensions. The three-factor rotation yielded a low total percentage of common variance explained; and the communalities (per cent of explained variance for a variable) for party (40 per cent), chance of winning (38 per cent), and threats (37 per cent) were so low that it was obvious that additional factors were involved in the pattern. Another factor analysis was run using the "scree" criterion, and six factors were rotated.[28]

For the rotated six-factor solution, the three factors which accounted for most of the variance corresponded closely to the three-factor model described above. A candidate's capability and his stand on issues loaded highly (.93 and .93) together on the first factor. This factor might be labeled the ideological or issue-oriented dimension. Obviously it matches Phase C of Scott's scheme. The second factor had high loadings for family ties (.86), *compadre* ties (.86), and *utang na loob* or debts of gratitude (.57). All of these ties suggest the traditional deference that was discussed earlier and is found in several Third World countries.[29] On the basis of what was said by the *liders*, however, personal loyalty, seemed a more fitting description of the dimension than did deference.[30] Projects, money, and jobs composed the third factor: particularistic reward. This finding was interesting since other authorities cited above assumed that personal loyalty was tied to material reward. Yet in the factor analysis, *utang na loob* was shown to be an independent factor in spite of Western thinking that it was strictly part of a Filipino *quid pro quo*.

---

[26] The questions which yielded the most realistic responses were designed so as to have the respondents answer about other *liders*. When questions which asked the *liders* about their own views were administered, the *liders* would give what they considered "correct" or proper answers. In several instances, *liders* who were influenced by money or jobs denied that money or jobs were important to them personally. Therefore, sixty-one *liders* were asked questions about others as well as questions about themselves. The results reported here are based on responses from questions about others.

[27] By not using a rank ordering, the *liders* were better able to give tied scores for some variables if they chose to do so. Although the questionnaire was administered in English, those who completed the schedule demonstrated an understanding of the questions and the scale by elaborating on their numerical scoring with examples.

[28] Raymond B. Cattell, "Scree Test for the Number of Factors," *Multivariate Behavior Research,* 1 (1966), 245–276.

[29] Powell.

[30] When the *liders* elaborated after giving a score for the different variables, they referred to family ties, *compadre* ties, and *utang na loob* differently than Scott's term, "deference," suggests. The *liders* defined these variables as personal bonds between themselves and others, either superordinates or subordinates. Deference implies the obedience given to only a superior. See Scott, "Corruption, Machine Politics, and Political Development," pp. 1146–1147.

Although these three factors correspond to the three-dimensional model described above, the three dimensions account for only 62.5 per cent of the common variance and 54 per cent of the total variance. The rest of the common variance is taken up by threats (13.1 per cent), party loyalty (12.8 per cent), and chance of winning (11.6 per cent).

Since the results of the factor analysis verify the independence of the three dimensions, a model could be developed that would represent the three phases by three independent dimensions: personal loyalty, particularistic reward, and capability-issue orientation. In considering the three-dimensional model for analysis, however, it must be understood that in this study the three dimensions explain only a little more than half of the variance in a *lider's* motivation to support a leader. Obviously, with this kind of restriction the model would only be marginally useful even as a purely heuristic device.

Evaluation by the Liders. At the analytical, model-building level, the results of the questionnaire did not substantiate the three-dimensional model, or even the three-phase model. On simply a descriptive level, however, the questionnaire was shown to be more than just another Western instrument. The relative weight given to different bases of support used in the Philippines provided valuable insights into the *liders'* motivations and upset other commonly held assumptions.

The *liders* consistently rated the particularistic rewards above the other incentives for supporting a political leader. The offering of positions or jobs was considered first in importance by almost all of the *liders* interviewed. For example, one *lider* had been in the Liberal Party (LP) and had supported the Liberal candidate for congress, but when the Congressman, a Nacionalista, offered to make him the chairman of the Nacionalista Party (NP) in the *lider's* municipality, the *lider* switched parties. Another *lider,* a cousin of the Congressman's opponent, switched to support the Congressman. The *lider* brought with him the votes of approximately eleven hundred followers, and for his efforts the *lider* was appointed to a judgeship through the recommendations of the Congressman.

Table 2. Mean Scores[a] for *Liders'* Evaluations of Components of Support

Positions and Jobs	5.98
Projects and Money	5.59
Utang na Loob	5.57
Party	5.48
Family	5.46
Chance of Winning	5.43
Compadre Ties	4.69
Capability	4.56
Issues	4.36
Threats	3.34

[a] Range 1–7.

Rated closely behind jobs were projects and money. Since the *liders* have to sustain their own *liders* and constituents, money and projects are important in the maintenance of their political positions. One mayor showed me photographs of himself standing with Presidents Quirino (LP), Magsaysay (NP), Macapagal (LP), and Marcos (NP), as well as with three congressmen, two Liberals and one Nacionalista. He said that his party was always the same party as that of the incumbent president and congressman. Asked why, he replied that if he were not a supporter of the incumbents, he would not have been able to bring improvements to his municipality, and as a consequence, he would not have been able to serve as mayor for the past twenty years.

These attitudes are characteristic of a system of machine politics, and the *liders'* responses to the questionnaire further substantiate the hypothesis that a boss system as described earlier operates in this rural province. The more traditional elements, however, such as personal loyalty, family ties, and *utang na loob,* are also present. The relatively high scores given to family and *utang na loob* would be expected on the basis of what has been written about the nature of the Philippine social system.[31] The real surprise was that *compadrazgo* ties were less emphasized than earlier writings suggest. As was noted above, *compadrazgo* ties were earlier said to have been essential social and political ties. Apparently extrafamilial connections have now become so extended as to be meaningless for many of the *liders.* In some cases the *liders* would have so many *compadres* and clients that they could not remember them all. In fact, one young councilman flatly rejected the *compadrazgo* system as a waste. He pointed out that he had no *compadrazgo* clients, yet he had managed to finish first in a sixteen-man field for eight council seats. Nevertheless, the other two personal loyalty elements are still considered as strong influences on a *lider* in his decision on whom to support.

The importance placed on the chance of winning of the candidates demonstrates the extent to which the *liders* were favor buyers and the extent to which they operated as economic decision makers.[32] Although favor buyers are part of the machine system, the chance of winning was given less importance than it might have otherwise received. I found that strong endorsements and prior commitments undermined a *lider's* willingness to switch away from a losing candidate. The *liders* had a strong sense of *hiya* (face). Once a pledge was given during a campaign the *liders* would remain steadfast in their support even if their candidate was going to lose, unless sufficient money, projects, or jobs were used as incentives to switch.

---

[31] See notes 19 and 24.

Capability as a criterion for either the Governor (perceived by the *liders* to mean administrative ability, competence, and expertise) or the Congressman (speaking, legislative, and representative competence) was rejected by the *liders*. Political issues such as foreign policy stands, law and order, and coherent national planning also had little importance for the *liders*.

The adherence to the party and blind support of the party's candidate are rather rare in the Philippines where party switching is extremely common.[33] Yet in the province studied there were a few *liders* who contended that party loyalty was, in some cases, the only criterion used in determining whom they would support. Other *liders*, in discussing party loyalty, referred to party ties in personal terms, i.e., loyalty to one or another of the two top provincial leaders who headed the two parties, but these ties fell under the general heading of *utang na loob* and not party loyalty.

Summary and Conclusion

Selecting a province in the Philippines which closely matched the criteria outlined by Scott for the existence of boss politics—elected leaders, universal suffrage, and high electoral competition—made it possible to test the practicality of the machine model for interpreting the leader-subleader linkage patterns in Filipino politics. Since the political subleaders have played such a large political role in a machine system, the local *liders* were used as the means to characterize the provincial support structure.

The *liders* were found to be an integral part of the provincial political system which operates much like the political machines of early America and early England. Discussions with the *liders* and the tabulated results from the questionnaire confirmed that the individual voter actually mattered little to the top provincial leaders since individual votes were usually bought and sold by a *lider* to whom the voter gave allegiance.

Beyond this point the model of machine politics breaks down as just another Western conceptualization. The Philippines plainly is not like the United States or Great Britain. Descriptively, the model was helpful, but for providing an analytic basis for predicting change, it is sadly lacking. The conditions which existed in Britain and the United States do not exist in the Philippines. For instance, there is not a strong party system in the Philippines to reinforce political alliances.

The most important difference between the Western states and the Philippines is that in countries like England and the United States, when the social system grew increasingly complex, the resource base and the existence of colonies or a frontier enabled their economies to develop and expand. Also, when social welfare became a government enterprise, the governments were financially sound enough to take over many of the roles previously handled by the political machines. In both cases the politics moved from particularistic reward to issue orientation. Neither of the above economic conditions exists in the Philippines, and even though the Philippine government is committed to social welfare, the government is simply not economically strong enough to cope with all the demands that have previously been met unofficially by the *liders*. As for the machine politics model, its critical fault is that it does not provide us with insights into changes that occur in the political system when the numbers of people who expect rewards from the *liders* increases and the ability of the *liders* to supply rewards decreases.

The unanswered questions now facing political scientists, and, more acutely, Philippine politicians, are (1) When will it become economically impossible for political leaders to pay off supporters with money and jobs; and (2) When it does become impossible, what will leaders use to maintain their support structures and influence patterns?

---

[32] Downs.

[33] Landé, pp. 48–69. In Philippine politics, political leaders switch from one party to another depending on which party can accommodate them the best. For instance President Ferdinand Marcos was the leader of the Liberal Party in the Senate before Liberal President Macapagal decided to run for reelection in 1965. Marcos was invited to join the Nacionalista Party as the party's presidential nominee.

COMMUNICATIONS

To the Editor:

A colleague recently expressed to me a proposition which he felt would characterize American presidential politics in coming years. The proposition is this: "After the first term of an incumbent President, the opposition party will nominate a more extreme candidate than after the second term, when no incumbent is running." His reasoning was that no candidate with appeal to the broad center of American voters would run against an incumbent candidate and thus stand a high probability of losing, since he can run four years hence against a non-incumbent with a much higher probability of winning. He cited Goldwater's nomination as the first example consistent with his proposition, and he believed that McGovern's nomination would be the second example. (At that time, the Democratic primaries were in progress.) In the McGovern case, the obvious best example of the potential candidate with broad appeal but not motivated to run is Edward Kennedy.

More recently, political commentators have noted more than once during the Democratic convention and since that the Democratic party was not behaving like a party intent on winning. This suggests actions somewhat beyond those underlying the above proposition. That is, not only the motivations and actions of potential candidates for the presidency, but the motivations and actions of those in the party involved in shaping the platform and directions of the party—the party activists. It suggests that these motivations and actions are not so much directed to winning the election as to taking positions consistent with their beliefs. This would broaden the proposition above to include the platform, somewhat like this: "After the first term of an incumbent President, the opposition party will have a more extreme platform and will nominate a more extreme candidate than after the second term, when no incumbent is running."

This may come to be a new property of American politics which differentiates "mid-incumbency" elections from non-incumbency elections, following the two-term limitation on the presidency, just as the midterm congressional elections are different from the presidential election years. If so, it will be a particular case of a more general principle that has long been noted in politics. This principle is that minority parties with a small chance of winning are more "principled," adhering more to a fixed set of beliefs, than are those parties in serious contention for winning the election.

In this communication, I would like to show that such behavior can be predicted from a very parsimonious rational model in which party activists, whether in a seriously contending party or in a noncontending minority party, are attempting to maximize utility. What is particularly interesting is that in terms of this model, the same motivation leads to the opposite behavior in the two cases. The model has been discussed in detail in two publications, where the interested reader may pursue the ideas further.[1] Here I will merely give a verbal discussion. The general idea is this: Those engaged in selecting a party nominee or shaping a party platform, whether voters in a primary, more active party workers, or delegates to a nominating convention, choose, if they are rational, on the basis of how that choice will affect their satisfaction with the government they can expect to have following the general election. They do not choose merely on the basis of their satisfaction with the candidates' positions, because if the candidate with those positions they most agree to has no chance of winning, then by choosing him they will end up worse off—with the opposition party candidate elected—than if they had chosen a candidate with whose positions they agreed less, but who has a high chance of winning. More precisely, they want to maximize their expected utility from the new government, and the expected utility from a particular primary candidate with a given position is the *product* of the probability that a candidate with this position will win the general election and the utility that would be experienced if he won.

Now suppose each party tentatively takes a position at the median of the position of party voters-and-activists in that party. Then, the party of the left, by moving toward the center, would take a position that is less satisfactory to the majority of its voters-and-activists than that median position. (I use "party voters-and-activists" here, rather than "party voters" to reflect the fact that party's nominee is not selected by a simple process of voting by a defined set of party members, but by a complex process in which the work of the activists helps determine how many and which persons will be party voters.) But if by moving to the center it can gain enough probability of winning the general election to counterbalance the loss in utility if it wins, then all party voters-and-activists will gain in expected utility, even those to the left of the party median. Thus, if such a condition holds, the party will take a position closer to the center than its median, since that position will maximize expected utility from the general election for the majority of party voters-and-activists.

---

[1] James S. Coleman, "Internal Processes Governing Party Positions in Elections," *Public Choice*, II (Fall, 1971), 35–60, and James S. Coleman, "The Positions of Political Parties in Elections," in *Probability Models of Collective Decision Making*, ed. Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill, 1972).

If this condition does not hold, that is, if the gain in probability of winning the general election does not counterbalance the loss in utility if it wins, the party's optimal position will be at the median of its voters-and-activists, and there will be no motivation to move toward the center. Thus depending on whether this condition holds, the party will behave very differently as a result of maximization of utility by party voters-and-activists: either moving toward the center, or taking a principled stand. The question then becomes: When can the condition be expected to hold?

Consider first the set of positions that parties can take, which may be thought of as a line (a left-right continuum of positions), a plane, or a space of higher dimensions. Then the probability of their party's winning the general election as a function of the position it takes is some probability distribution over these positions. It should take roughly the form of a cumulative normal distribution which depends upon the distribution of the population of voters in the general election, and on the positions of the other parties. We can think of this distribution in a two-party election: assume that the party's position is only one of several considerations that lead voters to vote for it. Then there will be a certain nonzero probability of winning if the party stays at the position of the median of party voters-and-activists. By moving toward the center, the party can increase that probability to some maximum, depending on the other party's position and *a priori* strength, but a maximum less than 1.

In a normal, relatively balanced two-party election, the gain in probability of winning as a function of going from the party voters-and-activists median to the position that maximizes the probability of winning, assuming that the other party goes to its optimal position, is a gain from near zero to about 0.5. In moving to that point, with each move there will be a loss in expected utility owing to reduction of utility given a win, and a gain owing to increase in probability of winning. Assuming that the sum of the gains due to the latter outweigh at some point some of the losses due to the former, there will be an optimal position neither at maximum probability of winning, nor at maximum utility given a win (the party voters-and activists median), but where the product of the two is maximum.

In a normal, balanced two-party election, this will produce a pair of equilibrium positions so that both parties will have about a probability of 0.5 of winning.

But in an unbalanced election such as an incumbent election, where one party has a relatively high *a priori* probability of winning, the minority party, in compromising its position to the same degree, goes from something near zero to something considerably less than 0.5, given the stronger party's optimal position. Thus the party voters-and-activists have lost the same amount in potential utility, if elected, as in the balanced case, but have gained much less in probability of winning. It is quite possible, in fact, that there may be no position, as it moves toward the center, in which the gains in expected utility owing to increase in probability of winning exceed the losses owing to decreased utility given a win, compared to the original point, the median. If that is so, then there is no incentive to move toward the center. This lack of incentive derives from the small potential gain in probability of winning, owing to the other party's *a priori* strong position.

An examination of the strong party's incentives shows an analogous situation. Because its probability of winning is high at the outset, it cannot gain much in the probability of winning by moving toward the center, and thus there may be no point other than its original point at which the gains in expected utility owing to increased probability of winning outweigh the losses owing to decreased utility given a win.

Thus, the result is this: that as the *a priori* difference in strength of the parties is greater, whether because of incumbency of a candidate or for another reason, there is less likely to be an incentive on the part of voters-and-activists in *either* the strong or the weak party to shift the party's position from the median toward the center. What this implies for elections in which there is an incumbent, assuming that incumbency gives *a priori* strength, is that in those elections neither the incumbent party's candidate and platform nor the opposition party's candidate and platform are as likely to show movement toward the center, as are both parties' candidates and platforms in an election without an incumbent.

JAMES S. COLEMAN
The Johns Hopkins University

TO THE EDITOR:

The following was originally sent as a memorandum to members of the M.I.T. community in October, 1972.

> The Gamalian plurality in the late plebiscite was so huge that contemplation of it has distracted the public attention from all subsidiary phenomena. One gapes at it as a yokel gapes at a blood-sweating hippopotamus; its astounding vastness makes it seem somehow indecent, as a very fat man always seems somehow indecent.
>
> —H. L. Mencken, "Optimistic Note," Nov. 29, 1920

Being the careful sort, I have been unwilling up to now to predict the outcome of the 1972 presidential election. To add my voice to the universal agreement that we will indeed have "four more years" seems almost a waste of your time and mine. If the unanimous testimony of the polls is even remotely in the right end of the ballpark, President Nixon will win a popular majority which—if it is comparable to anything at all—equals only such immensities as 1920, 1924, and 1936: it is, in fact, possible to make projections from some of the *northern* state polls which, linked to voting behavior in 1968 and earlier, yield literally incredible national estimates. It is always possible, of course, to construct a hypergeometric curve on time from now until the election which would make this election reasonably close. But this seems pure wish-fulfillment at this stage; and I, for one am now willing to throw in the towel.

At the same time, it is at least a useful exercise in self-control to analyze this "blood-sweating hippopotamus" in its context, and make a first crude attempt to unravel its meaning. There are a variety of expository modes available to those who write about American elections. This time I shall do the job in the mode of "axiomatic" statements about American politics generally and as applied to this case (of course, without "hard data").

1. The average American voter is neither a saint nor a devil; he is, quite literally, *l'homme moyen sensuel.*

2. He is accordingly very unlikely to feel personal guilt for general social conditions at home or abroad which he did not have a hand in creating.

3. Any effort by the intelligentsia or by political candidates to create such feelings of guilt will normally be deeply resented by many voters.

4. Even now, under conditions of unprecedented cultural turbulence in American society, a majority of the electorate (and an even larger majority of those who will in fact vote this year) still believe in the traditional or "conventional" political morality of this country. This morality includes such items as the following:

(a) This country has a free, democratic political system.

(b) This country has a private-enterprise economy which has produced the greatest good for the greater number of people in world history.

(c) This country's political and social system is based upon "careers open to all talents"; therefore, if I am not that well off, my children can hope for winning their place in the sun through their own achievements and hard work.

(d) The poor and the rich alike get pretty much what they deserve.

(e) Politically created threats to my own economic well-being and especially to the prospects of success for my children are an intolerable usurpation, which interferes with the right order of things. This is particularly intolerable when, as a result of pressure-group actitivies and support from bleeding-heart intellectual elites, I am expected to consent to this jeopardy for the sake of people who are unwilling or incompetent to "make it on their own," as I did.

(f) In the international world of threat, the U.S. must always be No. 1 in military power.

(g) As long as Americans are not doing very much of the dying, we will accept the President's definition of "national interest" in places like Vietnam. And we will accept as well his definition of the means to be used to protect and promote that interest. In any case, the world's greatest country cannot accept anything which looks like abject surrender.

5. George McGovern has become identified as being on the "wrong" side of all these propositions. Richard Nixon is identified with the "right" side—not only because of McGovern's diffuse negative image, but because (as Garry Wills and others have pointed out) Nixon is virtually the embodiment of this conventional political morality.

I have argued more than once that the United States is passing through one of the deepest transitional crises in its history; and that the crisis has increasingly assumed the form of a crisis of political legitimacy. I retain this view. In one sense, the "emerging Nixon majority" may well be viewed as a counterrevolution of an "older" America against a "newer" one. But a "counter-revolution" cannot exist without a prior "revolutionary challenge. We can *very* briefly sketch some of this here.

1. The underlying crises are to be found in the following areas:

(a) Economic pressure, associated with the phenomenon of "stagflation." Among other things, it appears that the real income of the average American worker has not significantly increased since 1965. A very much larger part of this chronic (not yet acute) economic problem that most Americans realize is the result of a long-term deterioration in the *international* competitive position of the American economy, a deterioration which has been chronicled by the never-ending gold-currency crisis.

(b) Profound modification of the class structure under conditions of technological transformation and affluence. Very generally, the modifications parallel those suggested some years ago by David Apter, with an emergent stratification of technologically-competent, technologically-obsolescent and technologically-superfluous being superimposed upon the older industrial stratification pattern.

(c) Massive *locational* transformations since 1945. For the shorter term, the most politically sensitive of these population exchanges affects the metropolitan region. These have had the effect of creating an ever-more explicit functional differentiation along sharply-marked political boundaries: the herding of the "technologically superfluous" strata into the center cities, the moving out to suburbs of the employed (and employable) white population. For the longer term, the continuing movement of the population to the South and West, and particularly the ongoing industrializtion of the South, also will have cumulatively important effects on the structure of politics in the United States.

(d) Major *cultural* ruptures along generational, occupational and education-income dimensions.

2. With the nomination of George McGovern, cleavages within the population have been explicitly organized at the national level around these changes in *society* which have undermined the basis of the old New Deal alignment.

(a) This candidacy tends to pit the "technologically competent" and "technologically superfluous" against the "technologically obsolescent"—in short, what Levitin and Miller call the "liberal coalition" against "middle America." For a number of reasons, this is a losing coalition—only partly because the lowest class of the technologically competent" have abysmal turnout rates.

(b) This candidacy tends to pit the "counterculture," the people who repudiate the conventional morality discussed above, against the large majority of the population which clings to old ways, and which fears that further politically directed change of the sort pioneered by the Great Society will hurt them.

(c) While economic problems are very large, this candidacy has been unable to capitalize on them. In considerable part, this is because McGovern's original economic package could be seen as threatening to transfer income away from about 48 per cent of the population (and quite a bit more than 48 per cent of the active electorate). In part, it is because McGovern seems to be widely regarded as not "safe" so far as conventional free-enterprise rhetoric is concerned.

3. The very nomination of George McGovern follows the classical critical-realignment scenario very closely. The party most vulnerable in its pre-existing coalitional structure to capture by large-scale dissent from things as they are has been duly captured. Much has been made of the McGovern rules in explaining this revolution within the Democratic party. More should be made of the point that the nomination would have been impossible under *any* rule structure unless there was a very broad and intense demand within the party for drastic change.

4. As Theorore Lowi and others have pointed out, the *political* (or legitimacy) crisis of the present is centered on "the end of liberalism." In particular this is the end of that kind of interest-group liberalism which, in ideology, is reflected in the writings of conventional American pluralist political science; and which, in operation, achieved its apogee in the programs of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. *This* form of the "American ideology" has now achieved bankruptcy. As is well known, it is under devastating attack from at least two very discrete quarters.

(a) It is attacked by those who, literally revolted by the foreign policies of the 1960s, wish to achieve a moral regeneration. Many of these people want what amounts to a general confession of sins. They are of course concentrated in the McGovern campaign. Curiously, however, a very great deal of the McGovern domestic program calls for much more of the same—for a major expansion along "Great Society" lines without any very clear innovations. Or at least it is widely *seen* to call for more of the same—and what is seen in politics is all-important.

(b) It is attacked by those who see runaway taxation, inflation, and expansion of programs to help the poor who, by definition, do not deserve such help. The latter are now clearly in the ascendancy.

5. As yet, the crisis of legitimacy has not crystallized around anything remotely like a rejection of the conventional American political morality (or the "American dream"), except among a very limited stratum of disaffected intelligentsia and a substantial part of the black community. Both of the latter are in fact, more or less pervasively identified in the public mind with all the social and political forces at work which threaten realization of "the dream." Nixon, on the other hand, virtually embodies it.

6. Time does not allow us to probe deeply into whether the time will come when more than the legitimacy of interest-group liberalism (or political-science pluralism) is at stake. A few points can be made here.

(a) It is my view that the crisis is stimulated by (you'll pardon the expression) "objective" transformations in the social and economic structure which are producing acute conflicts in belief systems.

(b) It remains *politically* uncrystallized in large part because no huge systemwide malfunction or trauma similar to those of the past has yet occurred. Perhaps no such trauma will occur in the foreseeable future.

(c) It would be very unlikely to be effectively crystallized even then unless exceptionally skilled political leadership were available. Thus, for example, even in the 1930s FDR was careful to attack "moneychangers in the temple," "economic royalists," and "malefactors of great wealth" rather than capitalism as such. Who knows? While some of us find it psychologically difficult to accept even the possibility, it may be that Nixon and his Republican successors may provide this "skilled political leadership." If so, and if *fortuna* is on their side, they stand to inherit the earth politically for the next generation.

(d) It is very possible that the crisis will continue indefinitely in a chronic rather than an acute state. If so, the leading characteristics of American electoral politics in the next decade or longer will be:

(i) Extreme volatility of voting behavior at all levels; (or continuing "electoral disaggregation," as I have called it);

(ii) Mediocre to poor levels of voting participation;

(iii) A broad "pattern" in which the candidate of either party who can most credibly promise limitation of the anxieties associated with demographic, social, and political change will win the election;

(iv) An extreme resistance (from mass referendum behavior to elite actions in Congress, the Executive and elsewhere) to *any* further policy innovations of the "Great Society" type. Such innovations as do occur (and there will be quite a few) will be legitimated in terms of conventional (or "conservative") values and will avoid any flavor of the redistributive.

To sum up: I regard both the nomination of McGovern and the emergent Nixon landslide as evidence for the existence of a deepseated crisis in belief system and underlying social structure. When large numbers of people find themselves in such crisis, several well-known paths for reducing "cognitive dissonance" and anxiety are open to them. One of these paths is well-trodden indeed; it is escape from the anxious present into an hypostatized past, an intense reaffirmation of the antecedent, of the most traditional core social values. Such a reaffirmation may seem to be grotesquely inappropriate to the intellectual. But all that the latter can do when living in such a period is to remind himself and others of what *that* can lead to, and to remind himself and others that such a flight from change can be stable in a relatively free society *only* if the pressure for change itself ceases or alters direction.

Of course, it may be wholly unnecessary to reach such Olympian heights in order to arrive at the "real" cause of the Nixon landslide. For it is very clear that the Democratic candidate himself has been made the "issue" in this campaign. The Republicans have simply picked up the pieces. There have been three major disasters in the campaign so far: the first is in the structure of the McGovern Commission party reforms, the second in the handling of the Eagleton affair, and the third in the effects of McGovern's inability to define and adhere to tenable policy positions.

1. The effect of the McGovern rules. The crucial issue here is the age-sex-race quota system which these rules, as executed by the Democratic convention, specified. Such quotas, in the first place, are in flat contradiction to the ahcievement or "merit" ethic which is deeply imbedded in American political culture. Secondly, it does no good *politically* to point to the conditions of factual inequality affecting what Justice Stone used to call "discrete and insular minorities" against which majority prejudice is directed. What people see is the existence of

quotas. To a very considerable extent, both Catholic "ethnics" and Jewish voters see this quota arrangement as part of a broader hyperliberal "conspiracy" against their welfare. It is obvious that many traditionally Democratic voters have found the 1972 Democratic convention to be deeply alien to them in symbolism and in personnel.

2. The Eagleton affair. Very probably, McGovern would have been better off keeping Eagleton rather than dropping him. There were three crucial mistakes in handling this affair—and it should be stressed that it has been of decisive importance in expanding the dimensions of the Nixon landslide.

(a) As one who was until very recently "from Missouri," I can testify that all sorts of background noise existed about Eagleton's "condition" ever since at least the 1968 election. Competent staff work could readily have seen this smoke, penetrated it, and examined the fire underneath. No such competent staff work existed.

(b) It was a crucial mistake for McGovern to react at once by "1000 per cent support for Eagleton," unless he was willing to ride out the storm. He was not.

(c) A situation like this requires *instant* evaluation and decision by the man in charge. It was a major error to let matters hang fire for a week, permitting Eagleton, in effect, to run a personal campaign against the staff and against McGovern.

3. Inability to define and adhere to tenable policy positions. The situation here is sufficiently well known to require little additional comment. The crucial point so far as public opinion is concerned is this: people neither know nor care very much about the details of policy, as a rule; but they are sensitive to wavering or unsteadiness in a candidate's positions, especially when the candidate's stock in trade is moralism.

The upshot of all this, very simply, was that McGovern created a large credibility gap around himself, and in two dimensions. First, the handling of the Eagleton affair, as well as his very publicized staff troubles, suggested doubts about the man's competence to make good decisions and control subordinates as president. Second, his efforts to modify his positions—no less than his courting of such people as Lyndon Johnson—have merely persuaded many voters that he's "just another politican," that winning for him is more important than principle. This I would regard as the supreme irony of the 1972 campaign, and the supreme disaster for McGovern personally.

Two things further should be stressed. First, a significant minority of people, when they vote for president, are well aware of the immense imperial scope of the office; there is, as it were, a "statesmanlike" attitude toward the electoral act among such voters. Before they feel free to vote according to party identification, liking of the incumbent, or perceived self-interest, they must be reassured about the basic competence of the candidate, his "capacity to govern." There is some reason for thinking that Stevenson had an "image problem" here; but one must go back to Horace Greeley in 1872, a full century ago, to find a candidate about whom a more pervasive doubt on this score has developed. Second, the level of popular discontent with the existing order of things is, as I indicated before, extremely high. People appear to be correspondingly sensitive to "opportunism" among political leaders. This is especially so when a leader who claims to be above it comes to be viewed as being as opportunistic as all the rest. Whether such a view is "right" or "wrong" is immaterial. Finally, to the extent that the discontent is in fact particularly directed against "interest-group liberalism," a quota system may be widely seen as its logical—and *illegitimate*—fruit.

But it seems to me very easy—too easy, in fact—to dwell upon these manifest inadequacies in the McGovern campaign. After all, only a member of President Nixon's immediate entourage would be likely seriously to believe that his leadership is inspired or inspiring. This incumbent administration is literally full of holes. The emergent FBI disclosures, going vastly beyond that "tip of the iceberg," the Watergate incident, go far toward demonstrating the literal truth of Senator McGovern's charges about the moral obliquity of this administration. Yet the overwhelming mood is one of apathy verging on narcolepsy, if not catatonia. Why is this? I believe that the general answer to the question lies somewhere in the direction of the following propositions:

(a) McGovern as a candidate has so thoroughly stultified himself that a very large part of the American electorate has literally "tuned him out."

(b) This tuning out also has a very great deal to do with popular identification of McGovern with the bankrupt liberalism of the 1960s.

(c) People in the main do not care very much about political corruption even when proved: the elections of 1872 and 1924 form good historical examples of this proposition. They come to care about it only when some systemwide malfunction directs their hostility against the incumbent party *for other reasons* (as, e.g., in the election of 1876), usually economic ones.

(d) The crucial, central point as I read it, is this: Because of the structural crises alluded to here, a popular settling of accounts with interest-group liberalism is still going on: it is still unfinished business. Here, I believe, is the crux of the matter. Nixon is the incumbent; but Nixon and his administration have credibly presented themselves as antagonists to this liberalism. Until very recently, it had the allegiance of a wide array of policy and academic elites, it thus becomes uniquely possible for an incumbent administration to project itself *as opposed to an establishment,* to project itself virtually as the representative of the alienated (white) underdog.

(e) If Nixon were another Theodore Roosevelt, he could fashion a landslide against this "establishment" out of positive support for himself and his persona. Since he is not, the landslide becomes almost wholly negatively based; consequently, it becomes manifest by political narcosis, and by the most conspicuous noncampaign in the history of American electoral politics.

(f) If one seeks some historical parallel for this, crude as it is, we may find the most relevant to be the elections of 1920 and 1924; for the latter, in my view, reflected a continuation of the popular settling of accounts with Wilsonian liberalism which led to the Harding landslide of 1920. Not that this parallel is very exact, to be sure, but it is there nevertheless.

This overlong discourse is a "working paper" which—for whatever if may be worth—I am glad to share with my friends, students, and colleagues. Its basic theme may seem similar at first blush to Scammon and Wattenberg's "real majority" or even to Kevin Phillips's "emerging Republican majority." But it really isn't. As I read the evidence (and my hunches and "informed suspicions"), we are witnessing *the progressive radicalization of American politics.* But this turns out to be something very different indeed from the visions of further "breakthrough" reforms of society-through-politics which the McGovern coalition had.

On the surface, it could plausibly be argued that American politics is still dominated by a "vital center" and that "extremist" candidacies, whether of the Goldwater 1964 or the McGovern 1972 variety, are rejected by that center. But this view fails to deal with two issues. The first is that of explaining the conditions under which "radicals" like Goldwater and McGovern could win control of major parties at all. And it is by no means enough simply to argue that primary- and general-election clienteles are of very different orders of magnitude. Secondly, such a view fails to take into accunt the movement of that "center" *across time,* or to contemplate the possibility that a counterrevolution of the great middle against the purveyors of a now-bankrupt interest-group liberalism is what the election is really about this year.

In any case, there are excellent reasons for supposing that George Wallace represents as much of the "wave of the future" in American politics as does George McGovern, and maybe more. We may conclude with two brief and very shrewd passages by H. L. Mencken on the 1920 election. The first has to do with the bankruptcy of an earlier, Wilsonian, liberalism—like its remote successor, extinguished in the ashes of war:

> Americans tire, after twenty years, of a steady diet of white protestations and black acts; they are weary of hearing highfalutin and meaningless words; they sicken of an idealism that is oblique, confusing, dishonest and ferocious. . . . Today no sane American believes in any official statement of national policy, whether foreign or domestic. He has been fooled too often, and too callously and impudently. Every idea that has aroused him to sentimental enthusiasm and filled his breast with the holiest of passions has been dragged down into the mud by its propounders, and made to seem evil and disgusting. . . . He wants a renaissance of honesty—even of ordinary, celluloid politician's honesty. Tired to death of intellectual charlatanry, he turns despairingly to honest imbecility.
>
> —H. L. Mencken, "In Praise of Gamaliel,"
> Oct. 18, 1920

The second of Mencken's comments has to do with the subjective political realities of the American class structure of 1920. There has been less change since then than many of us may have supposed.

> The United States has never developed a true proletariat. . . . Instead, it has simply developed two bourgeoisies, an upper and a lower. Both are narrow, selfish, corrupt, timorous, docile and ignoble; both fear ideas as they fear the plague; both are in favor of 'law and order,' i.e., harsh laws, unintelligently administered. . . .
>
> The boobs, in fact, were against political radicalism as violently as the trembling captains. They always are, and for a reason lately plainly stated by Secretary Colby: they hope to rise and believe that they *will* rise—they want the loot protected so that it will be still there when they come to collect their share of it. Until this universal belief in prosperity around the corner dies out in the American people, there can be no serious radical movement in the republic. Now and then—as after 1893—there may

be a few growls, but that is as far as the thing will go. Nor can there ever be any genuine passion for liberty, or any organized movement against harsh laws, or any effective punishment of profiteers. Such things, to the bourgeoisie, are not evils; they are goods; upon them the whole structure of bourgeois society rests.

Only one thing will ever seriously damage that structure: unsuccessful war. The day the United States is beaten on land and sea, and the unbroken hope of 144 years suddenly blows up—that day it will be high time to look for the birth of radicalism. Until then, let us snooze in peace. We are all safe. All we have gobbled we may keep.

—H. L. Mencken, "Optimistic Note,"
Nov. 29, 1920

One may discount all of the elitism in Mencken's comments and still see the validity of both points in his argument—and what is more, their relevance to the 1972 election. Whether in fact crisis is once more to be resolved in "normalcy" remains to be seen. It seems to me that one very important truth of American politics is that liberalism repeatedly crashes against the outer limits of what the system can provide without *fundamentally* changing its character or beneficiaries, and so regularly comes to grief. Another equally important truth of American politics is that the political system normally works in a multitude of ways to scale mass demand down to the point where it can be accommodated without undue strain. This worked brilliantly during the Normalcy era. Mr. Nixon's first administration has been dedicated to scaling down again in ways relevant to this particular era in American history. "Four more years" will tell the tale as to whether this is still a viable strategy.

In the meantime, we see the extraordinary spectacle of an incumbent running for re-election and being re-elected in a time of vast, pervasive discontent: an incumbent running as a kind of underdog against an "establishment" which he somehow—despite his incumbency—is able to identify with his opponent. There has been nothing like it in the history of American politics. As to the aftermath, I am more than inclined to suspect that a decade hence we will come back to Peterkin's question about the Battle of Blenheim: "But what good came of it at last?" "That I cannot tell, but it was a famous victory." In the meantime, and for the present, let's leave "four more years" in the hands of the Providence which has always watched over the destiny of these United States.

WALTER DEAN BURNHAM
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

TO THE EDITOR:

Jeffrey L. Pressman's recent article "Preconditions of Mayoral Leadership" (*APSR*, 66 [June, 1972], 511–524), presents an interesting case study of mayoral behavior as figureheadship. In evaluating Mayor John Reading's performance, Mr. Pressman constructs a model of an "ideal" mayor and lists a set of preconditions for mayoral leadership. Unfortunately, Pressman's model is based mainly on research in communities interpreted in the literature as pluralistic and overlooks the effect of variations in community power and conflict structures on mayoral leadership styles, strategies, and performances. By basing his model on findings from only one type of situational context, Pressman underemphasized some important constraints on contemporary mayoral leadership and may have overestimated the potential of anyone, no matter what his personality, skills, or institutional resources, to attain the "ideal" mayor's goals in many American cities. Further, by using a rarely attained model as an evaluative standard, Pressman might have been too harsh on Mayor Reading and too hopeful that someone else could be more effective in Oakland.

In every community there is some conflict associated with the management of local government. However, the structure of conflict—its participants, stakes, intensity, focus, and forms of expression—differ across communities and over time. In studies of mayoral leadership there has been too little attention given to these variations and the impact of different configurations of groups and cleavages on political institutions and leadership activities. Since political structures vary, the pluralist model of mayoral leadership must be only one of a potential set of models of mayoral behavior. Its value as an explanatory tool, an evaluative standard, and a strategic device depends on its fit with a complex, variegated reality. How well does Pressman's model fit contemporary urban realities?

In the earlier pluralist studies of mayoral leadership, communities were interpreted to be multipolar, having low or moderate degrees of conflict. Mayoral performance was assessed on four criteria: the mayor's ability to mobilize community involvement, to integrate diverse interests, to activate innovative programs, and to convert the focus of community politics from a system of multilateral competition to a system of mayor-dominated politics, an executive-centered coalition. Because of the dispersion of power and veto privileges, innovationminded mayors built coalitions in which they served as brokers among the competing groups and which they used to mobilize support behind broad, overarching programs. The search for feasible innovative programs—usually couched in the rhetoric of collective goods—became the major entrepreneurial task for mayors in these pluralistic communities.

In Pressman's analysis, Mayor Reading's ineffectiveness is primarily explained by the absence of certain institutional and organizational preconditions for civic entrepreneurship. Pressman's analysis is consistent with his model. However, mayoral ineffectiveness can also be explained by factors Pressman's model underemphasized. Executive ineffectiveness can also be explained by changes in the structural preconditions of pluralist politics that affect the prospects for coalition building and civic entrepreneurship.

In many American cities increases in black populations have combined with rising black militancy and the uneasiness and hostility of white working-class residents to produce racial cleavages that are far more severe than the cleavages discussed in earlier studies of mayoral leadership. The political structure of many cities has changed from a system of multipolar competition of a low or moderate intensity to a system of bipolar or polarized conflict. Under conditions of racial polarization, both black and white leaders seek to block new programs that benefit the other racial group. The obstructionist tactics of racial politics militate against the kinds of innovative policies Pressman's "ideal" mayor might pursue and helps to explain the political immobilism of many American cities.

Since the bipolar conflict structure represents a different political reality than the pluralist structure implicitly assumed in Pressman's model, some of the structural preconditions that underpin mayoral entrepreneurship are worth examining in the context of racial polarization. Among the conditions that are said to foster pluralist politics, three are most affected by racial polarization. It has been argued that pluralist politics are more likely to occur when there is (1) an expanding set of divisible political stakes and collective goods that can be allocated without emotionally charged after effects; (2) fundamental sociopolitical agreement among a substantial majority of citizens; and (3) a commitment by officials and interest group leaders to a set of rules or bargaining conventions that lend stability and legitimacy to the policy-making process. As many cities entered the last half of the 1960s, racial polarization produced changes in each of these preconditions affecting the feasibility of entrepreneurial strategies.

Of those substantive stakes usually associated with urban politics—public office or employment, money, and governmental services—even the casual observer notices their increased scarcity in most major cities. Even when some slack resources can be found, or when symbolic rewards can be substituted for substantive programs, mutual suspicion between white and black leaders often makes any form of brokering or innovation impossible. Under conditions of racial polarization, issues that might be considered public or collective goods and conform to the model of the overarching policy—like urban renewal, pollution control, recreation programs, and law-and-order policies—are often interpreted for their distributional impacts, seen as favoring one racial group at the expense of the other. In communities beset by racial polarization, "community wide" programs are interpreted in terms of their secondary impacts and in terms of their symbolic significance. Even broker-oriented coalitions are extremely difficult to assemble because racial group leaders are continually on their guard against the threat of co-optation. In short, under conditions of racial polarization: (1) programs are interpreted for their psychic effects on the self-image of the contesting groups; (2) the distributional impacts of new proposals come under close scrutiny; (3) proposals are evaluated for their opportunity costs (i.e., What other program might better benefit either the black or white communities?); (4) the long-run political consequences of an innovation are carefully analyzed (i.e., Will a new program ultimately strengthen one side at the expense of the other?).

The well-publicized frustrations of big-city mayors who possess Pressman's preconditions and are committed to civic entrepreneurship pose some serious questions about the utility of the pluralist leadership model as an explanatory tool and as a strategic device. Constraints rooted in the social structure of American cities inhibit mayoral leadership, and a mayor's strategy of leadership must take into account the degree and form of community conflict. Mr. Pressman's model of mayoral leadership has implicitly assumed a low or moderate degree of conflict, and he fails to emphasize community conflict patterns as a crucial contextual variable or constraint on mayoral leadership. In polarized communities a mayor's pursuit of the liberal program goals Mr. Pressman's "ideal" mayor might promulgate would hardly "maintain within the political system a process of constructive dialogue between diverse groups which would contribute to harmony in the city" (p. 512).

CHARLES H. LEVINE
University of Maryland

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Levine is quite right to emphasize urban social structure as a factor which can influence the exercise of mayoral leadership. Indeed, I made exactly that point in my discussion of the difficulties posed for a mayor by Oakland's lack of politically-interested groups. And far from ignoring racial polarization, I sought to demonstrate how black-white confrontations in Oakland served to depress and immobilize the mayor.

My purpose in creating a model of mayoral leadership was not to initiate yet another round of debate about community power. Rather, I wished to construct a standard which might be used to evaluate the exercise of leadership in a variety of social and political settings. Levine argues that I may have set the standard too high, but an evaluative model which corresponded with the experiences of numerous mayors would not be capable of distinguishing effective from ineffective performance.

In any event, I did not say that shortcomings of mayoral leadership in Oakland were solely due to Mayor Reading's personality. I argued that social structure, governmental institutions, and personality factors were all important in limiting political leadership in the city. Instead of debating whether or not the evaluative standard is too high or too low, we ought to concentrate on identifying and studying those elements which enhance or inhibit mayoral leadership. And in this regard, Professor Levine offers a number of helpful insights.

JEFFREY L. PRESSMAN
Dartmouth College

TO THE EDITOR:

Isaac Kramnick, in his recent essay "On Anarchism and the Real World: William Godwin and Radical England," (*APSR* 66 [March, 1972], 114–128), missed and distorted the political essence of at least one anarchist theoretician and perhaps of anarchism itself. Moreover, he indicted a complex and diverse political tradition on the basis of the ostensible shortcomings of one thinker and a few contemporary actors, the latter whose connection to the rich tradition of anarchist theory is at best superficial.

While anarchists opt for a nonpolitical society as the only society in which people can achieve freedom and human fulfillment, most anarchists agrue that such a society can only be achieved by decisively political means, namely, a social revolution. To be sure, education is important. The people must be shown, as serious revolutionaries have discovered, that their misery is neither a necessary nor an inevitable condition of social life. But education can only raise the consciousness of oppressed people who must themselves revolt to achieve human freedom.

One anarchist thinker, Peter Kropotkin, observed that a social revolution would be necessary to facilitate an anarchist society, a society marked by the right to well-being for *all*. He was obviously optimistic in his belief that the revolution was at hand and utopian in his faith that people can abruptly reorient their lives, let alone societies. But he was quite realistic in his understanding of the political qualities of a social revolution and the inherent bias of parliamentary regimes against fundamental social and political changes. For Kropotkin a revolution is an abrupt, violent, and destructive political activity.

> Revolution . . . is not a simple change of governors. It is the taking of possession by the people of all social wealth. It is the abolition of all the forces which have so long hampered the development of humanity.
> ("Revolutionary Government," in Roger Nash Baldwin, *Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets*, N.Y.: The Vanguard Press, 1927, pp. 247–248.)

> A revolution is a swift overthrow, in a few years, of institutions which have taken centuries to root in the soil, and seem as fixed and immovable that even the most ardent reformers hardly dare to attack them in their writings.
> (*The Great French Revolution*, N.Y.: G. P. Putnam's and Sons, 1909, pp. 2–3.)

> . . . a revolution [means] the demolition by violence of the established forms of property, the destruction of castes, [and] the rapid transformation of received ideas about morality . . .
> ("Revolutionary Government," in Baldwin, *op. cit.*, p. 238.)

The means of revolution are forceful expropriation, and Kropotkin claimed that this expropriation must be total:

> It must apply to everything that enables any man—be he a financier, millowner, or landlord—to appropriate the products of others' toil. Our formula is simple and comprehensive.
>
> We do not want to rob anyone of his coat, but

we wish to give the workers all those things the lack of which makes them fall easy prey to the exploiter. . . .
(*The Conquest of Bread,* N.Y.: The Vanguard Press, 1926, p. 41.)

While a minority, presumably some anarchist group, ". . . is to prepare men's minds for the revolution," the people are the authentic revolutionaries. Kropotkin asserted that

> A handful of conspirators cannot fight an army . . . To an army must be opposed an army, and, failing an army—the people, the whole people, the hundreds of thousands of men, women, and children of a city. They alone can be victorious, they alone have conquered armies by demoralising them, by paralyzing their brute force.
> (*The Great French Revolution,* p. 154.)

Now it seems that Mr. Kramnick overlooked the writings of Peter Kropotkin, an anarchist theorist who clearly follows in the tradition begun by Godwin, but who does not fit Kramnick's alleged stamp of elitism and nonpolitical means of education and enlightenment.

Kropotkin was an educator of the people, but he did not snobbishly pretend superiority to nor was he disdainful of them. He did not advocate "wasteful" confrontations, and he was, as I have indicated, an advocate of a social revolution as the only means by which human well-being could be established. If that is not political, what is?

BRUCE GILLESPIE
City University of New York

TO THE EDITOR:

One can seldom find in a responsible journal a more grossly unfair book review than that by Franklin W. Houn of Alan Liu's *Communications and National Integration in Communist China, APSR,* 66 (September, 1972) 1064–1065.

The validity of Houn's general criticisms can be judged only by reading the book. The specific examples which he cites to support his judgment, however, are a string of misrepresentations or unwarranted inferences. I will briefly discuss them all. His example of "glaring factual errors" is Liu's statement that the content of newspapers in years before the Cultural Revolution "showed no dominant theme." Houn proceeds to substantiate Liu's statement by listing no less than nine diverse themes. The example of contradictions on the building up of Mao's prestige by or in the army (p. 99) is no contradiction at all if one reads with reasonable care. Likewise reading the text shows no inconsistency (pp. 53 and 110–111) concerning reliance on the mass campaign. That Mao destroyed the printed media during the early part of the Cultural Revolution because of their ineffectiveness (Liu's interpretation) is certainly quite as sustainable as Houn's view that it was because the persons controlling them were "taking the capitalist road"; the latter idea smacks of naive propaganda. Finally, the allegation that Liu charged that "Mao has never been willing to 'improve the material conditions of peasant's (sic) life,' " verges on falsification. The words of Liu are misquoted (the book, incidentally, has "peasants' "). What he says is that without a major change of resource allocation, "to couple political penetration with a change in the material conditions of peasants' life, the prospect that the Chinese peasantry will be fully integrated with the rest of the nation is quite dim" (p. 173).

Further criticisms are of sources and detail. Anyone glancing at the footnotes can observe that Liu uses very many, varied, and frequently original sources. The specific complaint of basing references to the Cultural Revolution "almost exclusively" on Chao Tsung's three articles, cited allegedly 22 times, is a weak effort to find a flaw. There are 84 footnotes to the chapter, of which 20 refer to thirteen articles by Chao Tsung in a reputable and recognized journal.

When a reviewer doesn't like a book, he can usually find much fairly plausibly to criticize. That Houn's effort to damn this work falls so short is a tribute to it as a thoroughly sound treatment of its subject.

ROBERT G. WESSON
University of California, Santa Barbara

TO THE EDITOR:

Wesson seems to have accepted the correctness of my overall appraisal of Alan Liu's book by his complete silence on my primary criticisms of that book in the first two paragraphs of the review and by his failure to cite any specific merits as a positive proof of the latter's claimed excellence. Instead, Wesson attempts to discredit my review by challenging some examples of the book's other flaws. All his assertions are untenable, however. First, Liu himself speaks of the absence of "dominant themes" (p. 138), not "dominant theme" as Wesson says. Thus my effort to correct Liu's error by listing a number of dominant themes in the Chinese press in the period under discussion does not "substantiate" Liu's judgement. The contradiction between Liu's two statements (p. 99) on Lin Piao's campaign to exalt Mao stems from the fact that the endeavor to build up Mao's image in both the army and the country at large began in 1960 and that the campaign to emulate the army that got under way in 1963 was not directly related to the former effort and certainly did not mark the army's first involvement in that undertaking. Despite Wesson's denial, Liu does praise anti-Mao elements' use of mass campaigns while chiding Mao for employing the same tactic (pp. 53, 86, 110–111). Nor am I prepared to alter my view that the suspension of large segments of the printed media (incidentally, it is inaccurate to say that Mao "destroyed the printed press") in 1966–67 (p. 33) was mainly because they had been under the control of persons "taking the capitalist road." If Mao's action had been indeed prompted by a low estimate of the utility of those media, one must ask why, since then he has reactivated more and more of them. If there is no explicit reference on p. 173 to Mao's alleged indifference to rural welfare, statements on p. 178 do expressly attribute Peking's problems in the countryside to Mao's "unwillingness to improve the material conditions of peasant's [sic] life." Liu's heavy reliance on secondary sources can be seen by the fact that there are altogether 269 footnotes to the book, of which 183 cite sources of that category exclusively. In discussing the Cultural Revolution, I must repeat, Liu makes undue use of three articles on the subject itself and some specific aspects of it by Chao Tsung (transliterated as Chao Chung in some footnotes) in the avowed anti-Communist *Tsu Kuo* magazine. In fact, he cites two of them once each and the third 22 times. The last article is a serialized one which Wesson apparently has mistaken for separate essays.

FRANKLIN W. HOUN
University of Massachusetts

EDITORIAL COMMENT

The Backlog. A glance a little further along in this section will disclose that our backlog is truly enormous. This means that once an article has been accepted for publication it must ordinarily queue up for about a year before it sees print. Many of us believe that this is too long for maximally effective scholarly communication. Although the *Review* has had this year-long glut of coming attractions for quite a long time, and seems to have survived pretty well, nobody knows how many discouraged authors have taken their articles elsewhere rather than face the delays attendant not merely upon evaluation, or rejection by the *Review*, but acceptance.

A number of suggestions have been addressed to this problem. Least attractive to the management have been proposals to create of the *Review* a procrustean bed, where certain kinds of political science are ruled out *a priori*. This in our opinion defeats the purposes of a scholarly journal, which are to present work that contributes to the growing edge of knowledge. If people knew where that edge was *a priori*, it would be a rather dull edge.

Another perennial solution is to rob Peter to pay Paul. By amputating book reviews from the *Review*, goes this reasoning, more space is released for the publication of articles. Another journal is necessarily then created to publish book reviews, which of course is paid for through the same Association budget that presently pays for the *Review*. If that budget is not augmented, for example by charging an extra fee for subscriptions to the journal of book reviews, there is nothing to be gained from splitting reviews and the *Review* asunder. Many statesmen of the profession have assumed that the imposition of what amounts to a book review tax on top of our recently renovated dues structure would at a minimum provide unpleasant news about the elasticity of the market for learned writing in political science and at worst set off an effete intellectual version of the Boston Tea Party—perhaps a Cambridge Sherry party.

Some of those who have shrunk from heroic solutions have sought to pass the buck to the managing editor, urging him to raise his standards and get tough, as well as giving other household hints. This is all very well, but an acceptance rate that is already as low as nine per cent does not leave much room for maneuver. We have, nevertheless, found ourselves demanding an ever higher pitch of enthusiasm from referees before accepting articles outright, and making revised articles jump hurdles about as high as newly submitted ones.

There is a point, of course, where this sort of thing begins to put authors off in large numbers. A scholarly journal can afford this only if the offended and discouraged are not very good scholars. If on the other hand, at least some of the articles we turn down should appear in the *APSR*, and an accelerating number of such articles are not even proffered to the *APSR* for evaluation, we shall have severely damaged the capacity of the *Review* to do its job for the growth of learning in political science.

This is a nice dilemma, and one we do not enjoy contemplating. One way to take the heat off is somehow to find the money in the hard-pressed Association budget to run a couple of fat issues and knock the backlog down to manageable size. If one of these days an issue of the *Review* arrives at the door looking—and hefting—more like an oversized blue brick than like a scholarly journal, readers may deduce that something drastic at long last is being done about the backlog.

Epistles. On the whole, the *Review* communications section is taken up with complaints. It occurs to us, however, that the epistolary mode is also suited to less doleful uses. Two letters in the current issue make the point. Both articulate notions that may or may not be worth an article-length exposition at this stage of the game. Both are long on speculation, short on verification. Both tickle the mind. We think there is room for such hors d'oeuvres of the intellect in the *Review*. But not too many of them, of course, since we have no desire to lose our hard-earned reputation as perhaps the heaviest meat and potatoes place in the world of political science.

Son of Youth. We have heard it said that the *Review* does not encourage submissions from graduate students. This is not so. The *Review* as a matter of principle makes no distinction about the sources of submissions. We welcome submissions from everyone. As a matter of practice, fewer than one out of ten articles submitted survives our anonymous reviewing process and is accepted for publication. Many are galled, as George S. Kaufman undoubtedly said, and few are chosen. We have no way of knowing whether graduate students contribute disproportionately to the population of the disappointed.

We do know, however, of graduate students whose work has appeared in these pages over the last few issues, or has been accepted for future publication. We suspect that sometimes an article will be submitted by a graduate student but by the time we get around to printing it the job market has metamorphosed another humble caterpillar into an assistant professor.

Facts such as these, if anyone cares to collect them, may or may not bear upon the question of whether graduate students ought to run their own political science journal. Law students run most law journals, and in many cases with great success. These are not uncommonly subsidized by law schools, and there are multitudes who will testify to the educational value of the experience. Students customarily contribute only unsigned notes to these journals, to be sure, and signed articles are almost always the work of professors and practitioners. So in this particular the *Review,* which does print signed work by graduate students on the same basis as material contributed by more senior scholars, may appear in a comparatively favorable light.

In a modest way, the *Review* seeks also to provide a little of the flavor of the law review educational experience to a certain number of Berkeley graduate students who serve as editorial interns. Interns do a lot of the tiresome work that goes into producing a journal, just as law students do for their journals. They do not share the joys and sorrows of making decisions about publication as law students do. Our experience with the interns to date suggests that if they did, the quality of the *Review* would in no way suffer. These decisions, however, remain with a managing editor accountable to the Council under the constitution of the association, for better, or worse, or more likely, for just about the same.

Articles Accepted for Future Publication

Paul R. Abramson, Michigan State University, "Generational Change in American Electoral Behavior"

Timothy Almy, University of Georgia, "Residential Location and Electoral Cohesion: The Pattern of Urban Political Conflict"

Peter H. Aranson, University of Minnesota, Melvin J. Hinich, and Peter C. Ordeshook, Carnegie-Mellon University, "Election Goals and Strategies: Equivalent and Nonequivalent Candidate Objectives"

Robert Axelrod, University of California, Berkeley, "Schema Theory: An Information Processing Model of Perception and Cognition"

Harry W. Blair, Bucknell University, "Minority Electoral Politics in a North Indian State: Aggregate Data Analysis and the Muslim Community in Bihar, 1952–1972"

Bernard H. Booms, Pennsylvania State University and James R. Halldorson, F. W. Woolworth Co., "The Politics of Redistribution: A Reformulation"

Steven J. Brams, New York University and Morton D. Davis, City College of New York, "The 3/2's Rule in Presidential Campaigning"

Christopher Bruell, Boston College, "Thucydides' View of Athenian Imperialism"

Blair Campbell, University of California, Los Angeles, "Helvétius and the Roots of the 'Closed' Society"

Andrew T. Cowart, University of Oslo, "Electoral Choice in the American States: Incumbency Effects, Partisan Forces and Divergent Partisan Majorities"

Harry Eckstein, Princeton University, "Authority Patterns: A Structural Basis for Political Inquiry"

Peter Eisinger, University of Wisconsin, Madison, "Racial Differences in Protest Participation"

Victor Ferkiss, Georgetown University, "Man's Tools and Man's Choices: The Confrontation of Technology and Political Science"

Virginia Gray, University of Kentucky, "Innovation in the States: A Diffusion Study"

A. James Gregor, University of California, Berkeley, "On 'Understanding' Fascism: A Review of Some Contemporary Literature"

Nobutaka Ike, Stanford University, "Economic Growth and Intergenerational Change in Japan"

Donald B. Johnson and James R. Gibson, University of Iowa, "The Divisive Primary Revisited: Party Activists in Iowa"

Richard S. Katz, Yale University, "The Attribution of Variance in Electoral Returns: An Alternative Measurement Technique"

Chong Lim Kim and Donald P. Racheter, University of Iowa, "Candidates' Perception of Voter Competence: A Comparison of Winning and Losing Candidates"

Warren Lee Kostroski, Wittenberg University, "Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns and Models"

Eugene B. McGregor, Jr., University of Maryland, "Politics and the Career Mobility of Bureaucrats"

James T. Murphy, Wesleyan University, "Party and Pork: Party Conflict and Cooperation in House Public Works Committee Decision Making"

Peter B. Natchez, Brandeis University and Irvin C. Bupp, Harvard University, "Policy and Priority in the Budgetary Process"

David Ray, Stanford University, "Membership Stability in Three State Legislatures: 1893–1969"

William H. Riker, University of Rochester, "The Paradox of Vote Trading"

David W. Rohde, Michigan State University and Kenneth A. Shepsle, Washington University, "Democratic Committee Assignments in the House of Representatives: Strategic Aspects of a Social Choice Process"

Douglas D. Rose, Tulane University, "National and Local Forces in State Politics: The Implications of Multi-Level Policy Analysis"

Lester M. Salamon, Vanderbilt University and Stephen Van Evera, University of California, Berkeley, "Fear, Apathy, and Discrimination: A Test of Three Explanations of Political Participation Among the Poor"

Kenneth A. Shepsle, Washington University, "On the Size of Winning Coalitions"

Brian Silver, Florida State University, "Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities"

Walter Dean Burnham, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, "Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse's 'Change in the American Electorate' "

William Cavala, University of California, Berkeley, "Changing the Rules Changes the Outcome: Party Reform and the 1972 California Delegation to the Democratic National Convention"

Ada Finifter, Michigan State University, "The Friendship Group as a Protective Environment for Political Deviants"

Peter C. Fishburn, Pennsylvania State University, "Paradoxes of Voting"

Kenneth Jowitt, University of California, Berkeley, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems"

John C. Pierce, Washington State University and Douglas D. Rose, Tulane University, "Non Attitudes and American Public Opinion: The Examination of a Thesis"

Stephen G. Salkever, Bryn Mawr College, "Virtue, Obligation and Politics"

Richard Zeckhauser, Harvard University, "Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto Optimality"

A. H. Somjee, Simon Fraser University, "Caste and the Decline of Political Homogeneity"

Peter J. Taylor, University of Newcastle-Upon-Tyne, "A New Shape Measure for Evaluating Electoral District Patterns"

Glenn Tinder, University of Massachusetts, Boston, "Beyond Tragedy: The Idea of Civility"

Vernon Van Dyke, University of Iowa, "Human Rights Without Discrimination"

Susan Welch, University of Nebraska, "The Impact of Party on Voting Behavior in a Nonpartisan Legislature"

Eugene R. Wittkopf, University of Florida, "Foreign Aid and United Nations Votes: A Comparative Study of Aid Allocations and Voting Agreements"

Roger E. Wyman, Rutgers University, "Middle-Class Voters and Progressive Reform: The Conflict of Class and Culture"

William Zimmerman, University of Michigan, "Issue Area and Foreign Policy Process: A Research Note in Search of a General Theory"

Woodrow Wilson and the Study of Administration: A New Look at an Old Essay

RICHARD J. STILLMAN, II
California State College, Bakersfield

Cornell University
Ithaca, N.Y.
Oct. 13, 1886

My dear Professor Wilson:

We have recently organized a Historical and Political Science Association, and I hope we shall be able in the course of the year to have a few addresses before the Association, and I write you for the purpose of ascertaining whether you have not some address on an administrative subject or a topic in comparative political methods that would be advantageous to our students. . . .

C. K. Adams[1]

News Item

Before the Historical and Political Science Association on the evening of November 3 Professor Woodrow Wilson read a very able paper on "The Study of Administration." Professor Wilson outlined the history of the study, showed how it was a comparatively new development in political science, very cogently presented the necessity and value of such study, and indicated the methods by means of which it ought to be carried on.

New York Evening Post[2]
November 4, 1886

A surprising number of students and scholars of public administration in recent years have returned to the pages of Woodrow Wilson's essay, "The Study of Administration," presumably for a deeper understanding of the historic antecedents of American administrative thought. Few modern readers, however, seem to draw the same conclusions about the essential point of Wilson's writing. For instance, recently Frederick C. Mosher in *Democracy and the Public Service* wrote that the essay embodied one of the earliest American statements pertaining to the separation of administration from politics. Wilson, Mosher stressed, "made the most vigorous statement on this dichotomy."[3]

Fred Riggs, however, disagrees. In an article on development administration, Riggs sees the reverse lesson emphasized, "For Wilson not only were politics and administration closely intertwined, but administrative action was scarcely conceivable except as the implementation of general policies formulated by political means."[4] The essay's basic truth, at least for Riggs, is that politics and administration are inseparable.

John C. Buechner in his text, *Public Administration,* offers a third perspective, specifically, the importance of Wilson's essay was his argument that the study of public administration should be akin to the central concerns of business administration, namely the values of "economy," "efficiency" and "effectiveness." As Buechner writes: "The basic premise of Wilson's arguments was that the affairs of public administration were synonymous with those of private administration."[5]

Indeed what lesson (or lessons) should be learned from reading this salient document in American administrative thought? Did it stress the dichotomy of politics and administration? Or their inseparability? Or was Wilson, as Buechner suggests, more simply an evangelist for the wholesale application of business values to the sphere of government?

Perhaps the best way to understand the significance of the essay is to begin with the origins of Wilson's academic interest in the subject.

The Intellectual Roots of Wilson's Administrative Philosophy: Johns Hopkins, Darwin, and Reform

While Woodrow Wilson had enthusiastically studied politics as an undergraduate at Princeton (1875–79)[6] and law at the University of Virginia (1879–81),[7] his serious study of government and administration began at Johns Hopkins University (1883–85). Johns Hopkins had opened in November, 1877, and by 1881 the University had appointed its first two full time graduate social science professors, Herbert B. Adams and Richard T. Ely.[8]

---

[1] Letter from Charles Kendall Adams, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1885–88,* Vol. 5, ed. Arthur S. Link (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 351.

[2] News item from the New York *Evening Post,* cited in *The Woodrow Wilson Papers,* 5, 358.

[3] Frederick C. Mosher, *Democracy and the Public Service* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 68. For a similar point of view on the essay, see John Porter East, *Council-Manager Government: The Political Thought of Its Founder, Richard S. Childs* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1965), p. 23.

[4] Fred W. Riggs, "Relearning Old Lessons: The Political Context of Development Administration," *Public Administration Review,* 25 (March, 1965), cited at p. 71.

[5] John C. Buechner, *Public Administration* (Belmont: Dickenson Publishing Company, 1968), p. 6.

[6] For a complete set of Wilson's college papers, refer to *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1856–80,* Vol. 1, especially his first published article on "Cabinet Government in the United States," pp. 493–510.

Both professors only a few years earlier had earned their Ph.D.'s at the University of Heidelberg (Germany). They were steeped in continental history, politics, and economic scholarship and were intensely committed to making Johns Hopkins a top-ranking social science research center.[9] In Dr. Ely's classroom the young Wilson heard his first lecture on the subject of administration, for as he wrote of Ely's lecture on February 27, 1885:

> . . . Dr. Ely read a brief paper upon Administration, prefacing the reading of it by calling attention to two points of interest in French administrative practice: namely (1) That over each administrative dept., large or small, a single officer is placed who is held strictly responsible for the workings of his dept., though he is often assisted by a council of advice. (2) Courts for the enforcement of administrative laws.
>
> In his paper Dr. Ely dwelt upon the importance of administrative study; upon the special necessity for it in this country, in view of the fact that our administration is the worst in the world; and upon the strange apathy which has hitherto reigned in the U.S. with regard to questions of this nature.[10]

Dr. Ely's course ran only a few weeks and was essentially an introductory bibliographical survey of the major European writings in the field, principally works by German authors: Rudolf von Gneist, Lorenz Joacob von Stein, Barthold Georg Niebuhr, Robert von Mohl, Ludwig von Ronne, Siegfried Isaacsohn, and John Kasper Bluntschli (Bluntschli's personal library had been donated to Johns Hopkins in 1883, making German writings readily accessible to the students).[11]

Wilson's intellectual heroes, however, at least those most frequently cited in his student essays, were British rather than German political theorists and statesmen, especially English conservatives and Manchesterians like Bagehot, Burke, Gladstone, Cobden, and Bright. In particular, Wilson admired Walter Bagehot's philosophic insight, literary style, and understanding of politics as a process of slow organic growth. Bagehot, wrote the youthful scholar, "would much rather . . . see [society] grow than undertake to reconstruct it."[12]

Wilson's conservative evolutionary view of society was reinforced by his teacher, Herbert Adams, whose favorite hobbyhorse was the "germ theory of politics."[13] American political institutions, according to Dr. Adams, were the result of a slow organic growth process starting with the village organization which in the fifth century A.D. the Angles and Saxons had

---

For several excellent accounts of Wilson's early life upon which this study is based, refer to: Henry W. Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson: The Academic Years* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967); George C. Osborn, *Woodrow Wilson: The Early Years* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1968); Ray Stannard Baker, *Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters, 1856–90*, Vol. I (Garden City: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1927); Arthur S. Link, *Wilson: The Road to the White House* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947); and Alexander L. George and Juliette L. George, *Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study* (New York: Dover Publications, 1956).

[7] Wilson studied law initially as a route to politics, as he wrote to Ellen Axson, October 30, 1883, "The profession I chose was politics; the profession I entered was the law. I entered the one because I thought it would lead to the other," in Baker, I, 109.

[8] Herbert B. Adams: born in Shutesberg, Mass. 1850, died 1901, A.B. Amherst 1872, University of Berlin 1874–75, Ph.D. Heidelberg 1876, Johns Hopkins Faculty 1876–1900.

Richard T. Ely: born in Ripley, New York 1854, died 1933, A.B. Columbia 1876, Ph.D. Heidelberg 1879, Johns Hopkins Faculty 1881–92.

[9] For an excellent account of the development of Johns Hopkins University and the role of Drs. Adams and Ely in building the social science department, see Hugh Hawkins, *Pioneer: A History of The Johns Hopkins University, 1874–89* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), especially chapter ten, pp. 169–86.

[10] From the Minutes of the Seminary of Historical and Political Science, Feb. 27, 1885, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1885*, Vol. 4, 303.

Dr. Ely later noted Wilson's enthusiasm for the subject he taught, "I felt that I struck a spark and kindled a fire in Wilson." Refer to Richard T. Ely, *Ground Under Our Feet* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1938), p. 114.

[11] A listing of Wilson's bibliographical index between 1883 and 1890 cites 26 entries on the topic of administration, mostly German works with a few French and English titles, refer to *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1885*, Vol. 4, 303.

Johann Kasper Bluntschli, 1808–81, was a Professor of International Law at the University of Heidelberg and had taught both Professors Adams and Ely.

[12] As quoted in Richard Hofstadter, *The American Political Tradition* (New York: Vintage Books, 1954), p. 242.

[13] Henry Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson*, p. 106 and Hugh Hawkins, *Pioneer*, pp. 300–301. Wilson resented this minute style of scholarship: ". . . digging into the dusty records of old settlements and colonial cities . . . seems very tiresome in comparison with the grand excursions among imperial policies which I had planned for myself," Letter to Ellen Axson, October 16, 1883, in Baker, *Woodrow Wilson*, pp. 174–75.

brought to England from Germany. These "primordial cells of the body politic," Adams argued, later developed into more complex modern institutions. In keeping with the Darwinian *weltanschaung* (equally popular with contemporary intellectuals such as Herbert Spencer, Sir Henry Maine, and William Graham Sumner), Dr. Adams put his students hard at work examining the minute details of the governments of the thirteen colonies in order to discover the evolutionary process of American institutions.[14]

Besides an extensive exposure to Social Darwinism, Wilson was exposed at Johns Hopkins to leading American reformist doctrines. The early 1880s saw mugwump reforms precipitated by the revelations of the spoilsmen and by the assassination of President James Garfield by a disappointed office seeker. The reformist thrust culminated in the passage of the Civil Service Act of 1883 (the Pendleton Act). As Leonard D. White astutely observed of the mugwump reformers:

> The demand for moral reform was most effectively urged outside the halls of Congress by a small band of citizens who were dismayed by the corruption of the postwar years, and who eventually came together in the National Civil Service Reform League. . . . [The League's] first task was to agitate for a federal civil service law and to secure corresponding legislation in the states; its second was to defend and extend the legislation that was eventually forthcoming. Around the League were concentrated the reform forces, and seldom have so few men with such meager resources produced such major results. They were, of course, carried forward by a tide of opinion which was progressively shocked by the evils of the spoils system, by a growing irritation on the part of the business community, and by the concern of thoughtful men over the prostitution of party and the weakness of executive power.[15]

Civil Service Reform was a lively topic of debate at Johns Hopkins and the faculty were active proponents of such legislation.[16] *Congressional Government,* Wilson's Ph.D. treatise and first book, reflects this reformist sentiment.

Congressional Government: A Prelude to "The Study of Administration"

Of the eight books Woodrow Wilson published during his academic career,[17] *Congressional Government* probably remains the only one still read and cited by students of government. Written in 1884 when Wilson was 28 years old and in his last year of graduate education, the book demonstrates Wilson's attempt to emulate the writing style and point of view of Walter Bagehot.[18] Bagehot's famous treatise, *The English Constitution* (1867), had sought to examine the British political system as "a living reality" and "organic whole." Similarly, Wilson's "Preface" to *Congressional Government* expressed his goal as: "My chief aim in these essays, has been, therefore an adequate illustrative contrast of these two organs of government (cabinet and congressional) with a view to making as plain as possible the actual conditions of federal administration."[19]

The thesis of *Congressional Government* was that the central features of the Federal Constitution with its checks and balances of the three branches of government as well as the balance between the powers of states and the federal government had fundamentally been altered. Since the Civil War, argued Wilson, the federal government had become omnipotent and Congress had emerged as the center of national power, eclipsing both the judiciary and executive branches. "The balances of the Constitution are for the most part only ideal," wrote Wilson. "For all practical purposes the national government is supreme over the state governments and Congress predominant over its so-called coordinate branches."

Primarily *Congressional Government* focuses on a description and criticism of the shortcoming of Congress, which Wilson saw as "a government of Standing Committees." He cited the enormous power of these committees in American Government—their fiscal irresponsibility, their secret activities, their fragmenting effect on party discipline and executive leadership. He believed that such Congressional dominance "parcels out power and confuses responsibility." "If there is one principle clearer than another," he concluded, "it is this: that in any business, whether of government or of mere merchandising, *someone must be trusted,* in order that when things go wrong it may be quite plain who should be punished. . . . *Power and strict accountability for its use* are essential constituents of good government."

---

[14] For a list of Wilson's readings of the contemporary Social Darwinian writings, refer to *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* 5, 19, note 1. Two excellent analyses of the impact of Social Darwinism on late nineteenth century America are found in Richard Hofstadter, *Social Darwinism in American Thought* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1944) and Morton G. White, *Social Thought in America* (New York: Viking Press, 1949).

[15] Leonard D. White, *The Republican Era, 1869–1901* (New York: Macmillan Co., 1958), p. 297. Also, for a detailed and insightful account of civil service reform, see Paul Van Riper, *History of the United States Civil Service* (Evanston: Row Peterson and Co., 1958), pp. 60–136, and A. Bower Sageser, *The First Two Decades of the Pendleton Act* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska, 1935).

[16] Henry Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson,* p. 118, and Hugh Hawkins, *Pioneer,* pp. 178–79.

[17] The eight books Wilson published during his academic years were *Congressional Government* (1885); *The State* (1889); *Division and Reunion, 1829–1889* (1893); *An Old Master and Other Political Essays* (1893); *Mere Literature and Other Essays* (1896); *George Washington* (1896); *A History of the American People* (1902); and *Constitutional Government in the United States* (1908).

[18] Henry Bragdon, *Woodrow Wilson,* p. 125, and George C. Osborn, *Woodrow Wilson,* p. 117.

[19] Woodrow Wilson, *Congressional Government: A Study in American Politics,* as quoted from *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1885,* 4, 13–179.

Like the other mugwump reformers of the 1880s—George Curtis, Carl Schurz, Dorman Eaton, Everett Wheeler, and Charles Bonaparte—Wilson was caught up in the pressing issues of the day, namely, how to make politics less open to the influence of the spoilsmen, less prone to political abuse, and more representative of the general public interest rather than of special interests. As George Curtis, a leading mugwump orator at that time, pleaded:

> What we affirm is that the theory which regards places in the public service to be distributed after an election, like plunder after a battle, the theory which perverts public trusts into party spoils . . . destroys the function of party in a republic, prostitutes elections into a desperate strife for personal profit and degrades the national character by lowering the moral tone and standards of the country.[20]

In the pages of *Congressional Government* Wilson had likewise pointed out the political abuses and irresponsibility of the legislative branch. He sought "a strong, prompt, wieldy and efficient government" and frequently looked over his shoulder at the British Cabinet Government, the model of his mentor, Walter Bagehot, as a possible means for restoring "good" government. Yet, his first book curiously falls short of specifically recommending cabinet government as a suitable substitute for the existing American system. Indeed he fails to recommend any cure at all for the ills he enumerates in *Congressional Government.*

Among the questions Wilson leaves untouched are: Would cabinet government really serve as the best remedy for America's institutional problems? Was a foreign system the answer for our domestic troubles? Or would another antidote be necessary to heal our political ills?

"The Study of Administration": Part I

In 1885, the year Wilson completed his first book and started his college teaching career at Bryn Mawr, he referred in a letter to R. L. Gould of his "work upon comparative systems of administration."[21] Three fragments of his early writing on the topic of administration (1885–86) have recently been published for the first time and, while brief and inchoate, these pieces suggest that Wilson's mind was increasingly being attracted to the study of administration as a possible method for correcting the political abuses so painfully apparent to the reformers of his era.[22]

The opportunity to address fully the subject of administration came on the evening of November 3, 1886. At the invitation of President Charles K. Adams of Cornell University, Wilson was asked to speak before the newly organized Historical and Political Science Association in Ithaca, New York (his speech was eventually published in the *Political Science Quarterly*, June 1887).[23]

---

[20] George W. Curtis, "Party and Patronage," in *Orations and Addresses of George William Curtis* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1894), p. 502.

[21] Letter from R. L. Gould, *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1885–88,* 5, 94–95. The actual letter Wilson wrote to Gould is missing from his papers.

Curiously, Wilson found little necessity to study administration firsthand in nearby Washington, D.C. As he wrote to Ellen Axson, January 22, 1885, ". . . If I wrote *Congressional Government* without visiting Washington, much more can I write upon the science of administration without doing so." As quoted in Baker, p. 259.

[22] *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1885–88,* 5, 43–54. The three fragments are each only a few pages long but clearly provide the basis for Wilson's "The Study of Administration." Interestingly Wilson entitled the first fragment, "Notes on Administration," then changed the title to read, "The Art of Government," and finally to "The Study of Administration." The changes in the title reflect his own evolution of thinking on the subject. For instance, in "Notes on Administration" he wrote, "I suppose that no great discoveries of method are to be made in administration." Yet in his final draft of the article, he states ". . . administrative study and creation are imperatively necessary. . . ." Refer to the Editorial Note in *The Woodrow Wilson Papers,* 5, 43–44.

[23] Letter from Charles K. Adams, *The Woodrow Wilson Papers,* 5, 351. For correspondence concerning the publication of his lecture in the *Political Science Quarterly,* refer to pp. 386–87. For interesting comments on the essay by Almont Barnes and Wilson's reply, read pp. 518–21. Also for correspondence with Herbert B. Adams which eventually secured Wilson a part-time lectureship on administration at Johns Hopkins, refer to pp. 393–94.

Text of "The Study of Administration" is cited from *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1885–88,* 5, 359–80.

The essay, "The Study of Administration," originally

"The Study of Administration" begins by introducing the reader to the general field of administration. According to Wilson, the study of administration developed because society has become increasingly complex, and government, more democratic. Reflecting the dominant evolutionary themes of his period, he argues, "There is scarcely a single duty of government which was once simple which is not now complex. Government once had but a few masters, it now has scores of masters." And next echoing the reformist anxieties about the trend toward the excesses of democracy, "We have enthroned public opinion and . . . the very fact that we have realized popular rule in its fulness [sic] has made the task of organizing that rule just so much more difficult." "The reformer is bewildered by the fact that the sovereign's mind has no definite locality but is contained in a voting majority of several million heads." Wilson then implies reform is necessary, but, believing like Bagehot in gradualism, "practical reform must be slow and all reform must be full of compromise."

And what direction should the reform take? In the body of his essay, Wilson offers a solution that he had increasingly been moving toward since 1885, namely, the study of administration. According to Woodrow Wilson, the study of administration would "rescue executive methods from the confusion and costliness of empirical experiment and set them upon foundations laid deep in stable principles." Elaborating on an earlier theme in *Congressional Government,* he connects the study of administration with methods for centralizing political authority so as to provide "clearcut responsibility which would insure trustworthiness." Drawing a graphic metaphor, he explains, "Self-government does not consist in having a hand in everything, any more than housekeeping consists necessarily in cooking dinner with one's own hands. The cook must be trusted with large discretion as to the management of the fire and the ovens."

Yet, Wilson, at this point, foresees a problem that would plague administrative scholars during the next century, specifically how "to make public opinion efficient without suffering it to be meddlesome." Early in this essay he seems to agree with the German scholar Johann Kasper Bluntschli that for the sake of efficiency administration and democratic processes should be separated. But at another point in his essay, Wilson views administration as deeply intertwined in the political realm, "Administration philosophically viewed is closely connected with the study of the proper distribution of constitutional authority." Wilson's essay thus vacillates between the two poles of thought regarding the separability and inseparability of administration from politics (thereby providing generations of later scholars with ample footnote ammunition for both sides of the argument).

One can, of course, speculate as to the reason why Wilson exposed this vital issue, yet failed to reach a clearcut conclusion about the problem. Was he unaware of how important this issue really was (or would become)? Was he hedging because other academic opinions were equally inconclusive on the subject?

Perhaps the truth of the matter was that this issue—i.e., the proper relationship between the administrative and political realms—was simply not his major interest. Rather, like the other reformers of his time, Wilson was more concerned with restoring moral qualities to government—insuring trustworthiness, improving honesty and responsibility, and securing efficiency. His central object was moral reform and he saw this ideal as best realized through the practical study of administration and the development of a civil service. "The ideal for us," he writes, "is a civil service cultured and self-sufficient enough to act with sense and vigor."[24] Wilson's nineteenth century mind was still not exposed to twentieth century scientific management—a political doctrine that would substantially favor a hard-and-fast division between politics and administration.[25]

"The Study of Administration": Part II

In the last section of the essay Wilson returns to another dilemma he had wrestled with in *Congressional Government*—the applicability of foreign experiences to American institutions. His first book had drawn frequent comparisons between the United States and British systems of government, and in the last section of the essay, he continues to find the comparative approach a useful endeavor: "If I see a

---

appeared in the *Political Science Quarterly,* 2 (June 1887), 197–222 and was reprinted in the same journal, 55 (December 1941), 481–506. Wilson's essay appeared six years before the first textbook on administration was published, Frank J. Goodnow's *Comparative Administrative Law,* two volumes (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1893).

[24] In the original draft delivered at Cornell University and deleted from the subsequent article appearing in the *Political Science Quarterly,* this point was stressed even more strongly, presumably in defense of the newly created Civil Service System, then only three years old.

[25] For the classic attack on the rigid separation of politics from administration in scientific management doctrine, read Dwight Waldo, *The Administrative State* (New York: Ronald Press, 1948).

murderous fellow sharpening a knife cleverly I can borrow his way of sharpening the knife without borrowing his probable intent to commit murder with it."

Though, again as in *Congressional Government,* Wilson retreats from any specific recommendations for importing foreign practices: "Our own politics," he argues, "must be the touchstone of theories." "Arrangements not only sanctioned by conclusive experiences elsewhere but also congenial to American experiences must be preferred." Ultimately Wilson seemed too imbued with the spirit of conservative Darwinism to accept the wholesale transplantation of foreign institutions upon American soil.

Curiously, though, by the end of "The Study of Administration" the reader still remains uncertain about the actual substance of the study of administration. The essay covers considerable ground, touching on several vital issues, yet always skirting the projected theme. One senses throughout an abstract enthusiasm for the subject under discussion, though Wilson meanders, never leading the reader into a step-by-step description of the flesh and bones of administrative study.[26] From time to time his essay likens the study of administration to "business methods," "instituting a civil service," "fixing responsibility for public action," or "a problem of distributing constitutional authority." Such a tangle of metaphors is indeed exasperating for any careful reader.

One might speculate that a clear definition was not Wilson's major intention in his essay. Rather what was more important to him and to his mugwump audience was finding an appropriate ideology to justify their efforts to strengthen the executive branch, centralize authority, and check congressional irresponsibility. And what would serve as a better rationale for their moral reforms in government than an abstract appeal to the higher law of administration? It seemed just the sort of "moral tonic" necessary to cure the frayed nerves of government, even though no one, not even Woodrow Wilson, was quite certain what the study of administration really entailed.

The Johns Hopkins Lectures: The Continuation of Wilson's Administrative Thought

"The Study of Administration" established Wilson's reputation as an administrative scholar and for the next nine years (1888–96), he was invited as a visiting part-time lecturer on administration at The Johns Hopkins University.[27] Many of the remaining lecture notes are only fragmentary and, of necessity, are frequently repetitious. His notes, however, indicate an expansion of themes first developed in his original essay. Increasingly, Wilson tended to view administration as caught up in the complex web of the political and legal fabric of society. As he stressed in 1891:

> No topic in the study of government can stand by itself—least of all perhaps administration whose part it is to mirror the principles of government in operation. It is not a mere anatomy of institutions. It deals directly, indeed, and principally with the structural features and operating organs of the state life. . . . Administration cannot be divorced from its intimate connections with the other branches of Public Law without being distorted and robbed of its true significance. Its foundations are those deep and permanent principles of politics which have been quarried from history and built into constitutions. . . .[28]

Eventually his lectures ranged over the whole field of government, in particular examining the comparative aspects of European political systems, for, as Wilson believed, "The problems of administration are . . . in a very real sense universal, international. A wide examination of governmental organs will discover, not only the differences which may exist between government and government, but likewise the general likenesses between them."

While Wilson expressed the desire to move in his lectures "from a description of the existing organs and machinery of administration to a discussion of its standing problems, its general tenets of efficiency, its essential boundaries," his lecture notes, perhaps because he initially staked out such extensive boundaries for the field, failed to go very far beyond description.[29]

---

[26] In a letter to Almont Barnes, Wilson himself says of the essay that it was "too broad, too general, too vague," as appearing in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1886–88,* 5, 518–21.

[27] Wilson's administrative lectures were given in three cycles of three years each (1888–90, 1891–93 and 1894–96). They were originally intended to develop the topic in a systematic fashion, but this approach soon proved impossible because every year new students entered the course. Wilson normally gave these graduate lectures at Johns Hopkins during February. Fragments of the lecture notes appear in *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson,* Vols. 5–8.

Concurrently, while giving the Johns Hopkins lectures on administration, Wilson during his first three years at Princeton (1890–93) taught a similar course there on administration. The course is listed in the Princeton Catalogue of 1890–91 as follows: "*Administration.* Lectures and collateral readings. Two hours a week . . . Senior elective and open to Graduate Students."

When Wilson taught administration at Princeton and Johns Hopkins, only two other schools in the United States (Columbia and University of Pennsylvania), were offering courses in the field. Refer to Anna Haddow, *Political Science in American Colleges and Universities, 1636–1900* (New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., 1939), pp. 180–95.

[28] *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1890–92,* 7, 114–15.

Conclusion

"The Study of Administration" is at best understood as a response to the issues Wilson raised in *Congressional Government.* His first book had pointed up the defects of congressional dominance of the federal government. Consequently he wrestled with the question of how to restore balanced Madisonian government, strengthen the executive branch, and check the political abuses of Congress. While he toyed with British cabinet government as a remedy for the inadequacies of the American system, his inherent Darwinian conservativism made him reluctant to propose any foreign solutions. "The Study of Administration" was therefore Wilson's pragmatic and indigenous method for restoring "good government."

"The Study of Administration," however, raises more questions than it resolves. Wilson's essay and later lecture notes fail to amplify what the study of administration actually entails, what the proper relationship should be between the administrative and political realms, and whether or not administrative study could ever become an abstract science akin to the natural sciences. Wilson remained ambivalent on so many points that ultimately a modern reader can only conclude, as did Leonard White, that "Wilson introduced the country to the idea of administration."[30] To argue that he did more than this would exaggerate the influence of his essay.

---

[29] At one point in his lectures in 1890, however, he did recommend a system of local government similar to the commission form of municipal government, first instituted in Galveston, Texas in 1901. See *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, 1888–90,* 6, 501–502.

Despite his auspicious and enthusiastic beginning in the field of administration and despite the acclaim from his own contemporaries, Wilson did not continue writing on the subject. His subsequent works such as *The State* and *Constitutional Government in the United States,* while touching on administrative problems, mainly were devoted to broader political subjects. As Alan Altshuler has noted: "Wilson did not consider devoting his scholarly life to the refinement of administrative techniques. He left that to more prosaic minds." Wilson did, however, later become quite a dynamic and innovative practitioner of the administrative arts as President of Princeton (1902–10), Governor of New Jersey (1910–13) and President of the United States (1913–21). For several interesting assessments of Woodrow Wilson as a practicing administrator, see Louis Brownlow, "Woodrew Wilson and Public Administration," *Public Administration Review,* 16 (Spring, 1956), 77–81; Henry A. Turner, "Woodrow Wilson as Administrator," *Public Administration Review,* 16 (Autumn, 1956), 249–57; and Henry A. Turner, "Woodrow Wilson: Exponent of Executive Leadership," *Western Political Quarterly,* 4 (March, 1951), 97–115.

[30] Leonard D. White, p. 46.

Woodrow Wilson to 1902: A Review Essay*

EDWARD H. BUEHRIG
Indiana University

Compilation of the Wilson Papers began in 1958. Twelve volumes have thus far appeared, bringing the record to mid-1902. By that date, in his forty-sixth year, Wilson had reached the culmination of his career as professor and was about to assume the presidency of Princeton University.

The *Papers,* chronologically arranged, record little prior to 1873 when, at age seventeen, Wilson entered Davidson College. Thus, since they reflect neither boyhood nor early youth—except the daydreams of a teenager who fancied himself now admiral, then general (of the British navy and army respectively)—they yield little against which to test the supposition of a stern, if loving, father, who exacted perfection from an admiring, though resentful, son. But neither is such supposition precluded. The Georges (*Woodrow Wilson and Colonel House: A Personality Study,* 1956) may be right in ascribing to Wilson a love-hate attitude toward his father and—in terms of subsequent bridling against threats to his ego—deducing therefrom a psychological explanation of the repetitive pattern of triumph followed by fiasco in his Princeton presidency, his governorship, and, finally, in his peacemaking.

Though lacking in anecdotal accounts of early family life (for which Ray Stannard Baker's biography remains the chief source), the *Papers,* beginning with Wilson's year at Davidson, contain many letters from home, but regrettably without counterpart of Wilson's to his parents, since hardly any have survived (that of 16 December 1888 being the earliest among the very few exceptions). With Woodrow away from home, his health, comfort, and spirits were objects of a mother's solicitude, while of exceptional interest are the letters of Joseph Ruggles Wilson to his son. A minister, leader in the southern Presbyterian church, a man of intellect and wit, and of quick, forceful expression, the elder Wilson's letters portray an unusual relation between father and son. There is in these letters no suggestion of constraint or of reticence. Quite the opposite, the impression is of an unembarrassed opening of mind and heart. To be sure, the unabashed terms of affection are exceptional in today's idiom. Used by the father, however, they are hardly open to the interpretation of disguise for unacknowledged hostility, though such protestation by the son would, of course, be subject to a psychological reading. Even so, such address, it must be emphasized, was common to all the correspondence among the Wilson kith and kin, and it seems also to have reflected a wider currency in the upper middle class of the Victorian South.

In the fall of 1877, Joseph Ruggles Wilson, sending ten dollars to Woodrow at Princeton ("until the Church replenishes my own small treasury"), wondered whether a new overcoat was essential to his son's health and comfort. "If so you shall at once have it. If not—wait a little. Be perfectly candid—as I am. Our interests are *one*. I will sacrifice anything for you, as I am sure you will for me." (I,318. Italics in original.) That father and son were indeed one in mutual regard and affection is so strong an impression that the burden of proof is on him who would read the record otherwise. Nor does young Woodrow's need for frequent reassurance in his strivings, nor his dyspepsia, so severe as to cause a year to elapse between Davidson and Princeton, and as to result later in his withdrawal after a year and a half of law at the University of Virginia, necessarily argue to the contrary, even though they suggest a high degree of emotional dependence on his parents. There can be no doubt that Wilson's was a highly complex personality—a thread that destiny was to weave into the fabric of American history. Yet, it remains conjecture that unconscious reservation attended his many laudatory references to his father, as, for example, in the dedication to *Congressional Government:* "To His Father, the patient guide of his youth, the gracious companion of his manhood, his best instructor and most lenient critic, this book is affectionately dedicated by the Author." [To which Joseph Ruggles Wilson responded: "My precious Son—Your book has been received and gloated over. The 'dedication' took me by surprise, and never have I felt such a blow of love. Shall I confess it?—I wept and sobbed in the stir of the glad pain. God bless you, my noble child, for such a token of your affection" (IV, 208).]

A widower since 1888 and long in poor health, Joseph Ruggles Wilson died in 1903. In the preceding years, a querulous note now and again crept into his letters. Yet neglect—if not wholly the plaint of age and illness—can readily enough be attributed to his son's exceedingly busy life, while the continued warmth and solicitude in Wilson's references to his father do not in the least suggest filial piety that sprang merely from duty.

---

* Arthur S. Link and associates, eds., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966–1972, Volumes I–XII. Pp. 8171. $240.00 [$20.00 per volume]).

That Wilson was frail of health and psychologically complex the *Papers* confirm. Any psychoanalytical deduction therefrom continues, however, to be highly speculative, and, with the record now as nearly complete as it will ever be, is destined so to remain—though one must summarily reject the grotesque allegations of Bullitt and Freud (*Thomas Woodrow Wilson: A Psychological Study*, 1965). Only animus can explain so improbable a contention, as is there entertained, that a defective personality—assuming the mantle of Jesus Christ—was Wilson's chief stumbling block preventing realization of his Fourteen Points at the Paris Peace Conference.

Wilson's method as political scientist was (within the confines of Western civilization) historical and comparative. His scholarly reputation has rested primarily on *Congressional Government*, although *The State*, a text treating the origins of government and law and comparing certain governments of the time, was used widely in successive editions in the United States and in four translations abroad.

Wilson had just turned twenty-eight when *Congressional Government* was publisned in January, 1885. Wilson was then in the second of his two years as a graduate student, but the book was quite independent of his studies at Johns Hopkins and was used only *ex post facto* for purposes of a Ph.D.—a degree that Wilson did not particularly covet, but for which he submitted to examination at the end of his first year of teaching at Bryn Mawr. [The fields were history (classical, French, and British and American constitutional development) and political economy (general principles, public finance, American political economy, and socialism) (V, 154–155).] *Congressional Government* was, of course, modeled on Walter Bagehot's *English Constitution*, a realistic account of the functioning of British government. Such an account Wilson attempted for American government, eschewing, like Bagehot, a mere "literary theory" of his subject. With forceful effect, he contrasted government by congressional committee with the ministerial direction and party responsibility of the British political system. That *Congressional Government* greatly influenced the outlook of American political science is evidenced as recently as 1950 in the report of the APSA's Committee on Political Parties: "Toward a More Responsible Two-Party System." In actual practice, however, the reforms envisaged by Wilson have not occurred. Even the erratic consequences of the congressional rule of seniority are today unabated. To be sure, there have since been notable instances of presidential leadership of the legislative branch—unaided, however, by any institutional alterations. Despite its perversities, American separation of powers persists, and, as our bicentennial approaches, the *Federalist Papers*, whose dedication to separation of powers Wilson regarded as doctrinaire, increase rather than diminish in esteem.

Continuing professional recognition is also accorded "The Study of Administration" (V, pp. 359–380), published in 1887, an essay that marks the beginning of public administration as a subject of inquiry in American political science. The *Papers* now reveal that Wilson himself—without having written a book on the subject—pioneered the field with thoroughness and originality. From 1888 through 1897, he lectured on administration four to five weeks each winter at Johns Hopkins. Extending through a three-year cycle consisting of twenty-five lectures a year, the course was comparative in approach, using the German and French administrative systems to gain perspective on the American, rendered peculiar in contrast both by its British antecedents and by its novel constitutional arrangements. The lecture notes (chronologically distributed in Volumes V through VIII), though in some years fragmentary, are on the whole sufficiently systematic and detailed (with considerable emphasis on urban government) to afford a good understanding of Wilson's treatment of the subject.

Until his graduate study, British history and biography had dominated Wilson's reading. Such, however, was American regard for German scholarship that it was incumbent on Wilson to learn the language, which he did at Hopkins on his own, though not well enough "to be emancipated from the constant use of the dictionary in reading it" (V, 385). In 1886 he laid plans to spend as much as two years at German universities, improving his facility in the language, attending lectures, and engaging in "wide observation of men and things" (V, 385); but Mrs. Wilson's second pregnancy intervened. Wilson's exploration of the field of public administration was heavily dependent on German sources, as was the content of *The State*, while his course bibliographies at Princeton were replete with German references. Given the comparative approach to law and government typified by Wilson and considering the European-centered world of his time, one clearly sees the origin of German and French as the "tool skills" that have for so long attended advanced study of political science in the American university.

Wilson's preoccupation with literary style cannot go unremarked. It was an obsession. Combined with an incredibly facile pen, it often resulted in tiresome rhetoric: language that one reviewer of *Division and Reunion* characterized as "overwrought" (VIII, 346). Though Joseph Ruggles Wilson was Woodrow's model, the father's style was by comparison the more economical and muscular. In a fascinating letter of 12 September 1887 (V, 587–588), the father—gingerly and only at Woodrow's insistence—criticized an article of his son's. "You have too much wealth in use for the purpose in hand," he said, "and hence you have only to appear poorer in order to appear stronger. . . ." "You are not stingy enough . . . in your acts of creation." "Perfection is within your reach if only you keep well to the road your already well-groomed steed which is too much disposed to go afield."

Nor can one leave unmentioned the hundreds of love letters, each a fresh and ardent reiteration of a mutual dependence that never faltered. Ellen Louise Axson, educated largely at home, a woman of native intelligence and artistic sensitivity, was no less articulate than Woodrow. Moreover, Woodrow's letters—immune to the temptations of formal composition—are notable for their descriptive power and force of characterization, including self-analysis (see especially letters to Ellen in the year 1885). A remarkable corpus simply as love letters, they also afford intimate insight into the prevailing attitudes (on woman's status, race, the South, etc.) and conditions (salaries, prices, health, transportation, etc.).

Unlike Jefferson's, Wilson's is not the seminal mind that would in itself warrant so vast an undertaking as that involved in the assembly and publication of his papers. Compared to Lincoln's utterances, moreover, Wilson's fall short in style and poignancy. Yet the sheer existence of so extraordinary a record of a major public figure, one as talented and articulate as Wilson, invites and justifies the enterprise in which Professor Link and his associates are engaged. One is curious, of course, about the shaping of Wilson's thought; and, in fact, the *Papers* afford the basis for understanding his idea of democracy. Even more, however, one is beckoned in his reading by the human interest contained in the *Papers*, for they are a window on another era.

Thus Francis Landy Patton, the last Princeton president in an unbroken line of Presbyterian clergymen, congratulating Wilson on his election by the Trustees (February 1890) to the Chair of Political Economy and Jurisprudence, alluded to "one or two criticisms that I have heard regarding your work on the State."

> . . . in your discussion of the origin of the State you minimize the supernatural, and make such unqualified application of the doctrine of naturalistic evolution and the genesis of the State as to leave the reader of your pages in a state of uncertainty as to your own position and the place you give to Divine Providence. More particularly have I been reminded of the fact that while you have devoted inordinate space to Roman law and while you credit Roman law with its full share of influence upon the regeneration of modern society, you are silent with respect to the forming and reforming influences of Christianity.

The Trustees, Patton said, "mean to keep this College on the old ground of loyalty to the Christian religion," and would "not regard with favour such a conception of academic freedom or teaching as would leave in doubt the very direct bearing of historical Christianity as a revealed religion upon the great problems of civilization" (VI, 526–527).

I wish finally to commend the meticulous job of editing: annotation of the *Papers* is complete and the index both thorough and helpful. Meanwhile, the great bulk of the *Papers* still lies ahead, for in 1902 Wilson had just begun to catch the public eye.

EDWARD H. BUEHRIG

Indiana University

BOOK REVIEWS

Critical Interruptions: New Left Perspectives on Herbert Marcuse. Edited by Paul Breines. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1971. Pp. 188. $5.50.)

Herbert Marcuse. By Alasdair MacIntyre. (New York: Viking Press, 1970. Pp. 114. $1.65.)

The collection of essays edited by Mr. Breines is dedicated "to Theodor W. Adorno and Ho Chi Minh." This curious juxtaposition tells one more about the American New Left than whole volumes of criticism. Adorno in his last years had become the prime target of neo-Stalinist student activists in the West German Federal Republic, primarily because he refused to subscribe to the fashionable cult of the Third World. It is arguable that on this point Marcuse has taken a different position, but the dedication permits misleading inferences to be drawn about the Frankfurt school of neo-Marxism founded by Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, and Herbert Marcuse in the 1950s and currently represented by Jürgen Habermas and Alfred Schmidt. It is of the essence of the matter that all these writers rejected the Leninist interpretation of Marxism, whereas Ho Chi Minh—like other notable Third World figures—was not merely a primitive Leninist, but an active Stalinist who *inter alia* massacred all the Trotskyists he could lay hands on. The attempt to link Frankfurt with Hanoi is either naive or disingenuous. It is also at variance with the tone of Mr. Breines's introductory essay where one may read:

> At present the New Left appears to have utterly and decisively freaked out—and it may have. Normal and intense factional debate has not only suddenly been replaced by a blaring carnival of fetishized and mind-clogging rhetoric, but the rhetoric itself is "new." Actions and theories are now upheld or denounced in the name of Marxism-Leninism, proletarian internationalism, revolutionary discipline, the working class, the Black Panther Party, Chairman Mao, the National Liberation Front of Vietnam, the dictatorship of the proletariat, the seizure of state power, armed struggle and, here and there, Stalin, Georgi Dimitrov, and the Peoples' Republic of Albania. At least momentarily, genuine *auto-critique* or critical self-reflection is scarce.

The title of Mr. Breines's essay is "From Guru to Spectre." That Marcuse has remained a guru even for the most sophisticated faction of the New Left may be inferred from Shierry M. Weber's essay, "Individuation as Praxis," which restates the basic anarcho-libertarian message of Marcuse's *One-Dimensional Man* (1964), the work that turned him from a cloistered scholar into a popular messiah. What is wrong with the world is that "at present technology is subordinated to capitalism and capitalist rationality" and this subordination breeds a type of conflict which can be discussed in Freudian or Reichian language: "Capitalism perverts modern technology by turning it to false purposes, false in terms of the basic value, the notion of man discussed at the beginning of this essay. The resulting system serves not Eros, the integrating life forces, but the death instincts" (p. 31). Soviet state ownership presumably has different consequences for the individual.

It was the peculiar achievement of Marcuse in the 1930s to amalgamate a few carefully selected Marxian concepts with an ontology derived from his teacher, Martin Heidegger. The final implication of this remarkable synthesis is now translated into New Left language by the contributors to this symposium, for example, by Russell Jacoby, who writes:

> To follow Marcuse, the necessity of subjugating Nature entailed the subjugation of man himself: this historical "project" deformed from the beginning the subject/object, man/nature relation. . . . Violence against nature is sustained by violence against man. "The ego," Marcuse tells us in *Eros and Civilization*, which undertook the rational transformation of the human and natural environment revealed itself as an essentially aggressive, offensive subject, whose thoughts and actions were designed for mastering objects. It was a subject *against* an object (p. 68).

While Marcuse relied on Heidegger, Jacoby relies on Spengler. "If, as Spengler has written, imperialism is civilization unadulterated, Nature was the first colony" (p. 68). This surprising reference to the principal theorist of technocracy is followed by a quotation from Rosa Luxemburg concerning the ill-treatment of animals. Syncretism could hardly be carried further.

Where the volume under review serves a useful purpose is in acquainting the reader with Marcuse's adherence to the Frankfurt school of neo-Marxism originated by the Institute for Social Research set going by Horkheimer in 1932. Unlike Marcuse, Horkheimer and Adorno are barely known outside Germany, which is a pity, since they represented the core of the Institute. Horkheimer's essays, originally published in the *Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung,* have now been reproduced in book form and may eventually reach the English-speaking world. Contrary to legend, the Frankfurt school was not significantly influenced by Lukács. Its interpretation of Marxism was pioneered in the 1920s by Karl Korsch, whose *Karl Marx* (1938, reprinted in 1963) is still one of the best introductions to the subject. It was Korsch who rescued the authentic Marx from the Leninists, while Lukács threw in his lot with Soviet orthodoxy. William Leiss's essay in the volume under review deals at some length with Horkheimer, but fails to bring out the insurmountable cleavage that existed from the start between the Frankfurt group and the Leninists. This cleavage was rooted in the commitment of the Frankfurt school to the heritage of classical German philosophy, whereas Russian Marxism from the start found its principal inspiration in the materialism of the French Enlightenment—a materialism which is both contained and transcended in the writings of Marx. The pre-Hegelian, even pre-Kantian, character of Soviet philosophy was duly stressed by Korsch in his influential *Marxism and Philosophy,* recently translated into English and published by the British branch of the New Left. It is the starting-point for any rational discussion of the subject.

Some of these topics are pursued with great intellectual vigor in Alasdair MacIntyre's critique of Marcuse, published in the *Modern Masters* series. MacIntyre is particularly enlightening in noting the remarkable resemblance between Marcuse and the Left Hegelians of the 1840s from whom Marx had to emancipate himself before he could become the theorist of social revolution. As MacIntyre very pertinently observes, "we ought at least to consider the hypothesis that Marcuse is not a post-Marxist thinker" (p. 22). It is indeed remarkable how extensively some of the contributors to *Critical Interruptions* reproduce the problems of the Berlin Hegelians in the 1840s, a circumstance for which Marcuse must be at least held in part responsible. MacIntyre does not pursue this theme very far, being more concerned to stress the incompatibility of Marcuse's thinking with his own rugged empiricism. But he does bring out very well a notable peculiarity of Marcuse's theorizing: his tendency to characterize the difference between Hegel and Marx in terms of his own commitment to the notion that the idea of reason has been superseded by the idea of happiness. As MacIntyre notes, Marcuse does not produce a single quotation from Marx to support this view, for the excellent reason that Marx never adopted the idea of happiness as a human goal. The simple fact is that Marx was not a utilitarian, though some later Marxists—notably Kautsky—were. To quote MacIntyre,

> . . . most [Marxists] have been clear that freedom is a goal which may be incompatible with the goal of happiness. Trotsky's view that the gap between aspiration and achievement will be a permanent feature of human life, so that tragedy will be permanently relevant to the contemporary human experience, seems far more faithful to Marx's view than Kautsky's was. Moreover on this point Marx and Trotsky are surely right and Marcuse surely mistaken (p. 37).

He might have added that Marcuse's chief predecessor in this domain was neither Hegel nor Marx, but Ludwig Feuerbach. To the present reviewer, at any rate, it appears fairly obvious that in Herbert Marcuse the American New Left has found its Feuerbach. It is still awaiting its Marx.

George Lichtheim

Late of London

Law, Order and Power. By William J. Chambliss and Robert B. Seidman. (Reading, Massachusetts: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1971. Pp. 533. $12.50.)

This is a pretentious, mediocre book. Its authors, a sociologist and a law professor, are said to have benefited by a fellowship held by the senior author at the University of Wisconsin under the auspices of the Russell Sage Foundation. I'm afraid that the authors, in this *olla podrida,* have read not wisely but too widely and too narrowly.

The book starts out, after an innocuous statement of perspective, with a part on the creation of formal rules of law. After a bow to anthropology, they focus on whether law can be value-free. Of course, this discussion was bound to be tedious. The question can be answered both ways, depending on the level chosen. The authors first take up models (one of their favorite words) denying value choice. One is quite startled to encounter natural law under this heading. One's surprise is intensified when the authors talk about positivism as a theory that asserts value-choice by lawmakers. Then they get into a real morass when they talk about legal realism. To talk about legal realism when one is still discussing positivism vs. natural law reminds me of the man who wondered whether to go to Europe next winter or by air.

Legal realism can be consistent with either natural law or positivism. Most Americans have been conditioned by their legal system to be natural lawyers. British thinkers, on the other hand, who are not accustomed to a court's denying validity to certain acts of the legislature, tend to be positivists. It is an interesting paradox that most legal realists are natural law types.

Following this unfortunate venture into jurisprudence, the authors take up law-making institutions. Here it is unfortunate that they display no familiarity with the most influential, unpublished book on what I call applied jurisprudence, *The Legal Process* by the late Henry M. Hart and Dean Albert Sacks of Harvard Law School. That work asks what functions can be undertaken by courts, what functions by legislatures, what functions by administrative agencies, and finally (but first in their presentation) by the parties to transactions themselves. This last kind of law-making Hart and Sacks call "private ordering." Their scheme is one that cannot be ignored by anyone who addresses the problems of what can be done by legal institutions. Yet the authors ignore it completely and therefore are forced into a bland rehash of what political science has done to the study of legal institutions. On courts, what political science has done is to count, but not to think. This the authors faithfully parrot. It would take more than a book review to state what the deficiencies of that approach have been.

The authors next turn their attention to the substantive criminal law. In this shortest part of their book, they succeed in making in a scant 85 pages just about every mistake that can be made. Their discussion of *mens rea* is laughable: the centrality of the idea of the mental element in the analysis of crime has entirely escaped the authors. This lacuna leads them into an uncritical acceptance of the now discredited theories of Edwin Sutherland concerning so-called "white collar" crime. In their only reference to the contemporary debate between classical criminal law theorists and advocates of sociological theory, they unhesitatingly award the prize to the latter, without so much as discussing the contrary arguments.

The remaining part of the book professes to be concerned with "the implementation of law." Actually, it is almost wholly a tired recapitulation of what has been written about the criminal process. They pay far too much attention to what I would describe as the "official" legal version, the work of the National Crime Commission. This is interlarded with strong tributes to the work of what I would call "radical" sociologists (like Jerome Skolnick) to lend an air of being up-to-date, and therefore relevant. That too would require a separate essay to criticize. In their final chapter, they deal with what I would call "disorganized crime." They submit entirely to the official theories, which have been sanctified by the National Crime Commission, by the sociologist Donald Cressey and by the political scientist, James Q. Wilson. That there are contrasting theories does not occur to them (if one excludes a reference to Morris and Hawkins).

HERBERT L. PACKER
Late of Stanford Law School

Shape of Community: Realization of Human Potential. By Serge Chermayeff and Alexander Tzonis. (Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1971. Pp. 247. $2.95, paper.)

The authors mean to impress us with the fact that solving urban problems is a complex business. They are especially concerned that techniques employed in solving these problems are not used to define their solutions. Thus, they stress the importance of commitment as a prior condition to the use of techniques. The authors' commitment is toward humanizing life in urban areas. Man, as they see it, has become a victim of his own technology. While this victimization has occurred as a consequence of an evolutionary process, they argue that man must now plan for the uses of technology in order to attain desirable "sociological ends." Further, the aim of planning is to transform conflicting elements into complementary ones. They warn us that, "The most promising method for preventing ecological mayhem, if not the extinction of all living things on earth, undoubtedly must start with the planning for an excellent and comprehensive urban compactness" (p. 195).

The authors argue that planning for such transformations requires that all of the factors that constitute a given problem are sorted out and made explicit. They propose a "lattice-grid" approach as an aid to establishing priorities and clarifying solutions for problems. More specifically the aim is to relate human goals to technological means at different levels of interaction. The result is a "complementarity of goals, complementarity of organizing principles and complementarity of operational components irrespective of scale" (pp. 210–211).

The desirable human goal for the authors is the construction and maintenance of communities. By "community" they do not mean a geographically delimited area in which interpersonal relations are relatively stable and intense. Rather, they have in mind "places of concourse" to offset the dehumanizing effects of urban movement and transportation flow. They believe that such places should be devised along transportation routes so that pedestrians can "mingle and thus have a sense of community." Such places, the authors believe, can be made complementary to the human need for solitude and to the technological requirements of movement. The reader thus conjures up a vision of an area where people promenade, enjoy each other's presence, and take an avid interest in the shops and displays along the concourse. The authors' motives are worthy.

What is not so worthy is that it takes 244 pages, including appendices and a glossary, to tell us about the value of concourses, why we need them, and how to plan for them. The reader must have extraordinary perseverance to discover that this is really what the book is about. He must, in the process, deal with wide-ranging, disconnected commentaries, annoying metaphors and analogies, and obscure jargon.

The book opens with an account of technologically befouled ecology of man. Then comes a treatise on commitments to human goals. This is followed by a quick overview of evolution and by the authors' judgment that the four evolutionary "clocks" of biology, methodology, sociology and technology are not sufficiently synchronized; the principal problem as they see it is that sociological understanding has failed to keep pace with technological advances. Next, the reader is served a jargon-laden discussion on models, the problems of urban planning, and the myopia of urban planners and allied professions.

The graphic presentation of the text seems needlessly confusing. The chapter and section headings are printed in the left-hand margins, where they seldom caught this reader's attention. Footnotes and inspirational quotations are also entered in the margins, perpendicular to the text. It's rather annoying to have to turn the book sideways in order to read them, but apparently this is all part of the authors' master plan. What better way to convey the complexities of urban problems than to make the text and its presentation convoluted? As the authors state in the prologue, "he [the reader] is invited to become, as it were, a functionary to help structure the complex urban order with us and in so doing help overcome the restrictions of a linear narrative system" (xxvi). The prologue itself is presented in "random assemblage form" in an attempt to help overcome the difficulties of "one-dimensional representation of a multi-dimensional order of great complexity" (xxvii). Unfortunately, both the content of the book and its mode of presentation seem far more pretentious and complex than the issue of "concourses" warrants.

JOSEPH SMUCKER
Sir George Williams University, Montreal

The Child's Construction of Politics. By R. W. Connell. (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 1971. Pp. 251. $4.95.)

When I first received this book I flipped through the pages, much in the manner of most of us when trying to make a quick judgment about a new work. My initial judgment, based on this quick sampling, was not altogether favorable. I was upset primarily by what seemed to be an inordinate quantity of verbatim interviews. In some portions these materials continued for several uninterrupted pages. Now, virtually everyone doing research in political socialization uses interviews, either of the fixed format, survey variety or the in-depth, probing type. In addition, we all know that it is fun and even enlightening to listen to children's portrayals of the political world. Still, do we want to wander through a book saturated with dialogues between an adult investigator and children ranging in age from five to sixteen? After all, it isn't too difficult to conduct such dialogues on our own; and besides, case materials can quickly lead to an obsession with the idiosyncratic—all very interesting, but where does it take us in any systematic sense?

Happily, I dutifully tried to overcome this initial impression and proceeded to give the book a "fair" trial. While I still have strong reservations about the ratio of case materials to discussion and interpretation, I am nevertheless persuaded that this is a tremendously important work. It is, in the first place, the first major report which attempts to develop a theory of political learning. True, there have been preliminary efforts and hints, but I think no other work links up data with learning theory in such a clean, articulate fashion. A second major virtue is that it shows how what are essentially case studies can be used in a rigorous, systematic fashion. Again we have some precursors, notably Greenstein in political science and Adelson et al. in psychology. But Connell, partly because he takes a full book to do it, comes closer to illustrating the rich potential of the method.

The raw materials for the undertaking come from extended interviews with 119 children living in various suburbs in Sydney, Australia. As the protocols amply reveal, a direct, nonthreatening approach was used in the tape-recorded interviews. Surprisingly, perhaps, the fact that these are Australians rather than Americans, Germans, Japanese, etc., seldom gets in the way of the analysis. Obviously, the names and places make a difference, but not much. More significant is the geographical location of Australia and the political history born out of that location. Specifically, there is the "threat" phenomenon—the worry about being invaded and conquered by alien forces—which has conditioned Australia's children for generations. Apart from this element and the fading presence of the British crown, few culture-specific attributes limit the wider application of the work.

But the major reason topical and country-specific elements do not reduce the general usefulness of this study is that the author is primarily trying to erect a theory of preadult political learning. It is the how rather than the what of learning which forms the central focus. As with any good general theory, this one allows for substitutibility of particulars. Connell is heavily influenced by the stages outlined by Piaget and by other cognitive learning theorists. To this end, and drawing directly on the case materials, he constructs a two-dimensional paradigm of political learning. The first dimension has to do with the stages of learning and is divided into four more or less age-graded categories: intuitive thinking, primitive realism, construction of the political order, and ideological thinking. Accompanying this essentially cognitive development is one more affective and evaluational in nature, what Connell calls "stances." This is the more innovative conceptualization and consists of two classes. The first is marked by a view that politics is nonproblematic, and in this stance most judgments are of a random, unqualified, *ad hoc* nature. In the second stance politics is recognized as being problematic; preferences come into being, alternatives are advanced, the interconnected nature of stances is often recognized, and the problematic nature of one's own political behavior is identified. In the nature of such a paradigm, the contribution of the self to political learning looms large. While the indebtedness of Connell to the developmental and maturational theorists is thus apparent, it would be a mistake to say that he had simply applied their precepts to political learning. He makes clear the difference between learning about the physical world versus the political world, and it is, I think, a fundamental difference.

While succeeding admirably at the micro level, Connell fares less well when turning his attention, ever so briefly, to societal matters. He shares with others the dissatisfaction with what he calls the ". . . twofold preoccupation with induction into norms and the stability of systems" (p. 234) characterizing much of the political socialization literature. His proposed alternative regards the development of political belief ". . . as a contingent, historical process . . . which stretches across historical time and which links events present with events past" (p. 235). Fine, but there is nothing in Connell's admittedly cursory explication of this idea which forges any two-way link between the individual and the political process. It might tell us how historical tradition helps shape the political orientations of the child, but it would seem to go little beyond that. Nor is Connell much more persuasive when talking about social control and freedom, seeming to imply that the Aussie children, compared with those from a number of other countries, are growing up in a much less indoctrinated fashion. I would suggest that indoctrination is far more subtle than Connell admits. What I consider to be shortcomings in these areas should not detract in the least from Connell's major achievements.

M. Kent Jennings
The University of Michigan

Bernard Shaw: The Road to Equality: Ten Unpublished Lectures and Essays, 1884–1918. With An Introduction by Louis Crompton. Edited by Louis Crompton with the assistance of Hilayne Cavanaugh. (Boston: Press, 1971. Pp. 348. $9.95.)

Louis Crompton's discovery in the British Museum of ten previously unpublished essays and lectures now adds *The Road to Equality* to Shaw's *Intelligent Woman's Guide to Socialism* and *The Fabian Essays.* In the first essay, "Our Lost Honesty," written in 1884, Shaw proclaims that England is a slave state. This youthful radicalism comprehends distrust of the British party system, the Crown, the Houses of Lords and Commons, in short, the whole "establishment." But he perceived at an early date the defects in Utopian socialism and communism, which he also thought would not be accepted by the average British citizen. He advocates instead the gradual approach developed by the Fabians. "In the first place, it must be a continuous policy for developing our existing institutions into socialistic ones, and not a catastrophic policy for simultaneously destroying existing institutions and replacing them with a ready-made Utopia" (p. 31).

In "Freedom and the State" Shaw attempts a refutation of J. S. Mill's "Essay on Freedom." According to Shaw the alleged existence of "self-regarding actions" is a "decaying superstition" since there are no human actions which do not affect other human beings. Mill's position is therefore absurd because the natural rights of individuals are subject to limitations imposed by the rights of his fellows. Shaw thought that no one should have the right to claim an exemption from all moral and legal responsibility for his actions on the grounds of asserted individual rights. "In short, everything that a citizen possesses is held by him on conditions dictated by the community" (p. 125).

According to Shaw socialism is a "state of society in which the entire income of the country is divided between all the people in exactly equal shares, without regard to their industry, their character. or any other consideration except that consideration that they are living human beings" (p. 155). Because all governments are class governments, he advocates the abolishment of class structures by removing class distinctions which stem from inequalities of income. If incomes could be equalized, he suggests, class differences would be removed and real democracy would become possible. Shaw faces the paradox that although the working class and poor constituted a majority of the population and had the right to vote, the British government remained oligarchic, not democratic, in his opinion. Socialists were confronted with the average British working man's "conservatism" and the even "reactionary" tendencies of some labor union leaders. In contemporary America a similar problem emerges when the majority of the population is rich and middle-class, so that the poor are a minority. Rule by the rich and middle-class majority produces support for the capitalistic system rather than for equalitarian socialism.

In "The Climate and Soil for Labour Culture," written in 1918, Shaw provides a solution for the socialistic problem. The most significant factor contributing to socialism's failure in Britain, he holds, is the secondary educational system which produces a gulf between the university man and the wage worker. According to Shaw this discovery of the masses' conservatism made life dangerous for "men of modern culture." "Even Queen Victoria is now too liberal for us" (p. 293). The solution Shaw suggests is the extension of Fabian control over the educational system in combination with the invention of what he calls a religion of "creative evolution," a scientific religion dedicated to carrying man to the point where he attains a power and wisdom which would "now be called divine." "Socialism must have a positive religion, characteristic of and proper to the epoch which it is to inaugurate, with articles of faith and commandments based on it and accepted as the foundations of the Socialistic State" (p. 323).

Shaw's essays are marked by intellectual consistency. He defends the collectivistic state, the expansion of governmental power, and the economic, cultural, and political advantages of socialism. His wit, his humanity, and his insight into the foibles of human nature enliven the "dismal science." Despite his well-deserved reputation as dramatist, wit, and literary critic, he is not likely by virtue of these lecture-essays to be considered also a major political-economic theorist. Although their subject is supposedly economics, these essays consist mainly of summaries and commentaries on the ideas of others. Shaw offers no original theories and no empirical references to economic conditions in his own day. He does not move to discuss the ethical-moral-philosophical basis for his conclusions. Why, for example, is it better for the working class and poor to get a larger piece of the pie than the capitalist, and x, y, or z? Why assume the ethical-moral superiority and exclusiveness of economic equality as *the* definition of social justice? Could justice mean something more than or different from equality of incomes? Shaw's work provides no answers to these questions; this, in my estimation, is its essential weakness.

M. SUSAN POWER

Arkansas State University

Philosophy and Political Action. Edited by Virginia Held, Kai Nielsen, Charles Parsons. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972. Pp. 282. $2.95, paper.)

The present collection of essays is sponsored by The Society for Philosophy and Public Affairs, organized in 1969 by a group of philosophers intent on making concern for public issues a part of the activity of their profession. As one of the editors, Professor Charles Parsons, points out, the concern expressed in the title reflects the climate of political activism that has swept the academic world in recent years. He might have been better advised to refer to the weather than to the climate; rapid changes have occurred in the academic world during the last two years and one may well wonder whether today the same sense of urgency would have inspired the editors who assembled these essays—not to mention the authors themselves.

That Noam Chomsky, author of one of the

essays, should be hailed by the editors as an "inspiring example" of what can be accomplished in the area of philosophy and political action is indicative of the orientation of the book and the organization that sponsors it, although there is no party line and at least two of the contributors, Peter Caws and Robert Simon, hardly take positions that would bring joy to an activist's heart. Clearly editors and contributors alike would reaffirm Marx's celebrated eleventh thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only *interpreted* the world . . . ; the point however is to *change* it."

The volume is divided into three parts. In the first section, dealing with the issue of peaceful or violent reconstruction of society, Kai Nielsen supplies a precise definition of the difference between reform and revolution, finds that they are on a continuum, and explores the morality of recourse to revolutionary violence. Many readers will find the debate between advocates of reform and violent change a stale one and will wonder if anything new has been added in this essay. Popper and Marcuse are enlisted, the former in opposition, the latter in support of the possibility of a moral justification of revolution. Nielsen takes the side of Marcuse. However, Nielsen repudiates, as does Caws, the infantile leftist so confident of his ability to predict the future that he welcomes the worse as a necessary prelude to the better. But the very reason Nielsen gives is one of the best arguments I know for repudiating the flirtation or infatuation—as the case may be—of many adherents of the New Left with violence: "Our ability to make long-range social predictions is so slight that it is irrational to develop any considerable confidence concerning claims about how things must be" (p. 50).

For those of Nielsen's persuasion, Joseph Margolis, in discussing the possibility of an ethical defense of violence and destruction, must be a dubious ally for the very reason that prompts Nielsen to reject Popper. Margolis, one of a declining number of noncognitivists, rejects the possibility of objective ethical appraisal. Not only are there no values that all men support, there are no values that it can be said they *ought* to support. Consequently, individuals may rationally advocate the wholesale destruction of life: ". . . their claim may be disputed by partisans of another persuasion, but their claim is not obviously self-contradictory, incoherent, or morally ineligible" (p. 69). Clearly, Margolis's metaethic is unlikely to appeal to the average revolutionary convinced of the objective rightness of his cause.

A second section of this collection is concerned with civil disobedience and other methods short of violence for defying the state. Virginia Held finds that political protest by way of the ballot has been ineffective and suggests that the technique of the strike, since its efficacy has been established as an economic weapon, might be used with equal effectiveness as a political weapon. Such "political" strikes, which Professor Held distinguishes from civil disobedience, would be designed to hamper the administration of government and would take such now familiar forms as blocking entrances to public buildings, tax strikes, etc.

Professor Hugo Bedau sticks closer to the philosopher's last. His topic is compulsory military service, particularly whether there is a moral obligation to obey the draft law. This leads him to distinguish between legal and moral obligation, between being *obliged* and being *obligated* to do something, and to conclude that there is no general moral obligation to do what the law obliges us to do; each case must be decided on its merits. Sidney Gendin's is a thoughtful discussion of civil disobedience. The major issue, he contends, is not what circumstances justify civil disobedience, but rather what kind of disobedience a government may and should tolerate. Gordon Schochet concentrates on a specific issue, challenging the generally accepted assumption that a willingness to accept the penalty is intrinsic to authentic civil disobedience.

A third section of this collection raises the sensitive issue of institutional and professional neutrality. Professor Chomsky repeats his now well-known indictment of the American social system and American foreign policy—overdrawn even for the many of us who share his sensitiveness to prevailing social abuses, his hostility to the war in Vietnam, and his condemnation of a foreign policy which too often confuses stability and totalitarianism. This essay is different in that it is addressed to philosophers. Chomsky believes they have a special role to play, suited to their peculiar competence, in working for a "reconstruction of values" and "the creation of a more healthy intellectual community." In calling on the universities to institute programs of "radical social inquiry that would examine the premises of public policy and attempt a critical analysis of the prevailing ideology" (p. 213), Professor Chomsky implies that this is not now being done, an implication that may come as a surprise to some of us who have been spending our lives at it.

If what Professor Chomsky is really calling for is an abandonment of neutrality by universities and professional associations, he is answered at least in part by Robert Simon's essay defending institutional neutrality and denying (as many activists charge) that the universities are already captives of the "Establishment." What is at issue is not, as L. M. Schwartz seems to suggest in his discussion of the responsibilities of the universities, the propriety in classrooms of a normative appraisal of public policies, nor the impact of moral appraisal on academic detachment—I believe such issues have long been settled—what is at issue is the adoption of official, institutional policies, even on so consensual an issue as our intervention in Southeast Asia. I heartily agree with Schwartz's conclusion (p. 255) that "the overall consequences of politically neutral universities are to be preferred." That goes double for our professional associations.

Stuart Hampshire's concluding essay proposes a program for that one-third of the liberal and radical intelligentsia who, sharing Bertrand Russell's moral disgust with the postwar world (this is a reprint of Hampshire's review of the third volume of Russell's autobiography), say, in effect, "Stop the world, we want to get off." Admittedly lacking a comprehensive social theory, they can at least deprive all adversaries in the present struggle of a critical pool of talent and of the "experimental habit of thought" by which the society of which they are a part is normally invigorated. Such a "moratorium policy of disassociation" is what the student movement of recent years has given us, in Hampshire's view. Those who have not been trapped in a consequentialist (utilitarian) morality are urged to appropriate it and make it their own. Hampshire has given us a vision; perhaps like all visions it should be pondered, not analyzed.

Much as one may disagree with some of the viewpoints expressed in this book. it represents a refreshing departure from recent preoccupations of philosophy.

Harry Girvetz

University of California, Santa Barbara

Paradoxes of Rationality: Theory of Metagames and Political Behavior. By Nigel Howard. (Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press, 1971. Pp. 248. $12.95.)

Howard argues that the concept of rational behavior breaks down at three points. The first "breakdown" occurs in two-person constant-sum games lacking a saddle point in pure strategies, such as the following game:

	X	Y
A	1, 2	2, 1
B	2, 1	1, 2

GAME I

If player 1 knew that his opponent would choose strategy X, then he himself would choose strategy B. If he knew that the opponent would choose Y, then he himself would choose A. Likewise, if player 2 knew that his opponent would choose A, then he himself would choose X; and if he knew that his opponent would choose B, then he himself would choose Y. Neither player, however, can possibly know what strategy his opponent will choose if the latter plays the game with any degree of competence, because the main task of each player in this game is precisely to keep the other player completely in the dark about his intentions.

So what should the players do? Conventional game theory suggests that each player should use a mixed strategy, playing both of his pure strategies with probability ½. Howard wants to avoid the use of mixed strategies because they would require him to introduce cardinal utilities. This is a legitimate point of view. But, then, the correct conclusion would have been that for each player it is equally rational to use *either* of his two pure strategies (so long as he takes care that the opponent cannot guess which strategy he will actually use). There is here no "breakdown" of rationality. In fact, there are two alternative concepts of rationality to handle this situation. The stronger one, used by conventional game theory, tells the players exactly what to do (viz, to use a one-half/one-half mixed strategy). The weaker one, which avoids the use of mixed strategies and of cardinal utility, tells the players to use *either* of their two pure strategies. As far as I can see, there is nothing wrong with either recommendation.

What Howard calls the second breakdown of rationality is no "breakdown," either, but it is at least a genuine paradox. It occurs in games called Prisoner's Dilemma games, such as Game II below. (The first example of such a

	X	Y
A	3, 3	1, 4
B	4, 1	2, 2

GAME II

game, devised by A. W. Tucker, was stated in terms of a story involving two prisoners. See R. D. Luce and H. Raiffa, *Games and Decisions*, Wiley, 1957; p. 95.)

If the players can trust each other to keep agreements, then they should be able to agree to use the strategy pair (A,X), which is called the *cooperative solution*. But if they feel they cannot trust each other, then there is no point in reaching such an agreement because presumably it would not be kept, anyhow. Accordingly, player 1 will use strategy B (which will yield him a higher payoff than strategy A would, regardless of whether his opponent chooses X or Y). Likewise, player 2 will use strategy Y (which will yield him a higher payoff than strategy X would, regardless of whether his opponent chooses A or B). Thus, the two players will end up with using the strategy pair (B,Y), which is called the *noncooperative solution*.

Admittedly, it is somewhat paradoxical that two rational players, if they cannot trust each other, should choose the strategy pair (B,Y), even though both of them would be better off by choosing (A,X), since the latter choice would yield a payoff of 3 units to each of them whereas the former choice yields only 2 units. But, on reflection, this is not really surprising. If two rational players cannot trust each other, then it may very well be too risky for them to cooperate very closely with each other; and if they can obtain a higher payoff only by close cooperation, then they may find it safer to forego this higher payoff rather than face this risk.

Howard proposes, however, to show that this conclusion, generally accepted by game theorists, lacks logical force. He introduces the concept of *metagames*, which are games in which the players can make their strategy choices dependent on the strategy choice(s) of the other player(s). Thus, in Game II, both players may adopt what is called a tit-for-tat policy: "I shall cooperate with you if you cooperate with me; but I shall thwart you if you thwart me." (Here "cooperating" means using strategy A or X, while "thwarting" means using strategy B or Y.) It turns out that if both players use such a tit-for-tat policy, then they will reach the cooperative solution of the game because now both of them will have an incentive to use their cooperative strategies A and X, respectively.

The only trouble is that in Game II and similar games, as they are defined, a tit-for-tat policy is not really available to the players because they simply *cannot* make their strategy choices dependent on the other player's strategy choice. This is so because each player has to choose between using a cooperative or a noncooperative strategy *before* he knows whether the other player will use a cooperative or a noncooperative strategy. The only way the players can make their strategies mutually interdependent is to *agree* on which strategies they will use. But if they cannot trust each other to keep such an agreement, then there just is no way for them to cooperate in achieving the cooperative solution.

Howard's third "breakdown" of rationality is based on sheer misunderstanding. He proves that, in games of a certain type, if a given player has a dominant strategy, then this will induce the *best* possible equilibrium outcome for the other player (Theorem 9 on p. 180). This is the third "breakdown" of rationality. He has overlooked the fact that the theorem would be equally true if the word "best" were replaced by the word "worst": in that particular class of games it so happens that all equilibrium points will yield the *same* payoff to the other player, which is, therefore, both the "best" and the "worst" payoff he can obtain. Thus the third "breakdown" of rationality does not exist.

Howard also claims that his theory of metagames gives reasonably good predictions about people's actual behavior in experimental games. But this claim is hard to judge since his experiments were done on very small samples and the results seem to fall far short of statistical significance. (He does not provide significance levels.) But, what is more important, his theory yields only very weak predictions, so that very little would be accomplished if these predictions were in actuality confirmed by the empirical facts.

The book is well written. The author's ideas are very original and often quite ingenious. It is with regret that this reviewer expresses his disagreement with the author's main conclusions.

JOHN C. HARSANYI
University of California, Berkeley

History as Social Science. Edited by David S. Landers and Charles Tilly. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971. Pp. 147. $5.95.)

This book is one of a series aimed at providing a comprehensive review of the behavioral and social sciences in the USA, so as to serve as the basis for an informed national policy for their development. The inclusion of history within this scheme is courageous; and the panel of historians responsible for the volume are well aware of the difficulties and dangers of misunderstanding which their task involves.

The panels responsible for other volumes, they tell us ruefully, did not have to persuade their colleagues of the importance of their contributions to social science, nor to explain and identify what makes them social scientists. But the authors of this volume have perforce combined two very different jobs. They had to alert their fellow historians to the actual situation—a critical but by no means daunting one—of their own discipline. They have done this remarkably well in the space available, by methods well calculated to stimulate their colleagues to the kind of reflective stock-taking to which, as a species, historians are peculiarly disinclined. They have also tried, with less success, to address themselves to those in government and elsewhere whose cooperation is necessary if historical studies are to make their requisite contribution to social science. Here their suggestions seem to me, in the main, jejune when they are not positively misdirected.

How do the authors see the relation between history and the social sciences? Because they eschew arguments from first principles, and because their implicit arguments are complex and subtle, it is difficult to explain briefly their remarkably successful treatment of this question. They reject the view that history is an aggregate of inquiries having no common core or substance, and insist on the importance of two at first sight rather banal beliefs to which almost all historians would subscribe. These are the belief that no human institution or achievement can be understood except "as seen through time" (p. 17), and the belief—contrasting with the natural scientist's canon of simplicity—that in historical explanation complexity, many-sidedness and many layered-ness are the hallmarks of insight, of truth (p. 18).

These claims provide the starting-point for two highly generalised and highly persuasive descriptions, first of the traditional style, norms and methods of historical research, and secondly of the new techniques of historical analysis that have recently been suggested by, when not actually borrowed from, the more developed social sciences. The combined effect of these brilliant vignettes is to suggest, powerfully, that the hackneyed contrast between humanist and social scientist, or between the idiographic and nomothetic approaches, applies not so much to divergent intellectual aims as to changes in the character of the evidence available to historians and to the discovery of new ways and means of reaching back to the past. Thus the authors *re*-present the old-fashioned and easily caricatured historian—for whom originality appears to mean simply being the first to tap new sources, and for whom the minuteness and completeness of his evidence have a near-religious value—as a researcher determined to come as nearly as possible into actual touch with his object, and to build up his total picture only from elements that have been tested by his own individual perceptions and judgments.

Similarly, at the other end of the scale, the historian who makes use of statistical methods, new demographic techniques or the abstract models of economics is shown (when he is not a merely vulgar self-booster) to be quite as good an apostle of complexity, subtlety and many-sidedness as the best of humanistic colleagues. In sum we might say: the authors have effectively reminded us that historians at either end of the methodological spectrum are at one in the pursuit of freshness—of fresh evidence, fresh types of evidence, fresh slants upon and uses of whatever evidence can secure contact between the historical writer and student now and the theme or problem of the past that is his quarry. The importance of this reminder is two-fold. It could teach social scientists that not only one *kind* of history, but that any real work of history, can be of service to them—whether as a trail blazer or provoker or corrector. And it should remind historians (who have always acknowledged their responsibility to use evidence of whatever sort is relevant to their problems) that the new situation in which they must share much of their evidence with scientists engaged in more abstract social studies, gives no cause for anxiety on their part. It simply means a notable extension of the range of their more intelligent and critical readers.

The chapters in which the authors make recommendations for the better direction, development, dissemination and financing of historical knowledge are much less happy in style and level of argument. The authors have not always avoided the temptation to argue that because certain methods of work in the social sciences have succeeded in winning more students, more posts, and more endowments, therefore history had better make at least a show of going with the popular tide. This applies especially to their recommendation of some statistics or some sociology for all undergraduate historians, and of more colloquia, more senior seminars, more travel and, of course, more conferences for their teachers. What is wrong with these proposals is their assumption that whatever is necessary for better work within the discipline can, and must, somehow, be "laid on" to order and for all comers. The truth seems rather to be that, here as in other fields of creative work, what is most needed is more time, more liberty, more peace for the individual student and teacher to develop his own interests, ideas and techniques *as he matures*. Silence and solitude can do more for continuous learning than can the cult of incessant communication.

W. B. GALLIE

Peterhouse, Cambridge

Humanism and Politics. By Albert William Levi. (Bloomington, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1969. Pp. 498. $15.00.)

This book is a response to an urgent need. Professor Levi argues that our civilization is on the edge of an abyss which threatens to swallow up the works of Proust, Picasso, Wallace Stevens, and Stravinsky just as it did those of Menander. Auschwitz and Hiroshima are the warnings, and the author reminds us again and again, lest we forget, of the stakes for which he is playing. Although our situation is such as to have induced the despair and withdrawal from political involvement of Martin Heidegger and Norman Mailer, this is a temptation which must be avoided, for we can be saved, Levi says, only by the intervention of the humanistic imagination.

Science, with its technological barbarism and merely manipulative social branch, can offer us no help, says Levi, and he quickly dismisses it. Only humanism offers a resource because it is the endeavor which can be defined as "the quest for value" (p. 15). It assumes "not only the existence of standards of value which are not merely arbitrary, but the human freedom to commit oneself to values through an act of the will" (p. 17). He does not, however, give us much indication of what the nonarbitrary values are or how they are arrived at. Happily, though, one can catch glimpses of Professor Levi's views in the course of the book—man must always care for man and avoid his reduction to thingness or to brutishness as well as his transcendence of man. He steers carefully between the Scylla of behavioralism and the Charybdis of religion. Some of his imperatives might read: Thou shalt not serve the military-industrial complex (a commandment broken by Herman Kahn). Thou shalt not admire a political assassin who is not willing to die himself (a commandment obeyed by Camus).

The specific task of this book, which Professor Levi seems to understand as an act of humanistic beneficence to politics, is to investigate the relation to politics of humanists from Erasmus to Hochhuth. The fundamental distinction is between those who get involved and those who do not. For example, Erasmus did not get involved, but Montaigne did; Goethe did not really care, but Schiller did. These essays are filled with much nice detail, summations of the spirits of ages and anecdotes about the lives of the large cast of characters. Professor Levi assures us that he could have begun with Socrates, but that would have been to overextend his "canvas," which is already of proportions that would put Veronese to shame.

These essays, however unconnected they may appear, actually convey a general impression of a subtle humanistic strategy. After the quick tour of Renaissance humanists, we are introduced to the "great refusal," the turning away from politics practiced by many great humanists, particularly German. Levi tells us they were good men because they were humanists, but they, Goethe in particular, did not fulfill their potential for good works to mankind at large. Goethe in some way is responsible for Auschwitz, for he did not engage. Thomas Mann was another who refused engagement but who later changed his mind. And we know that he gave up a rightwing sentimental cultural snobbishness for the politics of the left. As Professor Levi puts it, ". . . Lukács urged on the regenerate Thomas Mann that at the heart of his intellectual and moral life, he should replace the tradition which runs: Goethe-Schopenhauer-Wagner-Nietzsche with another which runs: Lessing-Goethe-Hölderlin-Büchner-Heine-Marx" (p. 418). The point is that all humanists must be engaged; the refusal leads to Nazism or the like; and when any true humanist does engage, he must do so on the side of the humanitarian left, for that is all that a humanist could do. He must also be a cosmopolitan, for nationalism, it seems, almost inevitably leads to positions like those held by Treitschke, of whom Levi presents a sinister portrait.

The left which we must join in order to be useful humanists is the Marxist left. Marx, we learn, cannot be opposed any more than can Descartes. Even in disagreeing with him, we are agreeing with him. He constitutes our historic ambiance. The issue is not whether to accept Marx but how to interpret him. Therefore, it follows that the last half of the book, and more, is devoted to the postures of various humanists with regard to Communism, except for a stop to annihilate Herman Kahn who represents science which is responsible for Hiroshima and the Cold War. Picasso, Brecht, Pasternak, Camus, Sartre, Merleau Ponty, and Lukács are looked at. The existentialists mentioned are all members of Sartre's circle and their thought treated as a footnote to Marxism.

At all of this, one might wonder whether Stalin's Russia was more open to a humanist's values than was Hitler's Germany. This is a difficult point. Professor Levi knows that Stalin was not nice, but for him the experience with Stalin does not have the same absolute value that the experience with Hitler did. Somehow, humanism is not excluded by it. Thus Goethe's stance toward politics foreshadows Hitler, but Marx's possible connection with Stalin is not even hinted at; hence, humanist activism hardly seems a danger. Herman Kahn is *prime facie* corrupt because he worked for the Rand Corporation, but Berthold Brecht who accepted Stalin Prizes and put the money in Swiss banks was merely exercising peasant canniness in preserving the freedom of the artist; those humanists who supported and praised Stalin receive no blame, or else their little failings are buried under sociological or psychological explanation.

Professor Levi is suggesting a transnational, even a transpolitical, politics, peopled by "humanists" with special privilege but committed to the proletarian cause. Regimes are indifferent; one does not have to study that sort of thing; whichever has more "humanism" is best. This allows a dialogue across the opposing regimes with Marxists from bourgeois societies politely disagreeing with Marxists from Communist societies about the interpretation of Marx. Marxism has been freed from party rigidity, and the success of this endeavor is vouchsafed by the stunning flowering of humanism in Yugoslavia. This is the perfect ideology for the cultural congresses in pleasant Eastern European resorts (p. 342 ff.), and it allows one to play the conscience to both decadent bourgeois societies and intolerant people's democracies which misinterpret Marx's humanism.

The achievement of this book, the political central segment of a monumental trilogy, is to reduce to nothingness the gap separating philosophy from journalism.

ALLAN BLOOM

University of Toronto

The Works of Joseph de Maistre. Selected, translated, and introduced by Jack Lively; foreword by Robert Nisbet. (New York: Schocken Books, 1971. Pp. 303. $3.95.)

A few years ago, surely, no political thinker would have seemed more irrelevant to the present condition of society—in the eyes of the typical educated American—than Joseph de Maistre. Ultramontanist politics had become antiquarian merely; even the royal house of Savoy, which Maistre served with distinction, had gone down to dusty death. Yet Jack Lively (of the University of Sussex) took Maistre very seriously when this useful volume of selections was first published in 1965; and that influential sociologist Robert Nisbet, in his foreword to this new paperback edition, finds Maistre worth comparing with Plato and Hobbes—for good reason.

The powerful intellect of Maistre, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, stood in opposition to the Age of Reason. In the closing decades of the twentieth century, much of the rising generation sets its face against political and moral Rationalism—if more on the principles of Rousseau than on those of Maistre. Once more people seek, as Maistre sought, for an enduring principle of order: some principle quite different from the liberal order of the past two centuries. So it is that the conservative arguments of Maistre regain significance.

"Where the liberals and radicals of their day saw the *new order* rising like a phoenix from the ashes of the old regime," Professor Nisbet writes in his foreword, "the conservatives saw not the new order but the *new disorder*—one that they declared would be the permanent condition of man so long as the values of individualism, secularism, progress, and mass democracy prevailed" (pp. xv–xvi). That principle of order, Maistre (though no theocrat) found in obedience to God's design. The study of history, rather than of philosophy, is the proper discipline of politics.

Mr. Lively selects many of the more important sections and passages from Maistre's *Considerations on France, Study on Sovereignty, The Pope, Essay on the Generative Principle of Political Constitutions, The Saint Petersburg Dialogues,* and *Enlightenment on Sacrifices.* The character of these writings is so foreign to the tendency of political belief in America and Britain during the past two centuries that Maistre now has an exotic charm; some readers will be impelled to consult the sources at greater length.

In his perceptive and impartial introduction, Jack Lively traces the opposition—and the similarities—between Maistre and Rousseau, on the one hand, and between Maistre and Hume, on the other. These three political philosophers had this in common, that they denied the authority of a complacent rationalism, and discovered in intuition, moral sentiments, and custom the enduring bonds of society. For understanding in modern context such criticism of the Enlightenment's basic assumptions, it may be useful to turn to Michael Oakeshott's *Rationalism in Politics.*

Very like Hobbes, Maistre was seeking to apprehend the principles by which men may be saved from anarchy, in a time when the fountains of the great deep are broken up. Very unlike Hobbes, Maistre asserted the primacy of divine revelation and providence. The only real authority, he argued, is God's authority: from that is derived the authority of the political sovereign. For Hobbes's notion of the social compact, and for Rousseau's, Maistre had only contempt: men never deliberately create their own social institutions. Nor does any universal "best form of government" exist, every people necessarily being bound to their own peculiar historical experience. "The question is not to know what is the best form of government, but which nation is best governed according to the principles of its government" (p. 126).

Although influenced by Edmund Burke in much, Maistre did not share Burke's concern for political forms. "At bottom," Lively writes, "he was not concerned with institutional recommendations. His real interest was not in the machinery of government, but in the individual's relations with the state, and his ultimate purpose was to destroy all individual independence by equating the state with God, and transforming a necessarily qualified political into an imperative and unlimited religious obligation" (p. 30). Individualism, indeed, Maistre looked upon as a doctrine concocted in hell: men are not autonomous atoms, but members of a timeless community of souls. He did speak for a freedom that the French Revolution had tried to efface—for the concept that the service of God is perfect freedom.

Pull down your pride: that was Maistre's injunction to the postrevolutionary generation. Overweening egoism, usurping the throne of God, delivers modern man to the devouring appetite for power. As Lively puts it, "What he found most objectionable in this most objectionable of ages was the excessive individualism lying behind its claims for the omniscience and universality of reason" (p. 5). Trusting in his petty private rationality, modern man ignores religious authority and the dictates of common sense—and so loses order in the commonwealth and order in the soul.

Burke was the defender of an order which, in considerable part, could be preserved and improved; Maistre was the spokesman of an order, medieval essentially, that had fallen before he wrote, and could not rise again within foreseeable time. Yet Maistre's mordant analysis of fallacies in rationalism and liberalism has not lost its force in our time; and this book does something to remind us of how society, like the human body, cannot prosper unless it possesses the power of reaction as well as the power of renewal.

RUSSELL KIRK

Mecosta, Michigan

The Grundrisse. By Karl Marx. Edited and translated by David McLellan. (New York: Harper & Row, 1971. Pp. 156. $5.95.)

The title of this volume is obviously misleading: its 132 small pages of translated text are not, of course, Marx's *Grundrisse* ("Basic Outlines"). The original work runs to more than 1,000 closely-printed pages: McLellan's volume is nothing else than a selection, covering perhaps one-fifteenth of the mammoth manuscript. Nevertheless, this is a welcome addition to the constantly growing Marxian texts now becoming available in English translation. After Joseph O'Malley's excellent translation of Marx's first theoretical work, *The Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right,* David McLellan provides us in this volume with snippets from Marx's most significant manuscript of his mature period.

The *Grundrisse der Kritik der politischen Ökonomie* is a set of manuscripts prepared by Marx during the late 1850s when he was gathering material for his *magnum opus.* As McLellan reminds us in his Introduction, Marx envisaged this life work of his to comprise six volumes. They should have dealt, respectively, with capital, landed property, wage-labor, state, foreign trade, and the world market. What we possess in the three volumes of Marx's unfinished *Das Kapital* is thus only a torso of what Marx intended to be the first part of this enormous body of work. Marx's methods of work obviously made the completion of such a task unlikely, and one sometimes wonders how Marx did not realize this himself. The economy of time certainly was not Marx's strongest side.

The *Grundrisse* are the drafts Marx prepared for this enormous work. They thus cover a much wider range than that contained in *Das Kapital:* hence it is quite misleading to describe them, as some authors did, as a mere draft of *Das Kapital.* They represent Marx's mature thoughts on a variety of subjects which he hardly had an occasion of discussing in the published writings of his later period. Because the *Grundrisse* were published for the first time in Moscow in 1939, and this German original version is quite rare even today, it is the most neglected of all of Marx's theoretical writings. Though one may feel that McLellan overstates his case when he suggests that the *Grundrisse* are the "centerpiece" of Marx's work, no adequate understanding of the structure of his thought can be undertaken without incorporating the *Grundrisse* into this account. That some authors continue to overlook this is only a testimony to the basic conservatism of much of the writing concerned with a topic like Marxism in which orthodoxies and counterorthodoxies have become rigidified into doctrinaire beliefs over a period of many decades.

In his helpful Introduction, McLellan traces the development of Marx's studies on economic and social problems from his 1844 *Paris Manuscripts,* through the *Grundrisse* to the published portions of *Das Kapital.* McLellan is most successful in documenting his claim that since 1844 Marx was, in a way, trying to write one book; it never got finished, but the *Grundrisse* is the most complete version of it (pp. 14–15).

The question of continuity in Marx's thought thus comes to the fore in any discussion of the *Grundrisse*—especially in the case of alienation and Marx's usage of the term. McLellan justly points out that authors like Bell, Hook, and Feuer, who maintained that Marx abandoned the concept of alienation in his later writings "must now be judged to have been mistaken" (p. 13). The passages translated on pp. 59–73, 96–102, and 132–143 bear ample evidence to the centrality of the theme of alienation in Marx's mature thought. In the case of Marx's discussion on money (pp. 57–64) the parallels with the 1844 ms., "Money," are most striking and illuminating.

This issue is of extreme importance to the current debate about Althusser's contention that there is a basic "caesura" in Marx's thought and that his early writings should be dismissed as mere "socialist humanism." The neo-Stalinist implications of Althusser's thinking are obvious, and it is for this reason that his views became the new orthodoxy of the French Communist party when it was trying to resist the more humanist interpretation of Marx offered by Garaudy. What is shocking in Althusser's discussion is that he never mentions the *Grundrisse* in his *Pour Marx.* Had he considered the evidence of the *Grundrisse,* the whole argument would have fallen flat on its face—or, alternatively, Althusser would have had to dismiss the mature Marx as a mere "humanist socialist" as well. McLellan refers to this extraordinary intellectual dishonesty of Althusser's (p. 2), and it must invalidate whatever other merits Althusser's treatment of *Das Kapital* may possess.

McLellan is generally a lucid and reliable translator. When one keeps in mind Marx's innate proclivity for long involved sentences, as well as the fact that this is after all a draft manuscript, McLellan's achievement is considerable. On some occasions, however, he is carried away by his zeal to render Marx into clear Anglo-Saxon prose. In the chapter on money, for example, he translates *"blosses Moment des Austausches"* as "pure element of exchange" and *"Bestimmung"* as "definition" (both on p. 59); this is highly oversimplified. On p. 60 he mistranslates *"Verwicklung"* as "implication," and on p. 94 he translates *"Eigenschaften"* as "attributes:" both are obvious mistranslations. More examples could be given of this reluctance to preserve the Hegelian flavor of Marx's language: it flattens much of Marx's argument and is hardly justifiable.

Nonetheless, the availability of this selection from the *Grundrisse,* together with an earlier selection of other parts of it edited a few years ago by Hobsbawm under the title *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations,* makes the prospect of the forthcoming complete translation of this work by Marx into English even more welcome and eagerly awaited.

SHLOMO AVINERI
The Hebrew University of Jerusalem

Ideology and Moral Philosophy. By K. Bruce Miller. (New York: Humanities Press, 1971. Pp. 200. $7.50.)

How is one to react to a book which begins by lamenting the incapacity of "intellectualism. scientism, and particularly the radical moral subjectivism of positivism" to "raise a barricade of sustained moral action against the ubiquitous forces of disintegration appearing in both totalitarian ideologies and alien ethical systems" (p. xiii)? At the very least in a polemical work such as this, one would expect an effort to describe the "moral ideology," or "vital relationship of knowing, believing, and doing," which the author considers superior to the "narrow approach of Western intellectualism" (p. 137). A chapter is devoted to the ethics of Marxism-Leninism and it is preceded by a series of brief evaluations of various figures in the history of philosophy; Hume, Kant, and Bergson are praised because they recognize the volitional elements in moral philosophy, while the Greeks and the Scholastics are guilty of "anti-practical intellectualism." No attempt, however, is made to describe the substance of the moral ideology favored by the author. Instead he presents us with a tract on the need for a "dynamic" philosophy in the world today. But as Bentham once said, "Hunger is not bread" and a belief in belief is not an ideology. What Miller calls "experiential supernaturalism" (p. xvi) seems to involve faith in the person of Christ (p. 103) or in the efficacy of love, but then why was this book published in a series on Philosophy? (Or is the Humanities Press's attitude toward the whole enterprise indicated by the title "Ideology and Moral Philos-*phy*" printed on the back of the dust jacket?)

Appendix 60 at the end of the book finally gives the whole show away. It begins "To date this superior ideology has appeared in the force of Moral Re-Armament" and this is followed by the favorable comments by Konrad Adenauer and denunciations by Radio Moscow which appear often in MRA literature. The author has limited himself to only one of the four MRA absolutes, absolute love, but like the moral rearmers he makes no effort to deal with the complexities, tensions, and ambiguities involved in applying this principle to personal, political, and international life.

Reportedly MRA is running into financial difficulties these days. And if its advocates do not buy this book, who will? Perhaps the publishers should try to boost sales by including with each copy a free record of a youth choir singing "Up with People." *Ideology and Moral Philosophy* is neither ideology nor moral philosophy.

PAUL E. SIGMUND

Princeton University

L'Obligation Politique. By Raymond Polin. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1971. Pp. 159.)

This book is first and foremost a harsh, unremitting polemic against *"les anarchistes sorbonniques"* of 1968. The character of the polemic and the concern that fuels it are conveyed by the following passage: *"on pense à la dissolution de l'Empire Romain sous les coups des grandes invasions: il s'agissait aussi d'une civilisation qui n'avait pas pu et pas su se défendre contre les barbares. Mais, cette fois-ci, les barbares sont à l'intérieur"* (p. 62). By demonstrating the simplistic and dangerous character of the new version of anarchism that took form *"dans l'enceinte limitée et artificielle de la Sorbonne,"* and by reasserting the view that acceptance of political obligation is an essential constituent of a human community, Polin evidently hopes to provide France and perhaps contemporary civilization more generally with the understandings and the fortitude essential to defense against the new barbarians.

In its polemical character the book is of interest primarily as one more testament to *l'emprise* that *les événements* of 1968 continue to exercise over politics and much political thinking in France. (Curiously, the work contains lengthy sections consisting of what are on the whole familiar summary sketches of earlier theories concerning obligation and rights.) Owing perhaps to the author's basically polemical purposes, the more broadly theoretical position taken is presented primarily by means of dogmatic assertion rather than by carefully elaborated argumentation. Such a position does emerge, however, and deserves attention.

Professor Polin is one of the very best contemporary interpreters of the thought of Hobbes, and his own position testifies to Hobbes's influence upon him. Most generally, political society is said to be founded on an "opposition dialectique" between an absolute and unconditional obligation to obey and an absolute right or liberty of individual judgment and action. (Of course Hobbes did not speak of dialectical relationships. But there is nothing in Polin's use of this fashionable terminology that goes beyond or puts him at odds with what Hobbes said in other language.) By absolute obligation, moreover, Polin intends that the citizen, once having consented (p. 67), must obey all commands issued by the sovereign political authority, that is by an agent or agency that possesses a right of life and death over the members of society and hence the right to risk life and death in order to assure the public good (pp. 65–6). If it should be thought that having such an obligation negates or destroys liberty, Polin reminds us that even the slave *"peut toujours prendre le risque de refuser de l'être"* (p. 72). As with Hobbes, at bottom liberty consists of the capacity (Polin uses *"pouvoir," "droit" and "liberté"* indiscriminately in discussing the point) to go out—whether with a bang or a whimper. The one "right" of disobedience that is allowed the citizen, accordingly, is the right to defend his or her life. *"En effet, chaque fois qu'un individu se trouve menacé dans sa vie par l'application de la loi, d'une loi pénale par exemple, il conserve un pouvoir absolu de la défendre par tous les moyens. En menaçant sa vie, la loi lui ouvre un droit à la désobéissance"* (pp. 73–4). Finally, Polin echoes Hobbes in contending that when revolutions break out, all questions of right, of justification cease to have point. "*Une prise de position révolutionnaire ne se discute et ne se décide pas en termes de droit. . . . Une révolution est un fait entre deux droits; le droit qu'elle dénie et le droit qu'elle veut instituer*" (p. 97).

But Polin is no mere Hobbist. He has, to begin with, a conception of the end or vocation of man that is far more inclusive than the satisfaction of individual desires that Hobbes emphasized. This larger vocation, secondly, can be pursued only in a political community in which there is authority that can be used to achieve the public good. Thus it is not only legitimate in the narrow sense but fully appropriate and desirable for authorities to command the members of the political community in ways designed not simply to satisfy the desires the latter actually have but to contribute to achievement of the distinctively human *telos* or vocation. Such a community, thirdly, requires much stronger foundations than the narrowly instrumental and strictly individualistic allegiance that Hobbes proposed. It must "*incarne des valeurs décisives, des valeurs sine qua non. Si ces valeurs cessaient d'être tenues pour des valeurs suprêmes, sacrées, si la communauté cessait d'être la patrie, pour reprendre un terme que l'on a tendance à oublier dans la vie ordinaire, mais auquel chaque crise grave restitue instantanément une vertu poignante, alors l'obligation politique perdrait elle aussi son sens*" (p. 65).

Topical polemics aside, the basic defect in Polin's construct lies with the conception of liberty he accepts from Hobbes. The additions he makes to Hobbes's theory are indeed essential to an adequate conception of political obligation. But these additions require a conception of political liberty that will rarely if ever be satisfied by the desperate self- and community-destroying action that Polin treats as the essence of human freedom.

RICHARD E. FLATHMAN
University of Washington

Anarchy and Order; Essays in Politics. By Herbert Read. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1971. Pp. xxii, 235. $7.50.)

Anarchy and Order, originally published in England in 1954, is a collection of sociopolitical essays written by Herbert Read, who died in 1968. They form only a small part of the corpus of his work, however, and the philosophy which underlies them is the same as that which informed his more substantial and influential works on the relationship between art and society (*Education Through Art, Art and Society, To Hell with Culture*, etc.).

Read had little original to say about anarchism, but this collection is essential reading for political scientists interested in the peculiarly undoctrinaire tradition of English anarchist thought, in the distinctive aesthetic approach Read brought to political and social criticism, and in the current widespread attraction for anarchist theories in the overdeveloped industrial western world.

Serving as an Infantry officer in France in 1917, Read described the aim for which all socialists should strive as "more decency and beauty of life" (see the entry for 10 October, 1917 in his War Diary, published in his autobiographical reminiscences, *The Contrary Experience*, [London: Faber and Faber, 1963, p. 112]). This was more than simply a reaction to his immediate circumstances, however, for Read, like so many anarchists, was also lamenting the passing of rural society and its values. He may have rejected the backward-looking romanticism of William Morris, as he claimed, but in *Poetry and Anarchism*, the major essay in the volume under review, his acceptance of industrialism was at best reluctant, and he wished only to see it used to restore values, through anarchism, which were essentially those of a rural society. "I despise this foul epoch—not only the plutocracy which it has raised to power, but also the industrial proletariat which it has drained from the land . . . Deep down, my attitude is a protest against the fate which has made me a poet in an industrial age" (pp. 58–9). He was not only a ruralist at heart, but he was a very English ruralist, too. In *A Dearth of Wild Flowers*, an essay in *The Contrary Experience*, he recalled nostalgically the days of his boyhood on a Yorkshire farm, associated "the genius of England" with the country house, particularly the parsonage, and concluded fatalistically that despite their knowledge of the solidity of rural values, men were walking "like blind animals into a darker age than history has ever known" (p. 343).

But Read was not merely a cultural pessimist in the atomic and industrial age. As his essays on this volume make plain, he possessed an acute artistic sensitivity and awareness, for which none of the major ideologies offered a haven, and for which the history of his time provided a turbulent background. Having as a young man avidly devoured Proudhon, Tolstoy, Kropotkin, and Morris—and, significantly enough, having passingly embraced Disraeli's version of a Tory Democracy—he suffered the disillusionment with the "peace" of 1919, discovering that, in his own words from *Poetry and Anarchism,* "we had won trophies of hatred and greed, of national passion and commercial profiteering, of political reaction and social retrenchment" (p. 75). He withdrew into personal and professional life, first as a civil servant, then later in 1931, as Professor of Fine Arts at Edinburgh. Ex-bureaucrats often make good anarchists, but Read's explicit commitment to anarchism and his political essays (which in this volume date from 1938 to 1953), arose in large part from a rejection of the deadening effects on the artistic imagination of both western and Soviet societies in the 'thirties. For Read, Mayakovsky's suicide in 1930 was symbolic of the failure of communism to create the framework for "decency and beauty of life," and again for him, as for many in his generation, the Spanish Civil War acted as a catalyst for the open espousal of anarchism. In the religious fervor of the Spanish anarchists he saw the possibility of a new religion emerging as a basis of a new society.

Read's inconsistencies have been frequently noted. A theoretical pacifist in 1914, he nonetheless fought; having proclaimed in *Poetry and Anarchism* that anarchism naturally implied pacifism, he supported the British war effort, and, like Kropotkin before him for the same reasons (in 1914), created a distance between himself and other anarchists; in the 1940s he was closely associated with *Freedom,* the anarchist newspaper founded by Kropotkin in 1886, and with the Freedom Press, which published two of the essays appearing in this collection—*The Philosophy of Anarchism* and *Marxism, Existentialism, and Anarchism,* yet he was never an activist. His quixotic acceptance of a knighthood in 1953 led to a further estrangement, and his energies in the last two decades of his life were almost exclusively directed toward literary and artistic criticism.

Yet the inconsistencies and apparent lack of activism were an integral part of his social philosophy. For Read, artistic awareness and creativity were the solvents of false values, and experience the crucible of that creativity. He defended his war experience for the self-awareness it gave him, and, a romantic, rejected any attempts to restrict and define modes of political commitment. Significantly and characteristically, his main criticism of fascism and communism in *The Philosophy of Anarchism* was "for their lack of any real sensuous and aesthetic content, for the poverty of their ritual, and above all for a misunderstanding of the function of poetry and imagination in the life of the community" (p. 45).

This provided Read's anarchism with its individuality. If, as he believed, the worth of a civilization could only be measured by the quality and achievement of its "representative individuals"—its philosophers, its poets, and its artists, and the artist was the essential mediator between the individual and society, then his own substantial contribution to artistic and literary criticism was explained and justified. His work on the relationship between art and society was his form of activism, and his influence on such contemporaries as Gropius and Henry Moore can be judged both from the *Memorial Symposium* in his honor (London, 1970), and from his personal papers deposited in the University of Victoria.

Summing up his fundamental beliefs at the end of his life, Read observed that his profoundest experiences had been aesthetic. "Goodness is living beauty," he wrote, "life ordered on the same principles of rhythm and harmony that are implicit in a work of art. Vulgarity is the only sin, in life as in art" (*The Contrary Experience,* p. 348). This collection of essays tells us why anarchism appealed to this essentially unpolitical man.

D. A. T. STAFFORD
University of Victoria, British Columbia

Freud: Political and Social Thought. By Paul Roazen. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1968. Pp. x, 322. $6.95. [Paperback edition, Random House, Vintage Books, 1970. $1.95].)

This is a welcome book and one which seemed long overdue. Despite occasional allegations that political scientists are wedded to a psychoanalytic view of man, the impact of Freud on the discipline—and related social sciences—has been oblique and elusive. The study comes at a time of intense professional ferment, a period marked by uneasiness with prevailing standards of inquiry and canons of explanation. The argument is presented in a lively literary style which contrasts sharply with the turgid jargon so prevalent in contemporary professional publications. Yet, the book is far from flawless; in view of its timeliness and intrinsic qualities its defects are all the more regrettable.

The "Introduction" properly sets the mood. As Roazen notes, verbal invocations notwithstanding, Freud has not become "part of the conventional wisdom of academic political thinking" and actually has "remained throughout political science something of a spook" (p. 5). Among the many reasons for this state of affairs, Roazen points to the vicissitudes of the psychoanalytic "movement" itself, to the growing divorce of clinical investigation from the legacy of Freud's social thought—a divorce which resulted, on the one hand, in a narrow professionalism and, on the other, in a proclivity for "extravagant" and "overblown" social speculations (p. 7). A basic prerequisite for gaining access to Freudian thought, according to the author, is the clarification of methodological issues: by disregarding these issues "social scientists have missed the full potential significance of psychoanalysis for the study of politics" (p. 35).

Given the crucial status Roazen assigns to methodology, the following chapter dealing with "psychoanalysis and the study of politics" is bound to be disappointing. By contrast to anthropology, we learn, political science has remained largely immune from influence, chiefly due to a neglect of Freudian techniques and especially of the methodological implications of his discovery of the "unconscious." Attention to these aspects, the author affirms, would contribute to overcoming "the limitations of political behavioralism" by bringing into view submerged or cryptic dimensions of political experience. Unfortunately, Roazen's assertions on this point are themselves cryptic; in fact, the significance of psychoanalytic method for political, and specifically behavioral, inquiry remains largely obscure. "Behavioral reality can hide latent meanings," he notes adding that "precisely because of its preoccupation with motivation, because it is interested in psychic reality as well as external behavior, psychoanalysis can help to show the inadequacies of behavioralism" (pp. 54, 65). The admonition to probe motivation and the psychic dimension is good counsel, but one which would hardly be disputed by behavioralists. Clearly, political behavioralism has traveled a long way from Watson's crude reinforcement model; from the days of Merriam (not to mention Lasswell) to Lane's recent studies, psychic factors have been treated as important "intervening variables" in empirical political inquiry. To this extent, Roazen's admonition appears less a challenge than corroboration of empirical behavioral research.

Yet, the situation is more complex; in several passages the author suggests that psychoanalysis points beyond empirical or scientific methodology. "The approach of depth psychology," he writes (p. 64), "is designed to focus on the 'way in which human beings in a specific situation subjectively experience themselves.' " The citation refers to Peter Berger and thus, at least obliquely, to the legacy of understanding or *Verstehen* theory in social science. Unfortunately, the reference stops there and is not further pursued. There is no hint of recent hermeneutical reassessments of Freud—the most notable example being Paul Ricoeur's *Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation* (whose French edition, after all, appeared in 1965). Silence also covers recent examinations of psychoanalysis from the perspective of structural linguistics (e.g., Jacques Lacan, *The Language of the Self,* translated in 1968). Indications are that Roazen confounds interpretation and the actor's perspective with subjectivism or introspection. "There is a widespread reluctance," he says (p. 62), "to acknowledge the subjectivist character of psychological knowledge, and a corresponding tendency to attempt to render psychological insights prematurely scientific by social survey techniques. That psychological understanding is first of all a question of the sensitivity of the finger tips has yet to be conceded."

In subsequent portions of the book Roazen turns to the central aim of his inquiry: the elucidation of Freud's political and social thought. Initial glimpses into this dimension are provided through an examination of Freud's writings on the psychology of religion, including *Totem and Taboo* and *The Future of an Illusion.* The next section, entitled "Politics: Social Controls," opens with a discussion of Freud's two essays on war, written in 1915 and 1932. Several conclusions, in Roazen's view, can be drawn from these writings. With regard to child development, he notes, Freud's essays point toward "a balanced psychic diet of indulgence and deprivation," since "lack of discipline, as well as an absence of instinctual gratification, can interfere with the growth of ego functions" (pp. 205–206). In the broader context of political theory, "Burkean conservatism" is singled out as a remedy against aggressive drives, while Fromm appears as representative of "anarchistic" tendencies resulting from a revisionist neglect of aggression (p. 210). What one misses at this point, above all, is a consideration and analysis of Lorenz's views on aggression. Turning to *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego,* Roazen affirms that instinctive group behavior, like war, appeared to Freud as a state of regression, a relaxation of civilized constraints in favor of libidinal attachments between group and leader. As he adds, Freud's study constituted an important landmark in the development of "ego psychology" with its stress on the integrative and regulative capacities of the ego and its differentiation of ego and "ego-ideal" (superego). His interpretation definitely seems an advance over Rieff's treatment of *Group Psychology* as an outgrowth of "conservative snobberies"; Roazen's own political inferences, however, are at best puzzling. Contrary to the previous appeal to Burke, Freud's perspective on social psychology is now described as consequence of his attachment to a "traditional liberal view;" curiously, his liberalism is associated not so much with the accent on regression in group life as with the juxtaposition of state and individual and a concomitant fascination with the model of "the leader and the led" (p. 231).

The section on social controls is rounded out by a summary overview of Freud's "political psychology." As Roazen indicates, Freud never had a direct personal "stake in politics" (p. 242); his one adventure in the broad arena of contemporary political affairs—the Freud-Bullitt study of President Wilson—is commonly viewed as an embarrassing fiasco. (In the "Epilogue" of the book, Roazen probes the background and suggests reasons for the fiasco.) Yet, lack of practical involvement does not necessarily affect the political import of Freud's teachings. Roazen successfully sketches the ambivalence and complexity of Freud's political perspective—but without clarifying the connection between the diverse strands of his thought. As before, Freud is depicted as part of "the liberal tradition" and "a great heir of the Enlightenment." In probing the unconscious and man's elaborate psychic structure, however, Freud also presumably contributed to "liberalism's self-examination." This self-examination, according to Roazen, opened up vistas pointing both in conservative and radical directions: "Along with Burke he recognized the intensity of destructive urges and the sense in which societal coercions can be psychologically necessary. With Marx he extended our appreciation of the extent of self-deception and self-alienation" (pp. 247–249). The study closes with a chapter on "Civilization: Tragedy and Possibility," devoted mainly (though not exclusively) to an analysis of *Civilization and Its Discontents*. Again Roazen emphasizes the inner tension in Freud's thought: "This polarity between the need for individual fulfillment and the necessity of social coercion was a central theme throughout Freud's social thinking. His ability to retain *both* poles within his framework separated him from romantic anarchism, just as his rationalism and scientific commitments saved him from conservatism" (p. 255).

The book leaves the reader both intrigued and perplexed: intrigued by its verve, its accomplished style, and the many nuggets of insight strewn through its pages; but also unsure about the drift of its arguments. As a challenge to behavioralism the book is hardly successful or persuasive. Both in regard to methodological and substantive issues the study contains too many equivocations to permit a crystallization and clarification of alternative positions. In trying to accommodate too many perspectives, Roazen risks offending each; more probably, however, his study will be absorbed into "mainstream" political science with its motley amalgamation of views. The reader who uses the book as introduction—and as such it has many virtues—would want to supplement it with competing texts. Compared with another treatment of the same topic, Johnston's *Freud and Political Thought*, Roazen's presentation is more subtle but also more narrow; whether adequately or not, Johnston at least reviews the work of Lasswell (*Psychopathology and Politics*), Money-Kyrle (*Psychoanalysis and Politics*), Osborn (*Freud and Marx: A Dialectical Study*), and Schneider (*Freudian Psychology and Veblen's Social Theory*). The accent on ego psychology needs to be balanced with literature written from a different vantage point, including Fromm's *Crisis*, Laing's *Divided Self*, and Marcuse's *Eros and Civilization*. Moreover, the reader should note an important recent contribution to the general theme: Wollheim's *Sigmund Freud*. What all these studies at least indicate is the immense fertility and richness of the Freudian legacy, a legacy which has only barely begun to infiltrate political science. Despite Roazen's valuable efforts, Freudian psychoanalysis still remains for social theory and research largely *terra ignota*, beckoning to be explored.

FRED R. DALLMAYR

University of Georgia

More Essays in Legal Philosophy. Edited by Robert S. Summers. (University of California Press, 1971. Pp. vii, 161. $6.50.)

Since there is probably no effective line to be drawn between political theory and legal philosophy, the subject of this book (like its predecessor edited by Professor Summers, *Essays in Legal Philosophy* [1968]), deserves attention from the readers of this journal. Surely—so an argument might go—if a political theorist cannot afford to ignore the views of Suarez, Hooker, Hobbes, and Blackstone, he cannot afford to be ignorant of the views of their successors such as Austin, Maine, Holmes, Pound, Hägerström, and of such contemporaries as H. L. A. Hart, Lon Fuller, and Hans Kelsen. And if one expects to understand the views of these legal philosophers, there should be a scholarly need (cynics might prefer "market") for critical essays like those gathered in the present book.

What Summers has given us (and he implies he would have given us more and better if only the pickings were not so slim) is a book of six essays, five of which provide, he says, "a 'general assessment' of much of the relevant work of a major legal philosopher" (p. vii). Hart, himself the subject of a critical study in this volume by Rolf Sartorius, contributes the lead essay on Bentham. Herbert Morris writes on Pound, Martin Golding on Kelsen, and the editor on Fuller. All the essays were previously published during the 1960s and most first appeared in scholarly journals not likely to be available in general college or university libraries. The sixth essay, "Notes on Criticism in Legal Philosophy," is the editor's introduction. No other single book provides such superior critical appraisals of this (or, for that matter, of any other) group of legal philosophers, and in this respect and as a contribution to familiarizing a wider scholarly public with the methods and accomplishments of philosophical criticism in law, the book is quite valuable.

The five main essays show different preoccupations, and provide (in the language of the book's subtitle) "General Assessments of Legal Philosophies" in divergent and not equally satisfactory fashion. Hart's essay originated as a Lecture on a Master Mind to the British Academy. For all its distinguished qualities, at most the ten pages devoted to expounding and criticizing Bentham's conception of legal and moral rights can properly be said to be directly relevant to the putative concerns of this book. Morris's patient and effective criticism of Pound is in fact only a long book review of Pound's multivolume *Jurisprudence* (1959). Morris, no doubt unintentionally, persuaded this reviewer that by any criterion, Pound's legal philosophy—at least as presented in *Jurisprudence*—is too primitive and inchoate to be deserving of sustained and intensive study. Golding confines his attention to a close examination of Kelsen's notion of a legal system, and in the course of doing so provides not only acute criticisms of the topic under review but also a number of considerations of general interest (in particular, a study of the notion of a "rational reconstruction" of the concept of a legal system) which are relevant to the appraisal of any legal philosophy. Sartorius writes on the seminal ideas in Hart's influential book, *The Concept of Law* (1961), especially on Hart's much-discussed claim that the distinction between so-called "primary and secondary" (duty-imposing and power-conferring) rules of law provide "'the key to the science of jurisprudence'" (p. 136). The editor's essay on Fuller is another long book review, in this case of *The Morality of Law* (1964), and thus rather less than a "general assessment" of Fuller's legal philosophy.

Uneven as the book is in providing such "general assessments," the essays reprinted here do display a wide variety of critical moves which anyone must be able to deploy if he hopes to do effective work in understanding a legal philosophy. At times it even looks as if these essays were gathered together as much for the conceptual ploys, gambits, and assorted critical maneuvers they exhibit as for their "general assessments." Certainly, the editor's own preoccupations in his introductory essay, in which he catalogues and illustrates some tools and techniques of varying sophistication to be found in the analytic philosopher's kit-bag, will not discourage this interpretation of his book.

Because the editor's own writing dominates the volume (it amounts to exactly one-third of the whole), it may be appropriate to measure some of it with the same severity he and his co-authors visit upon others in the book. Consider as a sample this short paragraph from Summers's discussion (elsewhere often instructive) of Fuller's central doctrine, that the law is a "purposive human enterprise."

> A theory of law should also provide an account of legal sovereignty. But the author's theory does not. Furthermore, his theory of law as a purposive phenomenon cannot begin to account for the complex factors that influence compliance with the system. According to one whole tradition in legal thought, this compliance is to be represented in terms of "habit," a conception wholly at odds with "purpose." The habit theorists may have been wrong, but not wholly wrong (p. 119).

As the essay containing this paragraph was originally published in a law review, the absence of any explanation of "legal sovereignty" is perhaps excusable. However, the editor in his introductory essay to this book comments in passing that "the so-called problem of 'legal sovereignty' really breaks down into a half dozen separate questions" (p. 2). In neither context is the reader told what any of these "questions" is. Consequently, he is at a loss as to the meaning and significance of the alleged failure of Fuller's theory. But does Fuller's theory really fail as alleged? I am not certain that it does; since Summers gives no analysis or argument for his opinion, the reader of his essay, unless he has carefully studied Fuller's book with this very question in mind, is in no position to judge. Summers's next claim is carelessly overstated. Fuller's doctrine of purpose *does* "begin to account for the complex factors that influence compliance with the system." It *does* go some distance toward that end, even if it fails to give a completely adequate account. Whether or not Fuller implied that it did seems not to concern Summers. Finally, Summers's reference to the "habit" theory comes perilously close to being a red herring. Elsewhere, in his own review of Hart's *Concept of Law* (cited at p. 103, note 3), Summers explained without reservations Hart's now well-known objections to the "habit" theory. Unless Summers has changed his mind about the finality of Hart's criticism, why make it appear to be such a glaring fault of Fuller's "purposive" theory that it and the "habit" theory are "wholly at odds" with each other? In any case, the two theories are *not* "wholly at odds"—they are independent but not necessarily contradictory. Nothing in Fuller's "purposive" theory prevents him from invoking habits of obedience where they exist and are relevant to explaining compliance with law.

The book, like too many nonbooks, has no bibliography or index. Several of the footnotes betray someone's negligence, for the interior cross-references have not been brought into line with the book's pagination. No other errata of moment were noticed.

HUGO ADAM BEDAU

Tufts University

Between Two Worlds: The Political Thought of Graham Wallas. By Martin J. Wiener. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 229. $11.25.)

Dr. Martin J. Wiener deserves our gratitude for having given us the first book-length study ever made of one of the most important and yet curiously neglected political thinkers of our century in the English-speaking world. Further, he is to be congratulated for having done his job well, for having written an intellectual biography, however limited its scope, which pulls together an impressive body of basic data, written in a style which is at once scholarly and readable.

The author begins his study with a discussion of Wallas's "Victorian origins," making special note of his childhood as a son of a clergyman, tracing his intellectual growth through his education at Shrewsbury and Oxford, studying classics. Some careful attention is given to Wallas's activities between 1886 and 1904 in the Fabian Society, in which he played a prominent role, together with the Webbs and Shaw. It was during his tenure as a Fabian Socialist that Wallas was elected, in 1894, to the famed London School Board; in 1904 he was elected to the London County Council, as the School Board was merged into the Council, serving that body until 1907. His first book, *The Life of Francis Place,* was published in 1897, when he was thirty-nine, and it was acclaimed, in and out of the Fabian Society, as a pioneering work in social historiography.

As a political thinker Wallas was a late bloomer: he did not produce his first major work until his fiftieth year, four years after his resignation from the Fabian Society and a year after his retirement from politics. When *Human Nature in Politics* made its appearance in 1908 it stirred a sensation as a work of great courage and originality. In it Wallas attacked what he called "intellectualist fallacies" inherent in the prevailing misconception of political behavior, a misconception which he, rightly or wrongly, blamed largely on the lingering impact of Benthamite psychology. It has been said repeatedly, probably without exaggeration, that of all the works written during this period which sought to undermine "intellectualism," or false rationalism, *Human Nature in Politics* stands out as the most significant single achievement in shifting the focus of British and American political science away from the sterile institutional analysis of "government" to a psychological examination of political "behavior." With his later works, notably *The Great Society* (1914) and *Our Social Heritage* (1921), Wallas's influence spilled over into other fields of social inquiry, provoking a chain of serious debates among their leading students.

It cannot be determined from Wiener's book whether the title is a conscious adaptation from that famous line in Matthew Arnold's *Grande Chartreuse* (stanza 15), "Wandering between two worlds, one dead,/ The other powerless to be born." But the phrase as it stands certainly evokes a powerful image, and that serves the author's purpose well. He locates Wallas's intellectual career in the transitional period between the Victorian world of "evangelical" conscience and the modern world of scientific spirit; but he feels that the Victorian ethos, against which Wallas rebelled in his youth, as did many of his contemporaries, was not yet "dead," nor, indeed, was the new world still unborn awaiting its turn. These two worlds existed side by side, in awkward company, creating a tension in those who sought, without success, to break completely with their cultural inheritance in the hope that they might become full-fledged citizens of the new world. These people were suffering from a certain "identity crisis," if you will, or an attitudinal ambivalence, which marked the "transitional character" of the so-called "Edwardian" period, and the author describes Wallas as its "representative" figure (p. 1). Thus, he was at once "a behavioural scientist and a moralist, a 'debunker' and an idealist, a practical reformer and a misty visionary" (p. 216). Insofar as Wallas was a political scientist, says the author, he was "Moses rather than Joshua: he showed the way out of the desert, but did not himself enter the land of modern political science" (p. 96).

Regrettably, the author nowhere tells us precisely what in his mind constitutes the defining characteristic of "modern political science," for his interest is primarily that of an intellectual historian, rather than that of a political scientist. But my reservation, although limited, goes further, because I believe that the book contains some errors of judgment which appear to have sprung from a careless reading of Wallas's own writings rather than from a possible lack of expertise in the literature of political science.

Dr. Wiener is correct to note the essentially individualistic content of Wallas's psychological interest, and yet, oddly enough, he fails to take notice of the enormous importance Wallas attached, throughout his life, to the method of "introspection." Second, the author claims that Wallas in his later years "altered his methodology" (p. 208) in expressing his doubts about the usefulness of "quantitative method," which he had favored in *Human Nature in Politics.* A careful reading of that book would reveal, however, that what really changed was not so much Wallas's methodological bias as the manner in which he used the phrase "quantitative method." His methodological preference was twofold, i.e., introspection and description, and in this preference he remained remarkably consistent.

One who is interested in intellectual history, seeking some broad historical perspective to Wallas's life and thought, will find Dr. Wiener's effort highly rewarding. But a political scientist interested in gaining a fresh appreciation of Wallas's contributions to his discipline may be justified in wishing for a much more analytical treatment of the subject, one which would go beyond historical generalities and devote itself more fully to the critical analysis of the substance of the man's thought, especially with regard to his overriding perennial concern with the *method* of political inquiry.

SUGWON KANG

New York University

Congress Against the Court. By Adam Carlyle Breckenridge. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970. Pp. viii, 160. $5.95.)

The subject of this little book is more specific than its title implies. Unlike *Congress and the Court* (by Walter F. Murphy) and *The Supreme Court and Congress* (by John R. Schmidhauser and Larry L. Berg), it is no general treatise on periods of conflict and accord between Congress and the Supreme Court. Instead, Breckenridge has put together a description of three Court decisions—*Mallory* v. *United States* (1957), *Miranda* v. *Arizona* (1966), and *United States* v. *Wade* (1967)—which he argues led in part to the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968. "Unlike the Roosevelt court-packing plan, the Congress sought to overrule the objectionable decisions through legislation" (p. viii). Title II of the act did alter some of the stipulations and guarantees from *Mallory, Miranda,* and *Wade,* for persons accused of crime.

For the political scientist, this book is a disappointment. Professor Breckenridge offers no thesis about relationships between Congress and the Court, even with regard to the policy issue he studies. There is no reference to extensive research by Murphy, Schmidhauser and Berg, Robert Dahl, Harry Stumpf, Glendon Schubert, and Stuart S. Nagel, all of whom have created models of Congress-Court relations to which more limited hypotheses might be tied. These models have used the policy outputs of Congress and the Court as a basis for determining periods of conflict and accord. The Warren Court, 1953–1969, offers a fecund period for hypothesis-building about branch relations and policy output. Breckenridge creates no hypothesis; and he fails utterly to relate his subject to earlier research. There is, in fact, no indication that the author is familiar with existing literature on Congress-Court relations.

The Court's treatment of the rights of accused persons, as well as of civil liberties generally, over a sixteen-year period offers an opportunity to relate Court activism and restraint to the policy choices of other national political institutions. As many analysts have shown, the Warren Court was not uniformly activist. Although Breckenridge mentions the seeming aberrations of two subversive activities cases—*Uphaus* v. *Wyman* and *Barenblatt* v. *United States* (both 1959)—he does not deal with differences in Warren Court periods. The analysis of such periods can be significant, for, as Nagel has shown, frequency of Court-curbing legislation correlates nicely with Court composition and output. That Breckenridge fails to treat the court-curbing aspects of crime control legislation more systematically is a major defect of this book.

In the preface, Breckenridge states that "racial issues, unrest in urban areas, large and small, reports of a substantial rise in crime, a growing concern about many social and economic conditions in the nation, all helped climax a near-constitutional crisis" (p. viii). Such a statement serves as a backdrop for the author's description of *Mallory, Miranda, Wade,* and House and Senate versions of the Crime Control Act. Whether these conditions did precipitate a near-constitutional crisis is difficult to say. The author never examines the proposition in the text; and he offers no guidelines or criteria to define a "near-constitutional crisis."

Without appeal to systematic analysis, we know that many congressmen and senators reacted negatively to the Warren Court's elaboration of the rights of accused persons. Breckenridge feels that "Minority Leader Gerald R. Ford (Rep.) of Michigan . . . echoed the majority view of the House, saying, 'I refuse, Mr. Speaker, to concede that the elected representatives of the American people cannot be the winner in a confrontation with the Supreme Court' " (p. 6). Senator John L. McClellan (Dem.) of Arkansas termed *Mallory, Miranda,* and *Escobedo* v. *Illinois* (1964) "deplorable and demoralizing. They have weakened intolerably the force and effect of our criminal laws. . . . These decisions have set free many dangerous criminals and are daily preventing the conviction of others who are guilty" (p. 38). Breckenridge describes with balance the general "atmosphere" or "mood" in the House and Senate at the time its members considered crime control legislation. His explanation of the differences in attitudes represented by Emanuel Celler (Dem.) of New York and McClellan, chairmen of the House and Senate Judiciary Committees, respectively, and the way in which such attitudes affected the bills' treatment, is a notable aspect of this study. In the end, the House accepted the more restrictive Senate version of the crime control act; the separate House and Senate measures never went to conference committee. Neither version affected the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. President Johnson signed the measure into law on June 19, 1968.

The student of constitutional law and the administration of criminal justice will likewise find this book disappointing. The mode of analysis is principally descriptive: *viz.*, the facts are these, the outcome is this. Critical evaluation of constitutional decisions, characteristic of the scholarly work of Alpheus T. Mason, Alexander Bickel, and Martin Shapiro, is absent or undeveloped. Similarly, the sociological and administrative aspects of such decisions are undertreated. For example, Theodore L. Becker's *The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1969) contains two studies on the impact of *Miranda.* Such analyses are useful in assessing the significance and effect of Court policy; but Breckenridge shows little interest in the impact of the decisions he describes. There is no attempt to deal with "law and order" as a social problem. If anything, these sociological and administrative aspects receive indirect treatment through the author's account of expert testimony before the House and Senate committees.

One-third of the book is an appendix in which the *Mallory, Miranda,* and *Wade* opinions are printed. For a book of this size, this seems unnecessary. An index and bibliography are not included; they *are* necessary.

Robert G. Seddig

Allegheny College

Racial Discrimination and Public Policy in the United States. By Richard M. Burkey. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath & Co., 1971. Pp. 144. $10.00.)

This is to be one of a series of country studies sponsored by the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) under a 1966 UN General Assembly resolution calling for studies of "the effectiveness of policies and measures against racial discrimination." Research on the United States was assigned to the Institute of Race Relations at the University of Denver. The scope of the UNITAR studies, envisaged in guidelines reproduced in an appendix to this slim volume, is here approached in a very preliminary manner. Only an updated country study, on the scale of the Gunnar Myrdal-directed research of the late '30s-early '40s, could supply the need. Moreover, UNITAR seeks a systematic cross-national perspective, but that is not specifically built into this research design.

A genuinely comparative perspective would entail not only a cross-national comparison of race relations practices and policies, but would include intranational comparisons of ethnic, racial, and religious minorities. In the U.S., the Nisei, Chinese, Puerto-Ricans, American Indians, Chicanos, Jews, Catholics, and other minority group experiences can provide a significant analytical perspective for viewing the Negro situation. Much is made of the uniqueness of the black experience in America, and that claim conceivably may be sustained by systematic research-based analysis. But uniqueness should not be concluded from unexamined assumptions. Some aspects of each minority group's experience are unique; discovering which and why is an important research objective. This perspective would benefit a study intended as part of an international, cross-cultural research project. Regrettably, Burkey's prospectus is limited to blacks on "tactical" grounds.

What then has the author derived from the existing literature and from his own analysis to guide the UNITAR project in the U.S.? He lists his "exploratory" purposes as: (1) development of a theoretical perspective on the nature of racial discrimination; (2) clarification of related concepts such as racism, prejudice, segregation and racial stratification; (3) summary of historical patterns of discrimination against blacks; (4) assessment of changes contrasting the periods before and after World War II; (5) identification of social factors, in addition to public policies, affecting the effectiveness of public policies opposing racial discrimination; and (6) providing a guide for further research.

Since the dependent variable, which presumably can be changed by governmental policies, is racial discrimination, careful definition is crucial. The author rejects several alternatives from the literature in favor of his own: "differential treatment by members of a dominant social category which functions to deny or restrict the choices of members of a subordinant [*sic*] social category" (pp. 1–2). This definition, however, assumes that a subordinate social category is incapable of discrimination against members of a generally dominant social category. It also neglects governmental discrimination against majority group members or other minority groups than those favored by a given public policy measure. Thus, compensatory employment quotas favoring one group discriminate against other applicants solely because of their nonmembership in that group.

Discrimination as an object of public policy might better be defined as an invidious distinction directed by anyone at anyone simply on grounds of ascriptive group characteristics. An objective policy analysis should not assume that all policies on behalf of one minority group's interests are *ipso facto* free from invidious ascriptive group discriminations nor that the victims of discrimination are not sometimes afflicted with the same social virus in their behavior toward outsiders. Otherwise, research on Nazi Germany would have to exclude the possibility of finding any Jews with "authoritarian personalities"; no Chicanos would exhibit anti-Negro chauvinism; and no American blacks would exhibit anti-Semitic or anti-white prejudices or practices.

More generally, Burkey's discussion of the nature of racial discrimination and related concepts is a valuable contribution. Particularly noteworthy is his discussion of the relation between discrimination and social stratification. This analysis is needed to protect the conceptual clarity of racial discrimination against the muddying confusion of an indiscriminate use of the term "racism" and particularly of "institutional racism."

The historical account of public policies against discrimination is too cursory to serve as much of a guide for the research to come. A more useful summary is that covering the literature on racial norms, along with an excellent analysis of prejudice and discriminatory behavior.

Ultimately the contribution of the book must rest on its design for analyzing the effectiveness of policy measures to reduce racial discrimination. Burkey identifies five general variables which may influence policy effectiveness: (1) internal organizational efficiency; (2) research-based knowledge; (3) enforcement; (4) support and resistance; and (5) the comprehensiveness of the policy as opposed to a piecemeal approach. More specific variables are derived from these as criteria for evaluation. The result is indeed a helpful guide, though the discussion is marred by an occasional confusion of objectives. UNITAR commissioned the author to prepare a prospectus for research, but this goal is hampered by *ex-cathedra* conclusions that pronounce a verdict on controversial policy questions before the evidence is collected and analyzed (e.g., pp. 102–103). Nonetheless, a future UNITAR study will owe something to the prospectus provided in this preliminary effort.

HERBERT GARFINKEL
Michigan State University

Air Pollution and the Social Sciences: Formulating and Implementing Control Programs. Edited by Paul B. Downing. (New York: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1971. Pp. 270. $16.50.)

Political scientists interested in environmental policy will find this volume of considerable value as a bibliographical resource for studying air pollution. Sponsored by the University of California's Project Clean Air, the book contains review essays on sociological, psychological, political, legal, and economic aspects of air pollution, which seek to identify and assess what is known in each area, and offer suggestions for further research. As expected in a collection of this sort, the contributions are uneven in quality. Those by Harvey Molotch and Ross C. Follett on sociological research, Ronald O. Loveridge on political science, and James E. Krier on legal aspects are excellent—comprehensive, well organized, very useful. The essay by Robert W. Reynolds on psychological and behavioral effects is very brief—principally, I take it, because of the lack of research. Still, no effort is made to outline the many intriguing social psychological dimensions of air pollution problems. The Anderson-Crocker assessment of economics literature is disappointing, since coverage is superficial and material confusingly organized.

Paul B. Downing, an economist, provides an introductory essay that emphasizes economic and political aspects of air quality. His economic analysis is lucid and might well have served as the organizing basis for the bibliographical essay on economic aspects by Anderson and Crocker. The scientific (including health) and technological aspects of the air pollution problem-set, however, receive very little attention in these introductory remarks.

In a final chapter, Downing offers a "policy trade-off analysis model," which "attempts . . . to interrelate the physical, economic, social, administrative, and institutional aspects of problems that affect and are affected by any control policy" (p. 167). The model does identify many of the variables which are more or less involved at different times in decision making for air pollution control. And it reminds us yet again that our individual disciplines are severely limited in doing the research necessary for policy analysis in an issue area of this type. Aside from this valuable advice to broaden our disciplinary horizons in such research and offering a catalogue of major variables, however, the model has limited practical value—either for immediate research needs or as a basis for policy recommendation.

Finally, an extensive bibliography has been compiled by Michael K. Fox—further enhancing the value of this book for the growing number of social scientists interested in environmental policy.

CHARLES O. JONES
University of Pittsburgh

The Wise Minority: An Argument for Draft Resistance and Civil Disobedience. By Leon Friedman. (New York: The Dial Press, 1971. Pp. 228. $5.95.)

"*The Wise Minority* will anger the fascists among us (were they to read it) . . ." proclaims one reviewer, immortalized on the back book jacket. Admittedly, such initial contact tends to "turn off" one of conservative, nonfascist inclinations. The introduction, however, seemed promising: "This book will try to suggest under what circumstances defiance of the law can be viewed as legitimate" (p. xiv).

Indeed, a book which would contribute to the formulation of a "legitimate" theory of rebellion would be an intriguing and valuable addition to the literature—assuming Aristotle, Augustine, St. Thomas, and Justice Douglas have proved inadequate. Even supporters of the Vietnam War (the nonfascist supporters, naturally), recognize claims of conscience, if not to the war they consider just and/or necessary, then certainly to a war which may arise in the future, that is, a war *they* may feel unable to support.

The book is divided about equally into two parts, the first recounting resistance to the Whiskey Rebellion, Alien and Sedition Acts, Abolitionists (reaction to fugitive slave laws), labor and farm revolts, and selected Jehovah's Witnesses, Communist, and Civil Rights cases. The second part deals primarily with the contemporary crisis of conscience—the decision to resist the draft. In brief, the book is an intellectual defense for the Resistance, an attempt to associate the Resistance with the tradition of conscience which preceded it.

Several criteria are noted during the author's discussion of the various movements, but they are never systematically developed, at least not to my satisfaction. Friedman does note the character of the regime in which one resists, the claims of a higher moral law above the state, the problem of the initial use and kind of force brought to bear by the state, and the inadequacy of the simple test of violence or nonviolence as the sole criterion of justified resistance. Yet, it is precisely on the crucial issue of violence that he remains most ambiguous. This ambiguity would have been avoided had he clearly developed pertinent theoretical boundaries, for example, the nature of the goals sought, the realistic options available, the attitude and actions of the state, and the consequences of submission.

"I am not concerned," notes Friedman, "with reactionary violence, such as that perpetrated by the Ku Klux Klan in the past one hundred years or by other vigilante groups throughout our history. My central focus is on illegal protest as a tactic in political or economic reform movements in America" (pp. xiv–xv). In my opinion, these are precisely the weighty omissions which reflect a somewhat naive division of society's activities. In short, Friedman reconstructs the struggle of the his- ness (how nice), we are not provided with any tools to make such judgments, neither retroac- torically successful resistance movements and assumes their causes were morally correct. While we may all agree on their moral correct- tively nor proscriptively. In fact, the one piece of raw material most suitable for developing his argument to meet the issues head on—the sensitive exchange between the trial judge and defendant David Harris—is merely slapped on as an appendix.

Friedman assumes too much, belittles but does not answer the historical and theoretical arguments raised by the intelligent opposition. For example, the author could have, but did not respond to Kendall's brilliant exposition of the claim to order in "The People Versus Socrates Revisited" (*Modern Age*, Winter, 1958–1959, pp. 98–111). Likewise, Friedman discusses several instances of American "suppression" first explored by such men as Levy (*Legacy of Suppression*) and Hyman (*To Try Men's Souls*), but he ignores the fact that his crucial assumption—a certain reading of the Bill of Rights—has been for sometime open to serious question, most recently and with considerable articulation by Kendall and Carey (*The Basic Symbols of the American Political Tradition*). Friedman has an eye, a sensitive one, for pertinent material, but in this book he appears to be preoccupied with advocacy rather than serious investigation of the topics he identified. Perhaps timeliness made him feel satisfied with so little.

WILLIAM GANGI
St. John's University, New York

The Draft and Public Policy: Issues in Military Manpower Procurement, 1945–1970. By James M. Gerhardt. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971. Pp. 425. $15.00.)

This is an analysis of American military manpower procurement proposals and policies during the quarter century following World War II. The study is not simply a history of postwar conscription. Although the issues raised by the revival of selective service in 1948 and its subsequent extensions are considered at length, Professor Gerhardt is also concerned with legislation concerning the reserves, military pay scales, and other matters relating to the recruitment and retention of military personnel. Moreover, major proposals which were not enacted into law, such as Universal Military Training, are treated in detail.

Set in a chronological framework and based largely upon published government documents and newspaper reports, this study lays special emphasis upon certain issues raised by executive agencies, Congress, and, to a lesser extent, by spokesmen for organized pressure groups as military manpower procurement proposals have been debated in the public forum. Professor Gerhardt identifies five issues as having been important in these debates, with shifting attitudes toward them significantly shaping policy outputs. Provision for national security has been the primary concern, but budgetary costs, traditional American antipathy toward compulsion, considerations of equity in distribution of service burdens, and impacts on nonmilitary social goals have been influential. The author methodically analyzes manpower procurement policies with reference to each of these issues.

Within the limits defined by the author and, to some extent, determined by the nature of the sources utilized, the study is rigorous and well-executed. It is a significant contribution to public policy literature. However, its interest for students of defense and foreign policy would have been enhanced if greater attention had been given to relationships between American global strategies and military manpower requirements and possibilities. Although Professor Gerhardt considers such questions as the balance between active and reserve forces, which he properly identifies as having far-reaching implications for overall strategy, he generally neglects broad strategic goals, as these have shaped manpower policies and simultaneously have been shaped by them. Moreover, the impacts of particular crises—Berlin, Korea, and particularly Vietnam—upon defense manpower policies, while given attention, do not emerge very clearly.

A final caveat may be raised concerning the scope of this book. No doubt many scholars experience external pressures as well as personal temptations to bring their research projects to early completion. Professor Gerhardt may have yielded prematurely to some such influence. The period covered by this study appropriately begins with 1945, marking the end of World War II hostilities and the beginnings of a new American military role in world affairs. But it is questionable that 1970 represents anything more than an arbitrary cut-off date. The four-year extension of selective service in 1967, when Congress rebuffed most proposals for modification of the draft, had yet to run its course. As of 1970, agitation for major reforms, particularly for institution of an all volunteer army, was growing; and future directions became somewhat clearer—if not yet altogether certain—during protracted Congressional debates over a two-year extension of conscription in 1971. Climactic changes in American military manpower procurement policies appear to be impending in the immediate future. In his final chapter the author speculates about future procurement policies, but if he had abided the course of events a few years longer, and taken such events into account, a more finished work would have resulted.

Clyde E. Jacobs
University of California, Davis

The Seniority System in Congress. By Barbara Hinckley. (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1971. Pp. 146. $5.95.)

The Seniority System in Congress by Barbara Hinckley, Assistant Professor of Government at Cornell University, provides a compact and systematic statistical analysis of some aspects of the seniority process. This is *not* a detailed history of the uses and abuses of seniority, nor a recitation of the intriguing ways various congressional committees have circumvented their seniority-selected leadership. However, you will find a careful examination of the committee leadership in relation to the base it represents. Most of the data are drawn from the 1947–1966 period. Senators and representatives are "classified by their age and congressional seniority; by the electoral 'safeness' and regional and demographic characteristics of their constituencies; by their support for party and presidential programs; and by the 'liberalism' or 'conservatism' of their voting records" (p. 15).

Dr. Hinckley concludes that the custom of seniority is not as bad nor as unrepresentative as is often believed. In general, she finds that the profile of the Republican committee leadership is closer to the profile of its membership than that of the Democrats. In both houses, the South (in the Senate also the West) is geographically overrepresented in the Democratic Party.

She believes that "perhaps the single most important finding of this study is that the effect of the seniority system on the kind of committee chairman selected by congress is at most a limited one" (p. 108). Despite her statistical analysis which shows that the Democratic committee leadership does differ substantially from its rank and file, in several respects, she holds that the committee leaders of both parties "reflect with fair accuracy" the composition of their party in Congress.

Dr. Hinckley questions the critics' traditional objections to seniority (such as that it rewards age, service, and one-party safe areas—especially the rural and conservative interests, obstructs party cohesion by creating independent power centers, and reinforces an antipresidential tendency). Noting that more than 40 per cent of the committee leaders change within a decade, she concludes that "any view of the venerable chairman outlasting President after President, is not supported by these facts" (p. 22). If the presidents are Franklin D. Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower, maybe so. But since 60 per cent do not change within the decade, maybe a few presidents do come and go.

With incumbents having an 85 per cent success rate, she holds that most Senate and House seats are not competitive. In the period 1947–1966, only four of the forty-eight mainland states did not have a minimum of two senators who had won at least two consecutive victories during that period and thus met the "time served" criterion for rising to a position of committee leadership. That, however, does not explain much. For example, of the 17 Democrats newly elected to the Senate in 1958, eight of them still survived in 1972, having been re-elected in 1964 (Goldwater helped) and in 1970 (an off-year). Of the eight, one (Byrd of West Virginia) was party whip, two (Williams—Labor and Public Welfare, and McGee—

Post Office and Civil Service) were committee chairmen; one (Muskie—Public Works) was second in committee seniority on his major committee; the others were either third (Hartke), fourth (Hart) or fifth (Cannon and Moss) on their principal authorization committee. The two (Byrd and McGee) who were also on Appropriations ranked seventh and eighth on the Democratic side. Three elections and almost 14 years of service obviously were not enough for several senators.

Dr. Hinckley admits that more are qualified by long service for committee responsibility than there are positions available. She also acknowledges that "factors other than congressional seniority, such as original committee assignments and subsequent reassignments, can and do influence the selection of chairmen" (p. 109); but analysis of these other factors is not a part of her work. Conceding that Democratic rural overrepresentation seems to be more dependent on "luck or discretion involved in original committee assignments . . ." (p. 110) is not enough if one is going to examine the impact of the seniority system in Congress. Nowhere is it noted, for example, that in the House of Representatives after the Democrats gained 97 seats in 1932, 75 seats in 1948, 49 seats in 1958, and 38 seats in 1964, a majority or half of the Democrats on Ways and Means who assigned the initial committees for this influx were from either the South or border states —including the chairman. One could argue that given the complexion of the Democrats on Ways and Means, more than "luck" was involved in the assignment of newcomers to "meaningful" committees.

As for the Senate, nowhere is there a discussion of the effect of Democratic leader Lyndon B. Johnson on the seniority process. As chairman of the Senate Democratic Steering Committee which made the committee assignments, Johnson developed a rule in 1953 that every new Democrat in the Senate ought to have at least one good committee assignment before a more senior Democratic senator had two. While some would argue that such an assignment correlated higher with one's agreement with the Democratic leader, an analysis of this change "before and after" might have been revealing. Until 1965, Senate Republicans with rare exception followed rigid seniority criteria in committee assignments. Dr. Hinckley's study shows that the GOP Senate committee leaders rising to the top under that system seemed to be more in tune with the profile of their rank and file than were the Democrats. Perhaps a justification for adherence to rigid seniority was overlooked.

A few minor factual errors have unfortunately crept into the work such as the assertion, among others, that Walter of Pennsylvania, as chairman of House Un-American activities, was an example of "Southern" predominance (p. 9), the statement that "John" (p. 75) rather than "James M." Mead chaired the House Committee on Post Office in 1933, the implication (p. 79) that Knowland succeeded Taft as chairman of Foreign Relations when both went on as members at the same time and neither one was ever chairman, and the reference to Democratic party support for President Roosevelt as occurring in 1931–32 (p. 82) rather than 1933–34. One can also question whether students of Congress should refer to the House of Representatives as "the junior chamber" (p. 6)—a term annoying to those elected to the House and certainly inaccurate in terms of Constitutional power.

Nevertheless, given the enterprising analysis of much of the data available, Dr. Hinckley's work deserves the scrutiny of all who seek to unravel some of the facts and myths regarding the seniority system in Congress.

STEPHEN HORN
California State University, Long Beach

Political Tendencies in Louisiana. Revised and Expanded Edition. By Perry H. Howard. (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1971. Pp. xxxvi, 476. $12.95.)

The state of Louisiana occasionally conveys the impression of having been caught up in a political nightmare; but from a different perspective, it may be seen as a political observer's dream. In point of sheer variety, Louisiana equals or exceeds the claims of virtually every other state to a diversity of political experience that has run the full gamut of problems to be found in the political history of the United States. When it was acquired as a territory, Louisiana was already involved in the politics of ethnic groups; it passed through a period of competitive two-party politics in the 1830s, '40s and '50s; it suffered the trauma of rebellion, attempted secession, imperial reconsolidation, reconstruction, and solidification under Bourbon rule; it has passed through periods of dissent from the left in the form of Populists, Progressivists, and Socialists, and from the right in the form of Dixiecrats, Goldwater Republicans, and a considerable range of purely local troglodytes. It is probably the only southern state which paralleled selected states in other sections of the country in developing an authentic boss rule in its major city in the nineteenth century; and it is certainly unique in having spawned Huey Long and perpetuated, for more than thirty years, the dynasty he founded.

These claims to a special place in the annals of American politics are amply borne out by the quality and quantity of the political literature inspired by the state. At least one reviewer has indicated that T. Harry Williams's life of *Huey Long* is the best political biography ever produced in this country, and more than one commentator has judged *All the King's Men* to be the finest political novel written by an American. And concentration on the flamboyant Huey Long should not be allowed to obscure such minor masterpieces as Roger Shugg's *Origins of Class Struggle in Louisiana,* a neglected study (outside of Louisiana) in which the demographic basis of political conflict is examined at a level of sophistication rarely achieved in the social sciences. Nor should one fail to mention in this connection the late A. J. Liebling's comico-serious *The Earl of Louisiana.* In Liebling's sybaritic response to *haute cuisine,* the splendor and high risk of the race track, and the symphonic violence of the prize ring, Louisiana found a sympathetic and near-perfect recorder of the state's propensities toward the practice and observation of politics as a hedonistic art.

In the pedestrian world of historians, sociologists, and political scientists, it is not easy to keep pace with such fast company. But in the new edition of *Political Tendencies in Louisiana,* Perry Howard has, at the very least, established a claim to having written the most complete historical analysis of the general voting patterns within any major political subunit of the United States. The book is a product of more than twenty years of devotion to the subject by Professor Howard, who is a transplanted Yankee by choice, and a sociologist by profession. The maturity of the study not only reflects the length of time the author has been involved personally, but also reveals an even lengthier set of contributions to the conceptions and methods utilized in it. Professor Howard is a student and long-time associate of Professor Rudolf Heberle who, under the influence of Andre Siegfried's work on *geographie électorale,* advanced the study of political ecology, first in Germany, and then in the United States, with a special emphasis on Louisiana. Unfortunately, this line of endeavor has had less direct influence on the field of voting behavior than it should.

The quality of Professor Howard's study that stands out most clearly is its relative simplicity. The book is based on a careful use of aggregate data, which are examined in relation to the geography, socioeconomic conditions, political institutions, issues, and political personalities which have influenced the history of popular political participation and its results in Louisiana. The author is careful to warn us that the word "tendencies" is to be taken literally; he lays no claims to having established causal antecedents for the phenomena described. Furthermore, he is talking about trends on the part of *aggregations* of voters, and not about definitive conditioning of individuals who comprise these aggregations. Clearly the assumption is that the voter exercises choices which, although influenced by numerous background factors, remain open to rational assessment.

The method culminates in the identification of nine "voter-type areas" within the state; and the voting trends within these areas are compared and contrasted throughout Louisiana's political history. The persisting patterns of competition and conflict consist of such classic divisions as those between ethnic groups (in this case the French-Catholic and the "American"-Protestant groups), planter and farmer, laborer and proprietor, northern and the southern geographic sections of the state and, omnipresently, blacks and whites. Out of the complicated permutations of these perennial pairs of opposing forces come patterns of political domination and subordination, struggles for political power, and policy orientation of various regimes, which, arranged chronologically, constitute the state's political history. Howard uses relatively uncomplicated statistical measures, along with exhaustive historical sources, to examine the way in which gubernatorial and presidential election patterns emerge out of this welter of influences. The result is a complete and intellectually satisfying assessment of a political system as it has operated in historical depth.

This book is not merely a long-delayed second edition; to all intents and purposes it is a new book. Not only is it twice as long as the old volume, but it exhibits an assurance in the handling of materials, a continuity of treatment, and a firmness of conclusions that render it virtually incomparable in relation to the earlier edition.

One may quibble over a few details: the graphic materials, for example, are full-page and excellent in their clarity and composition;

but, despite text references to map numbers, the maps themselves are not numbered. And the failure to use historical maps—which *were* used in the first edition—tends to be distracting, because so many of the contemporary configurations of the parishes are left blank in the maps covering elections prior to the establishment of more recent boundaries. Although the quality of writing in the current edition shows a great improvement over the earlier one, and although the book is singularly free of sociological (and/or political science) jargon, the syntax occasionally leaves something to be desired.

But such faults are trivial in the context of a volume that tells us so much about the politics of a particular state, and suggests so many useful ways to try to understand what the practice of electoral politics is all about.

WILLIAM C. HAVARD
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Food and Drug Legislation in the New Deal. By Charles O. Jackson. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1970. Pp. 249. $7.50.)

Using both public and private sources, Professor Jackson has written a narrative case history, with all the limitations that implies, of the 1938 Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The author is a historian, and one cannot help but be impressed by his solid research. He offers few theoretical conclusions of a general nature and is satisfied to note that the evidence in his study seems to support the thesis of Professor Gabriel Kolko (*The Triumph of Conservatism*, Chicago: Quadrangle Press, 1967) that legislation affecting business will not pass unless and until it receives endorsement from the business community. This reviewer concurs with that conclusion.

While I cannot claim competence to judge the value of the study to historians, it does seem to be an accurate and thorough review of the events and people interacting during the five-year legislative struggle. Political scientists, however, will be disappointed in the study's methodology and conclusions. No attempt is made to compare this case study with others of the legislative process. No interest-group theory is tested, nor does the author seem to realize that the study reveals in stark detail how pluralist democracy fails in practice to live up to its ideals. The competition among the affected interests was fully developed. Out of this struggle should have come resolution of the issue through compromise and consensus. Yet Professor Jackson notes, "four years had elapsed and it would appear that final passage of a drug bill was not even close" (p. 151). The author's own conclusion is that as of summer 1937, ". . . S. 5 was dying" (p. 150). In this contest among interest groups, where the affected interests had many influential friends and contacts, it was the veto power of the minority which prevailed. That being so, Professor Jackson surely overstates the case when he says on p. 46 that aid of the women's organizations "became a decisive factor in the passage of a new drugs measure," and on p. 213 that without the backing of the national women's organizations no new law would have passed. The evidence seems clear that the bill was dead in 1937 even with considerable backing from industry and from the national women's organizations. The unhappy accident of an improperly tested drug (the infamous elixir sulfanilamide) which killed more than 100 people finally provided the impetus to pass a bill that reason, compromise and consumer political pressure could not provide. While tragedy brought about a stronger law than otherwise might have been passed, Congress was *not* stampeded into approving legislation which really threatened the affected interests. The strongest statement which can be made is merely that some previously unregulated aspects of industry life were thereafter to be regulated. Had the author compared the history of the 1938 act with that of the 1962 Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendment he would have found fascinating parallels. In both instances, the affected interests themselves were badly divided. It was the thalidomide episode in 1962 which provided the stimulus to revive still another dying piece of legislation. Once again it was a minority of even the affected interests which prevented passage. The significance of these examples might well be considered by the defenders of pluralism.

Professor Jackson's evaluation of the importance of the women's clubs for the passage of the 1938 Act can be faulted on other grounds. In almost every instance, when they fought for a particular provision, they lost. They fought for multiple grade labeling and did not get it. They fought to keep advertising under the Food and Drug Administration and did not get it. One could go on. The author, it would seem, mistakenly equates numbers, enthusiasm and decibel level with influence.

Professor Jackson's solid and careful research is indeed praiseworthy and only rarely can one fault him for going beyond his evidence. It is, in fact, the evidence rather than the conclusions that political scientists will find particularly useful.

James R. Woodworth
Miami University, Ohio

The Minority Party in Congress. By Charles O. Jones. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1970. Pp. 204. $6.95.)

Professor Jones begins his study of the legislative roles of House and Senate minorities in the present century by outlining certain *conditions* which hypothetically have a bearing on minority behavior. Some of these are external to Congress (e.g., the "temper of the times," which party controls the presidency, the severity of conflicts and divisions within the parties), others internal (the size of the congressional minority, the strength and unity of majority and minority party leadership, etc.). Jones then specifies the "behavior" he is interested in: a range of legislative *strategies* that extend from simple "support" of majority efforts, to "cooperation" in devising compromise bipartisan proposals, to attempts to defeat majority initiatives and/or to develop distinct alternatives to them. He assumes that the range of strategies open to the minority in a given Congress will be dependent on "the combination of conditions that exist at the time." The question is whether and to what extent the minority party tends fully to exploit these options —and particularly to pursue the more "positive strategies" for which Jones admits a preference.

Not surprisingly, and through an analysis that sometimes confuses the relationship between the situational variables and the supposedly dependent strategic options (e.g., p. 73, where the fact that "the minority party began to develop a more positive role for itself" during the second session of the 89th Congress is adduced as evidence that in fact the strategies *available* to the party had shifted), Jones finds that congressional minorities faced with severely restrictive conditions have tended to limit themselves "to the weak strategies of support, inconsequential opposition, and withdrawal." More interesting are several findings with respect to "participating" minorities (where the party in the congressional minority also controls the presidency) and others enjoying a relatively "unrestricted" situation. The generally unimpressive performance of participating minorities he makes understandable in terms of the heightened incentives to activism and competitiveness experienced by the majority under such circumstances and the necessities under which the president himself labors, to work through those congressional leaders upon whose pleasure the fate of his program largely depends. The lack of "restriction" that comes with lassitude in the presidency is found to be a decidedly mixed blessing, even when the president is from the opposing party: "Normally, if Congress is allowed to do whatever it wants, it will do very little . . . seldom has the minority party taken the initiative when the president has failed to act" (pp. 115, 130). And the "slack" which the system contains is demonstrated both by the repeated failure of relatively unrestricted minorities fully to pursue their strategic options and, more positively, by the success of House Republicans during the sixties, under conditions that varied widely in their "restrictiveness," in strengthening their central party organs and increasing their legislative productivity.

Jones effectively conveys—and, indeed, seems to share—the ambivalence felt by minority activists as they confront their range of strategic options: "responsibly" to assist in coalition-building and in the refinement of majority proposals is to compromise the distinctiveness of their own appeal and perhaps to strengthen the opposition, while to hold out for alternative proposals is to risk appearances of political grandstanding or obstructionism. He is less perceptive in exploring the peculiar tensions attendant upon the "participatory" situation—tensions to which the ranking Republican members of many committees, torn between White House entreaties and patterns of accommodation and institutional maintenance built up over the years, could currently attest. More serious yet, despite his occasional acknowledgment of differences among committees and of the "individualism" of the Senate, is his failure adequately to portray the *variety* of minority roles and strategies ordinarily to be found in a single Congress. In focusing on the minority party "*qua* party," Jones has perhaps avoided "many complications" (pp. 6, 98), but he has by the same token given a restricted and overly generalized account of the shape minority behavior assumes and the contextual factors that have a bearing upon it.

It is interesting to speculate how Jones's analysis and assessment might have differed had he adopted a more straightforwardly inductive approach. What could one learn, for example, from a comparison of the minority roles in the Senate Medicare battles of 1962, when Jacob Javits, courted by Democratic liberals and the administration as they sought to build a winning coalition, assumed a major role in reformulating the bill, and 1965, when Republicans could make only token gestures of acquiescence or opposition as the administration bill was whipped through the Finance Committee and the Senate? To be sure, certain of Jones's conditions, most notably the size of the majority and its degree of unity, would emerge as relevant indeed, not only to the leverage minority activists like Javits could hope to exert but also to their enterprise's life-chances. But also of crucial importance are the differences between the *arenas* in which the action was concentrated—(free-wheeling attempts to build a winning coalition on the floor, as compared to the restrictiveness of the Finance Committee) and between the *agents* who chose or were able to put themselves forward on the minority's behalf (Javits, whose identification and working relationships as a "constructive" partisan were well established, as compared to the likes of AMA champion Carl Curtis).

Differences among committees are of particular importance: if the 89th Congress found the Finance Committee minority frequently in a position of "inconsequential opposition," one might argue that the modal strategy among Commerce Committee Republicans was "cooperation," while Javits's Labor and Public Welfare coterie displayed a mixture of "cooperation" and "consequential constructive opposition." Or as an HEW administrator told a Congress Project interviewer in 1972:

> You really have to deal with these committees differently. [As a Republican administration,] we'll normally touch base with the ranking minority committee or subcommittee man first, but [in most cases] he'll tell us to go ahead and deal with the chairman directly. He'll say, "That's where things will be decided; and he's the one we'll be dealing with eventually anyway." But it's different with Education and Labor; we'll sometimes work more exclusively with the minority there. That's a divided committee, and Quie [ranking minority member] is a little funny about these things. He really wants to handle things on his own, in his own way.

Behind such differences, of course, lie Education and Labor's history of integrative difficulties and related patterns of committee recruitment and leadership. Can it be doubted that an analyst seeking to account for the shape and the efficacy of minority efforts on any number of recent social-welfare measures would conclude that such factors are absolutely critical?

In his apparent desire to avoid the anecdotal and particular, Jones has also taken a largely ahistorical approach: he groups Congresses together for analysis according to the constraining "conditions" they share (e.g., the 59th, 67th, and 89th Congresses) rather than in terms of the evolving composition and commitments of the parties. But these Congresses often display striking differences, and Jones's quest for timeless independent variables of general significance seems to have rendered little in the way of a capacity for prediction—one of the payoffs, supposedly, of such a quest. For example, consider the question, "Are there differences between the two political parties when serving as the minority party?" Jones acknowledges that "long periods of one-party dominance make comparisons difficult," but nonetheless ventures to answer the question in a general (and negative) fashion (p. 193). The two parties thus have presumably responded to similar conditions in similar ways. But he hesitates (wisely, one suspects) to predict on the basis of this what the role of congressional Democrats might be were they to be thrust into minority status currently (pp. 189, 195–196); nor is it clear that advance knowledge of the general "conditions" under which they would be operating would make possible a much more definitive prognostication. Again, Jones's purposes might have been better served by an analysis that began with and generalized from particular instances of minority-majority behavior and interaction. To specify the constraints imposed by Jones's general conditions is only to begin to understand the variability and potential of the minority's role in Congress.

It is, however, a useful beginning, if it is not oversold as a definitive explanatory scheme. Creative legislative action must be examined on its own terms and in its own immediate context. But Jones has performed a useful service in sketching out certain general conditions that have a bearing on the incentives and prospects for success facing minority partisans, and in developing, from diverse and scattered sources, a comprehensive categorization of past Congresses in this regard. His is thus a study on which students of policymaking in Congress can build.

David E. Price

Yale University

Northern Schools and Civil Rights: The Racial Imbalance Act of Massachusetts. By Frank Levy. (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971. Pp. 190. $6.95.)

Massachusetts historically has pioneered in state public policy. In the nineteenth century, it was second among the states to enact a civil service law, and in the twentieth century it has led the nation in no-fault automobile insurance legislation and a bilingual education law, among other legislation. Small wonder, then, that in 1965 the General Court (state legislature) enacted a racial imbalance act designed generally to implement the intent of the 1954 desegregation cases and specifically to achieve a balance of nonwhite students in the public schools of the Commonwealth, especially in Boston. Professor Frank Levy has accomplished a commendable job of describing the events surrounding this legislation and of analyzing the constitutional arguments and the attempts at enforcement of the law.

Levy's story is relatively brief, yet concise and well organized. He sets the stage with an introduction to the topic, then divides the next seven chapters into three basic groupings: first, on the politics of getting the racial imbalance law passed; second, on the questions of de facto and constitutional segregation; and third, on the processes and problems of enforcement. These divisions form the three central questions of his inquiry, and they therefore tend to keep the reader focused on the story's development.

The author makes it clear at the outset, although the book's title does not, that his focus is on "Massachusetts' attempts to eliminate de facto segregation in the Boston public schools." Boston, with its heavy proportion of nonwhite students, is the chief benefactor or target, depending upon one's point of view, of the racial imbalance act. Other affected cities are Cambridge, New Bedford, Medford, and Springfield. To the extent, however, that he draws conclusions respecting only the Boston scene, they cannot fairly be associated with any general assessments.

Levy's development of the central questions flows well, and he has called upon some credible written sources for much of his documentation. I find myself somewhat bothered, however, in three respects. First, I question his argument that the racial imbalance act in issue represents one of the historic "Boston bills" enacted by a discriminating legislature reflecting a long-standing tension between Boston with its Irish Catholic orientation on the one hand, and the "remainder" of Massachusetts reflecting the Yankee Protestant focus on the other. To be sure, this split once was a reality, and it resulted in Yankee moves to control the city government of Boston from the legislature. My puzzlement arises because legislative dominance of local concerns in general and big city affairs in particular always has been a universal phenomenon of American politics. The historical "father knows best" type of state-local relationship, whereby municipalities possess few or no rights of self-government and exist virtually at the pleasure of the legislature, is legion. Boston is no special case. The heavy hand of the state legislature is still felt today, even after some home rule gains, and even though the Irish Democrats, rather than the Yankee Republicans, now dominate the legislature, a factor the author acknowledges but seems not to accord sufficient import.

Second, the author's documentation in numerous instances is insufficient. In Chapter 4, which gives a legislative history of the imbalance law, there is little evidence that Levy talked directly with any of the principals associated with background events leading to the 1965 legislation or with any legislators closely involved in its passage—the Senate President, the House Speaker, bill sponsors, floor spokesmen, or committee members. He consulted the House and Senate journals, such as they are, but it is almost a sine qua non of state political research that a good legislative history demands direct communication with those involved. The author's major sources of documentation seem to have been three unpublished academic papers by other writers (p. 49).

Finally, although Levy makes it clear that the book is focused on the three previously mentioned questions, he goes little further in his research design than simply to pursue these questions in a somewhat unstructured fashion. It is true that in Part II, which reviews the conditions under which a de facto segregation situation might be unconstitutional, he does develop and test a series of related questions. But for a book which has been adapted from a doctoral dissertation, the expectation is that he would have developed a central hypothesis or series of hypotheses and proceeded to test them in an appropriate manner.

Despite these reservations, the subject matter of this book is crucial to our systems of public education everywhere, and Levy's work represents a significant contribution to the literature. The time span under study is limited to the first four years following the act's passage, and the problems encountered in the implementation of the law during this period are clearly identified and assessed. This work assumes increasing importance in 1972 when one recognizes that the law's implementation has become increasingly difficult with each passing year. Attempts have been made to repeal the law, Governor Francis Sargent has vetoed two bills restoring withheld funds to Boston and Springfield, despite their failure to comply with the law, and Commissioner of Education Neil Sullivan has recently tendered his resignation, partly because of the staggering problems of enforcing this law.

Levy argues that passing a civil rights act, such as the imbalance act in question, is easy, and that enforcement is the big problem. "It takes a period of years rather than months," states the author. "Because a civil rights act covers the behavior of millions of people, there are thousands of opportunities for violations" (p. 131). Frank Levy seems to have appraised accurately the cross-currents of political mood within which such legislation must live and struggle.

EDWIN ANDRUS GERE
University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The Modern Supreme Court. By Robert G. McCloskey. Edited by Martin Shapiro. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 376. $12.95.)

At the time of his lamentably early death in 1969, Professor McCloskey was working on a book analyzing the modern Supreme Court, and had completed the sections on the Stone (1940–45) and Vinson (1946–52) periods. To cover the Warren Court (1953–69), the editor of this volume, Professor Martin Shapiro, has reprinted some journal articles in which McCloskey dealt with various segments of the long and eventful Warren period. The results are a bit unfortunate, though the profession will welcome the republication of so much of McCloskey's scholarly work in this convenient form. The essays on the Stone and Vinson Courts are well-rounded, self-contained essays, each having a beginning, a middle, and an end. On the other hand, the sections on the Warren Court are more contrived. Dividing the period of Warren's Chief Justiceship into the early (Eisenhower) years (1953–60), and the later years (1961–69), the editor has pulled together essays which, for the most part, dealt with the Warren Court one year or one problem at a time. The four essays concerned with the early Warren Court appeared as annual reviews of civil liberties decisions; three of them were published in the *Virginia Law Review*, covering 1955, 1956 and 1957 Terms of Court, and the fourth, dealing with the 1960 term, appeared in this *Review*. Thus there is nothing directly concerned with the 1958 and 1959 Terms. The material on the later Warren Court is even less comprehensive. Included are an essay on the reapportionment cases, which appeared as the introduction to the annual *Harvard Law Review* article on constitutional law for 1962, an essay on the church-state decisions of the Warren Court which appeared in an annual volume dealing with the general subject (Giannella, ed.), and some general "Reflections on the Warren Court" which appeared in the *Virginia Law Review* in 1965. There is nothing on the Court covering the 1966–68 Terms of Court. In addition it is very doubtful whether a book which, for the most part, analyzes the Court one term at a time, can do adequate justice to a subject which requires the systematic exploration of continuities of thought and experience.

Even so, Professor Shapiro has performed a useful service in bringing together so many specimens of McCloskey's work, for he was one of our most astute students of constitutional law, and wrote in a spirited, literary tradition. As Shapiro remarks in the foreward, McCloskey

> distrusted the flamboyant and dramatic. He preferred sound interpretation, that had a chance of survival, to startling originality; the right word to the flashing one; the tempered evaluation to the scintillating criticism. He was by nature judicious, and by persuasion an adherent of the measured democracy that the "sense of the meeting" produces. And he was suspicious of a Court that too precipitously proclaimed eternal verities (p. vii).

During the years when Chief Justice Stone presided over its deliberations, the Court began to devote more of its efforts to civil liberties questions, but only in a tentative and hesitant way, and without solid agreement about the nature of its role. The Vinson Court was much less hospitable to civil liberties claims, particularly in respect to the loyalty program and other by-products of the Cold War. McCloskey draws careful attention to the divisions on the Court during this period, and particularly to the contrast between Frankfurter and Black. Frankfurter, he writes, "was both by instinct and by conviction, what we loosely call pragmatic. He questioned the possibility of certitude; incertitude did not trouble him. He was in a way fact-obsessed. He looked for differences between the circumstances of one case and those of another, and differences of degree were to him not incidental but decisive. Simple and universal rules were not only impossible, but distasteful" (p. 105). Black on the other hand, "was a natural universalist. His mind reached out for the categorical, self-executing rule, rather than subtle distinctions of degree. And his need for such reassuring axioms was so great that he was able to find them, where others could not, in the unmistakable commands of the constitutional text" (p. 105). Of course, the Vinson Court's policy of "prudent self-restraint" was abandoned by the Warren Court which, in McCloskey's words, "found its role," and developed a maturity of thought with regard to the basic rights of man and the values of a humane democracy. While McCloskey warned against over involvement in such touchy areas as state aid to religion, where the injuries are often negligible, he welcomed the Court's position on such matters as reapportionment and race relations as effective exercises of judicial power. He concludes that the Warren Court fashioned "a meaningful jurisprudence of civil liberties," and emerged as "a major initiative-producing agency of modern government."

On the whole, McCloskey was optimistic about the modern Supreme Court. He endorsed the shift in the central emphasis of our constitutional law from protecting the business community with respect to regulation and taxation to protecting basic human rights. While the Court lost a constituency, it acquired a new one, and he felt that the Court could hold its ground in the years ahead. He thought that the Court could best serve its purpose by "a carefully reasoned doctrine, infused with the love of liberty but alert to the realities of American political life and the limits of judicial capacity." (p. 220). This book serves to remind us of the keenness of the loss we all suffered with Bob McCloskey's untimely death.

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Wisconsin

TVA and the Power Fight: 1933-39. By Thomas K. McCraw. (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1971. Pp. 201. $5.95, cloth; $2.45, paper.)

This significant addition to the extensive literature on TVA should be of interest to every student of American government, particularly to those who have a special interest in TVA. It contains a tremendous amount of relevant, very readable historical detail, reaching far beyond the indicated years of 1933-39. Chapter 1, on "The Public and Private Traditions," succinctly yet comprehensively traces the circumstances that contributed to the setting in which TVA was created. Included are many interesting tidbits of historical background, such as the early childhood conditioning of the man most responsible for TVA—Senator George W. Norris—in an impoverished rural home where self-reliance was essential for survival of his widowed mother and eleven children. Good biographical sketches of other principal characters (Samuel Insull, Wendell Wilkie, David Lilienthal, and others) add to the reader's understanding of the events that took place.

The main contribution made by Professor McCraw is his discussion of why and how TVA came to be. His critical analysis of Franklin D. Roosevelt's role is especially good; one of his conclusions is that "essentially, Roosevelt rescued the industry from its own abuses, and thereby preserved it" but that he "might have done this much with a great deal less agitation and ill will" (p. 157). The account seems to be written with considerable objectivity, and the author does not hesitate to criticize some of TVA's policies and actions. "At first glance, a government yardstick seemed especially appropriate for the power problem. . . . Actually the idea was particularly invalid for the power business . . . when applied to a multiple purpose enterprise such as the TVA, the notion contained a deep and irreconcilable paradox" (p. 30); "the Authority engaged in some of the kinds of public relations for which Norris, Roosevelt, and others had earlier condemned the private traditon" (p. 148).

One almost gets the impression that destiny decreed the outcome: McCraw writes: "In retrospect, the real wonder is that a single TVA ever materialized. The reasons that it did lie in the history of American crises politics during the twentieth century" (p. 159).

The last chapter, "A Successful but Unrepeated Experiment," is a good explanation of why TVA is still unique, although Roosevelt and others viewed it as a model to be emulated elsewhere:

> Wilkie and the private tradition lost the battle for the Tennessee Valley; but they won a qualified victory in the war against public power and valley authorities elsewhere. . . . This paradox—that TVA, though successful, was never duplicated—resulted in part from the private tradition's own exertions, but even more from changing political conditions and opposition to the TVA idea within the governmen itself (p. 140).

No doubt private power adherents will affirm that the book has a public power bias, but it impresses me as a well-balanced, factual, and insightful account of the interplay of many complex forces and individuals involved in one of the greatest power fights in U.S. political history.

VICTOR C. HOBDAY

The University of Tennessee

Radicals or Conservatives? The Contemporary American Right. By James E. McEvoy III (Chicago: Rand McNally and Company, 1971. Pp. 167. $4.95.)

Power on the Right. By William W. Turner. (Berkeley: Ramparts Press, Inc., 1971. Pp. 272. $5.95.)

Journalists and social scientists continue to find the American radical right of considerable interest, and each profession has developed its own modal approach to the subject. The two books reviewed here, *Power on the Right* and *Radicals or Conservatives, the Contemporary American Right,* represent in turn, the journalist's expose on the radical right's danger to American society, and the social scientist's exploration of propositions on the sources of popular support for radical right movements with reference to survey data.

Radical right activists in the 1960s are the specific subject of both books. William W. Turner describes leaders and the tactics of a variety of organizations in *Power on the Right.* James McEvoy III describes the attributes of voters labeled as rightists in 1964 because of their preference for Goldwater, and as rightists in 1968 because of their preference for George Wallace, and asks if the supporters of both candidates are *Radicals or Conservatives?* Both authors point out that there are differences among right-wing movements with respect to the characteristics of their followers, their strategies, and their goals, and contend that all right-wing activists cannot be dismissed as naive about the acquisition and use of political power. These are the only similarities between the books and are derived from different evidence and analyses. Yet each book, considered in its own terms, is unsatisfactory, for each author overlooks his findings in generalizing about the radical right.

Power on the Right is a collection of reports on right-wing groups based on interviews with their leaders and with informants, and on news coverage of their activities. It will be useful to students of American radical behavior only in the sense that, as journalism, it provides some reference to the location and intensity of activity of several current right-wing organizations. Turner's reports on the right are too often a vehicle for discussing the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Turner, a former FBI agent, the author of an expose on FBI tactics, and a defense witness in trials involving the Bureau, is obsessed by the power of the Bureau. He is sympathetic to the erratic, militant radical right leaders whom he considers victims of frame-ups or harrassment by the Bureau. Turner claims it is not these leaders who have the "power on the right," but the articulate and wealthy "establishment right" who, with the support of the FBI and some elected federal officials, may achieve right-wing government for the United States. Turner's interpretation may be worth a hearing, but it is not accompanied by evidence or analytical insight sufficient to make it worth consideration as political research.

McEvoy's inquiry about alleged right-wing voters is based on analysis of the Michigan Survey Research Center's 1964 and 1968 national election surveys. McEvoy prefaces this inquiry with a separate study of radical right phenomena. He presents the evidence of poll data and of trends in the circulation of right-wing periodicals and in the news coverage of the radical right, to demonstrate that there was an increase in the audience for rightist rhetoric from 1960 to 1965. The introduction to the analysis of the election survey data is a review of propositions from the literature on the characteristics of supporters of the right wing. The review is not comprehensive however, and would not be a satisfactory summary reference to proposals about the characteristics of right wing clientele. McEvoy omits from the review chapter two characteristics frequently attributed to such clientele: (1) They espouse fundamentalist Christian doctine; and (2) they are socially and politically estranged because they live in areas undergoing rapid urbanization and economic expansion. The centrality of these proposals about the characteristics of rightists is apparent when McEvoy does cite them later in his discussions of the findings from his analysis of the election data. He discusses the religiosity of both Goldwater and Wallace voters. He cites the proposition on the experience of status strain as a result of experiencing economic change in discussing extremism among Goldwater supporters. The development of his arguments would have been served better by including these propositions in his review of the literature on the right wing.

McEvoy presents a good cross-section of the election survey data that bear on the social characteristics and political preferences of Goldwater and Wallace voters in comparison with other voters. When his interpretations of each electorate are based on careful analysis of the data, these are informative. He finds some similarities in the sources of support for Goldwater and Wallace. Both candidates appealed to voters in the South and to voters living in small towns. Neither candidate attracted voters distinguishable from the rest of the electorate by authoritarianism or status anxiety. Goldwater and Wallace voters were somewhat less sanguine about the legitimacy of governmental authority and more inclined to express prejudice against minority groups than other voters. But McEvoy reports findings indicating that the differences between Goldwater and Wallace voters were more extensive than were the similarities. A considerable proportion of Goldwater supporters were high in social status as indicated by level of education, occupation, and church affiliation. Wallace supporters were drawn much more heavily from the lower class and middle class; they were less well educated than the rest of the electorate; and a considerable proportion indicated a preference for fundamentalist religious beliefs. For the most part Goldwater voters were Republicans and were active in electoral politics, while Wallace voters were more likely to be Independents, Independent-Democrats or Independent-Republicans, without a high level of political involvement. A belief in right-wing ideals was shared by many Goldwater voters who were concerned particularly to curb governmental authority. Wallace voters were *not* partial to rightist ideals and, insofar as they were concerned with the need for law and order, they were not opposed to governmental authority *per se*.

In his conclusions, McEvoy chooses to emphasize the similarities between these two rightist electorates to the extent of neglecting these differences. It is an unfortunate choice of emphasis and results in generalizations about all American right-wing movements that are either contrary to the findings or inappropriate.

The generalizations encompass a definition of right-wing movements; the social conditions associated with their attaining a popular following; the grievance shared by their supporters; and the attitudes expressive of the supporters' grievance. In discussing these generalizations, however, he either has no supporting evidence from the data, or he has presented contrary evidence. For example, no questions on the surveys tapped the sense of a loss of prestige that he says was shared by Goldwater and Wallace voters and by supporters of rightist movements in general. Furthermore, he suggests in one place that loss of social support propels people into right-wing politics while indicating in another that Goldwater supporters had had past histories of political involvement and were not suffering from status anxiety or a loss in status. Finally, when McEvoy stipulates that hostility toward outgroups is the characteristic expression of rightists' grievances, and one that the Goldwater and Wallace electorates share with past American nativist movements, he neglects the differences in the bases of prejudice he found between the two electorates. Finally, these generalizations violate his appropriate introductory admonition against attaching a common label to all political groups right of center.

Sheilah R. Koeppen

University of Minnesota

The Politics of City Revenue. By Arnold Meltsner. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 303.)

Arnold Meltsner analyzes how city officials in Oakland, California obtain money to run the city. Unlike many studies with similar titles, this one really focuses on the *political* aspects of city revenue. The book has broad relevance for students of urban politics because raising money relates to many central aspects of governing a city. Also, Oakland's political system and socioeconomic characteristics resemble those of many other cities in the 350,000 to one-million range.

Professor Meltsner describes Oakland's fiscal situation (an erosion of resources coupled with large expenditure requirements), the behavior and orientations of the main fiscal participants (the city manager, city council, and department officials), and its "sleepy political system." The latter is crucial in understanding Oakland. Its political system—as is true of an increasing number of cities—is "reformed": it has fragmented institutional authority, a separation of politics from administration (the top executive is a "nonpolitical" appointed city manager), formal and informal nonpartisanship, and weak and inactive parties. Thus "in Oakland one has to look hard to find politics"; it has a " 'non-political' political system" (p. 49). After characterizing Oakland's political system, Meltsner analyzes the revenue process and the attitudes of the city's citizen-leaders. He concludes by discussing policy options open to city officials.

The broad analytical themes throughout the book are most significant. First, in Oakland, and perhaps in many other cities, "the politics of taxation is bureaucratic politics." It is dominated by appointed officials who keep it insulated from the citizens, most of whom do not participate in tax politics anyway. Conflict is avoided by selecting taxes (indirect ones and nominal charges) that reduce the tax consciousness of the payer; this results in small yields and small attentive tax publics. The goals of the political actors in the black box are at least as important in shaping the outputs as are the political system's inputs. The analysis here is especially useful because we have learned from other urban studies that the pattern of bureaucratic dominance and insulation from elected officials and citizens often characterizes other policy areas (welfare, police, and schools). Indeed, I infer from other Oakland studies that this is the pattern in these other areas, especially since even the city's top executive—the city manager—is appointed and rather insulated. (Meltsner does not adequately indicate the city manager form as an extreme case of this general pattern of insulation.) The second theme is that the federal structure of our fiscal affairs means that the cities' potentially best revenue sources are dominated by federal and state governments. Third is the political nature of city revenue problems; fourth is that their solution is basically a political one.

These last two themes are the book's greatest strength, but they also contain its most serious gaps. Meltsner persuasively argues that "the current fiscal crisis of our cities is a political problem, not just an economic one. Although there may be some poor states, some poor cities, and some undernourished rural areas, there is no long-run scarcity of resources" (pp. 248–49). Unlike some critics, Meltsner does not use the term "political" here as a catch-all to explain what appears to be irrational behavior—inadequate decision making, balkanized local governments, inept local officials. He means "political" in the sense of getting revenue plans accepted, dealing with conflict and developing agreement and support. The problem is ascertaining the political limits of a proposed tax and developing a strategy to get it accepted by the public. The most realistic questions about taxes are their "political elasticity—how does public tax support or resistance change when tax rates are changed?" (p. 251). The most significant problem is not one of scarcity, in Oakland and in most larger cities; the money is there, though probably less so than fifteen years ago. The problem is getting the people to agree to be taxed, and *for what.* (A recent federal survey of Oakland and other large cities confirms that the potential resources are there, though they have declined in the last fifteen years, and tax spenders have increased.)

Meltsner's analysis of Oakland's political and fiscal affairs convincingly supports this argument. At a time when there is so much wrong-headed rhetoric from public officials and analysts about the nature of cities' financial crises, and when political science is too often apolitical, I found Meltsner's analysis refreshingly realistic on the whole. I would like to have seen, however, more detail and richer data on the exact operation of the political process of revenue raising. Perhaps this shortcoming is due to the limits of the case study approach or to Oakland's "sleepy political system." Nevertheless, initially the most important and difficult task was creating some analytical order from the empirical reality, and Meltsner has done this well.

As for recommendations, Meltsner suggests that local officials must see the problem as a political one and develop a political solution:

> [They should] question the assumption of taxpayer hostility and take sufficient action to *build coalitions* for increased levels of taxation and public expenditure. . . . [But] they should also try to avoid public conflict. . . . The fiscal crisis is in reality a crisis of political leadership. Officials have to walk a thin line between a threatened taxpayer's revolt and a poor people's riot. The resources though are there (p. 11, emphasis added).

But Meltsner does not specify these tactics sufficiently. Moreover, to the degree they are spelled out, given the nature of politics in our large cities, they tend to be unrealistic and thus sometimes almost irrelevant. For example, a major element in Meltsner's political strategy is the creation of tax coalitions. But with a few exceptions, his explanation of how this and other strategies can be developed are broad, almost abstract generalities (e.g., "Depending on how much money the official needs, the [size and complexity of the] tax coalition . . . will vary . . ." p. 263).

Perhaps so many of his suggestions remain at this level because the tactics necessary to implement this strategy are not realistic for Oakland and similar cities. They slight a major policy consideration—circumstance or context—which here is the nature of the political systems of these cities. For example Meltsner suggests that "there are some clues for building a winning coalition. The local official first should develop a support nucleus composed of citizen-leaders who will work and donate resources for developing community-wide support . . . . The appeal should be tailored [so that] each individual of the support nucleus . . . sees some personal payoff to the official's proposal rather than relying on a vague sense of civic do-good" (p. 265).

But to build coalitions, the means and resources must exist—appropriate structures. In Oakland, and increasingly in many other cities, the "reformed" and amorphous political system does not provide them. (Thus, for example, my analysis of Minneapolis indicates many of the patterns present in Oakland.) Parties often serve as a vehicle for creating coalitions as well as issue deflectors, which are very important in tax matters. In Oakland parties are generally weak and are inactive in the formally nonpartisan city government. Organized groups—another potential vehicle for forming coalitions and revitalizing parties—is also in short supply in Oakland, as Pressman has indicated.

Political leadership and informal factors are also important. Meltsner urges "political officials [to] assume a certain measure of risk" (p. 11). But this requires some incentives, and in the nature of these cities' political systems such incentives are scarce. Oakland is "an administrative city"—epitomized by the appointed city manager, who the "man on the street hardly knows exists, [though] if anybody runs the city, he does" (p. 50). The city manager lacks such risk-taking incentives as an orientation toward program development and expansion and an ambition for higher elective office. Rather his operational code emphasizes "the separation of politics from administration," efficiency (judged by a low property tax), and "fiscal realism" in finding new taxes (pp. 50, 84). Even more generally the stakes in Oakland politics—including city expenditures—are not sufficient to attract ambitious risk-takers. Instead, they turn to the federal arena, such as poverty programs. One black activist told Meltsner, "Why bother with the city? It has nothing to offer." (Again the pattern of federal dominance.)

There also must be incentives at the taxpayer level: the services and programs for which the money is raised. But Meltsner seems to overemphasize the politics of the revenue side—generating public support for a tax. Citizens' reactions to taxes probably are based on both what they are paying and what they are getting. More attention should have been given to the politics of the expenditure side (conflict among citizens about how taxes should be spent—Oakland has a large black population; the role of organized service providers in shaping expenditures and conflict with their clients), and how this relates to the revenue side. This is especially true because in Oakland the question of "who cares" seems to be more important than the question of "who governs" (p. 49).

Because of this political system and its lack of political resources and incentives, Meltsner's strategy for a political solution for the fiscal problems of Oakland and similar cities remains incomplete if not somewhat irrelevant. To implement this strategy perhaps we also need a strategy for revitalizing these cities' political systems which have been sapped by "reform" and more indirectly by changes in the economic characteristics of our population, changes in our parties and citizens' relationships to them, and changes in federal-city relations. Nevertheless, we are greatly indebted to Meltsner's pathbreaking study which has properly focused on the political aspects of the revenue problem.

MARTIN A. LEVIN

Brandeis University

Leadership Development for Public Service. By Barry A. Passett. (Houston: Gulf Publishing Company, 1971. Pp. 135. $7.95.)

Given the rapidly increasing interest and concern with management development in recent years, it is surprisingly one of the less generally understood aspects of public personnel administration today. One convincing explanation for this existing state of affairs can readily be attributed to the woefully weak theoretical foundation underlying management development. A quick survey of the burgeoning literature immediately reveals a bewildering variety of forms, innumerable philosophies and approaches, and the emergence of issues and questions unaccompanied by persuasively argued explanations or prescriptions. Moreover, like many other books of this genre, this one by Passett fails to offer a purposeful theory of management development.

The publication of this book makes it understandable that much of management education carries the mark of opprobium that it does today. If the art of the training and development profession is to flourish, it will need to free itself from the preliterate culture engaged in recreating the known or the obvious; of confusing re-search with research. It will need to apply its talents instead to the creative enterprise of systematically building upon the existing body of professional knowledge. Passett's book is heavily descriptive, weakly prescriptive, woefully unsystematic, and completely nontheoretical. It might even encourage some of the training and development professionals to become apostates from the whole management development enterprise.

While Passett's book purports to focus on leadership development for the public service, what is actually advanced is a mélange of issues which scarcely bear any direct relationship to the topic. Fundamentally, the first few chapters of the book focus generally on the proclaimed discrepancy between promise and performance in the area of management. Passett's thesis is that the future of the administrative process is critically dependent upon the availability of managerial (leadership) talent, and the greatest benefit for society as a whole would be to develop this leadership potential for the public service. What immediately cripples his argument, however, is the looseness of his operational definition of the vital function of leadership. For the author, a leader simply consists of "one who is responsible for others . . ." (p. 2). In other words, he does not view leadership as a process which is goal oriented. Nor does he view leadership as mediating between the task orientation of the organization and the human needs of the individuals in order to secure at least a modicum of satisfaction for both. Needless to say, the noetic rationality of Ramos' "parenthetical man" would not find room in this book.

Furthermore, the book makes no attempt to determine what a leader does, to ascertain what attitudes he holds, to analyze how he behaves, or to explain why he behaves as he does in an organizational setting. Passett does not elaborate on the diversity of leadership roles or theories posited in the literature beyond the uninspiring assumption that "[We] still do not know very much about leadership" (p. 9). And this is a book on leadership!

Actually, the explicit purpose of all leadership development programs is to extend the span of utility for those managers who may be confronted with the imminence of premature obsolescence; and for those middle managers whose past performance has been outstanding, and whose potential for assuming higher managerial functions is promising.

A considerably longer review would be required to enlarge upon the author's statistical inaccuracies in dealing with organizational mobility; his conspicuous omission of the impending issuance of the guidelines for executive development in the federal service; and his inadequate treatment of the evaluative process attendant on management development activity. It is regrettable that this book, the third in a series sponsored by the American Society for Training and Development as part of its continuing interest in advancing the state of the art of human resource development, is a disappointing one. Not only does it not expand any frontiers of knowledge, it fails to introduce any new ideas, promote any agenda for discussion, or analyze any of the current trends in the theory and practice of management development for the public service.

RAYMOND POMERLEAU
California State University,
San Francisco

The New Deal and the States: Federalism in Transition. By James T. Patterson. (Princeton University Press, 1969. Pp. viii, 226. $6.50.)

Following twelve years (1921–1933) of rule under three uninspired Republican Presidents, Warren G. Harding, Calvin Coolidge, and Herbert C. Hoover, the American presidency was taken over, as it turned out, for the next twenty years (1933–1953) by one and then another Democrat more dedicated to action—that is, first by Franklin D. Roosevelt for sixteen years (1933–1949), and then by Harry S. Truman for four (1949–1953). These twenty years (1933–1953) of Democratic domination of the presidency, and of the leadership also of Congress, began with the nation near the bottom of a downward economic spiral culminating in the so-called Great Depression. That disastrous period ended, and was succeeded by a slow rise of economic activity, assisted and in part directed by a program of governmental actions, mostly national, designed to restore "full employment" and to improve the general economic welfare of the nation.

This national program of recovery from the Depression, and of the growth and expansion of the economy through an active working partnership between the social, economic, and governmental forces of the nation under a program which came to be called the "New Deal," revealed hitherto unused and even unsuspected potentialities for constructive action in and by the federal system as a whole—national, state, and local.

The book by Professor Patterson, which is here barely introduced to the reader, tells ably and amply how the architects, builders, and leaders of the New Deal, shook the American federal system out of its former lethargy and provided the federal, state and local governments with new fiscal and administrative tools for the stimulation and redirection of the national economy. In place of the old governmental "hands-off" policy with respect to the economy, government was made to accept and to use its once latent powers to help revive and redirect the economy to improve life for all the people.

For the full story condensed into one small volume, I can do no better than to recommend the reading of Professor Patterson's small and excellent volume.

WILLIAM ANDERSON
University of Minnesota (Emeritus)

Revenue Sharing: Crutch or Catalyst for State and Local Governments? By Henry S. Reuss. (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1970. Pp. 170. $6.50; paper, $2.45.)

As this review is being written, the Congress is about to approve a "revenue sharing" bill ostensibly intended to improve the performance of state and local governments by giving them unrestricted funds. After all the compromises which have been extracted by senators from the less urban states, the final bill almost certainly will fail to put the most money in the areas where it is most needed, and thus (we can confidently predict) will fall short of its target. To this extent the bill will fail to follow the main proposition underlying general revenue sharing: that the main trouble with state and local governments has been fiscal starvation.

The relative increase in expenditures during the 1960s was higher for state and local governments than for any other major economic sector, the rate of inflation was highest in the state-local government sector, and there is wide and increasing concern with state-local deficiencies and the low and falling productivity of labor in the public sector. Given these facts, many have concluded that the major deficiency of state-local governments lies not so much in fiscal starvation as in poor management, bad organization, and lack of efficiency incentives which in the private sector are supposed to flow from the profit motive.

The redoubtable author of the book under review, Congressman Henry S. Reuss of Wisconsin, adopts this second view in his statement that "local government faces a crisis in its organization and administration—a crisis that cannot be met until states amend their constitutions and laws, and local governments respond by modernizing themselves" (p. 37). This conviction leads him to advocate coupling general revenue grants with incentives for governmental improvement. "What is needed," he says, "is not a financial crutch that will prevent states from achieving reform, but a financial catalyst that will cause them to move" (p. 123).

In order to qualify for revenue-sharing grants, a state must submit plans and timetables for a whole series of reforms set forth in a statutory laundry list. The reforms are at three levels: interstate, state, and local.

The improvement criteria listed in the Reuss-sponsored bill (State and Local Government Act of 1971) introduced in the Senate in 1971 by Senator Hubert H. Humphrey are unexceptionable but have a rather dated flavor; they include the short ballot; the single responsible executive, reform of personnel practices (this might be dynamite if directed at the ills of contemporary "civil service" systems and what now passes for collective bargaining, but one suspects it is not); extending home rule powers to local governments of sufficient size and scope; overhauling state and local fiscal systems according to long-accepted principles; liberalizing municipal annexation powers, and authorizing county-city consolidation, intergovernmental contracts, metropolitan councils of government, metropolitan study commissions, metropolitan planning agencies, and like changes.

Most of these good objectives have long since been adopted in the more progressive states. The bill is therefore shooting primarily at the less progressive states where, for the most part, the problems of urbanism are less acute. The targets are not much concerned with the problems of governing Megacentropolis, nor with handsomely structured but ossified administrative systems, nor with excessive red tape and poor performance, nor with decaying civil service systems, nor with cumbersome procedures and lack of strong central government—in short, the things which plague Megacentropolis today.

Included are some items needed nearly everywhere, such as restricting zoning power to larger jurisdictions in order to prevent zoning by smaller municipalities which exclude housing for lower-income families, and furnishing state financial and technical assistance *to metropolitan areas* (my italics) for such matters as planning, building codes, urban renewal, consolidation and local government finance.

The provisions for monitoring state-local government improvement, moreover, are not completely convincing: governors would prepare and file with the President a master plan and timetable for modernizing and revitalizing state and local governments. The President would report to the Congress regularly on the progress made by each participating state in carrying out its government modernization program.

The approach has been criticized (1) for not touching problems of bureaucratic arteriosclerosis and (2) for involving the federal government too deeply in the morass of state and local administration. There also are questions respecting incentives for improvement. Under the above-described bill, grants would be made for a period of years on nothing more than declarations of good intention, with no rewards for performance but only penalties for nonperformance, imposed by taking away funds which nonperforming recipients had become accustomed to receiving.

For understandable reasons, federal administrators are reluctant to withhold funds already promised to a jurisdiction, and hence tend to emphasize threshold activities—planning and promises to perform rather than actual performance. The exceptional cases, when funds are withdrawn, usually are accompanied by rhubarbs similar to those between an umpire and a batter caught looking at a called third strike which he claims was low and outside.

In general, if we are to have general-purpose federal grants, there is much to be said for designing them specifically to improve state and local government—better the Reuss-Humphrey approach even with the difficulties mentioned above than what we are likely to get. Nonetheless, it must be admitted that there are formidable political and administrative difficulties in using federal funds to coerce states and localities into pulling up their administrative socks.

LYLE C. FITCH
Institute of Public Administration, N.Y.

James Madison. By Neal Riemer. (New York: Washington Square Press, Inc., 1968. Pp. 238. 75¢, paper.)

Neal Riemer has not written a biography. We never learn if James Madison's character was forged in his youth or if he had a sense of humor. Nor has Riemer written, strictly speaking, an intellectual biography. Rather, he has set for himself the task of illuminating the political theory of James Madison and making comprehensible the strains and consistencies in Madison's thinking between 1776 and his death in 1836. Within these confines Riemer has written a fine book.

The strength of the book does not lie in the depth of its analysis. A much better book in this regard is Vincent Ostrum's *The Political Theory of the Compound Republic* (Blacksburg, Virginia: Center For Study of Public Choice—Virginia Polytechnic Institute, 1971). What Neal Riemer has done is write a well-researched, nicely balanced book on Madison which is largely free of distortion. After wading through Chapter 1 of Robert Dahl's *A Preface to Democratic Theory* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1956) to discover his brilliant analysis of faction is mostly Dahl and little of Madison, or George Beam's *Usual Politics* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc., 1970) to discover he has corrected many of Dahl's errors but misunderstood the overall thrust of Madison's thinking because of his own ideological commitments, one is refreshed to find a Neal Riemer willing to match an appreciation of Madison's theoretical brilliance with a critical awareness of Madison's mistakes and shortcomings.

Riemer correctly notes that for Madison theory was intimately linked with practice: "The function of theory was to provide the statesman with a prudent guide to action" (p. 14). Madison's practical problem was how to adapt republicanism to a large state, and the success of his theory in providing a solution to this problem is laid out by Riemer in seven well-written chapters. This accomplishment alone—presenting a clear discussion of Madison's theories of federalism and the extended republic without distortion—is sufficient to make the book ideal for teaching purposes. What makes it doubly valuable is the manner in which Riemer discusses the later Madison of the 1790s and 1820s as he faces the Alien and Sedition Acts and the threat of nullification.

Clearly one reason Madison has failed to gain his niche in the hearts of modern academia is his apparent shift away from support of a strong central government to oppose Hamilton's program and later seemingly to support Calhoun's position. Riemer shows nicely how Madison's later actions can be made comprehensible if we remember that he was committed to unification in the 1780s not for the sake of mere order but because a stable and effective central government would enhance republican rights. Without turning him into a civil libertarian, Riemer shows Madison to be more concerned with freedom of religion and speech once the national government has been erected. Thus, Madison was searching for the middle ground between tyranny and dissolution of the government. Riemer also shows that while Madison explicitly rejected the right of nullification and was clearly not an advocate of states' rights, his theoretical position during the 1820s and 1830s gave aid and comfort to the states' rights faction and probably went too far in that direction. In short, Madison tried to strike a balance between republican rights and a stable union but was pushed by circumstances too far in one direction.

This view of Madison as a spokesman for civil liberties will engender some controversy, but Riemer shows it to be the only way Madison's actions can be made comprehensible if not consistent. The argument is not entirely convincing, yet it is based on Madison's letters and tracts and not on Riemer's ideology and therefore is provocative. Aside from the usual minor quibbles about interpretation, I believe Riemer's book deserves wider discussion. Ignoring my quibbles, I can say that while it is not the last word, Neal Riemer's *James Madison* is ideal for generating in our students an understanding and appreciation of the man who is still America's best political theorist.

DONALD S. LUTZ
University of Houston

Contemporary Constitutional Issues. By Alan H. Schechter. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1972. Pp. vii, 293. $6.95.)

A quick glance at the title and the table of contents of *Contemporary Constitutional Issues* suggests that it is just another casebook of Supreme Court decisions. Careful analysis, however, reveals that Professor Schechter has made a distinctly unique and imaginative contribution to the study of public law, a contribution which is considerably more valuable than the ordinary anthology of Supreme Court cases. Although the book does contain numerous excerpts from court decisions, it also provides many data which place these decisions in a wider political, legal, and social perspective.

Contemporary Constitutional Issues differs in two significant ways from the traditional casebook. First, the author provides comprehensive legal briefs arguing *both* sides of each constitutional issue discussed. This means that when professors and students examine these cases, they will not have to perform the sometimes impossible task of reconstructing the arguments that might have been made by the two parties to the case. With the typical casebook, which contains only the *decisions* of the Court, the public law student is forced to glean from the written opinions what the contentions of the plaintiff and the defendant might have been. This is not a very satisfactory method but is all one can use unless one has independent access to the briefs filed by the parties. By systematically outlining in the text the arguments of both parties, Professor Schechter allows the student to compare the contents of the legal briefs with the subsequent content of the majority opinion, thus enabling him to know precisely which arguments the Court chose to incorporate and which to reject in their final opinion. Schechter's underlying assumption is, of course, that the nature and quality of legal briefs do affect the outcome of court decisions and that, therefore, these briefs should be studied by public-law scholars. While this assumption may not be shared by the most extreme judicial behavioralists, I think it is an assumption which most students of public law still consider valid.

A second innovative technique is Schechter's discussion of several major social and political questions which the Supreme Court will probably hear at some future date, but which presently have not yet found their way into the court system. With such issues (e.g., aspects of federal open-housing legislation) the author constructs and briefs a hypothetical case, and he concludes the discussion with an analysis of why the Supreme Court has not yet considered the questions involved, what will probably happen when an actual controversy reaches the Court, and what would be the probable social and political impact of judicial resolution, one way or another, of the issues involved. Such an innovative technique forces the student to reject the notion that constitutional law is merely the study of the history of Supreme Court decisions. Rather, he learns to come to grips with some of the basic and contemporary questions about the nature of law and the role of the courts in American society—without benefit of a higher authority—and to think for himself about what alternatives the Court has available to it for resolving some of the major legal-political issues of the day.

Besides containing these new and imaginative techniques, the text has two additional virtues: it is unusually well and clearly written. Professor Schechter reveals the same considerable editorial skill in this book as in his 1964 edition of the *Interpretation of Ambiguous Documents by International Administrative Tribunals*. Also, the book deals with subjects which are especially current and relevant to the student of contemporary American government. They include: (1) literacy tests and voting rights, (2) freedom of speech in the Vietnamese War, (3) confessions, self-incrimination, and the right to counsel, (4) federal open-housing legislation, (5) federal aid to parochial schools, and (6) de facto segregation and the Fourteenth Amendment.

In sum, one need have no hesitation in recommending this book as a first-rate supplement to both introductory American government courses and upper division courses in constitutional law.

ROBERT A. CARP

University of Houston

Learned Hand's Court. By Marvin Schick. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1970. Pp. 371. $12.50.)

Although *Learned Hand's Court* is the third major book concerning the late Judge Hand (1872–1961) and his life's work to appear in recent years, Marvin Schick's illuminating study is an important, valuable contribution on its own, wholly different from the two others.

First a word about its predecessors. *The Art and Craft of Judging* (Macmillan, 1968) by Hershel Shanks was, as its subtitle made clear, an annotated selection from Judge Hand's many hundreds of opinions as a United States judge in New York. A decade and a half before that, the present reviewer brought out *The Spirit of Liberty* (Knopf, 1952; Vintage Books, 1959), a collection of Judge Hand's nonlegal papers and addresses that quickly introduced the jurist-philosopher to a world-wide audience. Foreign editions included five in languages other than English.

Marvin Schick's book is substantially about Judge Learned Hand, but it is much more about the bench over which Hand presided as Chief Judge—the United States Court of Appeals for New York, Connecticut and Vermont. Even more particularly it is about that court, its members and their decisions and relationships, during the years 1941–1951. The other judges whose work is described and evaluated are Learned Hand's slightly older cousin, Augustus Noble Hand (1869–1954), Jerome New Frank (1889–1957), Charles Edward Clark (1889–1963), Harrie Brigham Chase (1889–1969) and Thomas Walter Swan (1877–).

The author makes no apology for inviting the reader's attention to a 350-page plus study of an appellate court one rung below the United States Supreme Court. Nor need he. Indeed the very fact that political scientists for many years "seemed to think that the federal courts of appeals were unfit for study . . ." (p. xi) became a factor in Schick's choice of judicial area for intensive investigation on a scholarly basis.

Aimed at both lawyers and political scientists, his book, he says, is "an effort to present a comprehensive picture of a lower federal court" (p. xii). But drawing that picture was not easy. Although the Second Court of Appeals in Learned Hand's heyday was unquestionably the best-known appellate court in the country, still Schick found there was a dearth of knowledge about it, as well as about courts of appeals generally. Yet here was a bench consisting of a fascinating group of judges. Two had been dean of the law school at Yale University and a third a teacher there. All six were men of outstanding quality and ability.

The author's opening chapter presents a set of concise, perceptive biographical sketches of Learned Hand and his five colleagues of the decade. Then Schick offers a short history of the New York appellate court from the days of its founding, an account that turns out to be in part a brief history of the development of the United States appeals court system.

Here it is worth interjecting that the Second United States Court of Appeals which sits in New York City is not to be confused with the New York Court of Appeals, the highest state court in New York, over which Benjamin N. Cardozo was presiding at the time of his nomination to the Supreme Court. Referring to the New York Court of Appeals, Schick writes: "Once rated among the very best courts in the country, its reputation has steadily declined" (pp. 94–95).

Schick continues by taking up the process through which Judge Hand and his associates came to their decisions and then proceeds to the matter of judicial relations, that is, relations between courts. Next the author appraises the six judges and their views and work on the court in considerable detail.

Beginning with Learned Hand, Schick calls him "the obedient judge" (p. 154). Judges Augustus Noble Hand, Swan and Chase are grouped as three "of conservative bent" (p. 194), while Judges Clark and Frank are joined in a chapter that labels them "The Battling New Dealers" (p. 219). Some fifty pages are devoted to a study of "the business of the court," its subject matter, who wrote opinions on what, and relatedly how the court and its members fared when their handiwork went before the United States Supreme Court for review. Finally there is a summing-up that undertakes to assess "the stature of a court" (p. 348).

Quite rightly Schick gives attention to what he describes as "the outstanding feature of the court's work—except for the decisions handed down—the virtually uninterrupted friction between Judges Clark and Frank, the court's junior members" (p. 219). The two Roosevelt appointees among six all otherwise elevated by Coolidge, these New Deal judges apparently were at each other's throats a large part of the time. When the young investigator began his research he knew none of this. The scant literature available gave the impression of "amity and serenity" (p. 221). Law clerks and others who knew what the situation was really like below the surface kept very still.

But Judges Clark and Frank—two of the Yale men—fired countless letters and memorandums at each other, and it is this voluminous material on which Schick bases his revealing, not to say astounding, report. The combatants disagreed not only on questions and issues but almost as much on basic rules and procedure. This antagonistic relationship, Schick writes, "was not merely a Second Circuit sideshow"; it was also "an integral part of the Learned Hand court, going to the innermost source of that institution's vitality" (p. 219).

From references to Learned Hand by name in United States Supreme Court decisions, it might be thought that his views were regularly sustained in Washington, but "an examination of the 1941–51 record does not bear this out. For example, Jerome Frank fared far better in the High Court than his more esteemed colleague" (p. 347). If having a dissent sustained is a measure of a lower court judge's influence in the Supreme Court, Learned Hand did not come off as well as his colleagues. One of the many tables compiled by the author shows sustention of dissents as follows: Learned Hand 10.5 per cent, Chase 13.3, Frank 14.5, Clark

14.8, Swan 23.8 and Augustus Hand 27.3 (p. 340).

Summing up, Schick says that while Learned Hand's court "was not capable of attaining greatness in the sense of the capacity to influence other courts and judges," actually "greatness may consist in doing greatly what a court is capable of doing. In this sense the Learned Hand court was truly outstanding" (p. 355).

Justice Felix Frankfurter called Hand "lucky" in not being appointed to the Supreme Court. Schick tends to concur, for he writes: "Had Hand been on the Supreme Court it is doubtful that he would have become a legend" (p. 19). Part of the legend grew up around the times that he might have been elevated and was passed over. The author tells how Franklin D. Roosevelt turned back Frankfurter's efforts on Hand's behalf, and how Chief Justice Taft earlier wrote Harding this objection: "If promoted to our bench, he would almost certainly herd with Brandeis and be a dissenter. I think it would be risking too much . . ." (p. 15).

Noting that this reviewer, after bringing out the first Hand book later collected Justice Black's opinions (*One Man's Stand for Freedom,* Knopf, 1963), Schick writes that "Dilliard speaks glowingly of this noted civil libertarian. Yet it is just not possible to reconcile Hand's views on the Bill of Rights with those of Black" (p. 12). My rejoinder is simple. I admired both but for different reasons.

Learned Hand's Court is a twice welcome addition to the literature on the judiciary. First, it researches, describes, and evaluates an outstanding federal appellate court during a period of its greatest eminence. Second, it demonstrates the worth of other research into the appellate courts, their personnel, their decisions and their comparative contribution to the workings of American democracy. Physically the book is a model of clean, neat serviceable typography and manufacture with a gold-and-black jacket bearing an unusually handsome drawing of the memorable head and face of Learned Hand.

IRVING DILLIARD

Princeton University

The State of Welfare. By Gilbert Y. Steiner. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971. Pp. 346. $7.50.)

In introducing his last chapter, Steiner accurately portrays the nature of the book he has written: "Prescription has been freely interlarded with explanation and description in preceding chapters and will not be repeated here. The problem now is to focus on first principles—equity, simplicity, and adequacy in public relief—and on how policies change" (p. 315). The particular mix of description of programs, prescription about how better to handle the problems at which the programs are presumably aimed, and limited generalizations about the politics of welfare programs in general makes for a book that is difficult to read straight through but also for one that is filled with interesting and often insightful passages.

This book does not contain a theory of how welfare policy gets made, but no pretense is made at theorizing. In fact, even generalizations seem to be made somewhat grudgingly, although there are some interesting ones in the last chapter. The fact/value distinction is obviously not foremost in the catalog of canons important to Steiner. The lack of theory, skimpiness of generalizations, and interweaving of prescription and description will no doubt cause some political scientists to reject this as a valuable book. That judgment seems to me to be a mistaken one, however. Once one recognizes what the book is not and does not pretend to be, then it can be appreciated for its strengths. These are four in number.

First, Steiner is inventive in defining "welfare" so that it includes not just the traditional aid to families with dependent children but also public housing, food stamps, and nonservice connected pensions for veterans. It is useful to see these programs in the same context and have them jointly put in perspective.

Second, a number of the chapters present lucid histories and descriptions of public policy in specific parts of the welfare area. Chapter 4, for example, presents an excellent history of the public housing program, chapter 6 is an intriguing discussion of the food stamp program that is in part an anatomy of how a new program develops political staying power, and chapter 7 is a first-rate elaboration of the nonservice connected pension program for veterans. It is useful to have such succinct discussions of specific policies readily available in relatively tidy packages.

Third, the book is not entirely devoid of generalizations that can be compared to other findings about American politics and public policy. At the institutional level, for example, Steiner concludes that the most potent forces for change in the welfare field are strong presidential interest and leadership, federalization rather than federalism, and "intercessors"—groups that monitor "relations between the system's professed beneficiaries and the public agencies legally responsible for relief policy and administration" (p. 321). To be effective the intercessor must be "a group with some kind of stake—fiscal, fraternal, ethical, or political—in advancing the client cause" (p. 322). The most effective example of an intercessor group offered by Steiner is the National Welfare Rights Organization.

Steiner also concludes that some institutional matters do not make much difference—for example, shifting jurisdictions over programs between executive departments or between congressional committees is not likely to alter the basic political patterns that have produced and sustained certain kinds of policies. Multiyear authorizations by Congress are also dismissed as not very important, and perhaps even counterproductive.

Within a Department, however, the organization chart may in fact be important in determining the kind of priority a program will receive. Public housing is a classic case in which bureaucratic downgrading—both by altering the level of the unit administering the program and by giving scant attention to replacing "acting" directors of the program with permanent officials—signified the lack of any serious desire in the Department of Housing and Urban Development to consider any changes or innovations.

Fourth, the book abounds in what might be called random insights. Space permits the listing of only a few:

(1) There is an excellent summary of why welfare reform moved onto the national agenda in a major way early in the Nixon administration: "Because the President chose important supporters and staff aides who were interested in it, because both the Supreme Court and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare were staking out new approaches as the administration changed, and because there had been enough theoretical work done in the income maintenance field to make it possible to formulate specific proposals" (p. 95).

(2) There is a superb example of how substantive goals can be transmuted into procedural goals in the discussion of day care centers. The presumed goal was a real increase in day care facilities. The real goal was licensing existing facilities, with the result that a very large proportion of the budget was spent on the licensing staff and very little net increase in day care spaces occurred.

(3) The discussion of the work incentives program in the District of Columbia (pp. 68–71) provides an excellent example, typical of many social programs, of a program proceeding on the basis of unpredicted or poorly predicted patterns of motivation on the part of the beneficiaries.

(4) Poor prediction of consequences and impact tends to characterize many social programs. Steiner's discussion of the food stamp program highlights this problem exceptionally well.

In short, this is a book that has to be read carefully in order to gain access to its wisdom. It will not satisfy someone looking for a contribution to theories of policy making or American politics or someone looking for a systematic analysis of policy making. But it could be quite satisfying for someone interested in the substance of welfare policy or interested in public policy prescriptions based on careful attention to history, case studies of past performance, competing prescriptive positions, and common sense.

RANDALL B. RIPLEY
The Ohio State University

Alexander Hamilton and the Idea of Republican Government. By Gerald Stourzh. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1970. Pp. 278. $8.50.)

Much can be learned about American government and Western ideas from this study of a great statesman's thought in the light of great thinkers' works. Even when questionable, Stourzh's account generates questions worth asking, for he combines a diligent search into the extensive record left by a brilliant man of affairs with a considerate attention to the tradition of political philosophy which that man's career somehow presupposed. Chapter 1 shows how Hamilton grounded political obligation upon modern natural right, especially as taught by Blackstone; this discussion leads back to Machiavelli's teaching about the need for bringing a society back to its beginnings or principles. Chapter 2 presents Hamilton's solution to the ambiguity of the term "republic"—a stand for modern self-interest against classical virtue, pointing to Hume, Montesquieu, and Machiavelli. Chapter 3 shows how Hamilton, by relying on private passion to serve the republic and by distinguishing those few interested chiefly in reputation from the many whose chief interest is gain, struggled to constitute a nation not constituted of patriots. Chapter 4 presents the primacy of foreign policy in Hamilton's republic as another stand on the side of modern thinkers opposing ancient ones. Chapter 5 depicts Hamilton as a statesman who sought not power but enduring fame as founder of a nation that would grow greater than Britain in a commercial-industrial age of sea power.

Stourzh makes clear important parts of Hamilton's work but not its principle of energy. The book's virtues make it very much worth reading, but the reader should be wary of its theme, the primacy for Hamilton of foreign policy. Vexed that study of political theory and of international relations "for a century and a half . . . have been divorced," although forms of government and the conduct of foreign affairs cannot be understood separately (pp. 2–6, 127–128, 133–134), Stourzh blames others for considering foreign affairs an "afterthought, a consequence, an implication of the proper ordering of domestic society" (p. 128). He suggests that Hamilton talked about "energy of government" and "forms of administration" able "to direct the passions of so large a society to the public good" merely in consequence of foreign policy (p. 163). If, however, Hamilton gave anything primacy, it was administration, comprehending domestic as well as foreign affairs. Stourzh says that "even Hamilton with his paramount interest in administration" was "forced to wrestle with problems of nation building that involved more than appeal to legal precedent or to the simple image of the social contract" (p. 37). It would be better to say that Hamilton had to handle such problems *because of* "his paramount interest in administration."

It signified as much for Hamilton as the many meanings of *politeia* did for Aristotle that "administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether legislative, executive or judiciary, but in its most usual and perhaps its most precise signification, it is limited to executive details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive department" (*Federalist* 72). Hamilton's deepest difficulty was the "idea, which is not without its advocates, that a vigorous executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican government," for "Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government" (*Fed.* 70).

Stourzh notes "the paramount importance" of administration for Hamilton. He calls it "a recurring theme" in Hamilton that the "test of a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good administration" (*Fed.* 68). And, quoting the remark that a government's goodness consists in a vigorous executive even if inconsistent with republican government (1787 Convention: 18 June), he calls the speech containing it "probably the greatest" of Hamilton's career (pp. 39, 82–83, 234). But Stourzh does not pursue this theme at length. Hamilton's concern for strengthening nation against state and executive against legislature, not only to oppose external danger but also to suppress domestic faction, appears as a subordinate point in the chapter on foreign policy. A mere parenthesis denying that initiative and leadership are strictly "executive" disposes of the vast theme of executive leadership (pp. 201–202). The index, containing dozens of thematic entries, omits "administration," "executive," "energy," and "efficiency."

Confusion results from this neglect. In the foreign policy chapter, presenting *The Federalist*'s teaching on Montesquieu's point that confederation could combine a republic's internal advantages with a monarchy's external force, Stourzh says: "This task of blending, as Hamilton put it, as early as 1780, 'the advantages of a monarchy and republic in our constitution,' was properly the core of his lifework" (p. 154). In the letter here quoted—to Duane, 3 Sept. 1780, on "my ideas of the defects of our present system, and the changes necessary to save us from ruin"—Hamilton wrote: "the first step must be to give Congress power competent to the public exigencies," lack of such power being "the fundamental defect." However, Stourzh's quote appears not in this part on confederation but elsewhere: "Another defect in our system is want of method and energy in the administration." Congress, which at first attempted "to play the executive," was led by the inconveniences to employ boards instead. But only "vesting the great executive departments" under Congress's direction "in the hands of individuals" would give "energy to the operations of government. Business would be conducted with dispatch method and system"—*this* would "blend the advantages of a monarchy and republic in our constitution."

Stourzh cites Leo Strauss to distinguish moderns from ancients by the primacy of foreign rather than internal policy (p. 131). According to Strauss, however, Machiavelli's novelty was *not* recognition of the primacy of foreign policy, for the principle that the fundamental human fact is acquisitiveness or competition, which enabled Machiavelli to state most clearly the case for imperialism or power politics, applies equally to domestic policy (Strauss, *Thoughts on Machiavelli*, p. 293). Likewise in

Hamilton, provision for defense against foreign danger, although urgently necessary (*Fed.* 8, quoted p. 137), was one aspect of a comprehensive principle requiring that executive energy be employed domestically (*Fed.* 70, 72). In outward posture and in work at home, Hamilton would not trust in fortune to provide splendid feats of virtue that would bless and keep the republic. He deemed it wiser to secure energetic administrative machinery that would operate reliably through an extended territory during an extended time to produce one general interest from many most common interests. Hamilton, even if Plutarchian in concern for greatness, meant business, not adorning a civic stage or arena with spirited displays of polemic glory. Popular representation freed the populace from continual contention, and for productive industry, while safeguarding them against their governors. Americans had accepted this governing principle, but imperfectly, he thought. Only replacing the vestiges of democratic participation by an efficacious administrative system could supply the energy to protect them against turmoil and invasion and to manage their prosperity. The people had to choose: government by the people, affecting democratic workings—or government of and for the people, effecting popular works.

HARVEY FLAUMENHAFT
St. John's College, Annapolis

The Quest for Democratic Law: The Role of Parliament in the Legislative Process. By John Clarke Adams. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1970. Pp. x, 214. $2.95, paper.)

Professor Adams, of Syracuse University, has taken a vast subject for compression into a small book, and himself describes an important chapter as a "sketch," and his conclusions as "admittedly tentative." What he has attempted, in the main successfully, is a readable survey of the theory and practice of parliaments (using the word in its broad sense to include all representative assemblies in the liberal democratic tradition) with particular reference to the making of law. His six chapters deal consecutively with such considerations as the philosophy of popular sovereignty, the history of parliament, parliamentary actions and the limits on them, and the case for and against parliaments as effective instruments. His sweep is wide, both chronologically and analytically, and the documentation, offered in several languages, is lengthy.

The burden of Professor Adams's message, like most of his chronicle, is not unfamiliar. The bulk of the text, as seems unavoidable in surveys, is often reminiscent of something else: Wheare on committees, Luce (who is not mentioned) on legislative assemblies, and so on. The message is revealed in the subtitle of the last chapter: "A Case of Mistaken Identity and Misjudged Potential." It is the author's contention that the legislative function and the representation of the people's will are not necessarily the same thing, and that well-meant doctrines on the validity of separating powers—"the myth . . . with its emphasis on representative assemblies as the sole lawmaking bodies" (p. 197)—have misled both friends and critics of parliaments as legislators. "Thus," Professor Adams concludes (p. 198), "the most general and most telling accusations against parliament have been directed at the difficulties it has experienced in carrying out a task it was never equipped to undertake. . . . The traditional and the natural function of parliament is that of defender of the people."

The argument through which the author leads up to those words is lucidly presented. Purists may, indeed, be less inclined to challenge his conclusions than to cavil at his brisk treatment of their favorite theory, theorist, or epoch, for it is inevitable that a book so broadly conceived must resort occasionally to generalizations themselves so broad as to be almost meaningless. It is fair comment that the work, despite copious references to many countries' parliaments, gives no clear picture of any one.

A more serious stricture is that the author is too ready to accept uncritically, as still valid, assessments that have become obsolete. For example, his comments on fiscal control in Canada's House of Commons (which bafflingly appears in the index as "House of Representatives") are based on a 1958 source, and they ignore major changes that have since occurred, as well as a literature of some size. He also appears to assume, on dubious grounds, that parliamentary fiscal controls are not an integral part of the legislative process. Other references to Canada contain factual errors which could have been avoided by a reading of more recent works than those cited. It is not easy to have confidence in an apparently erudite work, worldwide in scope, which is so misleading about a neighboring state.

NORMAN WARD
University of Saskatchewan

Sotsial 'naia struktura sel'skogo naseleniia SSSR. By Iurii V. Arutiunian. (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo "Mysl'," 1971. Pp. 374. 1 ruble, 39 kopecks.)

Since the death of Stalin in 1953, the development of the social sciences in the Soviet Union has followed a checkered course. Among the encouraging tendencies has been the restoration of sociology from the status of a "bourgeois pseudo-science" under Stalin to an academic discipline enjoying increasing prestige and recognition. The present volume is an indication of the kind of empirical research and the level and scale of sociological investigations now being carried out in the Soviet Union.

The social structure of the Russian village and, in a larger sense, of rural Russia has been a much-neglected subject of research in the USSR since the early 1930s. Yet it was precisely in the Russian countryside that the October Revolution, especially after 1928, produced some of the most far-reaching changes and transformations. Although in itself only a beginning, the study by Arutiunian constitutes an essential and significant step toward filling a major gap in the literature on contemporary rural Russia.

The objective of this impressive monograph, as translated from the author's words, is

> to study the correlation of inter- and intra-class differences, to discover the essence and concrete manifestations of the differences between town and country, between individual social-professional groups of the rural population, to reveal the developmental tendencies of the social structure, the direction and tempi of mobility of individual social groups, to compare the demands and needs of people with the social reality, and to evaluate from this point of view the perspectives of development of rural society (pp. 14–15).

The parameters of the research, carried out for the most part in 1967, reach from the intensive study of individual collective farms, state farms, and enterprises to the investigation of complex regions, including a whole republic with a population of 3 million—the Tatar ASSR.

More specifically, the data for this monograph—which focuses on the Kalinin Region (*oblast*), the Moscow Region, the Krasnodarsk Territory (*krai*), and the Tatar Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic—were generated through the administration of a carefully planned standardized interview and a questionnaire, as well as through the study of documents obtained from various state institutions, regional and local organizations, newspaper files, and records made available by the directors of collective and state farms. The monograph contains more than a hundred tables summarizing the major findings, as well as summary tables of selected aggregates, and applies relatively advanced techniques of social statistics, including regression analysis, scaling, and latent analysis. The analytical units of the study were carefully chosen to allow the isolation of significant variables—e.g., the role of the ethnic factor in social mobility, the role of education, economic status, geographic location, and the impact of varying degrees of urbanization.

The study is organized into three basic parts. Part I deals with the formation of the contemporary social structure of the Russian village and includes a discussion of its evolution since the 1920s, as well as an analysis of current trends of development. Part II focuses on the social groups in the rural population, their similarities and differences. Besides discussing the socioeconomic bases of group differences, the author here is concerned with the problem of the cultural level in the Russian countryside, as well as certain aspects of the social psychology of social groups in the rural population. Part III, finally, is devoted to an analysis of social mobility in rural Russia. The study also contains an appendix, which sets forth the methodological base of the book, and a useful index.

In many respects, the present volume is a continuation and expansion of Arutiunian's research interests. He is the author of an article dealing with the social structure of the rural population, published in *Voprosy filosofii*, no. 5 (1966), and an earlier monograph on change in the social structure of socialist society (*Izmenenie sotsial'noi struktury sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva* [Sverdlovsk, 1965]). Like his earlier work, the book under review is a very useful and significant contribution. It contains only a minimum of ideological ballast and is written in a detached and matter-of-fact language which is a welcome relief from the typical jargon and propagandistic tenor of most Soviet books dealing with social science problems. Indeed, the book in its entirety is an eloquent argument for empirical social science research and for a more refined and sophisticated application of social statistics. As far as its subject matter is concerned, this volume is a "must" for every scholar who is seriously interested in the sociology of contemporary rural Russia. It contains a wealth of factual information about the immense heterogeneity (economic status, differences in cultural levels and life-styles, etc.) of various elements of the rural population and constitutes solid proof that the Soviet Union is a long ways from realizing the Marxist dream of a society in which the differences and antagonisms between town and country have been eliminated.

ROLF H. W. THEEN

Purdue University

My Odyssey: An Autobiography. By Nnamdi Azikiwe. (New York & Washington: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. 452. $12.50.)

It is a shock to find that many of the students who read African Politics for the first time have never heard of Nnamdi Azikiwe. They know something about Julius Nyerere and even perhaps about Sékou Touré, while Kwame Nkrumah has a place among past political luminaries. The reason is clear: For most of the period after 1958, when he became President of the Nigerian Senate, "Zik" played a largely dignified role in Nigerian politics. He is a flourishing businessman who may yet contribute to the politics of Nigerian demilitarization. And any student who consults the standard works on Nigeria—for example, James S. Coleman, *Nigeria: Background to Nationalism* (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1963), and Richard L. Sklar, *Nigerian Political Parties* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963)—will quickly realize how important was the part played by Dr. Azikiwe in the growth of Nigerian nationalism.

Only the early episodes in that story are told in this volume: it stops short at 1947 when Azikiwe, as president of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, was the dominant figure in Nigerian politics. We shall have to wait for the subsequent volume, which is promised, to learn about Zik's participation in the freedom struggle, his experience in public office, and his intriguing role during the civil war. From Nigerian nationalist to Ibo tribalist? Such a question is best left unanswered until the second volume appears.

My Odyssey fills out the picture already painted by Azikiwe's biographers, of whom one (and perhaps the best)—the Ghanaian, K.A.B. Jones-Quartey—was appointed assistant editor of *The African Morning Post* in 1935 (p. 255). It tells of Zik's early years in Northern Nigeria and of his schooling at Onitsha (the family home-town), Lagos, and Calabar. It describes how, in 1921, Zik became a junior clerk in the civil service but determined to go to the United States for further study. His first attempt to reach America, however, came to nothing. He got no further than the Gold Coast, where he became a police recruit, "bubbling with ambition to achieve fame as a police officer" (p. 60). His mother persuaded him to return to Nigeria. He was employed as an advocate's clerk at Calabar until his father, at considerable personal sacrifice, found the money for him to go to the United States. Before leaving Calabar, the young Azikiwe prayed to God to "teach me to be humble in my quest for greatness" (p. 74).

Chapters V-VII tell of Zik's experience in the United States over a period of almost nine years (1925–34). We learn of his academic and sporting achievements, of his debut as a journalist, and of the various menial jobs (ranging from janitor to dish-washer, from steel-worker to coal-miner) which he took to pay his way through college and Howard and Lincoln Universities. The worst period was after he left Storer College in West Virginia and was jobless in Pittsburgh; fortunately, his attempt to commit suicide was frustrated. Economic hardship left a deep mark on the impressionable Azikiwe. On the last day of 1933, faced with the prospect of unemployment, he vowed that he would not only work to eradicate imperialism in Africa but would also devote his energies to accumulate wealth and so "ensure that I shall never be in want" (p. 175).

Zik's efforts to secure lucrative employment came to nothing. He offered his services to Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia "to assist in safeguarding his territory from aggression" (p. 170) and to the President of Liberia; but in vain. He found that the colonial governments in British West Africa discriminated against educated Africans; he therefore decided to become a journalist, as a first step to founding his own printing and publishing business. In 1934, he returned to West Africa and became editor of a new Gold Coast daily, *The African Morning Post*, owned by the Accra businessman, Mr. A. J. Ocansey. Zik selected as the paper's motto: "Independent in all things and neutral in nothing affecting the destiny of Africa," and his vigorous editorials attacked anything that threatened to delay the Gold Coast's independence.

In July, 1937, Azikiwe returned to Nigeria, with his name in West African journalism already established. Except for a final chapter on "Sporting Activities," the rest of the book is devoted to the founding and management of the Zik group of newspapers, and to the involvement of the latter with the law. Zik used the *West African Pilot* and his other newspapers as vehicles for the spread of nationalist ideas; but he also showed that journalism could be a successful business enterprise.

My Odyssey is a story worth telling. Most of it is well written, though some sentences are ponderous—as, for example, that beginning at the foot of p. 187. The picture unfolds of an ambitious and rather immodest man who is rightly confident of his own ability to succeed. There are many references to Zik's philosophy. He tells us, unconvincingly, of his commitment to socialism, and that he is returning to West Africa "semi-Gandhic, semi-Garveyistic, non-chauvinistic, semi-ethnocentric, with a love for everyone, of every clime on God's earth" (p. 162). It is not easy to get behind these grandiloquent phrases and penetrate the real man. This task is made harder because Zik omits from his autobiography any intimate, personal details of his life, especially after his return from America. Thus, we are told briefly of his marriage in April 1936 (p. 260), but nothing of his subsequent family life. It is Dr. Azikiwe the public figure who emerges from these pages, and the reader is left to bridge for himself the gap between Zik's public and private life.

William Tordoff
University of Manchester, England

The Myth of the Guerilla: Revolutionary Theory and Malpractice. By J. Bowyer Bell. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971. Pp. xiv, 285. $7.95.)

Revolutionism. By Abdul A. Said and Daniel M. Collier. (Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1971. Pp. ix, 191. $3.95.)

Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century. By Eric R. Wolf. (New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Pp. xv, 328. $3.95, paper.)

The study of revolutionary warfare is as full of ambushes as the technique itself, and many are the unwary scholars who have stumbled into its booby traps as a result of underestimating the complexities of the field and the need for firm positioning on the ground. Now, alas, we must add two more to the body count. In both cases, the causes of the disasters are instructive warnings to those who would venture into terrain where only the most highly trained may hope to emerge in one piece.

J. Bowyer Bell has made the elementary mistake of divorcing the guerrilla from his background. After lengthy and conscientious interviews with assorted insurgents, and a cursory study of the classic cases of guerrilla struggle, he has set out to cut the guerrilla down to size by demonstrating that he fails as often as, or more often than, he succeeds. On the basis of this finding, he is eager to dispel the myths which animate both Western radical romantics and the more tenacious activists of root-and-branch change in the Third World.

Unfortunately, Bell has attempted short cuts to his objective which turn out to be blind alleys. His "theory" amounts to no more than a rudimentary and highly unsatisfactory outline of the role allotted to people's war in military thinking and revolutionary doctrine. An account of the Chinese revolution, for example, which treats Mao as acknowledged leader of the communists in 1927 (p. 20), attributes to him the view that the people are "immobile, without vitality" (p. 21), and reduces his theory of revolution to the three stages of "guerrilla war, positional war, and mobile war" (p. 24), hardly recommends itself as a reliable introduction to the subject.

Theory having been disposed of, Bell then tackles three case studies in guerrilla warfare. Two of them—the armed struggle in southern Africa, and especially in the Portuguese colonies, and the Palestinian *fedayeen* movements—are intrinsically interesting and under-researched. But Bell, ignoring his own maxim that "the study of war is the study of society" (p. 19), fails to come to grips with any of the central problems posed by the interaction of such factors as social structure, international relations, and leadership formation, which would enable him to present a meaningful account of the guerrilla experience and guerrilla prospects in these cases. His discussion amounts to little more than a confrontation between revolutionary rhetoric and academic rhetoric. The exercise is futile, and the honors far from even—at least the guerrilla myths perform some role in mass mobilization and morale-building, while Bell's counter-myths are homilies addressed to an audience which is irrelevant to the guerrilla enterprise.

The third case study—that of Guevara's Bolivian venture—need not delay us long. The carcass of Che's forlorn mission has been dissected too often at length to yield new discoveries in a brief outline which chiefly represents a crude psychologism in which the hero is seen as seeking "to expurgate his sins" in a suicidal undertaking (p. 211).

It is necessary to add that Bell's writing is at times incomprehensible. To cite only one instance, take this sentence: "The revolutionary-guerrilla envisioned by Mao, unlike the partisan-guerrilla, had been converted to the validity of the new ideology *fight for the future not the past,* to transform the old order, to destroy existing institutions, to create a new system, not to restore an old regime" (p. 27. Italics in original). Insofar as I understand this assertion, it is so simplistic in its oppositions as to suggest imperviousness to the considerable body of literature demonstrating the mix of past- and future-orientations in all modern revolutionary wars.

If Bell has lost himself in the guerrilla jungle, Said and Collier have hovered so high above the scene that heavy cloud cover completely obscured their view of the ground before their timely crash. I frankly confess to bailing out well before the end. There is, after all, a limit to what even a reviewer can absorb in the way of contorted mystifications, and this sample of passages taken from the first few pages of the book contains my justification for failing to complete my mission:

"The credo of revolution has become divorced from the execution of revolutions; the intangible and seductive concept of change has succumbed to the idiosyncrasies of the political system" (p. 1). "Their systematic attempt to solve the complexities of the world provides an ideational framework to an essentially value-free political milieu" (p. 1). "With the breakdown of the Church as a primary ordering principle, man views life with confusion and the knowledge that the only certainty in life is death" (p. 2). "Revolution appeals to the hidden essence of man that rebels against order and is captivated by abstract assurances of achievement and satisfaction in the present life" (p. 2). "The nature of revolutionary phenomena is bound to the nature of man and his never-ending quest for relevance during the finite period alloted to him on the planet" (p. 2). "The faith which he seeks may be founded in the past or the present; its exploration may be facile or arduous" (p. 3). "The truth about man is not as important as the miracle that he exists at all" (p. 3). "When man can no longer share the beliefs of his ancestors, a break with the past usually translates to disruption of the present" (p. 4). "Revolutionism . . . condemns ideology yet adheres to dogma . . . It aspires to a nationalism that can only artificially arouse the populace . . . Revolutionists are those who are most sensitive to the needs of the times" (p. 5).

Teachers of political theory may find these texts instructive, but there, I believe, their value ends. However, I shall treasure the thought that revolutionism, defined as "the ideology of constant and total political change" (p. 2) united among its practitioners Lenin, Mao, Christ and Luther (p. 4). Nor should I overlook my most cherished understatement of the season: "In the twentieth century the United States has tended to view revolution abroad as essentially an unsettling experience" (p. 7)!

Eric Wolf's study of the six great peasant-based revolutions of the century, by contrast, demonstrates a mastery of his field and the methods required to negotiate it that evokes respect and admiration. In six crisp essays and a brilliant conclusion, he extends our understanding of the nature of peasant reactions to social change appreciably by his skill in isolating and analyzing those factors, which, by a magnification of the anthropologist's techniques, can be shown to be crucial in linking local grievances and protest to larger movements of political transformation.

Wolf is not alone in perceiving the genesis of modern revolutionary movements in the impact of capitalism upon the social, economic, and cultural supports of pre-industrial and semi-industrial societies, nor is there anything novel in the emphasis he places upon the specific disruption wrought by these changes upon the peasantry as a class. Although his exposition of these themes in his six case studies is exceptionally vivid and perceptive, particularly in its discussion of land use and rights, his major contribution to the analysis of the peasant component in the revolutionary process lies in his convincing argument that "it is the middle and poor but 'free' peasants, not constrained by any power domain, which constitute the pivotal groupings for peasant uprisings" (p. 292). He demonstrates repeatedly how factors which "increase the latitude granted by that tactical mobility reinforce their revolutionary potential" (p. 293) and contribute decisively to the general outcome of the confrontation between the forces of change on the one hand and accommodation to exogenous pressures on the other. He effectively disposes of the communist mythology surrounding the revolutionary role of the landless and poor peasantry, while at the same time showing the inadequacy of those theories which try to explain the revolutionary mobilization of peasants simply in terms of such vague notions as "nationalist appeal."

Wolf does not exaggerate the role of the peasants, although they form the focus of his study. He is well aware that it is the synchronization of peasant uprisings with wider political movements which produces revolutions. Within the short compass of his overview, he examines the pivotal role of other classes, the types of nonpeasant leadership which determine the nature of the post revolutionary order, and the limitations of peasant action and consciousness. The central paradox of the middle and free peasant is beautifully outlined: fueled by anarchism and an apocalyptic vision of the world, his very attempt to remain traditional makes him revolutionary; hence his fate "is essentially tragic: his efforts to undo a grievous present only usher in a vaster, more uncertain future" (p. 301).

From the standpoint of the political scientist, Wolf's examination of the character of revolutionary leaderships, and the manner in which they forge links with and mobilize peasant rebels, is perfunctory, and he places far too little emphasis on the importance of institutional breakdown at the national level, in most cases under the stress of war, in creating the "space" for revolutionary groups to maneuver. But it would be carping to make too much of these deficiencies in a study which is primarily concerned to hone our analysis of one crucial dimension of the revolutionary drama.

A more serious general problem is posed by the nature of the study itself. By concentrating exclusively upon the successful instances of peasant-based revolution, Wolf is driven to stress structural similarities at the expense of cultural variables. As his anthropological work confirms, he is well aware that the dilemmas of societies in the throes of adjustment to the pressures of modernity involve a cultural crisis of a far-reaching kind, but since he is here dealing with only one mode of adjustment, through revolution, he fails to elucidate the circumstances under which such an outcome proves abortive or is bypassed. He adverts in passing to the issue, noting that "the very spread of the capitalist market-principle also forces men to seek defences against it. They could meet this end either by cleaving to traditional institutions, increasingly subverted by the forces which they were trying to neutralize; or they could commit themselves to the search for new social forms which would grant them shelter" (p. 282). The "search for new social forms" does not necessarily imply a revolutionary option, of course, and the likelihood of success in resorting to this path would seem to be affected by the extent of ethnic and religious diversity and by the strength of the specific forms of cultural cohesion between traditional elites and peasantry in the community in question. By failing to explore these variables, Eric Wolf misses an opportunity to make his stimulating comparative study even deeper and richer in texture.

REX MORTIMER
University of Sydney, Australia

Crisis in Costa Rica: The 1948 Revolution. By John Patrick Bell. Latin American Monographs, No. 24 (Austin, Texas: The University of Texas Press, for the Institute of Latin American Studies, 1971. Pp. xiii, 192. $7.00.)

Costa Rica is one of those few countries of Latin America, and the only one in Central America, where civilian government has almost always prevailed; where constitutional stability is more characteristic than turbulence; and where, at least since 1889, increasing popular participation has guided her political fortunes. During eighty-three years, Costa Rican government has been overturned by force on only two occasions, in 1917 and 1948. Some scholars have reflected that it is useful to political science to know why Costa Rican political institutions and processes are unique within the Latin American and especially the Central American-Caribbean context; and what were the circumstances which produced exceptions to the Costa Rican pattern of peaceful constitutional stability. Therefore, this brief study by Professor Bell, historian at Indiana University (Fort Wayne), is worthy of examination by those political scientists who are still more concerned about such old-fashioned quirks as popular rule and political stability than about "modernization" or "development."

A widespread account of the Costa Rican revolution of 1948 holds that during two administrations (that of Dr. Rafael Angel Calderón Guardia, 1940–1944; and of Lic. Teodoro Picado Michalski, 1944–1948) the relative tranquility of Costa Rican political life was disrupted by fiscal irresponsibility, administrative bungling, ham-handed executive authoritarianism, electoral corruption, and intrusion by influential Communist elements into governmental affairs. This account also has it that in 1948, in response to legislative annulment of the popular election of conservative opposition candidate Otilio Ulate and attempted imposition of ex-President Calderón Guardia, José Figueres saved the day by undertaking a revolution which restored and improved upon the constitutional order.

For the most part, Professor Bell sees the revolution in a different light. The regimes of Calderón and Picado, he believes, attempted valiantly to solve profound social questions. Communism and Communists were no problem. Fiscal corruption and mismanagement existed and were admitted by Calderón, but were not terribly important. There was indeed an electoral problem; but José Figueres, a naturally combative person (p. 87), had been plotting revolution for from six to eight years. Furthermore, Bell tells us, the revolution led by Figueres was largely inspired by an oligarchic elite which couldn't tolerate the social reforms of 1940–1948, including especially a new income tax.

This interpretation will grate on the nerves of those scholars who had supposed that the electoral question, including what Bell rightly calls the "fraudulent election of 1944" (p. 95; and see p. 112) and the grave irregularities of the election of 1948 (described accurately on p. 130), were central causes of an unusual revolution by democratic Costa Ricans of all ideological persuasions under the leadership of José Figueres. The traditional version does seem plausible when one considers the following: (1) José Figueres turned out to be a reformer no less radical than Calderón or Picado (see pp. 160–161); (2) he did in fact turn the government over to Otilio Ulate in 1949; (3) the Constitution of 1949 assured more than did any previous one the preservation of the institutions and processes of democracy; (4) José Figueres was elected to office by popular vote in 1953 and 1970; but (5) opposition candidates were freely elected in 1958 and 1966. A fact which Professor Bell does not mention is that Calderón Guardia, who died in 1970, was a very widely known and highly regarded family doctor as well as a babe in the political woods. Thus his regime, and that of Picado which relied on his leadership, suffered from serious deficiencies and naivetés which helped to push Costa Rica over the brink of armed revolt.

Professor Bell would have improved his case if he had provided more impressive substantiation for many of his claims. He tells us repeatedly (pp. 45, 95, 98, 131) that Figueres or his followers had been fomenting terrorism since 1940, but gives us no sources except a biased pro-regime newspaper, *La Tribuna,* and a Communist sheet, *Trabajo* (p. 99, n. 74 and 75). There are sweeping, often unsupported generalizations about the Costa Rican class system (pp. 8–9), the thoughts or actions of this or that class (p. 24), alleged problems of intense misery (pp. 20, 27), or the "call for modernization" (p. 81). Despite a thirteen-page bibliography which includes most of the scholarly sources on Costa Rica, the author occasionally relies on newspapers or authors (e.g., Carlos Luis Fallas, Manuel Mora) who were notoriously biased.

The case that Professor Bell is trying to make deserves a hearing, and other readers may be more impressed by the verification he provides. I cling to the view that in Costa Rica, a successful revolt requires more than the efforts of a rebellious man in combination with a disgruntled oligarchy. Otherwise the causes of the unique political character of this Central American republic, or for that matter of many persistent patterns of difference among polities, are reduced either to simplistic doctrines of psycho-economic determinism or to meaningless happenstance.

JAMES L. BUSEY
University of Colorado, Colorado Springs

Political Violence & Public Order: A Study of British Fascism. By Robert Benewick. (Baltimore, Maryland: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1969. Pp. 340. $9.95.)

Of all the irregular events that have punctuated modern British politics, few have been as unnerving as the scenes played out in the 1930s by Sir Oswald Mosley and the British Union of Fascists. While the episode might easily be written off as a fringe response to the interwar crisis, it continues to trouble observers of the British scene. British "traditions of civility" are, after all, the model that others follow. Rather than dismiss the BUF simply as a nuisance, therefore, students of British politics have sought to explain the rise and impact of the BUF. As most attempts have thus far been only partial, Robert Benewick has performed a distinct service with this straightforward and fairly complete study of British fascism between the wars. His study is all the more welcome as a corrective to Mosley's own dreary and egocentric apologia which has recently appeared in this country as *My Life.*

Although British fascism in the 1930s was irreducibly Mosleyite, Benewick wisely paints the larger picture of the movement as well as the man. By so doing, he provides a fascinating if plainly factual picture of the BUF as a mass movement. What is striking is the extent to which the BUF fits the models of mass movements developed by such writers as Kornhauser or Selznick. The BUF was characterized by such "mass" characteristics as promiscuous recruiting, organizational instability, rapid membership turnover, ideological restlessness, and a socially and economically marginal membership led by dispossessed middle-class subleaders. It never developed the discipline, the social base, the sureness of purpose, or the organizational solidity necessary for a really serious political movement. Such influence as it had was due to its ability to gain publicity through violence and theatrics and by the catalytic presence of the Mephistophelian Mosley. (Benewick is altogether fair on the former point in showing that much of the violence that accompanied Mosley's meetrings was caused by others—though provoked by the fascist style and politics.)

While Benewick avoids attempts at psychohistory in dealing with Mosley, he does supply sufficient data for us to reject the hitherto conventional and uncritical interpretations of the BUF leader. As against the tiresome assumption that he could have been leader of either the Labour or Tory Party, Benewick resists the temptation to dwell on the myth of the "tragedy of Mosley." That Mosley was endowed with more than enough charm, intelligence, competence, and even charisma can hardly be doubted. But, as Benewick emphasizes, he also demonstrated qualities of mind, character, and ideological instinct that made him quite unsuited for leadership within the constraints of the system. Like others at the time, Mosley was a dissatisfied and restless loner seeking an outlet that the system could not provide. He was an aristocrat as mass man. Benewick is partly right in terming him an opportunist. But an authentically unprincipled politician who had tasted the popularity and power that Mosely had by 1929 would surely have bided his time and not sought to gain power, by forming first an "oppositionist" group (the New Party), and, then, a party which looked across the Channel to foreign models. As Benewick points out, the New Party may have started where the Keynesian Mosley Memorandum left off, but it began to evolve almost immediately in an autocratic direction. By the time he visited Italy in early 1932, Mosley was already emphasizing characteristic fascist values: youth, character, race, nation, energy, manhood. Both Mosley's impatience with the Labour Party and the subsequent evolution of the New Party, then, prefigured the formation of the BUF rather than reflecting simple opportunism. Adventurer though he may have been, Mosley nonetheless moved within fairly stable ideological parameters.

Interestingly, Mosley's fascism was intially something other than it was to become or than it appears now when measured by contemporary experience. It was the "modern movement," stressing the values of action, youth, decisiveness, resolve, and discipline. Like other movements at the time, especially those on the left, it was a response to the political, moral, and economic failures of the system. Though it learned from Italy, it sought domestic roots, concentrated on domestic reform, and urged national renovation. While it began as a reformist group, however, it developed into a movement of reaction and of revolutionary change. As its chance of becoming a serious force diminished, it took on the extravagant trappings and sinister purposes of fascist movements elsewhere. By 1934 it was a discredited force. Yet precisely at this moment, the BUF took its final plunge. It launched its anti-Semitic campaign in East London and shifted its admiring sympathies from Rome to Berlin. The "seige of terror" it thereafter visited upon East London—it had little following elsewhere—brought it more publicity than it had attracted in its relatively sedate period. The "Battle of Cable Street" was the climax of the period, representing as it did for both those on the left and the right an opportunity to play out vicariously the deadly drama of the fascist struggle. The result was the passage of the Public Order Act, which, as Benewick shows, deprived the BUF of its blackshirts and checked its capacity for provoking or initiating violence. By 1938, Benewick concludes, it was "little more than an anti-Semitic band" (p. 138).

In an understated conclusion, Benewick suggests that fascism failed because of the strength of British culture and institutions in withstanding the stresses of the 1930s. His argument is, however, so brief and so general that one can hardly disagree with his comments on the civic culture in Britain. Yet given the complexity of any political culture, one's understanding is not substantially advanced by such broad generalizations. Which elements in British culture played the resistant role: the democratic and liberal? the working-class collective? the deferential and conservative? or some particular constellation? While we can know the answer intuitively, Benewick's failure to link his descriptive examination of British fascism more closely to the theoretical questions he correctly poses does not allow us to answer these questions in any depth. This modest reservation notwithstanding, Benewick's study remains a cool and comprehensive account of a troubling phase in a troubled time.

HENRY J. STECK

State University of New York
College at Cortland

Urban Policy-Making: Influences on County Boroughs in England and Wales. By Noel Boaden. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 150. $7.50.)

At the start of the 1960s the academic study of British local government was mainly a branch of public administration, concentrating on the formal structure and rarely venturing into either the processes or the outcomes of decision making. Local authorities seemed almost extensions of central departments and in no way political systems in their own right. Theories about local government were based on fragmentary observation and common sense. During the 1960s a great change took place. New provincial universities were established and departments of politics expanded. Staff could now specialize in local government and were eager to explore local authorities close by. The new Social Science Research Council pumped public money into studies of city politics. Above all, British students were inspired by American investigations into community power, their rigorous methodology and sophisticated statistical techniques.

Dr. Noel Boaden of the University of Liverpool represents the new trend. His book is important both for its methodology and substantive conclusions, at least for British scholars, although American political scientists may find it crude. He first demolishes the traditional assertion that strict central control produces uniformity in the provision of local services. Behind the façade of control British cities display variations in their levels of expenditure. About a quarter spend generously on all services, about a quarter spend very little on all, and about a half reveal a complex variety. Local authorities are therefore "authoritative allocators" (p. 19).

He formulates a model of three local features to account for the diversity of levels of expenditure: the incidence of need, the disposition to spend and the availability of resources, each of which he analyses into its components. Need is seen in terms of the social composition of the population and the physical structure of the locality; disposition in terms of party control, professionalization of the permanent officials and public involvement; and resources in terms of money, labor, and land.

To measure the relationship of his variables to expenditure Dr. Boaden examines eight local services which cover 70 per cent of local government spending: education, children, health, welfare, libraries, police, fire, and housing. His methods are the simple and partial correlation coefficient, and he points out that he reveals associations which although suggestive are not explanatory.

His general conclusion is that needs, dispositions, and resources show important, although varying, relationships with the various local services. Most significantly he stresses the influence of party control. Many observers have held that party politics has little impact on local government decisions: notably only in the reorganization of secondary education, council house rents, direct labor building departments and patronage. Dr. Boaden shows that the Labour Party, whatever the needs and resources, tends to spend more on education and housing, the most costly services, than the Conservatives. Conservatives tend to spend more on the police, and Labour more on the fire service. Dr. Boaden suggests that Labour reflects a working-class pride in the fire brigade or is more susceptible to pressure from the fire brigade trade unions.

Labour authorities also expedite their business more speedily and have a more elaborate committee structure which enables their members to participate more fully in decision making. Labour authorities trust these committees more, have a lower attendance of the public at council meetings, are less open to the press and are less generous to the other side in the exercise of patronage. Party has been restored as a significant variable.

Dr. Boaden indicates that the poorest authorities spend the most heavily on the most costly services: the poor are the big spenders and big taxers. Central grants, most of which go to the poorest authorities, do not wipe out local factors on expenditure levels, and do not seem to restrict local discretion. Central control is not related to the amount of money the center issues.

Dr. Boaden's book is an important prelude for further research. He deals in general totals. We now need to move into a number of local authorities to observe in detail their decision-making processes and outcomes. We must focus on how need is transmitted to the authority, the role of voluntary organizations and the relationships between the elected members and the full-time officials. These areas may not be amenable to treatment by statistical techniques; more traditional approaches are likely to be required. Dr. Boaden has rendered a service by providing through the apparatus of political science systematic evidence for what some students had long suspected.

G. W. Jones

London School of Economics and Political Science

Zhukov. By Otto Preston Chaney, Jr. (Norman, Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 1971. Pp. 512. $9.95.)

Worthwhile biographies of leading Soviet personalities (with the exceptions of Lenin, Trotsky, Stalin, and perhaps Khrushchev) are rare. Official Soviet biographies are usually of little value or interest except for selected (and sometimes amended) facts pertinent to political or propaganda purposes. There is other source material which varies considerably depending on the subject, but only infrequently is there sufficient relevant information to form the basis for a well-rounded biography.

Colonel Chaney, a US Army officer with a Ph.D. in Soviet military affairs, has written a worthwhile biography of Marshal Zhukov. He had made the most of the available materials that contribute to an understanding of this leading Soviet military figure of the past two generations. He has combed through the growing shelf of Soviet military memoirs, including naturally Marshal Zhukov's own, as well as Western and the few relevant former Soviet sources that throw some light on the Marshal's career. Chaney has a fully adequate understanding of the general framework of Soviet history within which Marshal Zhukov played his roles. This reviewer is aware of no significant sources which the author has neglected. (One of my very few criticisms is directed at the uncharacteristic error made by the author in accepting as valid two allegedly former Soviet sources, "Colonel Kalinov" and "Captain Krylov," whose memoirs are fabrications and who do not in fact exist. These works, however, have only been cited in a few instances on peripheral matters.)

This biography does not contribute any new insights into the Soviet political process or the history of the Soviet Union. But it does illuminate, probably as usefully as any biography of Marshal Zhukov can, many facets of the internal working, and to a lesser extent the foreign relations, of the Stalin and post-Stalin Soviet regimes. It is well written, and through the narrative of Zhukov's personal experiences and activities, we are given a lively and rewarding picture of developments, particularly in the period immediately preceding and during World War II.

Zhukov first received wide recognition as a result of his success in defeating a Japanese incursion into Mongolia in 1939. His role in that battle, and less successfully as Chief of the General Staff in the period shortly before the German attack in 1941, catapulted Zhukov into the first rank of Soviet military leaders. The Marshal's various services as a leading military planner and trouble-shooting field commander during the Soviet-German war (including the battles of Leningrad, Moscow, Stalingrad, and Berlin) made him clearly preeminent among Soviet military leaders.

The unique relationship which developed during the war between Zhukov and Stalin helps contribute to our understanding of Stalin. So, of course, in a different way, does Stalin's banishment of the well-known Marshal soon after the end of the war. Through no fault of the author, we do not really learn anything new about the postwar Stalin period.

Much more of course can be said about the later era, as seen from the rise and fall of the Marshal in the middle and late 1950s. The author makes use of such information as is available to sketch out Zhukov's political role in the period from 1953 through 1957. The author may in a few instances exaggerate Zhukov's political role in the 1955–57 period; for example, to say that "Zhukov almost certainly issued the orders which sent Soviet tanks into the streets of Budapest in the early hours on October 24," while almost certainly true, is also almost certainly irrelevant to the question of the Marshal's weight in making the Soviet policy decision to intervene; the Minister of Defense, whoever he might have been, would have issued these orders, whether he had been consulted in making the decision or not. But such passages are the exception in Chaney's carefully and generally balanced appreciation of the available evidence on Zhukov as "the soldier-politician."

Zhukov is a well-researched, well-written book. The author is sympathetic to his subject, but not uncritical. It is hard to imagine a more complete treatment of the subject. It not only represents a good and interesting biography of one of the outstanding historical figures of his time, but it also contributes to the reader's understanding of Soviet internal and external affairs in the recent past.

RAYMOND L. GARTHOFF

Washington, D.C.

The Lingering Crisis: A Case Study of the Dominican Republic. Edited by Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez. (New York: Las Americas Publishing Company, 1969. Pp. 178. No price indicated.)

This thin anthology is not a major contribution to our understanding of the Dominican Republic's troubled politics, nor does it significantly add to available analysis of the equally disturbed pattern of Dominican-American relations. Subtitled "a case study of the Dominican Republic," the volume makes little pretense beyond the title at providing material for systematic comparative purposes. Published in 1969, the book was dated even then; most of the articles brought together in the collection were written (and several originally published) in 1966–67. Even the book's most comprehensive and insightful article, Howard Wiarda's "From Fragmentation to Disintegration: The Social and Political Effects of the Dominican Revolution," written in 1966, makes somewhat frustrating reading in 1973; one would prefer an attempt, such as Wiarda might make in a forthcoming book on Dominican politics, to account more fully for the years of Dominican history since the 1965 intervention.

Besides Wiarda's piece and others by Harry Kantor and Larman Wilson, the book comprises a number of articles of ephemeral worth on the 1966 election. Most are reports by committed social democrats (including the late Norman Thomas) on their work as "observers" to insure that the electoral process would be fair. These articles, however, reveal little beyond the noble intentions of the authors and their consensus that the elections were unrigged in the mechanical sense, even if flawed by the presence of American troops and by the known disinclination of the Dominican Armed Forces to accept Juan Bosch's return to the presidency.

I was struck by the discrepancy between Professor Wilson's suggestion that "unless the United States can help change certain basic aspects of Dominican society . . . the holding of elections will be meaningless—no matter how free, fair, and large the percentage of participation" (p. 125) and the conviction expressed by Norman Thomas, Frances Grant and others that they, as "election observers," were participating in an important and meaningful process. It would have been interesting to include in this collection an analysis of the relevance to Dominican reality of the assumptions the electoral observers made; consideration of the fact that almost every "free and fair" election in Dominican history has been held at the direct instance of the United States government would have made a useful starting point for such an inquiry.

In-depth analysis of the long-term political, economic, and social effects in the Dominican Republic of the 1965 intervention and its aftermath is much needed. Of particular interest, for instance, would be an examination of the US military's renewed attempts to train an elite corps in the Dominican First Army (seemingly repeating the process from which Trujillo emerged in the 1920s) or a study of the various civic development efforts financed since 1965 by USAID in the Dominican Republic. These and other aspects of the Dominican Republic's still "lingering crisis" might provide material for a very good book, but the Chang-Rodriguez volume is not it.

Abraham F. Lowenthal
Princeton University, visiting

The Machine-building Industry in Communist China. By Chu-yuan Cheng. (Chicago: Aldine-Atherton, 1971. Pp. xvi, 339. $9.75.)

During the past two decades, machine building has expanded from a small prewar base into one of the largest sectors of Chinese industry, a development which has passed largely unnoticed in western analyses of the Chinese economy. Machine building is a difficult topic. In addition to the task of assembling and interpreting fragmentary data which bedevils any economist in the China field, an investigation of the machinery industry must confront further obstacles: an extraordinarily wide variety of products; complex and shifting administrative structures; and the secrecy surrounding defense-related installations. These difficulties, which are responsible for past neglect of this important industry, have been overcome by Professor C. Y. Cheng, whose massively documented monograph provides a welcome addition to existing literature on the Chinese economy.

Cheng's study focuses on the derivation of basic quantitative information concerning Chinese machine building during 1952–66. The most significant contribution is his estimate of the volume, composition, and growth rate of domestic machinery output. For 1952–57, Cheng has painstakingly constructed an output index for 23 civilian machinery products. Although this new index advances less rapidly than the official series for machinery production, nearly all of the difference seems attributable to growing output of new products and to overall improvement in the quality of output. For the period 1957–66, Cheng provides a smaller sample of 11 products which is used to assess the growth of output. The thrust of Cheng's results is to confirm the high growth rate claimed by Peking for machine building during the 1952–57 period and to indicate continued progress, though at a much reduced rate, during the subsequent decade.

In addition to estimating output, Cheng provides quantitative indicators for all significant aspects of the production, trade, and utilization of machinery. Clear presentation of data, sources, and assumptions will permit others to take full advantage of Cheng's command of Chinese materials on his subject.

While Cheng's primary objective is to provide quantitative insights, he does not neglect issues of analysis and interpretation. Two final chapters appraise the overall development of the machinery industry since 1949 and its contribution to China's major economic goals. During the period reviewed, machine building contributed substantially to China's national security, industrial growth and national self-sufficiency, but only marginally to agricultural transformation. The apparent overexpansion of this industry, in purely economic terms, appears related to its importance as a supplier of military goods.

Although Cheng carefully acknowledges the imprecise nature of his sources and methods and the consequent uncertainty inherent in his results, his estimating procedures seem less than satisfactory at several points. Most important is his failure to explore the quantitative implications of changing product quality. By assuming constant standards of quality, Cheng understates the growth of output during 1952–57 and 1961–66, periods of overall quality improvement, and greatly exaggerates output expansion during 1958–60, when quality deteriorated sharply. This error leads to overstatement of the extent and duration of China's industrial setback during the early 1960s. Less central, but also problematic, are such items as the inconsistency among declining unit input coefficients for labor and steel, improvements in product quality, and falling rates of value added during 1952–57; failure to specify a price base or to account for long gestation periods in estimating capital input; and use of a machine tool price so low that output per worker falls short of annual wages.

Despite these shortcomings, Cheng's monograph adds a new dimension to our knowledge of the Chinese economy, not only because of the volume of research reflected in this account of an important industry, but also because the broad framework of its inquiry provides a significant advance toward a much needed integration of the Chinese economic field with development economics.

THOMAS G. RAWSKI

University of Toronto

The Challenge of Bangla Desh. Edited by Pran Chopra. (New York: Humanities Press, 1971. 159 pages. $5.00.)

The Rape of Bangla Desh. By Anthony Mascarenhas. (Delhi: Vikas Publications, 1971. 168 pages. £2.00.)

Chopra's book consists of essays contributed by well-known Indian writers, four of them university teachers, two defense analysts, and two journalists. Mascarenhas, also a journalist, received international attention by publishing a report on the Awami League's "mutiny" and "brutal massacre of thousands of non-Bengali men, women and children" (Sunday Times, May 2, 1971) and then an account of the Pakistan army's "genocide" of the Bengalis in the same paper on June 13, 1971.

The two books differ more in tone and temper than in the substance of their argument. Mascarenhas is jeering, sneering, and shrill in his denunciation of Pakistan's successive governments. Here and there he engages in poetic exaggeration, as, for instance, when he reports that the air at Dacca airport on a certain afternoon was so heavy "you could have sliced it with a knife" (p. 2). These characteristics of style and approach damage his credibility.

Both books are offered as analyses of why East Pakistan had to break away from the West and become independent. It is argued that a common allegiance to Islam was not a sufficient basis for a separate Pakistani national identity; that culturally the two wings were vastly dissimilar; that the East Pakistani elite was persistently excluded from the nation's decision-makin processes, which were dominated by West Pakistanis; that a disproportionately high percentage of East Pakistan's foreign exchange earnings and rupee contributions to the central government was diverted toward West Pakistan's economic development and the maintenance of a large military establishment, which also profited West Pakistan; that these political and economic oppressions drove East Pakistanis to seek regional autonomy; and that after the army's use of terror to suppress the autonomy movement, the East Pakistanis fought to be independent.

Students of Pakistani politics are familiar with the main elements of this analysis, which are now conceded by a growing number of Pakistani commentators also. It is therefore in the detail of presentation that one must look for the distinctive contribution of these books. And it is here that a corrective needs to be applied. Space will not permit more than a brief reference to a few cases.

Sisir Gupta makes one of the truly insightful observations in Chopra's book, i.e., that the major cause of East Pakistan's alienation is to be found in the eclipse of politics in Pakistan and, beyond that, in the Pakistani system's failure to produce national, rather than predominantly regional, political parties. Given East Pakistan's underrepresentation in the civil and military bureaucracies, business, and industry, the logic of its numerical majority could not have been asserted, and the wrongs done it righted, except in a democratic system of party politics. But then Gupta and some of his associates, especially Chopra and V. P. Dutt, hold

American military assistance to Pakistan as mainly responsible for this decline of politics and for the rise of bureaucrats and generals to positions of supremacy. The United States, it is said, thought of Pakistan as being conterminous with West Pakistan; East Pakistan never entered its calculations! Beyond considerations of its global anti-Communist strategy, it wanted to use Pakistan to put pressure on India, and to this end, under British tutoring, it sought to maintain an "artificial balance" between Pakistan and India. The United States did not trust Asian democracy and felt more at ease with authoritarian regimes. Both East Pakistan and India suffered as a result of this policy (pp. 5–7, 25, 72, 102–106).

American military assistance did indeed strengthen the Pakistani army and bureaucracy. But surely Americans did not create the political debility of which the bureaucrats took advantage. A few pages earlier in Gupta's essay the reader will find that Ghulam Mohammad had dismissed Nazim-ud-Dim from the prime ministership of Pakistan and installed Mohammad Ali Bogra in that office in 1953, and that the regionalization of politics had happened on a grand scale in East Pakistan in 1954, when American military aid had not even begun to arrive (pp. 22–25). The politicians, including the East Pakistani, did nothing to stop Ghulam Mohammad's high-handedness. It might be argued that it was the docility of Pakistan's first two Bengali prime ministers (Nazim and Bogra) rather than American weapons, that ushered in a long period of bureaucratic rule.

West Pakistan's "colonial exploitation" of the East is a recurring theme in both books. But only incidentally is it mentioned that the exploiters were a group or a class that exploited the people of *both* West and East Pakistan (Chopra, p. 37). This heavy stress on the regional character of exploitation serves to disguise its class character, which one of Sheikh Mujib's own observations brings out forcefully:

> . . . when I speak of East Pakistan's wealth being flown to and concentrated in West Pakistan I only mean regional concentration. I do not, thereby, mean that this wealth has reached the masses of West Pakistan. No. I do not and cannot mean that. I know there are millions like us in West Pakistan who also are unfortunate victims of this economic exploitation. I also know that the entire wealth of the country is concentrated in the hands of a few families. This will continue till the capitalistic pattern of our society is changed. (Mascarenhas, Appendix 2, pp. 151–152.)

In this context our authors speak of West Pakistan synonymously with the province of Punjab. The Punjabis are represented as the political, military, bureaucratic, and economic overlords of Pakistan and as exploiters not only of Bengalis but of Sindhis, Baluchis, and Pathans in West Pakistan. In the higher bureaucracy, the Punjab does indeed have a larger representation than does any other province. But if one wanted to be accurate, one would have to add that only once was a Punjabi the Governor General, never the President, never the Commander-in-Chief of the army, and for less than two years (August 1955-September 1956, December 1957-October 1958) the prime minister. Dewan Berindranath does say that under Yahya Khan hardly one-fourth of the dozen most important military officers were Punjabis and that "out of the 22 top industrial families . . . only two are Punjabis" (Chopra, pp. 146–147). But Dewan Sahib does not bring out these facts to challenge the popular rhetoric about Punjabi domination. He is suggesting that all groups in Pakistan, including the Punjabis, are dissatisfied, so that the worst might be expected even for West Pakistani unity. In time there might be no Pakistan at all!

There is a curious attempt to rewrite history in these books, which was not necessary to establish the case for East Pakistani independence. It is suggested that the Muslim League was never really a party of the Bengali Muslims, that they would have preferred two independent Muslim states as envisaged in the Lahore Resolution, that they did not quite believe in the two-nation theory, and that their leaders were "steam-rollered" into demanding "Jinnah's Pakistan" (Chopra, pp. 17–21; Mascarenhas, pp. 13–14). These extravagant assertions do no credit to their authors, some of whom are reputable scholars. Equally reputable Indian historians will tell us that the Muslim League was established in Dacca at the instigation, among others, of Nawab Salimullah Khan; that right from the days of Ameer Ali, Bengali Muslims had been "building brick by brick a house of communal separatism"; that Hindus and Muslims were farther apart in Bengal than they were, let us say, in Punjab; and that the two-nation theory represented the objective reality in Bengal. (Ram Gopal, *Indian Muslims: A Political History*, Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1959, pp. 101, 279; Nirad C. Chaudhury, *The Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, New York: Macmillan, 1951, pp. 225–232, 401–413.) The Muslim League was the ruling party in Bengal at the time of Indian independence. It should be clear that if the Bengali Muslims had wanted to stay out of "Jinnah's Pakistan," they could not have been forced into it. Strangely enough it is also argued in these books that Pakistan would not have come into being without vigorous Bengali support, that Sheikh Mujib was a patriotic Pakistani and an old Muslim Leaguer, and that East Pakistan and West Bengal would not come together in a United Bengal because the East Pakistani Muslims were not liberating themselves from West Pakistani domination "merely to exchange it for domination by West Bengal Hindus" (Chopra, pp. 4, 77 and Mascarenhas, pp. 17, 137).

In both books the position is taken that since the 1970 election had been contested in East Pakistan on the Six Points platform, these points should have been conceded after the Awami League won a massive electoral victory. The Six Points proposed to entrust defense and foreign affairs (minus foreign economic relations) to a national government which, however, would have no revenue raising power. It would meet its expenses from subventions made to it by the provincial governments, an arrangement not unlike the one America had under the Articles of Confederation. Thus it might fairly be said that the Six Points envisaged a virtual disbanding of the national government. Mohammad Ayoob and others in Chopra's book see Yahya Khan and Bhutto conspiring to thwart Mujib's right to rule from Islamabad. Mujib, it is said, was not willing to share power with Bhutto. When he realized that he would not be allowed to control the national government, his strategy shifted beyond the Six Points toward an even looser confederation (pp. 52–55). But Ayoob does not explain why Mujib or Bhutto should have coveted national office: there would hardly be any power to exercise in a government organized under the Six Points; the provincial governments would be far more powerful.

Many valid reasons for criticizing Yahya Khan can be found. But it seems to me that another man in his place—neither wicked nor grasping nor militaristic—would also have opposed a constitutional design that made the national government thoroughly inefficacious. The historian, I think, will condemn Yahya Khan not for his opposition to the Six Points but for his failure to see that the tide of popular sentiment in East Pakistan had turned irresistibly toward separation. But then the historian will have the advantage of hindsight.

ANWAR H. SYED
University of Massachusetts

Japanese Blue Collar: The Changing Tradition. By Robert E. Cole. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. xi., 300. $9.50.)

This welcome study is an investigation of Japan's factory workers by an American scholar who spent three months working as a machine expediter at a diecast company in Tokyo with the aim of accepting, "so far as was possible, the same working conditions as other blue collar workers. This meant working a six-day, 51-hour week, asking for no special privileges, being paid a reasonable wage, socializing with the other workers after work, and living in a Japanese-style apartment in a lower middle-class/working-class neighborhood near the factory" (p. 41). He also worked for several weeks at a new suburban plant of the same company, and for one month on the clutch assembly line of an auto parts company outside the metropolitan area. Although this represents a good deal more mobility for Cole than the long-term commitment of the Japanese worker, it still brought him closer to the actual, as opposed to the ideal, worker type described by earlier writers. One welcomes this focus on the workers, even though the "blue collar" title has its problems in a setting in which "the blue collar workers commonly arrived and left the factory in a suit, white shirt, and tie" (p. 144).

The author's concern is not descriptive but analytical, and he uses his experience only to document treatments of government policies, wage rewards, advancement and security, unity and cleavage among workers, and relations with company and labor union. He takes up, and discounts, the "convergence" theory of Clark Kerr's *Industrialism and Industrial Man*, and steers a careful and sensible course between it and the equally unacceptable (to him) emphasis on Japanese uniqueness. His objective is to "provide a bench mark, an empirical graph of the role of tradition in Japan today" (p. 12). One conclusion is that "It is oversimplification to say that pre-industrial societies move from ascription and particularism to achievement and universalism . . . Far more subtle combinations and shifts are possible" (p. 210).

One of the book's merits is the author's reliance on Japanese research. His discussion of the seniority and "commitment" patterns makes clear that this was not fully "traditional," since it developed in the years after World War I in response to management needs and hardened after World War II in response to worker insecurity. Nor, he finds, is it irrational or inefficient. He does find a tension between seniority and ability, with the seniority principle in large firms possible only through its absence in small firms (p. 92); and he finds, predictably, that the recent shortage of labor is increasing the wages of young workers and compressing the wage-rate structure. He also finds a major discrepancy between the attitudes of workers in Tokyo and those of the younger work force in suburban and rural plants, who are more likely to accept management's goals and assurances. And he finds that "inter-firm mobility of blue-collar workers is increasing faster than that of other occupational groups" (p. 123).

Cole's discussion of the role of the foreman, whose sanctions and responsibilities remind one of the village headman, is of particular interest. His discussion of the labor union confirms earlier treatments of enterprise unions, often co-opted by management, with few professional leaders, and limited grievance machinery. In 1967, in fact, only 37 per cent of all unions had such machinery (p. 230). Union and worker acceptance of goals of production thus comes as no surprise. Neither does the discussion of the "instrumental" use and discharge of personal obligations, unless one comes to the book with the traditional stereotypes in mind.

The author's conclusions from all this are that "the stereotype of the submissive, loyal, and non-competitive Japanese worker has been exaggerated" (p. 277) and that recent "changes are weakening the traditional structure of management authority and creating a more militant worker" (p. 273). Supporters of convergence theory as well as those who hold for Japanese uniqueness will find arguments for their case in this useful book. Nor are they always at opposite poles, for some of this change was predicted by James Abegglen in 1958 when he wrote of the factories he described that "Young Japanese who are urban reared, born in the large cities of laboring and white collar fathers, educated in urban schools beyond the legally prescribed minimum of middle school educations, and steeped in the impersonality of modern cities do not fit well into these factory relationships" (p. 137). That description fits many more Japanese in 1972 than it did in 1958.

MARIUS B. JANSEN
Princeton University

Weimar Germany's Left-Wing Intellectuals: A Political History of the 'Weltbühne' and Its Circle. By Istvan Deak. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968. Pp. xii, 346. $9.75.)

The dismissal of rationalist liberalism by early twentieth-century Germany in favor of a return to a romantic ethnic primitivism continues to be of interest to historians and social scientists. There remains an uneasy feeling that the decline of the Weimar Republic has deeper and more universal causes than the temporary aberration of a people unable to make the transition to modernity. Quite justifiably, the Weimar years, viewed from a more distant historical vantage point, appear as a general human object lesson and a warning. It would indeed be hazardous to confine the search for explanations to the German national character or to traumatic historical experiences peculiar to the German people. It is therefore not surprising that a voluminous literature on this unhappy chapter of European history has come into existence and continues to be enriched by specialized studies. There has been a tendency to analyze events in terms of the ideology and politics of the Right and to dismiss them as pathological outbursts. One may wonder, however, whether a balanced explanation can be obtained without a critical examination of the forces that eventually were subdued. What positive social contributions did the leftist intellectuals make? What were their inadequacies? Why were their ideas incompatible with the German ethos despite the respectable liberal tradition of mid-nineteenth century Germany? Istvan Deak's study of *Die Weltbühne* attempts to provide a better understanding of the leftists' role in the collapse of the Republic.

The author starts out with a general characterization of the writers of *Die Weltbühne* and, in doing so, explains the alienation of the leftist intellectuals from German life. Their aspirations reflected naivete and a lack of realism. They flaunted the traditional values of the bourgeoisie, and yet, being themselves bourgeois in origin and social position, failed to make effective contact with the masses. The "Berlin style" which they represented was the product of non-Berliners and even non-Germans. Their historical heritage as free intellectuals, mostly of Jewish background, left them without a home base. In short, "they were out of place in Germany" both socially and intellectually. These generalizations are substantiated by a chapter containing biographies of the editors of *Die Weltbühne:* Siegfried Jacobsohn, Kurt Tucholsky, and Carl von Ossietzky. The latter, although of non-Jewish background, was because of his leftist intellectualism no less an outsider.

The second part of the book deals with the "Causes and Campaigns" championed by *Die Weltbühne*. The author examines its position during the revolution of 1918–1919; its support of European federation and friendship with France; its sympathy toward Poland and hostility to collaboration with Soviet Russia; its advocacy of a more militant republic than was run by the Social Democrats; and its opposition to the overt and clandestine military forces as well as to the nationalistic judiciary, which had remained irremovable under the Republic. The main criticism that runs through the account of these campaigns is the absence of a clear political line. Their idealism prevented these ideologically committed intellectuals from placing themselves in any political camp. They remained homeless even on the Left. Their commitment was abstract and kept them free-floating in relation to political organizations.

The main endeavor of *Die Weltbühne,* to which Professor Deak devotes the third part of his work, was the advocacy of socialist unity. He maintains that the efforts of men poorly acquainted with the working class cannot be judged in terms of their failure to produce concrete results, since not even the organized leadership of the working class was able to attain such results. There is no doubt, however, that rationality and consistency of argument, detached from practical politics, could not have a tangible effect upon the course of policy. When during the years of relative stability of the Republic from 1924 to 1927 *Die Weltbühne* became increasingly radical, it urged socialist-communist cooperation, condemning both parties for their lack of realism. But the purism generated by intellectual abstractions was wholly unrelated to the experience and problems of the workers' parties. Even when, during the final struggle of the Republic against the fascist menace, *Die Weltbühne* increasingly identified with the Communists, it persisted in its severe criticism of the Party leadership for not living up to the program. Its main target, however, was Brüning and his government. This misdirection of its polemics had its basis in the rationalist fallacy which tended to dismiss the Nazis as psychopaths incapable of securing sustained popular support. In this view, the high quality of German education would serve as a reliable check on the Nazi madness. Part IV describes the demise of *Die Weltbühne* at the hands of the victorious Nazis and explains the attractiveness of the Nazi movement for the average German. The author does not accept the frequently voiced charges that the left-wing intellectuals contributed to the downfall of the Republic through their failure to align themselves with one of the leftist republican movements. Their literary activities remained without political effect partly because of the many inconsistencies of their intellectual position and partly because of their political isolation from both the governing forces and the workers' and peasants' opposition.

The study is competently done: the ample documentation, comprehensive bibliography, and almost sixty pages of concise biographies of the "*Weltbühne* Circle" and "Some Friends and Enemies of the *Weltbühne*" provide much valuable information on the period. The author might perhaps have added a further dimension to his analysis by illustrating through the case of the *Weltbühne* the effect of political commitment upon the intellectual's role in society. Does not his commitment, one may wonder, turn him away from an honest striving for objective analysis and thereby undermine the very rationalism which provides his only *raison d'être*? Is not the atomism inherent in the liberal intellectual's rationalism at odds with man's craving for community life and therefore doomed to failure as a political force? Must not the analytic function of the intellectual, to be of any value, be differentiated from the activism of the man of affairs? To raise these questions is not to detract from the merit of the book. It is a valuable contribution to the history of Weimar Germany.

PETER J. FLIESS

University of Massachusetts, Amherst

The Prussian Welfare State Before 1740. By Reinhold August Dorwart. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 328. $12.50.)

This book reminds us that the idea of the welfare state is very old indeed, dating back to the Late Medieval communes. Under the Hohenzollerns, as in other Early Modern monarchies, legislation affecting the morality, health, education, and general protection of the population was enacted on the territorial level, so that by 1740 there existed on paper a welfare plan whose declaration of purposes is in most respects comparable to that of modern nation states. The evolution of ordinances, edicts, and administrative organization is minutely spelled out in Professor Dorwart's study, providing ample evidence of the paternalistic concern of the Hohenzollern monarchs and the comprehensive nature of their policies even before the middle of the eighteenth century.

Political scientists interested in comparing institutions will find in this book a wealth of detailed information. Dorwart also provides an adequate survey of the idea of welfare as it emerged in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But despite the attention to legislative detail, his work tells us little about the substance of the Prussian welfare system, i.e., whether or not it actually met the individual and general needs of the population. Thus, the possibilities of comparison with other functioning welfare systems is limited. The book relies entirely on legal codes and published administrative orders, making little or no attempt to separate result from intent. The detailed description of institutional change is not integrated with social, economic, or demographic history in such a way as to tell us much of what we would like to know about the impact of particular measures. From what little can be surmised from the repetition of ordinances, it would seem that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century welfare schemes were ineffective in important respects, meeting neither individual needs nor, ultimately, the demands of the state itself. As the contradictions between economic growth and political development lie beyond the scope of this monograph, we learn little about why this should have been so. This is the inevitable result of isolating legal and administrative history from the broader trends of the Early Modern period.

The underlying causes of the evolution of welfare policy, treated here largely as the function of the history of ideas, are not easily fathomed through the kind of documents on which Professor Dorwart relies. The "politics" of welfare, as it was played by the absolute monarchs of Europe, deserves more careful attention. Dorwart himself stresses the *ad hoc* nature of governmental responses to economic and social crises, but he pays relatively little attention to the role of pressure groups, the saliency of status conflicts, and the perpetual fear of popular unrest in the decisions of monarchs and bureaucrats. He seems to be led more by the nature of his evidence than by the substance of social and political history to conclude that change was due mainly to princely paternalism and, after 1740, to *raison d'état*. These explain little about the actual distribution of welfare and how it was manipulated by the state and its clients to serve their special interests. For the most part, welfare measures in Prussia served conservative purposes, respecting the boundaries of corporate society, always sensitive to the interests of the higher status groups. Plans that directly affected the life of the poor or the outcaste inevitably involved ulterior motives reflecting the tensions inherent in that highly stratified society. The prince was by no means as free to concern himself with the well-being of his people as the author would make out. In an era before the professionalization of the civil services, his agents were themselves a corporate interest group.

Little of the complexity of the relations between state and society comes through in this work. The fault is largely that of German legal and administrative historical writing, which for so long has assumed the autonomy of the state. Even the published documents on which Professor Dorwart has relied reflect this bias, making it impossible without fresh archival material to push the frontiers of history much beyond their traditional limits. As intellectual and institutional history, Dorwart's work measures up to the best produced by German scholars. But by making their method his own, the author falls short of his own goals of writing about the substance of the Early Modern welfare state.

JOHN R. GILLIS

Livingston College, Rutgers University

Teachers as Agents of National Development: A Case Study of Uganda. By David R. Evans. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 247. $15.00.)

Uganda, like many African states, makes an enormous resource commitment to the development of education—in the Ugandan instance, averaging about 25 per cent of the recurrent budget in the early years of independence. David Evans assesses one aspect of the return to society for its investment in education in *Teachers as Agents of National Development*. One of the major tasks of the educational system in a polity committed to development and change is to create in its new generation positive orientations toward nation and modernity. Evans focuses upon the secondary school system in Uganda, and seeks to understand its impact on the political socialization process. On the whole, Evans finds the performance deficient. Certainly his data would be of little support to a Minister of Education in defending his pleas for more funds for secondary education to the stone-faced inquisitors of the Ministry of Finance at budget time.

The book, apparently based on Mr. Evans's doctoral dissertation at Stanford University, is built around a survey of secondary school teachers. Evans used a random sample of secondary schools stratified by region, applying the survey to all teachers in the schools selected. One should note a major limitation on the scope of the study deriving from the restrictive conditions on which government clearance was obtained. Evans was refused permission to interview any pupils; thus the inferences on the political socialization impact of the schools derives entirely on what the author learned from the teachers. This is obviously quite unsatisfactory, but the author cannot be faulted for circumstances over which he had no control. Compounding this problem was a requirement that 16 questions exploring teacher attitudes toward the government be removed from the survey instrument. But despite this dilution of his data, Evans deserves credit for persevering; a great deal of interesting information was collected.

Uganda offers a particularly interesting field for such a study; although expectations as to what the educational system can achieve for state and nation have increased, the short-term impact of independence is the de-Africanization of its secondary teaching cadre. At the time of the study, only 15 per cent of the secondary teaching staff was African; 15 per cent were Peace Corps and other overseas volunteers; 23 per cent were Asian, many Ugandan citizens; 10 per cent were missionaries, many with long teaching service; 32 per cent were overseas, mainly British, recruited on contract arrangements; the balance, about 5 per cent, were primarily wives of British officials, serving on local terms. The extraordinary difficulties in forging an efficient instrument of planned political socialization out of this incredible variety of teachers needs no further elaboration.

Much of the study is devoted to a delineation of the differences in attitude uncovered among these different groups of teachers. Africans and the overseas volunteers appeared overall to be most receptive to the socialization role defined by the author as functional to development and nation building. The missionaries and British wives, for different reasons, occupied the bottom rungs of his table, for which he used such criteria as awareness and attitude toward government, student participation, awareness of social environment and community contact, and attitude toward educational innovation and greater curricular relevance. One might note in passing that not all of the assumptions on which the scales were constructed were convincing: It is *not* self-evident that respondents' perceptions of Ministry of Education receptivity to their views betokens a positive image of government, nor that this dimension can be tapped by the number of hours spent listening to Radio Uganda (pp. 71–72). Nor does ability to name ministers plausibly measure "awareness of government" (p. 79), in circumstances where several of the groups analyzed are only short-term residents, with a high turnover rate.

Evans notes that political socialization was not a high priority of the government. Had his focus been broader, the reasons for this would have seemed evident enough. The sheer burden of sustaining the expansion of the school system, in response to the enormous popular pressures for its enlargement, creates problems of such magnitude that more diffuse goals such as improving the socialization performance will necessarily be shunted aside. For example, it is the pace of expansion which will force reliance for the forseeable future on a huge cadre of foreign teachers, whose responsiveness to a government-directed socialization program is obviously in doubt. Add to this the lack of elite consensus as to what precisely the Ugandan "political culture" should be, and the problem is more intractable yet. The one nation-building task on which substantial headway does appear to have been made receives little notice in the Evans work—the attenuation of the level of religious conflict.

Thus, in sum, we have a somewhat disappointing study. It does present some quite useful information, and provides us with a well-executed survey of a crucial occupational group. Yet, partly because of restrictions on scope imposed on the author, but also partly because of self-imposed limitations, the volume falls short of presenting us with an integrated analysis of the contribution of the secondary school system, actual and potential, to the goals of nation building and modernization in Uganda.

M. Crawford Young

University of Wisconsin, Madison

A History of the People's Democracies. By Francois Fejto. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 374. $13.50.)

We have long been needing a comprehensive text dealing authoritatively with political developments in Eastern Europe since the Stalinist period. This deficiency is now largely remedied by Francois Fejto's book, *A History of the People's Democracies: Eastern Europe Since Stalin,* translated from the French and with an epilogue covering events since the book's first appearance in 1969.

Fejto's account begins with the New Course and de-Stalinization of the mid-1950s. The bulk of the book and by far its most interesting part deals with domestic political developments in Eastern Europe. There are also useful, if more perfunctory chapters covering social structures, the economy, cultural trends and other aspects of the development of the Eastern European states. Relations among the nations of the bloc, and with the Soviet Union, form an integral part of Fejto's treatment but are utilized mainly to explain the course of domestic political developments. Thus the volume serves as a useful complement to Brzezinski's work in the area of foreign relations, *The Soviet Bloc.* The value of Fejto's account is greatly enhanced by the excellent chapters on Yugoslavia, a country which is often ignored in other accounts of domestic developments in Eastern Europe.

Fejto's outstanding achievement lies in presenting a highly readable account of the contemporary history of Eastern Europe without sacrificing any of the complex details which are indispensable for understanding the nature of politics in the region. A sense of the unpredictability and intricacy of the events which shaped Eastern European politics is sustained by careful attention to the power struggles which determined developments in each of the Communist countries. At the same time the account returns continually to the broader social, economic, and political problems facing the governments of Eastern Europe during this period. These observations rarely fail to hit the mark, and show a truly extraordinary feeling for the conflicting forces which have shaped the development of the Eastern European states over the past two decades.

Fejto, who left Hungary in 1951 and subsequently served as a correspondent for *Agence France Presse,* does not conceal his feelings about the Communist regimes and the role of the Soviet Union in influencing their domestic policies. He convincingly demonstrates that Eastern Europe's destiny is still governed by the actions of the Soviet Union. Even in the case of Yugoslavia, Fejto is persuasive in connecting the struggle between the conservatives and the liberals in the mid-1960s with the outcome of the power struggle within the Soviet Union.

Of course, placing the Soviet Union in the center of events suggests that it is the Soviet Union, not Eastern Europe, that must be studied if the future of the region as a whole is to be understood. This implication emerges at the close of the book when Fejto, in analyzing the failure of the Communist East European regimes to liberalize in the face of Soviet opposition, is left with only one ray of hope, "that the next Dubcek will appear in the nerve center of the system: Moscow" (p. 317). Fejto's concern with Soviet refusal to allow change in Eastern Europe is nevertheless balanced by a recognition that the forces for change in the region are powerful and growing stronger. Notwithstanding references to the need for a Dubcek in Moscow, there is the implication that the slightest show of indecision on the part of Moscow could lead to new demands for reform in Eastern Europe.

The major problem with Fejto's volume is a lack of documentation. The work is based largely on newspaper accounts, Western journals, and the author's own great knowledge of the area. While the American reader will find sources of interest in the book (especially certain publications, such as *Documentation francaise,* better known in Europe than in the United States), the material on which Fejto bases his account is not always adequately revealed. A case in point is his dramatic description of the events taking place in the power struggle in Yugoslavia during 1963 to 1966. In this instance, as in certain others, Fejto appears to be relying on accounts provided by the victors in the power struggle, persons who have had their own self-interest very much in mind in describing what took place.

The Fejto volume is nevertheless distinguished by its outstanding grasp of Eastern European history and detailed knowledge of the events of the past two decades. It can serve as a comprehensive introductory text for serious students interested in the politics of Eastern Europe, and as a source of much new information on Eastern Europe for the scholar familiar with the area.

PAUL SHOUP

University of Virginia

Power in Africa. By Ruth First. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1970. Pp. xiv, 513. $10.00.)

Ruth First is a rather remarkable journalist, born in South Africa and now in exile, who writes with commitment and perspicacity about African affairs. Up to now she has written about southern Africa. This time she takes on the topic of coups d'état in independent Africa —why and how they have occurred, and what is their political significance.

She seems to have read, and read well, virtually all that the scholars have been writing on contemporary Africa. And as a good journalist, she has tracked down the details on the three countries about which the bulk of the book is concerned: Sudan, Nigeria, and Ghana.

Although several others have written about these coups, none has I believe sought to place them within a general perspective of the whole process of decolonization. The book is a critique of these coups from the left, but one that happily rejects a conspiracy explanation as a substitute for analysis: "The basic structures of African society in new states, Ghana and Mali included, hold the seeds of a coup d'état within themselves. It is precisely because foreign powers and bodies like the CIA understand this well, that their interventions, even very indirect ones, are so effective" (p. 414).

What then are the "deeper reasons" which Ruth First adduces as explanations? There is first of all, she argues, the fact that the colonial experience had a greater impact than many will admit. "For the sediment of colonization lies deep in African society" (p. 27). Basically she sees the military-bureaucratic regimes as "a very close copy" (p. 432) of colonial government. Instead of Lugard and Lyautey, Africa now has Mobutu, Gowon, and Bokassa.

But why? Was there not a nationalist revolution against colonial government? Ruth First admits that there was. But the rapidity of the decolonization process, which the colonial powers precipitated to prevent radicalization, "if it made the early 1960's heady with optimism, left behind a damaging legacy of myth and illusion" (p. 49). And the military regimes continue to breed myths and illusions. They claim they come to power to overcome the dangerous internal divisions bred by the politicians. But First sees no significant difference among politicians, bureaucrats, or army officers in terms of their policy objectives: "stability and order, national unity and rapid modernization. Politicians . . . failed to reach these goals; bureaucracy and army failed even more abysmally" (p. 362).

And yet, she ends with empathetic warmth and understanding:

> The government of Africa, in the hands of the politician-manipulators, or the less flamboyant but infinitely more parochial soldier-rulers, is not on the whole tyrannical, but bumbling. Time and again it makes false starts, and spreads false hopes. Condemnation there must be; but compassion, too, for those who talked so boldly about freedom but had so little freedom of manoeuvre" (p. 465).

This book is an excellent introduction for students to the complexity of post-independence politics. Its approach is far wider than its topic would suggest. For researchers working on the details of the coups in the three countries treated at length, there is no doubt material here worth culling. The tone is in general very balanced even if, as in my case, one does not share every bias First has. It is at least a book that gives the reader a sense of the concrete reality of African contemporary life, which cannot always be said about some of the pseudoanalytic works that engulf us.

IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN

McGill University

The Commissariat of Enlightenment: Soviet Organization of Education and the Arts under Lunacharsky. By Sheila Fitzpatrick. (Cambridge: The University Press, 1970. Pp. 380. $13.50.)

This is a fascinating account of the confrontation of revolutionary romanticism with post-revolutionary political and economic realities. Through a detailed study of the creation and inner workings of a single Soviet ministry, rich in historical detail and based in part upon hitherto inaccessible Soviet archives, the author illuminates the problems faced by the Bolshevik regime in its early years as it attempted to translate ideals into practice.

The Commissariat of Enlightenment was assigned the task of reorganizing both education and the arts to serve the needs of the nascent socialist society. Under the leadership of Anatoly Lunacharsky, the philosopher-poet and revolutionary enthusiast who described himself as "an intellectual among Bolsheviks and a Bolshevik among intellectuals," and of Lenin's wife Krupskaya, who devoted a lifetime to the cause of popular education, the Commissariat played a central role in mediating the relationship of the new regime to the Russian intelligentsia.

The book documents the enormous problems faced by the Communist Party in making the transition from political opposition to governmental leadership, and above all the severe shortage of experienced personnel and administrative skills. It describes the organizational struggles which masked conflicts over power and policy: the efforts of Narkompros to wrest control over technical and professional education from the economic ministries and over political education from Party agencies, and at the same time to resist encroachment by other Party and governmental agencies on its educational and cultural domains. The economic dislocation of the times created additional preoccupations: discussions about the procurement of firewood, food rations, and general supplies vie with more abstract organizational and educational controversies in the minutes of the Narkompros collegium.

But the study is more than an institutional history. It is at the same time an account of the efforts of the Commissariat to draw the prerevolutionary cultural elite into contact, if not cooperation, with the new regime, and into sympathy with its broad objectives, while simultaneously defending itself from antagonists within the Communist Party who viewed Narkompros as politically unorthodox, administratively incompetent, and, in the turmoil of civil war, expensively irrelevant.

In this effort Lunacharsky and Krupskaya had the full support of Lenin himself, whom the author places squarely in the camp of the old fashioned revolutionary enlighteners, defending cultural traditionalism and the value of a broad general education against a newer generation of Party militants more narrowly utilitarian in its concerns, more "military" in its methods. Apart from one disagreement over the autonomy of Proletcult which reflected important differences about the relationship of bourgeois to proletarian culture, there were no serious conflicts of principle between Lenin and the Narkompros leaders. Lenin was more deeply concerned than they with creating an orderly administrative structure out of the anarchy which constantly threatened to engulf the Commissariat. But he consistently sided with Narkompros when it was attacked, defending its policies against pressures brought by the technical lobby which sought to replace broad general education with early specialization and to subordinate educational policy to the immediate tasks of economic reconstruction.

Other studies have documented the progressive defeat of early revolutionary ideals both in education and in other realms. The failure of Narkompros to enlist popular participation and local initiative in education through a system of educational soviets and the restoration of centralized bureaucratic control brought to nought the efforts of a generation of educational reformers, including Krupskaya herself. The partial abandonment of genuinely polytechnical education and the concessions to early specialization diluted earlier commitments. The consequences of the New Economic Policy were particularly serious for Narkompros, for the general retrenchment in governmental activity entailed the withdrawal of central financial responsibility for the educational budget, and therefore a loss of control over the implementation of a uniform educational program. The loss of central subsidies also resulted in the reintroduction of fees at all levels of the educational system, a defeat, however temporary, for efforts to achieve free and compulsory universal education.

While the author chronicles these defeats in some detail, she also draws attention to small triumphs. In the midst of political chaos and general poverty, she argues, it was no small achievement to have maintained a policy of tolerance in the arts—defending the cultural heritage of the past along with opportunities for the vociferous avant-garde—nor to have respected the independence of science, nor to have defended the principle of universal general education despite concessions in practice. State subsidies for the arts and sciences necessarily entailed state supervision, for the central problem was patronage rather than freedom. But Lunacharsky, and Lenin with him, are credited with resisting pressures to use this power to interfere or to intimidate.

This balance sheet of achievements and disappointments implicitly suggests that the general economic situation and the personal roles and values of key figures are the decisive explanatory factors. It reflects the absence of a broader analytical framework for examining the interaction of conflicting pressures and priorities in the context of the developing decision-making institutions, and for evaluating the outcomes from this perspective. The study is nonetheless a most welcome contribution to the literature of the early Soviet period, and offers rich materials for more theoretical and comparative analyses of social and political change.

GAIL LAPIDUS

University of California, Berkeley

India's Green Revolution: Economic Gains and Political Costs. Francine R. Frankel. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 232. $7.50.)

In this volume, Francine Frankel reports on her research into the social, economic, and political implications of agricultural change in five widely dispersed Indian districts: Ludhiana in Punjab, West Godavari in Andhra Pradesh, Thanjavur in Tamil Nadu, Palghat in Kerala, and Burdwan in West Bengal. These districts were chosen from among the 15 districts selected in 1961 for special attention under the Intensive Agricultural Development Program (IADP). Since that time they have remained major foci of administrative energy in the propagation of the Green Revolution.

Professor Frankel's argument has two central components: First, she suggests that the economic gains deriving from the technological revolution in agriculture have been distributed very inequitably, with a greatly disproportionate share going to large landowners, leaving the landless and small holders with little gains, and indeed, with a substantial decline in economic well-being relative to their neighbors. Second, she argues that growing income disparities contribute to increasing antagonism and the breakdown of permanent bonds between land-owning patrons and their clients, leading, in the presence of Communist parties, to increasing political radicalism, social disorder and violence.

The majority of Professor Frankel's book is given over to the first argument, and here she presents a wealth of valuable comparative evidence from the five districts and makes a thoroughly convincing case. Each of the five district chapters contains an extensive analysis of the characteristics of the new seed varieties being used and of their relationships to the district's farm ecology, land ownership patterns, and prevailing tenancy and labor practices. In each case, she shows why agriculturalists on each descending rung of the land-based village economic ladder are able to derive proportionately less benefit from the innovations.

The second argument is much more central to the concerns of political scientists. Evidence of change in the level of social disorder, violence, and radicalism in specific districts over time is, however, difficult to come by. Moreover, in periods of pervasive social change it is especially hard to isolate the effect of agricultural change even where an increase in political radicalism can be documented.

The unusual characteristics of Professor Frankel's sample of districts compound the problem in this case. Districts were picked for inclusion in the IADP back in 1961 because of their unusual economic promise. In the subsample of districts chosen for this study, at least, these economic characteristics are accompanied by equally atypical social and political patterns.

Professor Frankel's four rice-growing districts, for example, have population densities that average 878 persons per square mile in contrast to the all-India mean of 348. The number of cultivators per 100 acres averages 58 as opposed to a mean of 38 in India as a whole. Even more striking, the percentage of agricultural laborers in these four districts averages 51.8, in sharp contrast to the all-India mean of 19.3.

It is precisely these characteristics of high rural population density in combination with extensive landlessness that Donald Zagoria, in "The Ecology of Peasant Communism in India" (*APSR*, 65 [March 1971], 144–60), has convincingly identified as being consistently associated with high levels of Communist Party voting. Thus it is not surprising to find that, in the early 1960s before the Green Revolution began, all four of Professor Frankel's rice districts were in the top 15 per cent of 305 Indian districts ranked by Communist Party of India (CPI) vote in Legislative Assembly Elections in 1960 (for Palghat) and 1962 (for the other four districts). Palghat ranked first with 53.8 per cent, Burdwan fourteenth with 32.3 per cent, West Godavari twentieth with 25.3 per cent and Thanjavur forty-fifth with 15.9 per cent. The only district from this sample in which the Communists had not done well was the wheat-growing district of Ludhiana where the CPI won 5.6 per cent of the vote in 1962. This district has relatively low pressure on the land (20 cultivators per hundred acres) and a relatively low percentage of agricultural laborers.

Professor Frankel relies heavily on high levels of 1967 and 1969 voter support for Communist parties in her districts as evidence of the radicalizing effect of the Green Revolution. But when one looks back to the pre-Green Revolution voting figures of 1960 and 1962, it turns out that in four of the five districts, these voting levels represent significant declines in Communist strength from the levels of the early 1960s. Only in Burdwan has Communist voting strength increased, and there the agricultural growth rate has been very low. Thus, despite evidence of radicalism and political violence in the districts, these data do not support the case for a causal relationship between rapid agricultural growth and the rise of radical and violent agrarian politics.

Problems with the adequacy of her evidence notwithstanding, Professor Frankel presents a logically and intuitively compelling hypothesis: that the nature of traditional landlord-tenant relationships is being eroded by the modernization and monetization of agriculture and by the exposure of peasants to arguments for the radical restructuring of the rural economic and political order. Her supporting evidence on the distributive impact of the Green Revolution is rich in its detail and its comparative coverage of the five districts. It is perhaps inevitable, given the scope of this effort, the nature of the sample of districts, and the attention to considerations of distributive economics, that the evidence on political dynamics associated with the Green Revolution should only be suggestive. Nevertheless, Professor Frankel's book does place in clear relief a range of issues which will require the continuing attention of political scientists and political anthropologists interested in the process of change in rural India.

STANLEY J. HEGINBOTHAM
Columbia University

La Pyramide de Babel. By Maurice Giroux. (Montréal: Les Editions Sainte-Marie. 1967. Pp. 140. $2.50.)

La Législation Electorale au Québec. By Denis Laforte and André Bernard. (Montréal: Les Editions Sainte-Marie, 1969. Pp. 197. $2.50.)

Réflexions sur la Politique au Québec. Second edition. Edited by André Bernard. (Montreal: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1970. Pp. 100. No price listed.)

La Jeunesse du Québec en Révolution. By Jacques Lazure. (Montréal: Les Presses de l'Université du Québec, 1970. Pp. 141. No price listed.)

The death of the autocratic premier of Quebec, Maurice Duplessis, in 1959 ended a long period of political corruption and decay, negative nationalism, and opposition to political and economic reform in the province. The floodgates were opened to a veritable tidal wave of new ideas and programs reflecting both a positive assertion of the Québecois personality in its relations with the rest of Canada and with other countries, and a genuine dedication to internal socioeconomic reform and democratization. These changes, which collectively have come to be known as the Quiet Revolution, also brought with them, not unexpectedly, great internal divisions and social tensions leading to the emergence of a strong independence movement. The principal democratic and electoral expression of this movement is the Parti Québécois which won 23 per cent of the popular vote in the last provincial election in 1970; it is widely recognized today as the major opposition party. There is also a small but determined group of *indépendantistes* committed to violent revolution, known as the FLQ, whose tactics, including political kidnapping and murder, triggered the October Crisis in 1970 and the temporary suspension of the civil liberties of Canadians.

The four books reviewed here address themselves directly to these developments. They also reflect the gradual evolution in the political thought of most of Quebec's intellectuals and academicians during this period. Giroux's essay, published in the Canadian centennial year of 1967, typifies an earlier concern with achieving more genuine political equality for French Canadians through reform of federal governmental institutions. Laforte and Bernard's historical description of electoral legislation in Quebec and the more speculative *Réflexions sur la Politique au Québec,* which appeared in 1969 and 1970 respectively, manifest a later interest in the democratization and reform of political institutions in Quebec itself. Lazure's social-psychological analysis of contemporary Quebec youth, also published in 1970, is characteristic of the more recent preoccupation with the forces and ideas of independence.

La Pyramide de Babel metaphorically describes the structure of the present Canadian polity. A central feature is the party system, which fails to encompass the social reality of a highly regionalized and fragmented society made up of diverse ethnic-linguistic groupings; rather, it is a top-heavy national organization set on a base which is regional and limited in scope. Giroux suggests that the Confederation structure resembles the Katimavik of Expo '67, an architectural monstrosity in the shape of an inverted pyramid. The central question which he poses is: How does such a structure survive?

Giroux proceeds to a critical examination of Canadian Confederation from the standpoint of French-Canadian aspirations. Wisely rejecting the tendency among so many of his Quebec contemporaries to focus on Canadian legal-constitutional shortcomings, he concentrates instead on the electoral system (for him, the key to structural reform), the party system, and executive-legislative relations. He analyzes, as a comparative illustration of the primary importance of these variables, the system which operated during the Union Period in Canadian history from 1840 to 1867. The designers of its constitution created a unified structure for the Canadian provinces in an effort to assimilate French Canadians into the English-speaking milieu. The French Canadians thwarted this objective by turning the electoral and party system to their advantage. Thus they succeeded in transforming the original legal-political structure into a quasi-federal system in which genuine cultural dualism and equality operated in the legislative, executive and administrative spheres. Giroux proposes an analogous reform for the contemporary period (1945–67), including the adoption of proportional representation, the fostering of a decentralized multiparty system in which major parties would be truly national in scope, and the election of a president by universal suffrage. He fails to explain, however, why French Canadians would be more likely to achieve political equality and cultural survival within such a system. He also does not come to grips with some of the obvious shortcomings of multiparty systems in presidential regimes (here Latin American experience might be pertinent). Moreover, it is rather doubtful that Canadians as a whole would ever agree to abandon so completely their British parliamentary heritage.

The books on institutional reform in Quebec are less ambitious in their proposals for political change and also less controversial. Laforte and Bernard painstakingly trace the evolution of electoral laws in Quebec from 1791 until 1967, showing that in the nineteenth century Quebec moved even more rapidly toward universal suffrage than did Britain during the same period. By the end of the nineteenth century, Quebec had legislated most of the present-day regulations ensuring freedom of voter choice, wide eligibility for candidacy, equal representation of constituencies in proportion to population, and limitations on electoral malpractices and frauds. In the twentieth century, however, during the "long" regimes of Gouin, Taschereau and Duplessis, this progress was slowed (e.g., in women's suffrage, redistribution) and even reversed (e.g., in government election subsidies). Since the beginning of the Quiet Revolution, the movement for electoral reform has once again accelerated, culminating in recent demands for a complete reassessment of the relative merits of the single-member plurality electoral system itself in comparison to other systems such as proportional representation. The same reform-mindedness seems to have motivated the authors of the *Réflexions*. They advocate important changes in Quebec's lower house, the Legislative (now National) Assembly, such as the elimination of much of the traditional and outmoded parliamentary ceremony, the establishment of fixed parliamentary sessions, a drastic limitation on debating time and parliamentary questions, greater use of committees, election of a permanent Speaker, and more closely regulated control of public funds. They also call for the abolition of the upper house, the Legislative Council. Several of these proposals, including the termination of the Legislative Council, have since been implemented. A major area of as yet unfulfilled reform, as one contributor astutely points out, is the regulation of pressure groups, since the present system allows disproportionate influence to groups representing capitalist and business interests. Other more sweeping proposals for institutional change, such as the adoption of a presidential-congressional system or some hybrid of the presidential and parliamentary systems like that of Fifth Republic France, are unfortunately not explored in this volume, although they are presently provoking considerable debate among Quebec intellectuals and political activists.

None of these proposals, however, meets the requirements set by the ideology of total liberation which now propels so many of Quebec's intellectuals, professionals, and above all, its youth. Former French President de Gaulle is acknowledged to have given the movement an important psychological impetus in his appeal "Vive le Québec . . . libre!" in 1967. By 1970, if Lazure is to be believed, the independence ideology had already seeped deep into the consciousness of the vast majority of Quebec youth, so that this group no longer debates whether independence will come, but rather when and in what form. Lazure uses a Freudian analytic framework to encompass the totality of this consciousness on the part of revolutionary youth. The ideology of sociopolitical revolution, which operates at the level of the superego, has substituted for the earlier ideology of national survival implanted by the Roman Catholic Church. It assumes any of three forms: revolutionary activism, libertarian anarchism, or pragmatic reformism. This ideology in turn shapes the attitudes of youth toward academic revolution and changes in modes of learning, which operate at the level of the ego, and their revolutionary sexual mores and practices, which operate at the level of the id. Although all three levels of consciousness are closely related and affect each other, it is the sociopolitical revolution at the level of the superego which is dominant. It is defined primarily in political rather than in economic terms, and is closely linked to Freudian notions of liberation from an Oedipal dependence on the mother. Lazure argues that the revolution at all three levels together constitutes a cultural revolution which rests on a strictly political base, and is unlike youth revolutions in other societies in North America or Europe. Its two distinctive features are its political rather than its anthropological nature and its search for a new collective identity for Quebec rather than for individuality.

Lazure acknowledges an obvious weakness in his analysis; it is largely hypothetical and exploratory, and needs much more verification. He promises to carry out this empirical investigation in subsequent studies. One may question, moreover, the necessity of using a Freudian framework to integrate the numerous ideas which are so imaginatively developed. The notion of a collective superego, ego and id, although recently developed by social psychologists such as Erich Fromm, is difficult to accept in other than purely symbolic terms. Lazure argues that the dominance of the sociopolitical revolutionary ideology in the consciousness of Quebec youth can be linked to continued repression of free sexual behavior carried over from an earlier period when the Roman Catholic Church sternly regulated these norms; in other words, libidinous behavior is sublimated to the superego. This seems to me to be a rather crude translation of individual Freudian psychology into collective terms.

Nevertheless, his study does pose the obvious question which all observers of Quebec politics are now asking: Is political independence the logical and inevitable culmination of the revolution of political renewal which began in 1960? Lazure himself obviously believes so, since he describes this process as "ineluctable as a sun ray which signals a new spring" (p. 141). Time alone will reveal whether this present optimism concerning the coming revolution is justified.

MICHAEL B. STEIN

McGill University

Yamagata Aritomo in the Rise of Modern Japan, 1838–1922. By Roger F. Hackett. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 377. $12.00.)

Western writers frequently have characterized Yamagata Aritomo as the father of Japanese militarism. Now, in the work under review, Professor Hackett has made the most effective refutation yet of this bit of political mythology. Yamagata was, of course, the creator of the modern Japanese army; and he was preoccupied with protecting Japan's national security. But he was also an essentially cautious and moderate man who keenly sensed the limits of national power. His "determination to enhance the position of the nation was fused with caution in the expansion of Japan abroad," (p. 348) as the author puts it. We learn in these pages that Army Minister Yamagata opposed early military adventures into Korea and Taiwan in 1873 and 1874; that, while he was a sponsor of the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, both times he traveled to the battlefield to induce reluctant commanders to accept unpopular peace arrangements; and that, indeed, much later, he held back fire-breathing foreign ministers in the era of the Twenty-One Demands and the Siberian Intervention. His political realism in matters of foreign relations, if perpetuated, might have spared Japan the disgrace of the Pacific War.

The fault lay less in the modern military establishment which he fathered than in the shape he gave to the political institutions that might have controlled it. His military reforms, synthesizing foreign and native elements, were a model of their kind. As soldiers he preferred pliable commoners to the tradition-ridden samurai; and through promotion of the Conscription Ordinance of 1873 he broke the hereditary samurai monopoly on arms. The conscripts were organized under a German-style command structure with foreign weapons in their hands, but disciplined through an updated version of the traditional samurai ethic as set forth in the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors of 1882.

In contrast to the participation of commoners in the armed forces, the notion of popular participation in any meaningful way in the legislative process under the Meiji Constitution of 1889 was anathema to Yamagata. In his two terms as prime minister, Yamagata was alarmed at the divisive spirit of the political parties: He thought that the political structure ought to insure harmony under the Emperor, and he fought a long holding action against party cabinets lest "our nation . . . suffer the same fate as Spain and Greece" (p. 184). Near the end of his life, then a Genrō, he reluctantly accepted a party leader as Prime Minister; but he had taken care that his beloved army should stand beyond the control of economizing party leaders. It was this independence of the military that appeared a fault in the later era of unbridled militarism when the successor generation used the superbly organized and disciplined instrument in a rash way which probably would have met with Yamagata's disapproval.

It is the aftermath, then, that, makes Yamagata's experiment in nation building less than a desirable model for contemporary statesmen in developing nations. There is, in this volume, a memorable vignette of Yamagata in mid-career eagerly awaiting installments of J. R. Seeley's *Life and Times of Stein* (1879) as they were translated into Japanese. Stein provided a notable inspiration to Yamagata; and, in office then as Home Minister, he thought highly enough of Stein's fundamental lesson of binding people to the state through civic spirit cultivated in service to local government to have the translations distributed to local officials of his Ministry. Indeed, the biography of Yamagata under review might serve today's nation builders in the same way as a guide to political and military modernization, for Japan modernized early and rapidly; and Yamagata was a central figure in that process; but the Pacific War casts a shadow over his Japanese model.

Students of comparative institutions and modernization, nevertheless, will welcome this remarkably complete record of the process whereby Japan became a modern military power and a centralized political entity. For six decades, from the 1860s to the 1920s, Yamagata participated in most of the military, political, and diplomatic decisions of state; and for much of that time his was the dominant voice in the oligarchy which modernized Japan. Not only did he promote military innovations such as the General Staff system; but he also gave final form to the system of local government in which "local policy was shaped from above," (p. 110) and he steered Japan into the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. We have before us then, nothing less than a comprehensive history of early modern Japan.

Professor Hackett gives less attention to his subject's personality than to the public record. He treats us to a few intimate glimpses of a hard-working, upwardly mobile youth who later became an austere, laconic, Japanese gentleman, always reverent toward his Emperor. The handful of anecdotes, the more vivid for their sparsity, sharply etch the portrait in mind. One tells of the suicidal plunge of his self-sacrificing grandmother into the Abu River in 1865 lest she be a burden to her ambitious grandson. Another reveals the old soldier in politics, Prime Minister Yamagata, quivering visibly as he read his first speech to the Diet while members crouched forward to catch his almost inaudible words. Still later, we read of the aged Prince Yamagata walking daily, in rain or snow, through his garden to worship at the shrine which housed a personal sword of his late, beloved Emperior Meiji.

The volume should be read, however, not as conventional biography, and certainly not as psychohistory; for the focus is on the public record, not the private. Professor Hackett's contribution centers on his making available the first serious biography of Yamagata in any Western language, a biography firmly anchored in the Japanese sources. Nonspecialists may not realize what a tour de force such a pioneering work is. To them he gives access to this important record through a sound, detailed narrative interspersed with generous and pertinent translations from the Yamagata state papers and correspondence.

The author is conscious of changes over time in his subject's political orientation, as Yamagata, the revolutionary, became an innovator, and finally a conservative. He delineates clearly the proportions of the mix between traditional and modern elements in Yamagata's personal life and statecraft. Commendably, he avoids claiming too much for his subject, noting that Yamagata's was merely a "supporting role" in the Meiji Restoration of 1868, "a movement planned by others," (p. 51) and observing that he had hardly anything to do with Japan's economic modernization. If the author does present a more favorable, even more idealistic, picture of Yamagata than we have viewed heretofore, it is because the story is narrated through the Yamagata documents and because the time has come for reinterpretation of the loose generalization that Yamagata fathered Japanese militarism with all of its excesses.

Sidney DeVere Brown

University of Oklahoma

The Astonishing Adventure of General Boulanger. By James Harding. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1971. Pp. xxi, 251. $8.95.)

James Harding, London-based, a musicologist, specialist in nineteenth-and-twentieth century French literature, whose previous books include ones on Saint-Saëns, Massenet and Sacha Guitry, is the author of what Scribner's publicity blurb describes as "The First Complete Biography of the Original 'Man On A White Horse.' " I am sure Mr. Harding will be fascinated to know that he holds, according to the same blurb, a *Diplome* [sic] *de la Civilisation Fraincase* [sic].

Born in Rennes, in northern France, on 29 April 1837, Georges-Ernest Jean Marie [sic] Boulanger was the son of an *avoué*, that is, a confidential legal advisor, still a common feature in France, and an English-born mother. Both parents belonged to a milieu called, in French for there is no English equivalent word, *embourgeoisé*, very provincial as against very Parisian. Harding gives, correctly, due attention to Boulanger's early ambitions and his military services. It is unfortunate that he neglects that particular and peculiar milieu that was nineteenth-century French provincial life.

Georges-Ernest saw military service in what would become the perennially troubled areas of the French colonial empire: Algeria and Indo-China; he also served in Italy.

The future youngest general of the French army was wounded several times. In order to endure his wounds, he was heavily medicated with habit-forming pain-killers. As a result, and because his wounds caused him great pain through the remainder of his life, he became, in effect, a drug addict. While Harding notes this, his addiction is barely mentioned as a contributing factor to his sometimes erratic political and emotional behavior. His military abilities were quickly recognized; promotions were rapid, and his concern for the ordinary ranks, the 'soljers,' was reciprocated by adulation on the part of the *poilus*. By 1870, and the *Commune* which he helped put down, he was a full colonel, for awhile. Here, Harding, typically, makes one of his existential leaps: he tells us that Boulanger, briefly demoted to Lieutenant-Colonel, developed a fierce streak of paranoia which the author attributes to this unjust, (according to Georges-Ernest) demotion. This extreme personality characteristic is neither further explained, nor further illustrated.

Ably blending Boulanger's military and political career, as well as describing, but never explaining his hero's wenching, Harding introduces the "love of Boulanger's life," Marguerite

Caroline Laurence Brouzet, Vicomtesse de Bonnemains. His love for this woman, and the effects on his career are the most psychologically sound elements of this biography. This very personal section of the work is both a strength and a weakness: a strength in that we are better able to understand Boulanger; a weakness in that the personal life of the General is not sufficiently correlated to his political career.

Promoted to general in 1880, through means appropriate to a sycophantic courtier, Boulanger flashed across the firmament of French politics in the decade of the 'eighties as a member of several French cabinets serving as Minister of War. Boulanger's reforms of the army are rightly insisted upon by Harding. Boulanger's early political career was due to the support of the radical wing of French politicians; the Republicans, Clemenceau. However, Boulanger's days of public adulation, his flirting on the precipice of a military dictatorship, and the overthrow of the Third Republic, found him associating himself with Royalists and Bonapartists. On the one hand, Harding suggests that Boulanger's advisors manipulated him; at other times, that Boulanger himself believed the "Boulanger myth"; but mostly Harding gives no explanation at all. It happened, *c'est tout.*

Boulanger, his successes, and his failures could have been the point of departure for an analytic study of nineteenth century French society. We have, in Harding's work, a lively well-written description. In himself, his personality, character, and activities, Boulanger could have become the focal point of an inquiry into persistent characteristics of France's society since the Revolution. The persistence of *ancien régime* tendencies, in particular the transference of the *roi soleil* image of prerevolutionary days, into a nonroyalist *chef,* the "leader-father-savior" figure (cf. the French emperors, more recently, de Gaulle), are not even hinted at. Nor is there any mention of that peculiar trait of French political society: the cohabitation of conformity-statism with anarchy-individualism whose contradictions have sundered French society and politics for almost two hundred years. Boulanger's own career clearly demonstrated these consistent patterns of French political life. It is unfortunate that his biographer did not.

Even though harsh, the evidence furnished by Harding indicates an inescapable conclusion regarding his subject's political career: as has been said of a contemporary American politician: "deep down he's shallow."

It is sad that in this definitive biography that the most commendable part of the book has little to do with France; it has, however, everything to do with Boulanger, for "nothing so became him as his death." His love for Marguerite was constant and deep. Boulanger had been exiled as a result of a supposed plot to overthrow the Republic; Marguerite accompanied him to London, to Jersey and to Belgium. Her health seriously weakened by inclement climates, Marguerite died in Belgium on July 16, 1891, at the age of thirty-five. Below her name, on her tombstone, Georges-Ernest had inscribed *"à bientôt":* soon.

On 30 September 1891, Boulanger put a bullet through his head; he was standing at Marguerite's graveside. He left wills, one of which contained his instructions for the inscription on his tombstone. It read: "Was I really able to live two-and-a-half months without you." Beautiful!

Cameron Nish
Sir George Williams University and
l'Ecole des hautes études commerciales,
Montreal

Social Stratification as an Obstacle to Development: A Study of Four Turkish Villages. By Jan Hinderink and Mubeccel B. Kiray. (New York: Praeger Publications, 1970. Pp. 248. $15.00.)

This book, based on collaboration between a Dutch geographer and a Turkish sociologist, explores the development process from a micro perspective. Comparative data from four villages on the Mediterranean coast of southern Turkey at different levels of development are used to support the argument that, although economic development does lead to some changes in power and status, the ordinary villagers have not benefited from such changes. This study is creative, challenging, and original.

According to the authors, alterations in social stratification in the village have occurred as a result of several different kinds of events: wars, changes in the prices of primary products, and such technological developments as new breeds of cotton and new kinds of farm machinery. Such changes have made it possible for a relatively few entrepreneurs to become richer landowners, but "the lowest incomes are found in both the technologically most- and least-developed villages. . . . Even the average consumption scores of the most-developed villages are lower than that of the least developed one, due to changes in occupational structure and working conditions without essential changes in control power" (pp. 241–242). Existing power relationships are proposed as "the real obstacle to true social and economic development in the villages" (p. 243).

A number of plausible rival hypotheses are explored. The authors observe that religiosity, fatalism, and authoritarian intrafamilial relations did not seem to stand in the way of development; the villagers expressed "a definite favorable disposition toward change" (p. 242). On the other hand, there was considerable population growth, out-migration, and pressure upon the local labor market. These problems might have been explored more fully.

Given the author's findings, it is important to discuss the quality of the data used. A number of methods—structured and unstructured interviews, analysis of household budgets, observations of standards of living, and the taking of a census of the village—provided the necessary information. Such a multimethod approach is one of the strengths of the volume. On the other hand, the data analysis might have been more extensive and additional checks on the data collection might have been incorporated.

Comparisons with available data gathered independently from other sources would have improved the internal and external validity of the research. Hinderink and Kiray used student interviews; one wonders how these findings might compare with other data collected through different sorts of interviews? More generally, comparison of the authors' information on the four villages with data on the same villages from the national census would have been useful.

Such sources of village information—including some published after the authors did their field work in 1964–65—might also have provided better longitudinal data. Such data would have been particularly valuable because retrospective techniques generated the longitudinal material which was used in this study. Such recalled information is obviously subject to distortion, and additional checks would have been desirable. Thus, some possibilities for stronger research designs were not fully utilized. In this connection—since the field research for this book was conducted nine years ago—the time is ripe for a return and restudy of these villages. A number of the suggestions made above might fairly easily be incorporated into a new design.

Because the findings of this research are important and controversial, further questions are raised: For example, might the population increase reported for these villages be at least partially responsible for the lack of improvement in living standards? And how general are the findings from these four villages?

From a slightly different perspective, the authors are to be commended for the linking of their data with various theoretical formulations. One co-author of this study (Kiray) has been conducting field research in Turkey during an extended period, and thus could presumably make more pointed generalization. Such an effort by Dr. Kiray to summarize her findings, hypotheses, and speculations would be most welcome.

Noralou P. Roos
Leslie L. Roos, Jr.
University of Manitoba, Canada

Indonesia: The Possible Dream. By Howard Palfrey Jones. (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971. Pp. 473. $12.95.)

How does a man reconcile his love of a people with his official responsibilities as an ambassador? How does he reconcile his friendship and respect for a national leader who pursues policies that are often inimical to the interests of the nation the ambassador represents?

In *Indonesia: The Possible Dream,* Howard Palfrey Jones provides us with his recollections of more than a decade of involvement with Indonesian politics. Significantly he humanizes diplomacy by dealing with relations among men as well as nations.

When Ambassador Jones first came to Indonesia in 1954, as Chief of the United States Economic Aid Program, the young Republic had just emerged from a violent war of national independence. Subsequently, Jones witnessed the transformation of a fragile parliamentary system into a semiauthoritarian state which was rapidly moving toward the left on the eve of his departure. Shortly after the Ambassador left, a bloody coup and reaction turned Indonseian politics around on yet another uncertain course.

Throughout this work, the Ambassador's knowledge of Indonesian culture and society is apparent. His lucid survey serves as an excellent introduction to ancient and contemporary Indonesian history. As the Ambassador who "acquired the record for the longest service at a single post by an American diplomat in the post-World War II period" (p. 332), Jones acquired a rare sensitivity to Indonesian affairs.

It is because of this sensitivity that the problem of reconciling official responsibilities and unofficial empathy for a people becomes apparent. Jones's assessment of Indonesian politics is correctly and succinctly stated, ". . . a sensitive nationalism easily aroused at the slightest hint of an encroachment on Indonesia's precious sovereignty by a foreign power" (p. 71); one wonders, however, if the Ambassador's perception clouded his judgment in the formulation and execution of United States foreign policy? Was he too sympathetic to Indonesian demands and aspirations? In analyzing the decline of the Republic under "Guided Democracy," Jones candidly admits that, "I have been optimistic longer than most Americans that even with his 'noisy diplomacy,' Sukarno would finally come around" (p. 358).

Admittedly, this reviewer has the benefit of retrospect, but one must question Jones's assumption that "Sukarno's emotionalism and preoccupation with colonial issues . . . often led him to adopt an irrational course of action" (p. 272). Perhaps the Ambassador's optimism was largely predicated on his enduring friendship with Bung Karno. Jones maintains that

> . . . I managed to retain the confidence and friendship of President Sukarno over such a long period, especially when the policies of our respective governments were sharply opposed and there were very few occasions when I was not either protesting specific actions or disagreeing with his policies. I can only assume there were two reasons. I always told him the truth, however unpleasant it might be. Also, he knew I loved his country and its people, and was genuinely interested in helping them attain their legitimate objectives (p. 331).

The Ambassador's virtue is admirable, but one questions whether the President believed in reciprocity. It may be that the former Ambassador was as dazzled by the President's legendary charisma as countless Indonesians were. The dangers of personalizing international relations either at the presidential palace or the summit are self-evident.

Interestingly, while the Ambassador was usually optimistic, he was subject to excessively pessimistic assessments at times. In analyzing the West Irian dispute, Jones stated, "I became convinced that war was just around the corner, for we in the embassy knew what was happening as a result of an operation that was then top secret—direct observations by U2 plane, a fact later publicly revealed by Sukarno. The Indonesians had the troops and the equipment, and public opinion had been whipped up to the high-tension level" (p. 210). Given Sukarno's mixture of sabre-rattling and bluffing in foreign affairs and the army's concern with the growing strength of the Communist Party, and given troops that were available, it remains doubtful whether war with the Dutch would have ensued.

Jones suggests that the destruction of the Communist Party in Indonesia occurred because the PKI "were all things to all men, and were found out; they themselves exposed the wolf inside the sheepskin. They failed because they employed every weapon in the political arsenal: when they did not get their way by persuasion, they used intimidation and terror. They failed because they came with favor and stayed with fear" (p. 167). A far more useful question is why the Party came so close to power. The PKI's growth after the abortive Madiun uprising of 1948 was not simply the result of fear. Aidit and his colleagues effectively mobilized down to the village level, and often struck a responsive chord among a peasantry that was either ignored or oppressed by Djakarta-based political forces. The PKI may yet reemerge if the new military leaders fail to establish direct links with the peasantry. Indirectly, Jones is aware of the inherent dangers in military rule: "But let the military leadership at any point be tempted by the heady wine of power to exceed its basic functions and a nation that has shed so much blood on the altar of freedom could again be denied the rewards of its revolution with a consequent renewal of internal unrest and upheaval" (p. 413). I share the Ambassador's respect for the Army's very impressive programs of economic stabilization over the short run. But, the threat of future conflict will remain unless the new leadership can build a political process that effectively encompasses the diversity of the Indonesian political culture.

In his epilogue Jones says: "The basic failure of American foreign policy in Asia in the period following World War II was in the coldness of our response to the new nationalism of Asia and Africa" (p. 420). For an individual who worked within the superheated climate of Indonesian nationalism, the Ambassador displayed an awareness of the potency of a new force that many of his peers may have missed. Perhaps he was too responsive to the rhetoric of Sukarno, but the liabilities of overidentification may be far less dangerous than the insensitivity toward people's aspirations that has led to the continued nightmare of the Indochina War.

STEPHEN SLOAN

University of Oklahoma

Monarchy in the Emperor's Eyes: Image and Reality in the Ch'ien-lung Reign. By Harold L. Kahn. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 314. $10.00.)

If one measures success in terms of lastingness and capacity for self-adjustment and renewal, the political system which prevailed in China under the empire was without doubt one of the most successful ever devised by man. It first took shape with the unification of the separate Chinese states by the Ch'in dynasty in 221 B.C. After incorporating Confucianism as its official ideology in the following Han dynasty, it persisted in essentially the same form with, of course, a great deal of elaboration and accumulated subtlety in its operation, down to the abdication of the last Manchu emperor in 1912. The emperor and the bureaucracy were the two principal elements in this system and their complementary, but also often conflicting, roles provided most of the dynamic behind both the political theory and the actual evolution of institutions.

More attention has been paid by western scholarship to the history of Chinese bureaucratic institutions than to the other side of the picture, the history of the monarchy. Professor Kahn's study is a notable contribution toward redressing this balance. The emperor known by his reign title as Ch'ien-lung lived through most of the 18th century (1711–1799) and was on the throne a great part of that time (1736–1795). His reign coincided with the apogee of the Manchu dynasty, in terms both of imperial power and of economic prosperity, intellectual achievements, and cultural splendor. As a monarch fully conscious of his position during his own reign and as part of the long line of Chinese monarchs extending down from legendary times, he provides an excellent focus for studying the monarchy in depth.

A problem one has to face in approaching any political system is the contrast between how it appears in its outward forms and symbols and how it is in actuality, controlled and influenced by the interests and personalities of the fallible human beings who are involved in it. When we are concerned with an institution as wrapped in ritual symbolism and as weighed down with traditions from the past as the Chinese monarchy had become by the 18th century, the difficulty of getting at the human reality behind the appearance is truly formidable. Professor Kahn's strategy has been to examine in detail three facets of the multifaceted problem (a) official historiography, (b) the education which Ch'ien-lung received as a prince, (c) the abdication of Ch'ien-lung after 60 years on the throne.

The problem in historiography that is taken up is at first sight surprising since it is not even about the Manchu dynasty. It is the succession of the Yung-lo emperor of Ming, who supplanted his nephew, the Chien-wen emperor, in 1403. This succession became crucial for Chinese official historiography not only because of still unresolved obscurities about what actually happened, but also because of many accretions to the story that grew up in popular legend, and because of the felt need to present through the official version an acceptable image of the imperial institution. The account which Professor Kahn gives of the handling of this issue over the years from the time of Yung-lo onward, therefore, is relevant to his larger theme, the Chinese conception of emperorship; but it is immediately relevant to Ch'ien-lung because the emperor was personally responsible for a final revision of the *Ming History* which incorporated his views on how the incident should be interpreted.

As an appendage to the section on historiography, Professor Kahn explores briefly the differing pictures of the Ch'ing imperial system that one can find in unofficial works, ranging from the private writings of high officials to the often salacious extravangances of popular fiction. He also touches on the theme of dissent as found in the writings of independent-minded political philosophers. Though such criticism of the system had to be increasingly veiled and circumspect as the pressures for conformity grew more and more severe under Ch'ien-lung, it was never completely stifled.

The problem of image and reality is again the underlying theme of the section on Ch'ien-lung's education, which was designed to prepare him to become the ideal Confucian sage ruler. Because of the practice of keeping the succession secret—a practice initiated by his father Yung-cheng—he was not yet clearly marked for his unique role, and he shared his upbringing on a basis of ostensible equality with other princes. The grounding he received in the classical curriculum of Confucian learning was comprehensive and rigorous, but that in the traditional martial arts of his Manchu ancestors was less so. When one gets past the clouds of sycophantic adulation in which his every utterance and action were inevitably wrapped at the time, one finds his achievements as a poet, essayist, philosopher, calligrapher, and painter mediocre and uninspired. On the other hand, his historical scholarship was genuine and deep, and his awareness of historical precedents certainly played a great role later both in his actual conduct of affairs and in the image of himself that he sought to create for posterity.

From this point of view the final episode in his reign—his abdication—is especially fascinating. Professor Kahn reviews the history of abdications in China which begins with the legendary sages Yao and Shun. Their voluntary withdrawals in favor of their chosen successors after long reigns theoretically set a model for later rulers. In practice, however, these examples had mainly provided convenient precedents through which the forcible seizure of the throne by an imperial prince or the founder of a new dynasty could be legitimized. In southern Sung there had been voluntary and genuine retirements. Ch'ien-lung's differed from these in being voluntary but not genuine. That is, he went through the elaborate charade of abdication for the sake of his place in history while still keeping the actual control of affairs in his own hands (or rather, alas, in the hands of his corrupt favourite, Ho-shen).

Here, and throughout his study, Professor Kahn illuminates the immediate questions at hand by means of parallels and contrasts with earlier dynasties. This makes the book much more than a commentary on certain limited aspects of one reign. It becomes a richly worked tapestry in which many themes are subtly interwoven. Without setting up any elaborate framework of social science concepts, Professor Kahn makes a major contribution to our understanding of the workings of the traditional Chinese political system that is also full of human interest and a pleasure to read.

E. G. PULLEYBLANK
University of British Columbia

Government in Rural India. By Iltija H. Khan. (Calcutta: Asia Publishing Co., Calcutta, 1971. Pp. 185.)

Professor Khan has developed the thesis that the success of nation building in India will depend upon the governmental process at the village, block, and district level. In developing this thesis he has summarized the history and development of Indian panchayats since Independence and has realistically evaluated the shortcomings of factionalism, the failure of villagers to understand the functions of panchayats, administrative neglect, lack of coordination, the failure to use panchayat machinery, the inertia of rural society, and the underestimation of the divisions in Indian society.

The Report of the Study Team for Community Development and National Extension Service is proof that the initial enthusiasm for community development has waned. Professor Khan's major emphasis is upon the unworkability of the block as the keystone of the program and his support of the district as the basic unit of planning and coordination of development with execution of project development at either the village, block, or district level.

Professor Khan distinguishes between those types of planning which may realistically be carried on locally or at the district level and planning which is an essentially regional or national. He realistically observes that adoption of the district as the unit of planning does not necessarily mean that it should also be the unit of implementation of programs and indicates that the nature of the subject matter should determine the operation unit of administration. What is significant here is the need for integrated development.

Nearly all examination of the development of the panchayat have assumed consensus and partyless government. The Indian experience fails to support these assumptions. As Professor Khan observes, factionalism which has not been diluted by party politics has pervaded the panchayat. He pleads instead for strengthening party organization and involvement in panchayat affairs as a means of socializing the individual and increasing involvement in the local political process.

A serious problem facing the program is the relationship between the public officials (such as the Block Development Officer and the District Collector) and the Panchavat Samiti Pradhuans and the Zila Parishad Pramukhs. The political power of the Panchayat Samiti Pradhan is often greater than that of the Block Development Officer, while the District Collector is likely to be a stronger personality than the Zila Parashad Pramukh. The result is often conflict, stalemate, and confusion. While Khan's assessment for the future is optimistic, I have seen a sufficient number of these persons functioning to experience great concern that the community development program will be arrested by a rapid turnover of official personnel and factionalism.

Professor Khan has made it clear the future of community development depends less upon the structural relationship between the official and nonofficial groups than upon the broad cultural factors. Until feudal social and economic structure can be replaced by an open, competitive system, supported by higher levels of education, awareness of alternatives and increased communication, the existing structures will continue. His volume should be read by those who continuously sing paeans of praise for the progress in idyllic Indian villages.

BENJAMIN N. SCHOENFELD
Temple University

Memoirs of a Russian Diplomat: Outposts of the Empire, 1893–1917. By Andrew D. Kalmykow. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. 290. $12.50.)

These diplomatic reminiscences could have been written deliberately to epitomize the differences between past and present methods of analysis in international relations. The author is a near-perfect example of an outdated diplomatic type, a reflective and somewhat romantic dilettante observing life from the Foreign Ministry and the consular office. Gently critical at times, aware that the Russian diplomatic service was less than adequate, he was yet incapable of the kind of penetrating study and forceful reform effort the diplomatic bureaucracy needed. Unknowingly, he provides a shocking demonstration of how his nation at the turn of the twentieth century foundered in its own ignorance and arrogance, and, for lack of a guiding intelligence, blundered willy-nilly into a series of catastrophes.

Kalmykow himself was somewhat better trained for his profession than the average Russian diplomat, for he had studied Persian at the School of Oriental Languages in St. Petersburg, and he was driven by an abiding fascination with the cultures of the East. Most of his colleagues in the Foreign Ministry were simply well-groomed young men whose parents had secured them a quiet and respectable post; they were content to come to work at noon and while away their duty hours scheming for promotion; and not even the high officials who headed the ministry concerned themselves overmuch with studying the issues of conflict, or worried about their ignorance of matters crucial to Russian interests.

Kalmykow, a quiet zealot, insisted upon assignments to exotic areas feared by other men. As a consequence, from 1896 until 1917, he served, at ascending rank, in Teheran, Bangkok, Tashkent, Ashkhabad (Poltoratsk), Uskub (Skopje), and Smyrna. Most of his pages are devoted to accounts of famous people and formal social functions, as if he judged his own accomplishments by the numbers of state ceremonies attended and people of high rank encountered. As a faithful servitor of the tsars he seems generally complacent about his associates; yet he repeatedly reveals levels of incompetence among them that are staggering. Assigned to Bangkok, he diligently sought information about Siam at the ministry, only to discover that no staff member could tell him anything at all about the country. Assigned to Uskub at a tense moment just before the outbreak of the First Balkan War, he received no instructions and no mission, except, ludicrously, to keep the peace. As such illustrations pile up, rounding out the picture of Russia's disdain for lesser nations and the suicidal bureaucratism of the Foreign Ministry, the reader increasingly wonders how the Russian Empire survived as long as it did.

Genuine diplomatic achievements, as described by Kalmykow, were usually the result of the audacity or imagination of some official in the field who dared to seize hold of an opportunity without checking with St. Petersburg. Here and there a consul general or ambassador, without directions from above, managed to cultivate a friend in the host government or to take action based on a daring estimate of the probable course of events. Thus, on occasion, in Persia and Siam, bold men took grave chances and advanced Russia's interests. Kalmykow himself, for example, halted a threatened war by imaginatively employing his personal influence at Bangkok and Saigon, and in Serbia-Macedonia he helped to avert bloodshed by negotiating the takeover of an embattled city.

Through these nostalgic recollections of court functions, decorated nobility, little work, and considerable ennui, the tragic message is always present. Behind the grandeur, a Foreign Ministry submerged in formalism and trivia and crippled by its inept staff was incapable of performing its complex functions. Kalmykow's romantic view of leisurely events, seemingly light-years behind us, outlines only too clearly the approaching ruin of a political system that could not function well enough to save itself.

ARTHUR E. ADAMS

The Ohio State University

Guerrillas in Power: The Course of the Cuban Revolution. By K. S. Karol. (New York: Hill and Wang, 1970. Pp. 624. $12.50.)

The author of this book, a Marxist journalist and writer on politics, was born in Poland, spent seven years in the USSR and since 1946 has lived in Paris. He visited Cuba at crucial points in the history of this nation, for a total of some seven months: April and July 1961, July-August 1967, and January-March 1968. Karol traveled throughout the country and held long interviews with Premier Castro, Che Guevara, and President O. Dorticós. The first edition of his book, published in France, provoked a violent critique of Castro which became generalized against the European radical left during Cuba's Cultural Congress of April 1971.

The book is divided into two parts. The first includes an account of the early years of the Revolution until Cuba closed her links with the USSR in 1961 (and Karol visited the country for the first time) · an abridged history of the prerevolutionary Communist Party of Cuba (PSP) from its founding in 1925 until 1959; and a description of the relations between the USSR and Cuba until 1967 (at the time of Karol's second visit). Part two of the book is composed of a discussion of what Karol calls the "Cuban heresy" (i.e., the 1966–68 departure from Soviet orthodoxy and development of a unique system influenced by the Chinese but shaped by Guevara and Castro); a description of the internal problems confronted by the leadership and the conflict with the USSR; and an analysis of Cuba's return to the Soviet path. The book closes with a series of appendices: a useful chronology of Cuban events from 1868 to February 1970; a brief and partially obsolete selection of Cuban official statistics on population, education, public health, agricultural and industrial output and foreign trade; and a list of Cuban officials in top posts, completed around 1968.

The book is well written and interesting. Most important are the book's yielding accounts of interviews held with Cuban leaders and of direct observation and anecdotes, unknown facets of the Cuban leaders' ideological stand. Karol provides new angles on well-researched events, clarifies some obscure points in recent Cuban history, and offers a perceptive analysis in his concluding chapter. But the book suffers from several flaws: a serious lack of organization, excessive details in dealing with events that have already been fully documented (e.g., the 1961 Cuban National Production Meeting), misinterpretations of Cuban history (for instance, the role of the Cuban "Soviets" during the 1933 Revolution is overemphasized, while that of the ABC party is underemphasized), important quotations from Cuban officials left unidentified (apparently an influence of C. R. Mills' *Listen Yankee* style), and frequent misspellings in Spanish names and quotes. There are also some gross factual errors. (For example Karol states that the prerevolutionary sugar harvests used to begin in late November, when the sugar content of the cane was at its highest, and employed some 400,000 canecutters who cut five tons of cane daily for a total crop of about five million tons of sugar. In fact the harvest began in January, the peak in sugar content was reached in March, less than 300,000 canecutters were steadily employed, and they cut about two tons of cane daily. If Karol's data were correct, the harvests could have easily reached 20 million tons of sugar.)

One of the problems that Karol faced in preparing his book was his absolute lack of knowledge of Cuba prior to the Revolution, as he himself acknowledges. Furthermore he does not seem to have kept track of Cuban events between his trips, particularly between 1961 and 1967 when he was first in China and then writing about his experience there. Hence it is not surprising that in 1967, Karol was aware neither that there had been an important Cuban debate on alternative models (1962–1965) nor that Guevara was the leader of the Maoist stand. Karol learned these facts through a second-rank Cuban official when the debate was over, three months before Guevara's death. He hurriedly tried to research six crucial years of Cuban socialist history plus the pertinent prerevolutionary antecedents while he was traveling and doing interviews.

The most revealing parts on this book are those dealing with the ideological stand of the Cuban leaders. Karol presents the little-known side of Che Guevara of 1961 as a naive admirer of the USSR, who uncritically accepted the Soviet model and trusted too much in Soviet generosity and the efficiency of the planning "clock." (Che candidly admitted to Karol that every revolution had its share of Stalinism, because of capitalist encirclement, but that this evil would not fully evolve on the island thanks to the Soviet aid.) Then Karol explains how Che gradually turned into a severe critic of the USSR because of Khrushchev's betrayal in the Missile Crisis, and because of the poor quality of Eastern European goods, the failure of the Czech-designed economic plans, the discovery of the technological backwardness of the Soviet bloc (whose technicians were incapable of handling the U.S. equipment), and the disenchantment with the Soviet terms of trade. Che's position closely approached the Maoist model but with an important exception: He still endorsed the Soviet myth that the working class's main interest was production and that the leaders knew best how to interpret the thoughts and needs of the masses.

According to Karol, Castro underwrote Che's latest stand from the very start but, being more pragmatic and diplomatic, he tried to avoid unnecessary frictions with the USSR until 1966 when the clash was inevitable. Castro assured Karol that Cuba was going farther than China because of Cuba's goal of abolishing money altogether. And yet Karol maintains that the Cuban Premier did not agree with the Cultural Revolution (nor with the Czech Spring) fundamentally because he was afraid of changes initiated by the rank and file, in an uncontrolled manner, which could paralyze Cuba's socialist allies, thus leaving her at the mercy of the United States.

Karol's main conclusion is that at the end of the 1960s, Cuba suffered from declining revolutionary fervor, waning interest in politics, poor labor productivity, and increasing antisocial behavior because the masses were not allowed to participate in the decision-making process reserved to Castro and his inner circle. Facing failure in their attempt to develop a "new man," this elite increasingly resorted to authoritarian and police methods, tightening of labor discipline, and militarization of the economy. Karol's prescription to cure these evils is to apply the Maoist model, at least that of the Cultural Revolution. Thus, presumably Cuba should go back to the "heresy" of 1966–68 but with the crucial addition of rank-and-file initiative and decision-making power. Three years after Karol published his book, the Sovietization of Cuba seems so complete (and the Maoist model has been watered down so much) that the possibility of applying his prescription appears highly improbable if not totally utopian.

CARMELO MESA-LAGO

University of Pittsburgh

The Middle Beat: A Correspondent's View of Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador. By Paul P. Kennedy. Edited by Stanley R. Ross. (New York: Teachers College Press, Columbia University, 1971. Pp. 225. $6.95.)

Paul Kennedy was the chief correspondent for *The New York Times* in Middle America from October, 1954 to December, 1965. He died in 1967 after completing a manuscript covering political events in Mexico, Guatemala, and El Salvador.

As an avid reader of the *Times,* I looked forward to reading his book with the hope that an intelligent journalist, freed of the time, style, and space confines of the newspaper format, would be able to supply the student of Latin American politics with insights that scholars might overlook. These hopes were disappointed: *The Middle Beat* is not a book; it is a 200-page newspaper article, much of which is simply spliced sections of dispatches that Kennedy published in the *Times.* Many important topics are handled in short, choppy, cliché-ridden paragraphs.

This lack of analysis seems to arise because, although Kennedy recognized that economic and political changes were taking place, he had few organizing concepts to help him distinguish between what was important and what was trivial. For example, the book spends a great deal more time on elections in Middle America than in explaining the rise of the Central American Common Market or the growing opposition to U.S. private investments.

The absence of an analytical approach can be partially attributed to a lack of familiarity with the scholarly literature concerning this region. A few traditional historians are quoted, but the only political scientists mentioned are Harry Kantor, Robert Scott, and Frank Tannenbaum. Kennedy also shows no awareness of the studies of anthropologists Oscar Lewis and Richard Adams, nor of the growing number of studies by Mexican social scientists. Consequently, Kennedy's book ends up being a description of surface events and phenomena.

Mr. Kennedy also neglects to analyze aspects of newspaper work that would be of interest to readers and especially to scholars. It would be worthwhile to know how Kennedy, who had covered Spain for the *Times* during the early 1950s, prepared for his assignment to Middle America in 1954. What did he read? How difficult was it to make contacts with people who knew the facts of the situation and were willing to explain them to him? What kind of policy guidelines did the *Times* designate about the kind of stories to pursue? How does a reporter seek out the truth in societies with partially-controlled presses and supersensitive politicians who have the power to oust the over-inquisitive foreign reporter?

The biggest disappointment of the book, however, is the manner in which Kennedy deals with the secret training base the C.I.A. set up in Guatemala in order to invade Cuba in April, 1961. On October 30, 1960, the Guatemalan newspaper *La Hora* stated that the C.I.A. had built a training base for Cuban refugees near the mountain town of Retalhuleu. One would have expected a diligent reporter to have investigated this story immediately, but Kennedy did not get anything in print until November 20. In that unsigned dispatch (why unsigned?) Kennedy published excerpts from an interview with Guatemalan President Miguel Ydigoras Fuentes who claimed this base was being used to train Guatemalans in the event Cuba invaded Guatemala. Early in January, 1961, Kennedy finally visited the secret site and published his findings in the January 10 issue of *The Times* under the heading, "U.S. Helps Train an Anti-Castro Force at Secret Guatemalan Air-Ground Base." Kennedy was severely criticized by the Ydigoras government for this story, and he then (voluntarily?) left Guatemala. In the book his final words concerning this investigation were, "For security reasons I did not use sizeable portions of the material gathered" (p. 157). Kennedy's book thus avoids subjects—namely the professional obligations of journalists and the public's right to know—that are of great interest to the reader. We would like to know on what grounds Kennedy decided to publish certain facts and to exclude others. Was there any pressure from the hierarchy in the *Times* or the Kennedy Administration not to publish certain information? Was the reporter engaged in an artful compromise between his professional obligations to tell the truth and his support of the Kennedy Administration when he ascribed most of the damaging pieces of information—those that indicated the U.S. and Guatemalan governments were lying—in his January article to "opposition forces" in Guatemala. Were we supposed to believe less in "opposition forces" than in "official sources?"

Paul Kennedy's reporting of these events has been attacked from two opposing points of view. Soon after the Cuban invasion, his revelation regarding the base was attacked by President Kennedy as a premature disclosure of security information. And, in the Fall, 1967 issue of *The Columbia University Forum*, Victor Bernstein and Jesse Gordon attacked him for diluting the truth in the name of national security. Kennedy never mentions the President's complaint in his book, and he died in 1967 before the Bernstein and Gordon essay was published. However, the editor of this book, the historian Stanley R. Ross, does defend the author in an appendix entitled "The Base of Retalhuleu." Although Ross's defense is well-argued, this book would have been more valuable if Kennedy had been willing to defend himself.

JOHN W. SLOAN

University of Houston

Lesotho 1970: An African Coup under the Microscope. By B. M. Khaketla. Perspectives on Southern Africa, 5. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972. Pp. x, 350. $10.00.)

Since the Kingdom of Lesotho presents a rare African example of an ethnically, linguistically, and culturally homogeneous state, the severe factionalism and acute political instability of its postindependence era seem especially tragic and unnecessary. In seeking "to identify . . . the factors, immediate and remote, which contributed to the crisis into which Lesotho was plunged in 1970" (p. 1)., B. M. Khaketla has produced a scathing polemic against the regime of Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan and a somewhat more restrained critique of the behavior of Ntsu Mokhehle, the leading opposition politician. Mr. Khaketla's characterization of the crisis as a "scandal" (p. 1) reflects his basic assumption that the roots of Lesotho's problems can be found in the personal idiosyncrasies, opportunistic strategies, and faulty decisions of these key political actors.

Lesotho 1970 is an intensely partisan memoir chronicling the constitutional development of that nation and the constant infighting among the conservative National Party Government, the militant Congress Party Opposition, the royalist Marematlou Freedom Party and the young monarch, King Moshoeshoe II. Mr. Khaketla played a prominent role throughout this period as the outspoken editor of the respected political journal, *Mohlabani*. In addition, he served on various constitutional commissions, as a member of the pre-1965 Executive Council, as founder and later Secretary-General of the MFP, and finally as the select Privy Councillor to the King. Given the extent of his own involvement, Khaketla's overemphasis on personality factors to the virtual exclusion of any more general conception of political behavior, political coups, or political and economic development is understandable. More surprisingly, Mr. Khaketla rarely draws new insights from his intimate linkages with the major political participants and almost never delves into his own aspirations, triumphs, fears and self-evaluations. Thus, the book becomes just another outlet for the endless factional struggles among Basotho leaders and offers an important example of the pathology of politics in the Kingdom of Lesotho rather than an explanation.

Khaketla approaches his task with a veritable legalistic passion for verification of his assertions. To this end, he includes lengthy and often undigested segments from parliamentary debates, public speeches, constitutional documents, party journals, and press reports. Although such materials are intrinsically interesting, they often become unsatisfactory substitutes for the more incisive and reflective analysis which Mr. Khaketla could have provided. The data which he introduces on Prime Minister Jonathan's efforts to negotiate some sort of return to constitutional rule are most welcome since they include verbatim segments of hitherto unpublished party position papers used in the delicate discussions. By contrast, lengthy eye-witness accounts of atrocities occurring during "the reign of terror" (pp. 262–291) following the 1970 coup serve only emotional purposes and may well conjure up the usual stereotypes of African savagery instead of focusing attention on the actual sources of unchecked factionalism. Moreover, one must wonder why Mr. Khaketla draws so heavily on English-language South African newspapers, especially after he has impugned the reliability and objectivity of their coverage of politics in Lesotho.

The quality of analysis throughout this book is rather uneven. Khaketla is at his best in demonstrating how Chief Jonathan shrewdly manipulated both negotiations with the opposition and Lesotho's perennial agricultural shortfall to secure the restoration of vital British aid without having to yield any substantive concessions. Similarly, he cogently analyzes how the ruling National Party utilized the governmental bureaucracy to augment and eventually supersede its own rudimentary organizational capacities (p. 174). On the other hand, Khaketla allows his marked bias against Indians to flavor his comments on the role which this small minority group has played in politics in Lesotho (pp. 40–41). More importantly, he fails to probe very deeply into the alternative courses of action available to King Moshoeshoe II in his pursuit of executive powers or to the royalist MFP in its efforts to become a major political force. Ironically, Khaketla directs his sole criticism of the King's political judgment (p. 68) to the very issue on which Palmer and Poulter imply that it was the High Court, not the monarch, which erred (*The Legal System of Lesotho,* Mitchie Company, 1972, pp. 300–304). In addition, Mr. Khaketla is all too ready to villify Chief Jonathan as a "lackey of the Republican Government" (p. 31). He neglects to buttress his assault by offering a plausible set of more appropriate policy options open to the leaders of Lesotho in coping with the acute dependence of their enclave state upon its powerful neighbor, racialist South Africa.

Despite these weaknesses, the general tenor of *Lesotho 1970* seems appropriate. Certainly, Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan's refusal to surrender power after losing the 1970 general election, and his thorough disregard for democratic norms since that time make him and his regime legitimate targets for severe reproach. Likewise, there is ample need for an effective rebuttal of Chief Jonathan's facile contention that authoritarian expedients were essential to promote national solidarity. B. M. Khaketla's multi-faceted professional career as a university-trained scholar, linguist, novelist, poet, and teacher provided him with the optimal background for accomplishing these objectives. While his passionate involvement in contemporary political events makes for interesting reading, Khaketla's inability to achieve some detachment from his subject matter would seem to have compromised his overall effectiveness. In attempting to score points against his political enemies, Mr. Khaketla has undercut his broader effort to demonstrate that the people of Lesotho have a long and distinguished national heritage and "do not need Chief Leabua Jonathan to make them what they already are, have been and always will be" (p. 334).

RICHARD F. WEISFELDER

Ohio University

The Politics of Military Revolution in Korea. By Se-Jin Kim. (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1971. Pp. xiv, 239. $9.25.)

There are, in general, two schools of thought on military involvement in civil politics in developing nations. One is essentially a negative view, which is shared by Morris Janowitz, Manfred Halpern, Edward Shils, and S. E. Finer. It is the view that the military should not intrude into civil politics because, in the long run, the military would hamper the growth of a democratic political system. It is quite conceivable that in the short run the military can restore order and maintain stability, for it emphasizes hierarchy, obedience, and discipline. But the ill effects of the military rule are the silencing of the opposition, the manipulation of the populace, the lack of provision for orderly succession, and the simplistic attitude toward problem solving.

The other view is represented by such scholars as Lucian Pye, Samuel Huntington, and Rupert Emerson. It is essentially a positive one, holding that the military can assume a positive role in promoting modernization while maintaining stability in developing nations. This is said to be particularly true in those nations which have had a long tradition of an administrative authoritarian system in the absence of a firm constitutional tradition of peaceful change. In such countries the military may become the only cohesive and disciplined unit with a modern scientific orientation; consequently, the military coup or revolution should be welcomed as a genuine alternative in bringing the necessary change and progress toward modernization. This was the view subscribed to by many in the 1950s and 1960s in justifying military involvement in the politics of such countries as Turkey, Pakistan, Burma, Indonesia, Vietnam, and Egypt. And it is the view advanced by Kim in this book detailing the role of the military in South Korean politics.

More particularly, Kim advances the thesis that the 1961 military coup, which brought overt military intrusion into civil politics for the first time in South Korea, was inevitable, because the thirteen-year civil rule by the two previous regimes—Rhee's First Republic

(1948–60) and Chang's Second Republic (1960–61)—failed to accomplish the two most important tasks of nation building. Their failures were, first, to create "an efficient political institution to articulate the public's demands and the nation's needs" and, second, to conjure up "a political ideology to capture and stir the imagination of the population." Instead, they succumbed to their own inabilities and petty political desires. Under these circumstances, the military, which "possessed the ultimate means of political power and subscribed to a more modern and pragmatic outlook . . . became a new political force . . . [and staged the coup] in the name of restoring constitutional democracy—a goal which, to some extent, has been achieved" (pp. viii–ix).

This is too rationalized and oversimplified a view of the process of political change in South Korea. It is difficult for the reviewer to conceptualize the military takeover of the civil rule in such a dialectic manner. For example, as the author has charged, the Rhee regime was guilty of political corruption and economic neglect, and the Chang government during its short period of rule was unable to correct the prevalent social and economic ills of the country. The military in the meantime became dysfunctional because of growing factional struggles among the officers' corps along the lines of geography, military service, school, and age. Social friction also occurred between the "new" modernized military (which was becoming too big to manage) and the "old" conservative civilian elites. Even assuming that all of these "facts" were correct, however, one cannot conclude (as the author does) that they would necessarily lead to the kind of military coup and its successful seizure of power of the country's political system at that particular time. The coup was a result of a conspiracy by a dozen key discontented officers and was implemented by less than 5,000 soldiers out of the total of 600,000 armed forces. It could very well have failed for a number of reasons if, for example, the regular military high command was determined to crush it. It succeeded because the Chang regime was either incapable of using or unwilling to use coercive power to prevent a small *illegitimate* group of soldiers from taking over its *legitimate* government.

As to the effects of the military takeover, the author seems to give too much credit to the military regime for peace and prosperity in Korea. He, for example, states that "the successful implementation of the entire developmental program could not have been achieved without the stability assured by these political organizations" [the Central Intelligence Agency and the Democratic Republican Party have been developed by Kim Jong-Pil, the master mind of the coup and the present Prime Minister] (p. 175). Another example of his almost "blind" faith in the present quasi-military regime is his statement that:

> What can be concluded from this almost fortuitous success of the present leadership is that modernization is not really as complex and difficult as has been supposed. It can occur if there is a determined leadership with organizational skill . . . committed to such a goal (p. 175).

He goes on to say further that South Korea has experienced great progress in its economy and public administration, because "former military officers have in the last ten years become managerial experts in both private and public sectors" (p. 175). This is not only an oversimplified view of the modernization process but also an exaggeration of the military regime's success. One cannot give the military the total credit for the success of the First Five Year Plan, because much of its foundation has been built over the years during the precoup civil regimes.

Throughout the book, the author is preoccupied with rationalizing what he considers to be "the causes of the military coup." Hence, he has failed to deal with the future of the military involvement in civil politics, especially its effect on the development of liberal political democracy in Korea. There is, of course, no need to assume that the establishment of liberal democracy is the ultimate objective or ideology of the present quasi-military leadership, for Korea throughout most of its history has been governed as an administrative authoritarian system.

In spite of these criticisms, the book is well written and well documented. It is the first book written in English which has dealt almost exclusively with the cause and role of the military coup in South Korea. It therefore deserves serious attention from students of Asian politics.

JOHN C. H. OH
University of Wisconsin, Whitewater

Rebellion and Its Enemies in Late Imperial China: Militarization and Social Structure, 1796–1864. By Philip A. Kuhn. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970. Pp. 254. $8.50.)

Any student of modern Chinese history soon learns to pay attention to the role of the military in Chinese domestic politics and power dynamics. In this book, Philip Kuhn examines the role of military growth in the social setting of China during the 19th century. Building on the studies of the foremost Chinese historians, such as Lo Erh-kang, and on some earlier analytical efforts by American authors, including this reviewer, the author has produced a superb, detailed study of that period and of the emergence of local military-political organizations during that time. In systematizing the complex institutional growth through case studies as well as through general analytical groupings, Professor Kuhn has made exhaustive use of a great variety of Chinese material, from local gazetteers to individual biographies and collected writings of both major and lesser participants, to trace the story of the militarization of Chinese society during the late Ch'ing period.

In close approximation to this reviewer's earlier analysis, Philip Kuhn draws two theoretical distinctions: one, the distinction between "natural" and state-imposed local military organizations; and the other, that between "orthodox" and "heterodox" leadership of the "natural" local military community organizations. The "natural" military organizations, in the author's terminology, are those that grow out of the village and town communities below the state administrative structure. The state is always attempting to tie this "local defense to the network of bureaucratic accountability," but without much success. The basis of "orthodox" natural military community organizations is the *t'uan*. Combined with the term *lien* (training in arms), *t'uan-lien* means "to prepare the community to bear arms." In times of crisis and of decline of the regular government troops, this community self-defense is a local necessity. Local officials, of course, always attempt to retain control over these locally established defense units. The effectiveness of these units, however, depends on leadership by the local elite—the gentry, which, while loyal to the existing order, is primarily interested in the defense of its own communities and social positions more than in the defense of the state. The interplay of this struggle for authority in the establishment and management of the *t'uan-lien* in the 19th century is brilliantly described by the author in numerous case studies, clarified by several maps indicating the location of the gentry lineages and of the *t'uan* organizations in key areas in which this local military growth occurred.

From the description of the *t'uan*, the author moves up to personal armies, demonstrating how local military forces, beginning with a predominantly local perspective, move outward from home districts to home provinces and eventually to the affairs of the empire, a development in which personal armies, based on recruitment from the *t'uan-lien,* provide forces for the regional commanders of the period. Professor Kuhn traces in considerable detail the history of these armies and their commanders, the highest tier of the three layers of local military development.

These "orthodox" forces of a "militarized" social structure were paralleled, as Kuhn recounts, by a similar growth of "heterodox" military hierarchies of forces that rebelled against traditional society and state. When the rebellions failed, the system of "orthodox" local military leadership survived throughout the remainder of imperial times and into the republican period.

In his concluding section, Professor Kuhn raises several interesting speculative questions regarding the role of this local military leadership under the impact of the major institutional changes that occurred with the birth of the republic. The author believes that a "certain degree of social continuity" existed, even though the end of degree status, privileges and sources of income of the old order would force the rural gentry "to forge new links to the formal structure of state power" (p. 222). The question of the decline of Confucianism, of the vain efforts of the last Confucian philosopher K'ang Yu-wei to transform Confucian concepts for modern use, may be outside the scope of this institutional study; but the issue, at least, could have been mentioned in the author's broad analytical framework. In its institutional analysis, however, this is an excellent book to be highly recommended to any student of modern Chinese history.

FRANZ MICHAEL
The George Washington University

Latin American University Students: A Six Nation Study. By Arthur Liebman, Kenneth N. Walker, and Myron Glazer. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1972. Pp. 296. $11.75.)

More than twenty years ago there was widespread recognition of the political importance of university students in Latin America, but virtually no useful research on this subject. Through the mid-1960s evidences of student political activity outran the rather spotty beginnings of an analytical literature, and only during the past five years have the results of reasonably sophisticated empirical field research on a number of the area's countries begun to find their way into print. Now the systematic comparative work catalyzed by Seymour Martin Lipset nearly a decade ago has finally resulted in this important study by a group of his former disciples. (Since they were brought into the project after the fieldwork had been completed, responsibility to that point rests in Lipset's hands.) Grateful as we must be for the hard data provided, much of it has aged quite rapidly, and the authors at times assume a continued relevance which is not demonstrated. They argue cogently for the utility of concentrating upon Mexico, Colombia, Uruguay, Paraguay, Panama, and Puerto Rico as including "[s]harply different versions of competitive party systems" as well as traditional and leftist variants of authoritarianism. Yet each appears dissatisfied with the limitations of this sample and to varying degrees reaches out to include developments, often more significant, in other countries. Rigorous as is much of their work, the authors somewhat disconcertingly pass *obiter dicta* judgments on countries excluded from their research design. Hence, for maximum usefulness this study should be read along with Frank Bonilla and Myron Glazer's *Student Politics in Chile* (1970), Richard Walter's *Student Politics in Argentina* (1968), Jaime Suchlicki's *University Students and Revolution in Cuba, 1920–1968* (1969), and Orlando Albórnoz's works on Venezuelan students in order to have a sufficiently broad Hispanic American comparative dimension. As is too often the case, this book has little proven validity for the other two-fifths of Latin America whose heritage is Portuguese, French, or British rather than Spanish.

The authors find the period of their survey work, 1964–1965, to have been one of "reassessment and a search for new and better ways of dealing with old and seemingly lasting national and university problems." This temporal limitation should also be kept in mind while considering their profile and analysis of the Latin American university student. Lipset's brief introduction aids in this task by placing the question of student political activism in historical perspective: The project's intellectual godfather asserts that "By concentrating on students in countries with similar religious, political, and cultural traditions whose universities derive from a common model, the authors have been able to narrow their focus to the sources of variation in student behavior which emanate from different political systems and levels of development." He defines the central inquiry of the study as "What is there about the interaction between the children of the Latin American elite and an archaic, socially insulated institution—the Latin American university—that regularly produces a significant number of students opposed to both their governments and the social structures that have and will so richly benefit them?" (pp. xxiii–xxiv) In the first chapter Liebman and Walker then furnish a concise historical overview of the manner in which student attitudes and behavior in the political realm have been "profoundly affected by the values and forces coexisting within their universities and societies as well as by the tensions emanating from the interrelationship between these two overlapping spheres" (p. 1). Here the scope is regionwide, with particular attention given to Argentina, Peru, Cuba, Venezuela, and even Brazil in passing, as well as Colombia as the only one of the countries included in the survey work to figure in this background discussion of basic trends.

The empirical body of the study begins with an analysis by Glazer and Liebman of social characteristics and career orientations using data of the mid-1960s and embracing all of Latin America. With university enrollment in the area low, but rapidly rising, they find a sharp urban-rural discrepancy and a high degree of selectivity by social class accompanied by underrepresentation of females. Similarly, conventional wisdom is borne out concerning relative overconcentration on law and medicine as well as the tendency of higher status students to plan careers in business while lower status classmates look to the employment opportunities afforded by the government. Glazer's exploration of "University Problems and Students' Attitudes Toward Higher Education" paints a picture of discontinuous professional socialization in an environment of inadequate facilities, low academic standards, and persistence of traditional teaching methods. Advanced students in particular express a longing for more courses stressing practical application of their professional skills. Centrality of professors to the students' evaluation of the total university experience and the dependency of the universities upon national governments are perceptively discussed. Blame for the politicization of the universities is transferred largely from the students to the system, and evidence of serious student concern for educational quality is introduced.

Variations between countries and among universities are emphasized in Walker's analysis of "Family Background, University Experience, and Student Politics" (pp. 89–126). Level of satisfaction with university life is not seen as an accurate predictor of student political activism or radicalism. On the question of the relative significance of recruitment and socialization factors, he finds strong family background influence on student political orientations, with choice of career chiefly ratifying political predispositions. Liebman treats conservative students at length, having found the left to be a "small minority" (whose political successes within the university reflect both the apathy of the centrist plurality and the reluctance of the rightists to work as intensely at politics as their ideological rivals. He also perceptively compares the national context of student politics in Mexico and Puerto Rico, providing excellent appreciations of the 1968 riots in the former and the 1969–1970 disturbances at the University of Puerto Rico. Indeed, the richness of this very contemporary case material highlights several of the study's weaknesses, while the concluding chapter brings the reader up to date on student politics in Cuba, Chile, Argentina, and in a sense Brazil rather than drawing upon the six nations empirically studied.

While my overall reaction to this volume is a very positive one, I do lament the failure to include more significant cases than its relatively limited range: three of the smallest and least typical countries of the region along with the second and fourth most populous and Puerto Rico, formally still a noncountry albeit of particular current concern to the United States. The omission of Brazil and Argentina is to be regretted the most, since useful efforts to conceptualize Latin American politics must include these two major nations. (As indicated by the questionnaire preface on page 237, Brazil was included in the original research design but subsequently dropped.) In their repeated references to Brazil the authors have chosen to rely upon only one of the three or more North American dissertations available on student politics there and to ignore non-English language materials on the subject. With very rapid changes having taken place in Brazilian higher education since 1969, they mar their study by continuing to view the situation in the early 1970s as a linear projection of policies of an administration which was out of office a year before Allende came to power in Chile.

RONALD M. SCHNEIDER
Queens College, CUNY

Israel's Parliament: The Law of the Knesset. By Eliahu Likhovski. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. 236. $13.75.)

Anyone who has observed the Israeli political scene knows only too well that it is not necessary to become theoretically involved in order to appreciate the intense centralization of political power in Israel. Indeed, the more astute would remark that viewing the entire Knesset, rather than the more exclusive Cabinet, as supreme, gives too broad a base to the ultimate source of political power.

Likhovski is, however, most assuredly aware of these all too easy and frequent observations about the cliquish nature of Israel's political leadership. The fact that the present government leaders were the founders of the state in 1948, and the founders of all important institutions of the Israeli state and society since the early 1920s, cannot escape his consciousness.

It is, in fact, this very intimate connection between Israel's present and its own past foundations that provides the threads with which behavior and intentions can be woven into this closely argued treatment of constitutional development. Since the authors and the practitioners are nearly identical, we have a rare opportunity to gauge intentions and actions against each other in a contemporary setting.

Likhovski finds constitutional-legal principles in two streams of influence in the developing Israeli State. The first of these is the Zionist practice, which was the prestatehood manifestation of the political relationships that obtain to this day in Israel. Although appearing to be a consequence of the second stream of experience, the British Constitution, these political relationships are uniquely and directly a consequence of Zionist practice; Likhovski maintains that, in fact, the Zionist experience established Israel's particular set of common laws which, when subjected to proper exegesis, reveal a richness of precedent and an internal consistency and logic that allow Israeli practice to represent itself.

The desire to continue the Zionist modes in the new state was a matter of pride, identification, and practicality. Viewing Israel as the fulfillment of their own definition of Jewish statehood, those present at the founding were not likely to deny the heritage they had themselves produced. Equally important, of course, was the ambition of the founders to maintain their positions of formal leadership while effecting a rapid transition from mandatee to independence under the conditions prevailing in 1948.

However unique and self-satisfying this Zionist heritage may be, it produced the more static, definitional aspects of the Israeli constitution. More dynamic is the legal system and the as yet unsettled relationship between the legislature and the judiciary.

The prestatehood legal system was mostly British, having been imposed during the time of the Mandate: it was adopted wholesale at the time of Israel's independence. With this adoption, the Israeli Court inherited the right to review administrative action. But an unwillingness to adopt the whole of British constitutional practice, as well as to formalize relationships in a written constitution, left the Court with some latitude to find its own place; ultimately, this could include the judicial review of legislation.

Thus, Likhovski implies that the supremacy of the Knesset need not remain absolute, and he finds the *Bergman* case (1969) to be, possibly, Israel's *Marbury* vs. *Madison*. Implicitly, the American experience meets the Zionist and the British in the unfolding of Israel's unwritten constitution.

In his treatment of this meeting of streams, Likhovski brings a subtleness and sophistication that makes his subject almost dramatic. While remaining objective, the analysis offers a useful handle for those who are concerned about the high concentration of power in Israel. Although, as Likhovski points out, the Court has shied away from the full implications of *Bergman*, its potential remains.

In the confines of its restricted mandate as a constitutional-legal exegesis, *Israel's Parliament* is an excellent book. We may only fault Likhovski for providing too narrow a framework for his analysis, which is merely to suggest that the limits he set may not be the true limits of the topic. Thus, while we can appreciate his desire to avoid the strictly political, Likhovski can be expected to test his skills in those areas where his interests meet the more expressive elements which have affected Israel's constitution.

In particular, it is surprising that the Jewish religious-legal tradition was not treated as an explicit stream of influence, for it is certainly the wish to avoid an outright civil-religious clash, as well as the legislative-judicial issue, that prevents the writing of an Israeli constitution. Equally true may be the notion that judicial unwillingness to be fully drawn into the question of legislative review is based on the fear of becoming too involved in questions of personal status and the representation of the state in religious doctrine.

Here we discover that our questions require more explicit behavioral treatment. Although most obviously evident in the sphere of religion, it is also in matters of political representation and access to decision makers that we become aware that constitutional development involves the relationship of the State to its constituents. If Likhovski's analysis falls short of our desires in this regard, it is possibly because the basic developmental mappings of Israeli political behavior remain to be completed.

MICHAEL KAHAN

University of Tel-Aviv

Classes, Crises and Coups: Themes in the Sociology of Developing Countries. By Peter C. Lloyd. (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1971. Pp. 223. £2.95.)

As befits a volume in a series entitled "Sociology and the Modern World," this is a book primarily for sociologists and restricted, as the author acknowledges on page 199, "to a narrow framework of analysis, focusing the discussion on the emergent patterns of social stratification in the poorer nations." But Dr. Lloyd's earlier books have shown that he is also a highly sophisticated political scientist despite his professional label as a social anthropologist.

The main title of this book is somewhat misleading as there is relatively little about crises and coups, and class is discussed mainly in connection with the differentiation between elites and the masses. Even though there are only eight chapters in total, the structure of the book falls into three distinct sections: four brief chapters discuss the impact of the West on traditional societies; three more discuss social stratification with respect to the changing rural scene, among urban workers, and within "the men at the top"; finally a long last chapter entitled "crises and coups" deals briefly with revolutionary change and the role of the military and then provides extended examples in the form of case studies of Nigeria, Columbia, Cuba, and Tanzania.

There is much that is valuable in each of the three sections. Dr. Lloyd writes well, and his succinct style is unencumbered by academic apparatus, with a bare minimum of footnotes to distract the reader. Although the last two sections contain little that is original, the general reader will find a great deal of material which might otherwise have remained buried in the scholarly monographs of the specialists. On Latin America and India, there will doubtless be points where Lloyd's uncritical acceptance of the conclusions of another writer (like Dix on Columbia) will be challenged by others; on his home ground of tropical Africa, Lloyd's judgment seems impeccable. The only major criticism would seem to be the continuing assumption that "the masses" are capable of exerting pressure on the various ruling elites through the use of the franchise. "The masses" are never given a satisfactory definition, nor is sufficient account taken of the capacity of elites to maintain themselves in power by controlling key groups rather than relying upon majority support.

One of the reasons for this analytical weakness is that Lloyd's "men at the top" in chapter seven are members of the civilian political elite and distinct from the military leaders discussed in chapter eight. And this final chapter is perhaps the weakest in the whole book. It points out but does not resolve any of the contradictions and limitations which result from the imperfect state of knowledge about why coups occur and how they are related to other factors in producing violent crises within new states. The book tails off in the last thirty pages because the case studies never get back to grips with the dominant themes enunciated earlier. The data are interesting in themselves but don't add up to much or lead anywhere in particular.

This sense of anticlimax is largely a product of declining tension because the first section of the book reached such heights. The first four chapters are densely packed with interesting information, almost all critical of the "conventional wisdom" on the subject of the process of modernization. Lloyd sets out to justify his skepticism of attempts to describe modernization as "stages through which all societies pass by processes of unilinear evolution" (p. 18). Against these universalist, evolutionary assumptions, Lloyd argues that "social change results from the continual interaction between individuals and groups seeking, through their use of existing resources and new opportunities, to improve their position in the social hierarchy" (p. 18).

He attacks theorists of modernization from Lerner to Hagen and McClelland because their notion of a single process implies evolution toward a common goal by a simple, inevitable route. Exposing a number of fallacies in this approach, Lloyd is especially critical of the ethnocentric assumptions which underlay it:

> Implicit in the evolutionary approach is the belief in the increasing transferability of social institutions; as countries adopted the technology of the western nations so they adapt their own social structures to resemble those of the West. This widely held viewpoint is far more deterministic than anything postulated by Marx. . . . It seems to be confidently assumed that the rest of the world will not only become like the United States but that it wishes to do so (pp. 68–69).

In building up his own approach, Lloyd denies that societies progress along a predetermined continuum because change is seen to relate to the activities of various individuals, each pursuing a conception of his own interest. The most suitable theoretical framework is seen to be that of games theory:

> Individual interaction is seen as a game in which the basic elements in decision-making are the resources of the individual: in terms of wealth, education, skill, personality, etc., and his expectations of the reactions of others, in terms of the sanctions of reward or punishment that they can or will wield over him . . . in this context, values are not a determinant of behaviour but a weapon used by contestants . . . the social process, defined in these terms as a game, or series of games, between individuals does not predict any specific direction of change, nor indeed does it predict that change will occur (pp. 76–77).

Lloyd is doing a valuable service to all students of political science by casting doubt upon the utility of grand theories and arguing strongly for an approach which requires first an increase in the basic ingredient of any food for thought —empirical data—before any general intellectual advancement is possible.

R. D. Scott

Canberra College of Advanced Education, Australia

The State of the Nations: Constraints on Development in Independent Africa. Edited by Michael F. Lofchie. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1971. Pp. 305. $10.00.)

This collection of essays puts forward the organizing concept of "constraint" in order to evaluate political change in Africa. The idea is to point to overall conditions and circumstances—largely inauspicious—in which Africans assumed responsibility for national political units. Rather than dwelling on conceptualizations of development or decay, which can lead to false hopes of generalized categories of explanation, the effort here is to assume a more modest stance, to "illuminate processes and problems" (p. 4). The editor and several contributors agree with the suggestion, familiar to Africanists in political science, that researchers in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s created a sense of purposive design in political transition, built around parties, "mobilization," and democracy. Professor Lofchie articulates the contemporary mood when he expresses "qualified pessimism" (p. 261) regarding the present outlook for policies of social and institutional change in Africa. (While one hopes for some cumulative knowledge based on scientific criticism in political studies, one can't help suspecting that the political analysis of Africa in the past decade or so has had as much to do with the state of American political science as with African politics. Although this volume reflects the present climate of retrenchment, Lofchie's own commentary is so reasonable and even wise, that the reader wishes it appeared earlier so as to save us much confusion.)

Like most collections, this one is marked by unevenness in the quality of contributions and discontinuity in some of the themes pursued. Rather than catalogue probably inevitable differences of scope and level of analysis among the articles, I will merely note apparent contradictions that strike me as fundamental. For instance, Immanuel Wallerstein summarizes the differences in the political character of African regimes in terms of the conservative-radical split, while Henry Bienen on parties argues that these distinctions are unhelpful. Rupert Emerson on the prospects for democracy avoids the use of these terms. Barbara Callaway and Emily Card, writing on Ghanaian development, conclude that Nkrumah wasn't socialist enough and the CPP wasn't disciplined enough to chart new directions. But Bienen, working with the concept of the political machine as a regime model, undermines the notion that leadership and parties in Africa have the resources to make and implement these kinds of choices.

Perhaps more than in most collections, the editor's introductory and concluding essays seem most rewarding in this one. Although Lofchie makes an admirable effort to incorporate the discussion of his contributors into his own presentation, his major analytical themes do not especially depend on the articles in the book. That is not to say that the six case studies in the section called "parameters" are without value to the reader. Jonathan Barker's use of Senegalese politics to illustrate what he calls "the paradox of development" seems cogently suggestive: a regime that presses hard with a policy of economic development will undermine the basis of its initial support. Cranford Pratt's description of the workings of the core of the Tanzanian executive during the first six years of independence seems genuinely revealing of administrative and political problems from the inside. But the significance of Lofchie's overall supervision here is to put the question of Africa's political development into a comparative historical context and then to suggest some connections between major social forces and public policy.

Lofchie starts by discussing the "timing of technological change" (p. 15) rather than colonialism. As a latecomer to industrialization and modernization, Africa is subject, he suggests, to certain economic and social dependencies which make it impossible for a given country or even the entire continent to influence change decisively under present conditions. Political choices available to European countries several hundred years ago are simply ruled out for Africa. Basic issues that were managed "in series" in Europe—constitutional matters, the state and the economy, popular participation in government, social welfare—now occur simultaneously in Africa. The political expectations and moral understandings of today do not permit the sort of deprivations endured by the lower classes a century ago. To these general points, derived from the theorists of constitutionalism and comparative politics of the postwar decades, Lofchie adds the observation of political economists that sophisticated technology is a poor instrument for stimulating employment. So the process of growth itself widens the gap between elite and mass.

Most of the contributions to the book reflect Lofchie's view that the major questions for policy and study revolve around development planning and the emergent social structure. Some interesting dilemmas appear. Most actual policies rely on foreign aid, so the debate between advocates of equality and advocates of growth may take on an artificial quality, especially when planning experiences are investigated. In addition, there is an assumed need for the state in development and there is an obvious weakness in state institutions. This political context is vulnerable to military intervention, which may overcome some new cleavages, but which may also intensify older ones. In terms of policy problems, Lofchie summarizes two basic contradictions. First, there is the attempt to transform the society at the same time as to represent all elements within it. This suggests the second, the attempt to create an egalitarian society in the face of the inegalitarian consequences of modernization.

The major theoretical suggestion that emerges is that political conflict is best understood as reflecting social rather than cultural tensions. Lofchie sees development strategies linked to the effort to redress "proportionate inequality" (p. 274), i.e., disproportional economic advantages for regional-ethnic groups. But such efforts are seen as mistaking apparent conflict for real cleavages, class differences that promise to be more severe than in previous Western history, because of the timing and conditions of social change, already mentioned.

Lofchie's contribution deserves expansion, refinement and reprinting on its own, as an effort in political theory in a tradition somewhat overlooked in comparative politics in recent years. It suggests a new look at the constitutionalism literature, tempered by neo-Marxian sociology and perhaps measured by the concerns that animated the casebooks in "public administration and policy development." For research in Africa, it would appear that political economy is yet another new frontier. Equally important, the thesis sketched here seems an exciting tool with which to teach—viewing African political change in the context of historical sociology.

HARVEY GLICKMAN

Haverford College

Guatemala: The Politics of Land Ownership. By Thomas and Marjorie Melville. (New York: The Free Press, 1971. Pp. 320. $9.00.)

In January, 1967, readers of *The New York Times* were, I suppose, at least mildly shocked by the report that a Maryknoll priest and a nun were expelled from their order and subsequently from Guatemala for involvement in a plot to smuggle arms to Castroite guerrilla organizations there. In the ensuing years the ex-missionaries have led extremely active lives in the United States. They married, were convicted (with the Berrigan brothers) of burning draft board files, pursued graduate studies and produced the book which is the subject of this review.

Being aware of the writers' background and having first seen the book under its British title, *Guatemala: Another Vietnam?* I was anticipating yet another in the long list of polemical treatments of the Latin American scene. What I found, however, was that, whatever their disclaimers, Thomas and Marjorie Melville have written a remarkably straightforward, well-researched book on the last twenty-five years of Guatemalan politics.

The book recounts in detail the attempts by Presidents Arevalo (1945–1950) and Arbenz (1950–1954) to create a more equitable and productive land holding system for the country. The basic purpose of their policies was not to socialize agricultural production but to realize an objective sought by various Guatemalan regimes since *La Reforma* (1871), namely, to force the owners of *latifundios* to manage their properties as capitalistic enterprises.

Although definitely favoring the infamous Decree 900—the Arbenz agrarian reform law—the writers do not hesitate to point out its defects: vagueness in its definition of uncultivated land, the lack of representation by landowners on the local agrarian reform committees, the lack of adequate appeal procedures, and the failure of the government to control illegal peasant invasions. The authors point out that those owners who had been most generous to their workers and had provided them with larger and better plots stood to lose the most from expropriation since the law stipulated that such property was to go to the workers (p. 67).

The Melvilles see Castillo Armas (1954–1957) as a tragic figure. A true Cold Warrior, he saw in the Arbenz approach to agrarian reform the destruction of private property, the dissolution of social peace, a decrease in agricultural productivity and the "sovietization" of Guatemalan society. Yet they also document the fact that he was not totally oblivious of the need to provide social justice for the peasant. However, it was to be in the form of colonization rather than land redistribution.

The remainder of the book describes the abortive attempts of successive administrations to deal with the agrarian problem in the face of increased politicization of both the left and the right. The social forces set in motion by the Arevalo-Arbenz reformist regimes produced most of the problems usually associated with policy making in underdeveloped societies: problems such as coalition maintenance, the "motivation-outruns-understanding" style of problem solving, hyperpoliticization, etc. Thus it was that, although "under Mendez Montengro (1966–1970) the number of labor syndicates and rural cooperatives increased impressively" (p. 243), his government had "the dubious distinction of awarding lands of insufficient acreage to 5,000 out of the 80,000 landless families that [had] proliferated during its four year regime" (p. 230). And all of this accompanied by "over a hundred political murders a month . . ." (p. 247).

As political history and as a case study of regime performance in a specific policy area, the study is a very useful addition to the literature on contemporary Guatemala. But, although passing reference is made to the political fragmentation of the military and the growing social consciousness of the clergy, the analysis is clearly based on the traditional oligarchic model of the Latin American polity. While reasonably accurate for Guatemala, the oligarchic model does not provide a totally valid perspective. What the authors have failed to do is to relate the land tenure problem to such phenomena as industrialization, urbanization and internal migration, all of which have the effect of redistributing power and wealth. It is in these areas that considerable social change is taking place and can ultimately be looked upon to produce political change as well. Thus, although the Melvilles believe that land tenure is the country's major problem, Guatemala is largely past the point at which agrarian reform can be viewed as a panacea.

ROLAND H. EBEL

Tulane University

Plan and Market in Yugoslav Economic Thought. By Deborah D. Milenkovitch. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. 323. $10.00.)

Quite a few books have been published on Yugoslav economic reforms, but this one by Mrs. Milenkovitch, Assistant Professor of Economics at Barnard College, is the best overall treatment and evaluation of the theoretical issues involved. It roughly follows the historical sequence of the reforms from the late 1940s to 1970. While it is based on primary sources, Marxist concepts are adapted to Western terminology, and it is scholarly and objective without being either excessively critical or unduly enthusiastic. The study is a useful contribution to the systematization of our knowledge of what undoubtedly is one of the most intriguing experiments in social history. Those who have been yearning for an ideal economic-political system—which neither capitalism nor socialism on its own has yet produced—will find the book most stimulating.

In contrast to the traditional Marxist approach, plan *versus* market, the Yugoslav economic version of socialism is the complementarity of plan and market. In the author's words,

> Plan is used here to mean central determination of what and how to produce. In physical analogy, planned decisions are made from the mountain top. From the peak it is possible to survey the entire area. Market here means that decisions about what and how to produce are made from the viewpoint of the primary economic unit. Following the analogy, market decisions are made in the valley (pp. 2–3).

The reasons for the reforms are discussed at length. On the economic side, the author points out that centralized, directive planning and management may be desirable for an underdeveloped country seeking rapid development, but in higher stages of economic development the market mechanism works more efficiently. However, it is political circumstances—the strength of the Tito regime and the expulsion of Yugoslavia from Cominform (in June 1948)—that made the reforms possible, as well as necessary.

In the process of the reforms, Professor Milenkovitch tells us, the three elements normally associated with the socialist economic system—production planning, investment planning and the social ownership of the means of production with the distribution of income according to work have been virtually abandoned one by one. Yet most Yugoslavs believe that the reforms do not represent retreat but rather advance on the road to communism.

In the reviewer's opinion, the feature of greatest interest to economists and political scientists alike is the workers' management of enterprises combined with the exclusive rights of use of productive public property. Although this feature will, no doubt, please many supporters of the syndicalist movement, the Yugoslavs maintain that the resemblance is misleading and they deny any connection with syndicalist concepts or dreams. The Yugoslav answer to the workers-management-owner problem brings to mind the Japanese approach, hinging on paternalism and loyalty for its success. Many observers believe that Yugoslavia and Japan have evolved better solutions to the problems of industrial relations than other socialist or capitalist countries have. One is tempted to speculate if the Japanese approach is tenable in the long run, when the economy reaches a more mature stage, the power of traditionalism weakens and trade unions become more powerful and militant.

Although Yugoslavia may have produced a lasting answer to intra-enterprise industrial relations, has she made much progress in solving broader issues of social justice? Not according to the author, who highlights a growing division between the privileged and the underprivileged, and she believes that "the have-nots, if brought together, could form a particularly powerful alliance against the Establishment . . . The Belgrade student uprising of June 1968 may have been a harbinger . . ." (p. 289). The author concludes the book with the following sentence: "The ultimate consequences of these reforms are not yet known but the Yugoslav experience suggests that the results may be more far-reaching than the reformers either intended or anticipated" (p. 300).

The book reads well, with arguments clearly and smoothly developed, but one cannot escape the impression of repetition. The description of the Soviet system could be omitted, and the account of the Soviet reforms is rather trite. Many a reader would instead prefer at least some brief comparative references to the ideas put forward by such Soviet and Eastern European writers on market socialism as F. Behrens, W. Brus, P. Erdös, G. S. Lisichkin, G. Petrov and O. Šik. This does not detract from the main object of the study and it will be welcomed by many social scientists as an example of mature scholarship.

JOZEF WILCZYNSKI
University of New South Wales

The New Order and the French Economy. By Alan S. Milward. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. Pp. 320. $12.00.)

The organization of conquered economies for the German war effort during World War II was largely the work of Hitler's brilliant favorite, Albert Speer, the Minister for Armaments and War Production from 1942. Although Milward has not used Speer's memoirs, he has sifted the available ministry records in the Foreign Documents Centre and also consulted the materials in the Bundesarchiv which received the Speer files captured by American forces. Most of this material was also microfilmed and the films are available in the U.S. National Archives. As I edited the material for filming I can add to Milward's exemplary bibliographic note that the unfilmed photostats were not sufficiently legible and that these and materials used for the Nuernberg Trials are still in the U.S. National Archives. None of it, however, would affect his excellent account of the French economy in World War II.

Milward's history emphasizes some of the salient points made by others of the few authors who have tried their hand at World War II economic history and policy. Like Homze (*Foreign Labor in Nazi Germany,* 1967), Milward makes clear the very deep division between on the one hand the new technocrats epitomized by Speer and the generation of young men educated in the Nazi era—and on the other, old party hacks like Gauleiter Sauckel (chief of labor conscription), who held to the raw revolutionary ideals of early Nazism and its attack on capitalism, Jewish capitalists, interest rates, etc., as summarized in the party platform of 1920. Milward's view that the National Socialist revolution was a "last stand" against capitalism and industrialization is a point which is perhaps exaggerated. Hitler was himself a great admirer, almost in a Social Darwinist sense, of the successful modern entrepreneur, the captain of industry. The hostility to big business had of course characterized the Storm Trooper (S.A.) wing of the party which Hitler had subdued in the Blood Purge of 1934. It also reflects the provincialism of German society as German industrialization was primarily decentralized and Germany lacked the cultural strength of modern urbanization.

Like B. Carroll (*Design for Total War, 1968*), Milward devotes a long introduction to the problem of war—Carroll to "total war" and Milward to the "idea of conquest." Introductions of this sort usually assume too much tradition for the subject at hand. Milward also finds a long tradition of "liberal" antagonism to conquest in the political thought of the sixteenth through nineteenth centuries but describes only those authors who agree with his thesis. Most of the leading political writers of these centuries from Machiavelli on were not at all opposed to conquest and war. The rights derived from conquest were even an integral part of the prevailing international law of the seventeeth and eighteenth centuries. The liberal dislike of war and the argument of the high cost of conquest arises in twentieth-century sociology as well as in Adam Smith, but its strength derives from the public reaction against World War I. The prevailing tradition was favorable to ideals of war and conquest and the limited education of the Nazi leadership provided no opportunity for imbibing any but the older traditions. And if, as Milward points out, Göring believed that the object of conquest was booty and did in fact order the systematic looting of France, he was consciously following ideals of warfare which had been accepted in Europe for centuries. He sounds little different from Wallenstein and Gustavus Adolphus whose conception of warfare was similar. Unlike Wallenstein, however, Göring resisted the idea that a conquered area could be made more prosperous and could serve the ends of future wars. Speer seems to have been able to persuade Hitler of the need to utilize the French economy for the effort of total war which the failure of the Blitzkrieg in Russia made necessary. Surprisingly, Hitler and the party faithful like Sauckel continued to resist the full implications of Speer's conception of rationalizing production. During 1942 and 1943, however, some production was concentrated in France, where labor productivity rose despite sabotage and despite Sauckel's heavy labor draft.

Although the French economy was not systematically plundered, it was despoiled. Inflation, the Black Market, shortages of fuel, agricultural deficits, marginal mining, the heavy occupation costs left their mark. Nonetheless, as Milward points out, Germany became increasingly dependent on France and the Benelux countries, and the pattern of her trade which had been oriented towards eastern and southeastern Europe was now shifted to the west. Here, then, was the foundation of the present common market.

German cartels, particularly I. G. Farben, also began to buy into French industry, thus seeding some of the roots of the greater integration which emerged after the war; but the account is rather too skimpy, and Milward ought to have researched the microfilm of records of captured firms and the archives of the major West German firms, which are also accessible. The N.S. government certainly encouraged German firms to acquire control of French and Belgian cartels, particularly after 1941. Whatever one's criticisms, however, this monograph establishes Milward as the leading English-language historian of National Socialist economic history.

HELEN P. LIEBEL
University of Alberta, Canada

Studies in Nigerian Administration. Edited by D. J. Murray. (London: Hutchinson Educational Ltd., 1970. Pp. ix, 324. $11.50.)

This collection of essays is one in a series of publications sponsored by the Institute of Administration at the University of Ife in Nigeria. The series, which also includes various monographs and the *Quarterly Journal of Administration,* is inspired by legitimate concerns and pursues laudable objectives. As the Institute's Director, Dr. Adebayo Adedeji, makes clear in a prefatory note, public administration—a key factor in the country's development process—has too long been neglected by local and especially by foreign scholars. What researches have been undertaken thus far are usually buried in unpublished doctoral dissertations or in foreign journals—out of sight of Nigerian policy-makers who might (should?) derive some benefit from them.

Adedeji has touched a nerve here, one which impinges on the whole range of social research in Africa. Addressing the matter more generally, a former graduate student of mine (from Nigeria, coincidentally) observed as follows in a seminar paper:

> It is foolish to search for the culprit in a single academic discipline. Anthropology, for example, as is now the fashion. Or in particular subjects of inquiry . . . tribal lore or ethnography, as cases in point. Or even in the national origins of research scholars. The problem transcends all these, and particular territories as well; it is continental in scope, perhaps universal. And it is at once moral, philosophical, and practical. The 'social research enterprise' in Africa, still dominated (but, it should be noted, not monopolized) by foreign institutions and operatives, is essentially an extractive industry, along with tin, gold, petroleum, etc. At least the latter three can lay claim to creating jobs, wages, and consumer goods to use. But what of social research in Africa, whether pursued by African scholars or by foreigners? What does that enterprise create, and what does it diffuse? Knowledge? Of what? To whom? And in whose interest?

A raw nerve, indeed!

Commendably, each contributor to *Studies in Nigerian Administration* has accepted the challenge to tailor his research to African needs and aspirations—particularly with regard to public administration in Nigeria at the national and the state (formerly regional) levels. Each has undertaken to examine critically selected aspects of that country's administrative life—during the colonial era and in the first decade of independence. Sadly, their efforts here have not been very impressive.

Eight essays range widely across the administrative landscape in Nigeria, from national apex to village base—albeit without coherence around either a theoretical perspective or a set of organizing policy questions. The editor, Dr. Murray, has refrained from "putting the whip" to his colleagues and to himself; his introductory essay, a superficial discussion of the evolution of administrative policy in Nigeria, anticipates the disjointedness of what follows: a "comparative analysis" of high ministerial organization in that country and the Ivory Coast (by L. Adamolekun); a discussion of accountability and public control of statutory corporations in Western Nigeria (R. O. Teriba); a "comparative analysis" of administration at the field level (D. J. Murray); reflections on the executive class in Nigerian administration (F. J. Fletcher); a survey of the public service commissions (O. Nwanwene); an empirical study of work habits and motivation among village level agricultural extension workers (R. K. Harrison); a review of personal income-tax administration in Nigeria (G. M. Walker, Jr.); and finally, a "role analysis" of Nigeria's higher public servants from the vantage-point of that country's Western-educated elite (R. L. Harris). With the exception of Harrison's piece, which draws on the literature of organization theory and industrial psychology, the essays are dry, tedious, and often banal.

If there is any single theme (mood?) which may fairly be said to unite most of these contributions, it is this one: that Nigerian public administration in practice has widely failed to mirror its English counterpart in theory. Various essays manifest a preoccupation, either implicit or explicit, with that "reality": Nigeria's executive class, beset by role ambiguity, is disappointingly unlike that found in the United Kingdom; the public corporations are excessively politicized; higher public servants are, unfortunately, more loyal to family and tribal constellations than to the civil service ethos; and so forth. The inappropriateness of *selected aspects* of the English model under Nigerian social, economic, and political conditions is observed by some contributors, hinted at by others. But nowhere in the volume is there to be found a critical examination of the entire model as such or any consideration of alternatives to the Weberian rational-legal perspective. The lesson may be a hard one for many Western and Western-trained scholars to learn, but learn they must: that alternative models for organizational life are not only conceivable but already available, and that these models may be more appropriate to conditions in Nigeria and the so-called "Third World" generally. The Soviet and Chinese alternatives come quickly to mind, the former suggesting, for example, that role ambiguity, to the extent that it places a premium on adaptive administrative behavior, may be highly functional to the attainment of organizational and national development goals. (In this regard, see Jerry Hough, *The Soviet Prefects: The Local Party Organizations in Industrial Decision-making*, Harvard, 1969.)

Since independence in 1960, Nigerian political life has been dominated successively by the party and the military factors—political parties prevailing up to 1965, the military thereafter. Those realities, it can be argued, are at base incompatible with key assumptions in both the English administrative model and the Weberian ethos. Except to vindicate the transcendent merit of Nigeria's colonial legacy, it seems pointless to belabor, as have most contributors to *Studies in Nigerian Administration*, the hiatus between theory and practice. Policy-oriented research organized in the future under the auspices of the Institute of Administration at Ife might contemplate that observation as it seeks to assist the country's development process.

ALVIN MAGID

SUNY at Albany

West African States and European Expansion: The Dahomey-Niger Hinterland, 1885–1898. By Boniface I. Obichere. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. Pp. x, 400. $15.00.)

Colonial expansion in Africa has spawned divergent explanations. Mixed motives marked the acquisition of territory—economic gain, both as markets and as sources of raw materials; philanthropic and cultural objectives, such as the "civilizing mission," Christian proselytization, or stamping out the slave trade the Europeans themselves had earlier fostered; and transference of continental rivalries to the checkerboard of tropical Africa.

Where does Obichere fall in the still inconclusive debate among historians about the causes of imperial conquest in West Africa? To him, acquisition resulted primarily from "the desire to ensure the economic viability of those coastal possessions whose commerce and prosperity depended on an uninterrupted flow of trade with the hinterland" (p. 3). He seeks to explain not the initial European implantation along the coast, but the frenzied period of treaty-signing and border-delimiting of the 1890s. This viewpoint represents a clear twist on the monistic, economic determinist arguments strongly represented in the literature.

My disappointment with this book certainly does not arise from the assiduity of research and the extent of documentation: 250 pages of text account for no less than 1,561 footnotes. But the citations come from standard archival sources—the French Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, the British Foreign Office, the private papers of Lord X and Monsieur Y. The author, an African as well as an Africanist and historian, has followed the well-trodden scholarly paths too faithfully. The story of the impact of colonialism remains untold, or viewed through the lens of Europeans, for rarely do the sources Obichere cites provide a rounded view of the initial effects of conquest.

The thesis linking expansion with the economic viability of coastal comptoirs is provocative, but not fully sustained by the evidence cited. It does accord with the well-known reluctance of the British government to undertake new colonial responsibilities; the flag followed trade, and the Colonial Office refused to accept any new protectorates until chamber of commerce pressure became "irresistible" (p. 142). The main competition for territory was carried out by hyperambitious captains and lieutenants, not easily restrained by instructions from London or Paris, nor, it can be surmised, by careful consideration of the economic viability of the kingdoms they were bringing under European aegis. The key to the frenetic treaty-signing lay not on the West African coast, but in European capitals. The negotiations that settled the major Anglo-French disputes testified to "reasons of European diplomacy and balance of power" (p. 219); "The consideration of the European balance of power as well as other international issues were also important in deciding the questions in west Africa" (p. 241).

The historian of Africa will thus find *West African States and European Expansion* a guide to cabinet perceptions and military adventures in the closing years of the nineteenth century. Obichere has carried out an extraordinary amount of archival work; it will be the task of other historians to determine how the information he provides accords with the various explanations of the scramble for Africa.

CLAUDE E. WELCH, JR.
SUNY at Buffalo

Political Development in Changing Societies. Edited by Monte Palmer and Larry Stern. (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath and Co., 1971. Pp. 179. $12.50.)

Subtitled "an analysis of modernization," this volume consists of eight essays by such distinguished scholars as Manning Nash, Leonard W. Doob, Joseph LaPalombara, W. J. Siffin, and Joseph Spengler, among others. The essays were originally delivered as lectures at Florida State University. The editors have contributed a short introductory chapter.

Unfortunately, this collection suffers from many of the weaknesses of co-authored works, while it has almost none of the advantages. Each of the essays stands by itself, with little or no apparent relationship to the others. This is true even of the editors' introduction, which singularly fails to provide a unifying theme that might pull the disparate efforts of the contributors together. The essays, moreover, are highly uneven in nature. The first, by Manning Nash, describes the survival of traditional attitudes in the politics of the state of Kelantan on the East Coast of Malaya. Those who are familiar with Nash's work will not be surprised to learn that it is incisive and lively, although perhaps too brief. The second essay, by Doob, also excessively brief, presents some hitherto unpublished survey data from among highly educated Africans "who have experienced the disruption of the traditional patterns or who will be helping to disrupt them" (p. 17). Doob presents six hypotheses about change. They are of a very high order of generality and in themselves unexceptionable. Following brief elaboration on each of these, he presents a series of statements reflecting modern or "nontraditional" attitudes and the level of agreement or disagreement on each of these among various groups of his African subjects. He does not, however, correlate the responses of these subjects, nor does he, in fact, incorporate them into the body of his discussion at all. Moreover, the "modernity" of some of the statements is merely assumed or asserted without further elaboration. But surely such sweeping statements as "People are naturally good," or "The world is so dreary that I feel sorry for children who are born into it" require some explanation, particularly in terms of their relation to the phenomenon of modernization.

With one exception, the remaining essays do not deal with specific communities or research projects. LaPalombara presents a full-scale review of the state of the art of political science as it relates to modernization. In terms of comprehensiveness, this essay is on a par with Huntington's recent survey article ("The Change to Change," *Comparative Politics,* 3 [April, 1971]), though the perspective is somewhat different. Part of LaPalombara's discussion summarizes the essence of the seventh volume in the SSRC-Princeton University Press series on political development. Siffin's chapter similarly summarizes how the study of public administration has contributed to an understanding of the politics of development. There is some overlap between Siffin and LaPalombara; indeed, Siffin extensively reviews his co-author's thoughts on structural-functionalism, but without once referring to LaPalombara's contribution to this volume!

William Flanigan and Edwin Fogelman next present some preliminary results from an ongoing research project in which they correlate attempts to establish or maintain democratic regimes with such indicators as proportion of the population engaged in agriculture, and incidence of violence. Although they describe an Index of Democracy, they provide no elaboration. For example, such items as "no significant political suppression," and "no widespread electoral suppression" are not defined. More important, they do not indicate how they determined whether a particular democratic regime was "successful" or "unsuccessful," although the correlation of success with other indicators is a key element in their research. Finally, Flanigan and Fogelman apparently have not read LaPalombara's contribution to this volume either, for they show no awareness of his vigorous criticism of research based solely on aggregate data. This is not to say that no response to the criticism is possible. It is, however, jarring to move from such a critique almost directly to a prime example of what has just been debunked—with no explanation, much less rebuttal.

Joseph Spengler next examines the relative advantages of democratic regimes for purposes of economic development. Political scientists familiar with prevailing trends in the third world will note his emphasis on the desirability of "private foreign investment, especially direct investment" as an instrumentality; his admonition that "restrictions of foreign enterprise need to be minimized"; and that "especially useful to an underdeveloped country is the multinational corporation" (p. 118).

Finally, John Armstrong reviews the experience of the Soviet Union as a pattern of modernization distinct from that of the West, and John Lovell summarizes the accepted wisdom on the role of the military in political development, with references both to policy making in Washington and to the evolution of theory among social scientists.

Aside from the total failure of the contributors to respond to one another, this collection also suffers from sloppy editorial work, as evidenced by a number of typographical errors. Nevertheless, several individual essays (notably those of LaPalombara and Siffin) may serve to introduce students to the subject.

FRANK TACHAU

University of Illinois at Chicago Circle

The Vietnamese in Thailand: A Historical Perspective. By Peter A. Poole. (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1970. Pp. ix, 180. $8.00.)

This all-too-brief description of the history of the Vietnamese minority in Thailand includes considerable new factual information while at the same time leading the reader to wish that the author had expanded upon his material. Professor Poole discusses knowledgably the two main groups that now compose the 70,000 to 80,000 Vietnamese in the Kingdom, the "old Vietnamese" who arrived at the end of the eighteenth century and have tended to assimilate into Thai society, and the "new refugees" who arrived after World War II and are themselves divided among first- and second-generation members. He notes the differences between the two groups in location, tradition, patterns of assimilation, and legal position. In this area he has broken new ground. To a great extent this book is concerned with a traditional tracing of the two peoples' histories and international contacts from the founding of their respective states to 1968. Emphasis is given to the efforts to repatriate refugees in the early 1960s and the failure to maintain the program because of growing tension arising out of Thailand's decision to support the United States in Vietnam after the Gulf of Tonkin incident.

The weaknesses of the book develop from its brevity and the difficulties Professor Poole had in getting into the newer Vietnamese community. In the first instance, one would wish for more information about and analysis of the social and political composition of this important minority and perhaps less discussion of the history and international relations of the area, much of it covered elsewhere. The very informative footnotes and equally fascinating material in the appendices could well have been expanded and included within the body of the text. These gaps in content and analysis may in part be explained by the author's self-acknowledged inability to talk to representatives of the refugees and Democratic Republic of Vietnam (he is to be congratulated for carefully listing the people he did interview, including Thai and South Vietnamese officials, Catholic priests, and a select group of old and new Vietnamese settlers and refugees). In-depth interviews with North Vietnamese and extended surveys of the Vietnamese community were apparently not politically possible, and the author himself notes that their presence would have strengthened the book.

In spite of these shortcomings, this work is the best contribution to our knowledge of the Vietnamese in Thailand since General Chan's narrowly circulated study a decade earlier. Professor Poole's tables and analysis of efforts to repatriate the refugees are of particular interest, and it is hoped that he will follow up this brief survey with a more extended analysis of a group important both to Thai domestic politics and the international peace of the area.

FRED R. VON DER MEHDEN

Rice University

Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru: A Study in Neo-Imperialism. By Aníbal Quijano. Translated by Helen R. Lane. (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Pp. 122. $6.50.)

The four years that have elapsed since the overthrow of Peru's President Fernando Belaúnde Terry have generated much speculation about the character and meaning of the revolutionary government which replaced Belaúnde in 1968. No small amount of the confusion about the significance of the new government's policies derived from the apparent contradictions in the government's actions. Thus the government expropriated the agricultural and cattle-raising estates of the Cerro de Pasco Corporation and the W. R. Grace and Company plantations, at the same time that it permitted the Southern Peruvian Copper Corporation to receive new mining rights and agreed to heavy new investments. Similarly, the installations of the International Petroleum Company were expropriated, while other important foreign companies were increasing investments and extending their concessions.

What do such tangled policies mean when considered in the context of change in Peru under the Velasco government, and in the broader context of radical change in Bolivia, Chile, Cuba, and the rest of Latin America? Aníbal Quijano, a Peruvian economist who has worked with the Economic Commission for Latin America, attempts to explain these policies as a form of neoimperialism. While the military junta operates against the traditional patterns of foreign control of agricultural exports and enclaves in mining and petroleum, it strengthens the foreign role in mining and the urban-industrial sector. Thus it appears that the 80 per cent of industrial investment in Peru that is foreign will simply undergo a change in sectorial emphasis. Dependency will continue; but the state has determined to play a stronger, more efficient role in structuring the form of that dependency. The Peruvian government intends, as Quijano sees it, to strengthen its ability to intervene in and control economic events. Under the tutelage of the state, Peru will develop a regulated economy combining private, state, and cooperative enterprise. It is clear to Quijano (and the record bears him out) that the military junta has no intention of eliminating foreign investment, but it does intend to supervise it, and to insist on state hegemony in the new economic alliance.

Quijano observes also, despite apparent concessions granted to workers in the so-called "Industrial Community," that the new regime is strongly authoritarian-paternalistic in nature, and that many of the concessions are illusory, posing no real threat to capital. He concludes that the regime is guided by an ideology of "limited nationalism within the imperialist order" and also by an aim of class reconciliation.

Aníbal Quijano has provided a useful service in reviewing the economic policies and programs of the military government of Peru and in finding coherence in those policies. It is unfortunate that he lapses so frequently into ideological jargon which through overgeneralization obscures rather than clarifies his meaning. (e.g., "dominated groups," "dependent bourgeoisie," "popular masses," etc.) Nevertheless, this short book is a well-written, important analysis of a new style of military regime in Latin America, and it deserves careful reading.

JACK W. HOPKINS

Texas Tech University

Scandinavian Political Studies. Volume 6/71. A Yearbook Published by the Political Science Associations in Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Edited by Erik Rasmussen and Erik Damgaard. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 260. $10.00.)

The 6th annual volume of *Scandinavian Political Studies* underlines the strong position of behavioral studies, focused primarily on electorates and elected bodies. But even if the revolution in American political science of yesterday remains the dominating style in Scandinavia today, the impression may be exaggerated, and for two important reasons. First, contributions to the *Studies* emanate mainly from those who regard themselves as members of a wide, international intellectual community. In this category, behaviorists hold a prominent place. Second, research in international politics is so far not represented in the *Studies,* except in its exhaustive annual bibliography. Since 1965 this field has been covered in another joint Scandinavian publication, the quarterly journal *Cooperation and Conflict*. Together, the two mentioned publications represent a significant part of the "international profile" of political studies in the "Nordic" area. It would be reasonable to argue that such a profile should be evaluated by an outside observer who cannot be regarded as part of that very profile. Since this is not the case, the reviewer is intensely aware of the difficulty and delicacy of his assignment.

The largest single political science research project so far in Scandinavia is the Swedish local government research project, started in 1965 and currently approaching its completion. (Cf. J. Westerståhl: "Swedish Local Government Research," *Scandinavian Political Studies,* 2, 1967, 276–80.) The project deals with what is probably the most sweeping local boundary reform in the Western world. One of the participants in this research venture, Lennart Brantgärde, has made an ambitious and sophisticated study on the behavior of the local councils facing local district amalgamations. It is an experiment in method; and as such at least a partial failure in view of the model's "relatively moderate power of explanation in terms of variance explained" (p. 82). Its ambition of offering information about the reform itself is very modest.

In this respect Brantgärde's study differs from that of three Danish authors (Mogens N. Pedersen, Erik Damgaard, and P. Nannestad Olsen) whose "Party Distance in the Danish Folketing 1945–1968" is not only a belated attack on the outmoded "undimensional model" of the party system but also is packed with information on Danish parliamentary party politics. The other Danish contribution, on "Saliency and Political Attitudes," deals with the old problem of using survey techniques for predicting future political behavior. The main preoccupation of the authors, K. W.

Redder and Ole Tonsgaard, is however to emphasize the need for a discussion on saliency as a neglected problem and to identify operational methods of measuring saliency. The authors are realistic enough to recognize that they are a long way from a satisfactory solution of this problem.

Philip E. Converse and Henry Valen have collaborated on a major study on "Cleavage and Perceived Party Distances in Norwegian voting." Multidimensionality is taken for granted, but the number of important dimensions at any given time is limited, "if for no other reason than that of the limits of attention on the part of either the governors or the governed" (p. 209). The "left-right" and the "religious-moral" conflicts seem to emerge as the most salient cleavages in current Norwegian politics (p. 148). A historical comparison reveals further that the recently successful anti-EEC combination between remote rural interests and city radicals had a counterpart in a similar cleavage structure almost a hundred years ago (p. 150). Another Norwegian study on "Political Awareness and the Distribution of Other Social Resources," centers around the problem of structural opportunities for political participation and motivation for political activity. Willy Martinussen tests two hypotheses: that political interest, information, and activity in expressing opinions vary strongly among voters, and that as indicators of political awareness or competence they are interrelated (p. 154). His critical conclusions on citizens' opportunities to use their political rights are made, however, without any reference to the role played on their behalf by numerous interest groups, whose strength and competence may well balance the disadvantage of being less informed as individuals.

Risto Sänkiaho introduces a model of "populism," primarily as a tool for studying the Finnish Rural Party. Its usefulness is admittedly limited; "it cannot be used to explain the rise of populist movements in the United States" or in the Third World (p. 44). A not very successful attempt is also made to apply the model to the French Poujadist movement. Ilkka Heiskanen discusses "educative propaganda," defined as "any asymmetric, legitimate communication that is politically neutral (does not aim at change in the power relations) and aims at value changes that are corrective and complementary to the value system produced by the primary socialization" (p. 173). It is a controversial paper, finally posing the fundamental ideological problem of the communicator's right to define "correct" change in values and behavior (p. 180–81).

Two contributions fall outside the major pattern of the *Studies* Dankwart A. Rustow's thought-provoking study on "Sweden's Transformation to a Democracy; Some Notes toward a Genetic Theory" deals with the basic problem of what "brings a democracy into existence" (p. 12). To Rustow, "the Swedish experience suggests two major factors. The first is a systematic attack on the old system by well-organized forces—the attack including at least implied threats of violence. The other are a number of considerations of prudence that weaken the old elite's will to resist" (p. 21). Gunnar Heckscher represents in the retrospect at least as much as any other individual scholar the changeover from traditionalism to modernism in Swedish political science. Many years ago he abandoned the profession of political scientist for applied politics and public service. In the 1971 *Studies* the former ambassador in Delhi pursues his old interest in public administration in a shrewd and sympathetic essay on "The Indian Civil Servant and Modern Politics."

Reviews of recent elections in Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Sweden, and the annual "Bibliography of Scandinavian political Science" by Helen V. Aareskjold add to the usefulness of the volume, also (and not least) inside Scandinavia.

NILS ANDRÉN

University of Stockholm

Tension Areas in India's Federal System. By Amal Ray. (Calcutta: The World Press Private Ltd., 1970. Pp. ix, 160. Rs. 15.00.)

In this brief volume Dr. Amal Ray develops some of the ideas which he first outlined in an earlier work, *Inter-Governmental Relations in India: A Study of Indian Federalism* (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1966). He is concerned with studying Indian federalism "not as a legal or constitutional structure, but eminently as a political process" (p. 21). It is particularly important to consider Indian federalism within its political environment, and that environment has changed considerably since the height of the Nehru era. "India's federal structure was conceived and planned in a unitary political environment" (p. 5), characterized by a "one-party dominance system," the "lop-sided dominance of Nehru within the Congress" (p. 23), a centralized planning apparatus, and, in general, so many centralizing trends as to threaten the balance of the federal system. In fact, the Centre was so powerful that no serious Centre-

State crises arose.

In the last years of Nehru's life a significant shift in Centre-State relations set in. Power began to move slowly from the Centre to the States. This trend was more manifest after Nehru's death. It was evidenced by the role of the Chief Ministers and political bosses in the selection of Nehru's successors in 1964 and 1966, by the trends toward localism, by the upsurge of regional forces and movements, and by the weakened position of the Congress Party, both at the Centre and in the States, as a result of the fourth general elections in 1967 (reconfirmed in the midterm elections in four important States in 1969) and of the split in the Congress Party in late 1969.

Dr. Ray's study reflects the impact of the changed political environment in India, and the consequent strengthening of the States in relation to the Centre. He concludes, as did most other observers, that the fourth general elections "put an end to the era of one-party dominance" (p. 29), that "sooner or later a coalition government shall be formed at the Centre" (p. 34), that "at the State level the unstable coalition is likely to remain the dominant style of politics in the foreseeable future" (p. 35), and that "no orderly and effective operation of Centre-State relations seems likely in [the] 1970's" (p. 35).

Quite obviously all of these predictions have proved to be wrong. A third important change in the Indian political environment has occurred since Dr. Ray completed his book. In the language of the psephologist, the general election of 1967 proved to be a "deviating" rather than a "realigning" election. As a result of the mandate which Mrs. Gandhi and her wing of the Congress Party received in the fifth general elections in 1971 (a mandate confirmed in the State Assembly elections of 1972), and of Mrs. Gandhi's astute handling of the crisis with Pakistan in 1971, a "one-party dominance system," under a leader of unquestioned dominance, has been restored at the Centre, in a new and perhaps stronger form, and in most of the States, and the centralizing trends of Indian federalism, apparently reversed in the years following Nehru's death, have again become manifest. Perhaps Dr. Ray will write a third volume on Indian federalism, to explain where and why he went wrong in his second study and to analyze the effects of the Indira Gandhi era in Indian politics.

While his overall predictions have not been borne out, the tensions which he discusses in this study still remain largely unresolved, and his two chapters on the functional role of the President of India and the Governors in easing tensions are still highly relevant and interesting. Among the tensions which he analyzes are those resulting from constitutional strains, from the conflicts between planning and federalism, from controversies over law, order, and property—"new areas of tension" (p. 50)—and from continuing differences over questions of language.

In considering the proper roles of the President and the Governors in the Indian federal system he seems to want both more autonomous actions by these officials and more curbs on them. He holds that "the Constitution itself has enjoined upon the President an autonomous role in the sector of Centre-State relations" (p. 70), but he emphasizes "the need for important constitutional amendments in order that the subsidiary presidential features are not turned into dominant ones" (p. 81). He believes that the Governor too should always remember that he is both the head of the State government and the representative of the Centre, but he argues that "it is desirable to spell out the Governor's discretionary powers in minimum terms" (p. 87). He also mentions "the need for creating channels of communication between the civil servants and the people" (p. 115), although he is obviously not very hopeful that this will happen; and in a curious insertion in the Epilogue he refers to "the Judiciary's insufficient awareness of its crucial role either as a federal balancer or as [a] tension easer in the overall political system" (p. 149).

In spite of the many false predictions of the shape of things to come, Dr. Ray's essay is a concise, clearly-written, and suggestive interpretation of India's experience with "cooperative federalism" in a changing political environment.

Norman D. Palmer
University of Pennsylvania

Developing the Third World: The Experience of the Nineteen-Sixties. Edited by Ronald Robinson. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971. Pp. 289. $13.50.)

In this skillfully edited book, Ronald Robinson makes a virtue of the fact that it contains papers written by fifteen different authors (plus six conference reports), generated by Cambridge Conferences on Development which took place between 1964 and 1969. His opening essay ("Practical Politics of Economic Development") catches the changes in mood which occurred during the latter years of the decade and in the issues on which the practitioners of development (and the ardent chorus of commentators) came to focus. The authors are familiar and distinguished: Balogh, Busia, Chenery, Figueiredo, Flores, Hutchinson, Ikram, Jacoby, Meier, Please, Ramaswami, Schumacher, Singh.

The papers are grouped under five headings: general perspective; industrialization; rural development; the role of government; and aid.

Some quite striking shifts occurred between 1964 and 1969. In terms of growth rates, there was fear in the mid-1960s that development was "petering out." By the end of the decade, the central question was that a 5 per cent per annum real increase in GNP was not sufficient to avoid dangerous levels of unemployment. In the mid-1960s deep concern was expressed about the sluggishness of agriculture, the innate conservatism of the farmer, and the prospect of imminent Malthusian crises. By the end of the decade, the central question was the effect of the Green Revolution in polarizing the rural population. In the mid-1960s there could still be rather sharp debate on the primacy of industry versus agriculture in development. By the end of the decade, the interrelationships were much better understood, and the case for reasonably balanced development, on economic as well as on political and social grounds, was almost universally accepted. Less dramatically, there was a gradual refinement of perception on the links between economic and political development.

Aside from its value in reflecting the perceptions and debates of the 1960s, the book anticipates some, at least, of the critical issues of the 1970s:

—What should be done about high levels of unemployment and partial employment? Here Schumacher's case for "intermediate technology" (Chapter 7) is at the center of the debate. There is some reflection of the possibilities of two-tier industry, with labor-intensive as well as capital-intensive sectors, as pioneered in Japan; but the possibilities are not fully developed. And there is no exploration of the potentialities of two- or three-shift use of industrial plant.

—What criteria should govern the balance between public and private enterprise? Here Kaldor's argument in favor of enlarged public outlays is the centerpiece (quoted at some length, pp. 176–77) with its evocative but incomplete posing of the issue in terms of "the sixteenth Cadillac of a Latin American millionaire" versus rice subsidies. Others get at the question of the efficient and equitable use of resources in a more satisfactory way. But the great unresolved issue of the appropriate rules of the game for private foreign investment is not explored.

—How shall we generate an adequate flow of official aid from the richer nations? There are five useful papers on aid, almost wholly exhorting and instructing the aid givers. And, having been in the exhortation business for some twenty years, I do not object. But, surely, in the 1970s, the developing nations have responsibilities, too, as they exert more vigorously the prerogatives of independence and sovereignty. The responsibility of settling regional quarrels rather than exacerbating them; the responsibility of intensified regional co-operation which might generate attractive joint projects; the responsibility of working to produce stable and mutually satisfactory criteria for international private capital movements rather than using foreign investment as a convenient whipping-boy to generate unifying nationalist reactions when things are, otherwise, not going too well. This book does not treat the international politics of aid as the two-way street it will have to become if we are to generate the level of aid most of us would like to see.

And there are two very large gaps—or virtual gaps: birth control; and the need for and possibilities of regionalism in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Clearly, at best, the Green Revolution has only bought some time for effective population control policies to take hold. Without them, massive Malthusian crises are as certain as anything can be in an uncertain world, capable in some critical areas of overwhelming all the other matters before us. As for regionalism, the medium and smaller countries of Latin America, Africa, and Asia face severely inhibited prospects for industrialization and growth unless much more intense procedures for cooperation emerge.

Nevertheless, this volume is a valuable addition to the literature of economic development, relevant, on the whole, to the 1970s as well as to the First Development Decade.

A final word is required on three pages of Robinson's introductory chapter (pp. 15–17). In a terse, brilliant summation he catches the essential tensions, political and social, that economic growth creates as it moves forward. He concludes:

> Unavoidably it seems, economic growth in the Third World tends to destroy employment faster than it creates it, to deepen social cleavages faster than the political system can contain and integrate them. Inequality in income distribution tends to outstrip the equalizing power of government; while old and new social and regional divisions tend to widen more swiftly than national sentiment and common economic interest extend to span them. The practical politics of economic development is to contain these negative trends and reverse them in the direction of economic growth and political integration (p. 16).

These, he notes, are the tensions which bring to the center of the economic development agenda recommendations for "intermediate technology, two-tier strategy, land reform, employment, and a balance between industrial and agricultural growth."

I would observe that the agenda is incomplete and will remain incomplete until social scientists concerned with development are prepared to turn more explicitly to the political process itself. There are cases in which the political process in developing nations has managed, against a background of rapid and steady growth, to contain these inevitable tensions, for some periods at least; and there are many cases of failure and acute political crisis. I have tried to isolate the lessons of these success stories and failures in a preliminary way in *Politics and the Stages of Growth* (Cambridge, 1971, Chapter 7). I do not believe we shall be successful in understanding and mastering this range of problems unless we are prepared—the intellectual and political leaders of the developing world, above all—to make the 1970s the Decade of Political Development, while carrying forward the Second Decade of Economic Development.

W. W. Rostow
The University of Texas at Austin

Economics, Politics and Administration in Government Lending: The Regional Loans Boards of Nigeria. By Sayre P. Schatz. (Ibadan: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 146. $3.75.)

Political science has suffered from unbalanced growth: far greater attention has been paid to the determinants of public policy than to the content, administration, and societal impact of policy. In the field of American politics the effort to correct this imbalance has increased noticeably in recent years. Studies in comparative politics, however, still tend to ask how power is won and decisions made rather than how these decisions are (or are not) implemented, or what effect government programs have on economic development, social structure, and subsequent inputs to the political system. In this brief, meticulously documented case study of the Regional Loans Boards of Nigeria, Sayre Schatz demonstrates the value of a balanced and comprehensive treatment of public policy. Students of comparative politics would do well to heed this economist's general approach as well as his specific conclusions.

The study, based on four years of research in Nigeria, deals with the efforts of the country's regional governments to aid indigenous business by lending public funds for productive enterprises; special attention is paid to the years immediately preceding and following independence in 1960, when the Regional Loans Boards were particularly active. Schatz illustrates the influence of political factors on the loans allocation process, a phenomenon related to the newly-acquired regional power base of the major political parties. He then shows how administrative problems—including staff shortages, rapid turnover, the absence of reliable data, a limited capacity for project viability studies, and high civil service salaries—contributed to the rather dismal cost-benefit record of the Loans Boards. Schatz is insightful in showing how political and administrative factors had mutually reinforcing negative effects on Loans Board performance: political manipulation fostered low morale among bureaucrats, while "The dearth of competent personnel for appraising loan applications almost ensured the potency of political considerations" (p. 124).

The author argues, however, that poor performance—measured by the high failure rate among assisted businesses and the "incredibly high" (p. 128) cost of financing the few projects that were successful—is due far more to the economic environment in which African private enterprise operates than to the factors just discussed. Governments can try to alter the economic environment by providing capital where needed. But Schatz contends that the major economic constraint in a country like Nigeria is the shortage not of capital but of commercially viable projects. The latter shortage, in turn, is presumably due to a low level and unequal distribution of income which it is extremely difficult for government policies rapidly and peacefully to alter. The author might have discussed, along with domestic constraints, the considerable impact of external economic forces—and of large expatriate firms operating within Nigeria—on the failure of so many Nigerian manufacturing, processing, and transport enterprises.

This book may help to moderate, as well as provide empirical data for, the frequently emotional debate over capitalist and socialist paths to economic development. That debate concerns in large measure the economic roles to be played by the public and private sectors. Schatz implies that the public/private distinction may be exceedingly hard to draw—and not terribly significant at that—in cases where (1) a rising political class uses public offices and resources to strengthen its position as the economic elite in the private sector; (2) government intervenes actively in the economy to aid, rather than compete with, private business; and (3) nationalist sentiment puts the government of an independent country in the same camp as the indigenous business class in the struggle against foreign-based economic exploitation. If, moreover, the economic environment has the profound effect on government's economic performance attributed to it by Schatz, the kind of public/private organizational mix a country chooses may have little practical consequence. The author, concluding that business-assistance programs are not necessarily low-cost users of public funds and administrative talent, hints that Nigerian governments should become more directly involved in administering economically productive activities. But whether a more socialist option would improve matters, in view of the negative effects on decision making of the political and administrative realities so carefully noted in this book, remains an open question.

David B. Abernethy

Stanford University

The Awkward Class, Political Sociology of Peasantry in Developing Society: Russia 1910–1925. By Theoder Shanin. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Pp. 253. $15.25.)

The controversy over Russian peasants started more than a century ago. Those among Russian intellectuals who developed a leaning toward Western theories, and especially Marxists, argued that industrialization and development of capitalism would affect the peasants in Russia as they had affected peasants in other parts of Europe. The rural population would dwindle. Capitalist relations would appear in the village, diversifying the peasants into rich and poor. A class struggle would ensue. As a result the socioeconomic structure and culture of the *obshchina,* the traditional rural community, would decline, if not disappear altogether. Originally the Narodniks, later the Populists, voiced a different opinion. They believed that Russian peasants represented a unique historical case. These people had retained their socioeconomic order and value system virtually unchanged throughout centuries. Left undisturbed, they argued, the peasant socioeconomic order would persist and perhaps even would generate a new sense of social justice and healthy social order encompassing the entire Russian society. Shanin does not claim that the *obshchina* constituted a natural source of socialism, as Narodniks and some of the Populists had done in earlier times, yet he is definitely on their side.

His book is an important contribution in the field of Russian history and the outlined debate. It is, however, even more important perhaps for the analysis of problems that it does not tackle. It provides a formidable analytical perspective for the analysis of the problems of modernization and socioeconomic development of peasant societies in the Third World nations. In a most provocative way it inspires the reader to pose questions about theories of African socialism, contemporary peasant revolutions, the possibility of modern societies composed of small communes, and other current issues. Furthermore, it is valuable as a work in social theory which especially accentuates the distinction between modern populism and Marxism. It is therefore a most illuminating work in rural sociology with far-reaching implications for political analysis.

Shanin begins the discussion by sketching a picture of Russia as a society entering the era of industrialization with 84 per cent of its people being peasants. He then focuses on the characteristics of the peasant society as a whole, and subsequently on the most elementary units of its structure, the *obshchina* and the family. The second part of the book begins with an outline of the debate concerning the development of the Russian peasantry. Following Chayanov, Shanin believes that the Russian peasantry has been in a process of perpetual multidirectional and cyclical mobility. Centripetal tendencies in this process have balanced centrifugal trends. Thus the society retained its character as an aggregation of middle-level peasant family units, neither too poor nor wealthy. Indeed, on the whole the peasant society was poor, illiterate, and ignorant. The average wealth and acreage of the land-holding of the household was usually proportional to the number of mature male members of the family. The writer points out several factors which maintained the Russian village in this state: periodic redistributions of the land by the community; an egalitarian distribution of land in the course of the Revolution; constant partitioning of more wealthy households by mature male members; migration, and so on. In substantiation he produces a wealth of data meticulously extracted from the relevant literature, most of it published in the Soviet Union in the 'twenties. His theses are also supported by analyses of various studies pertaining to the subject and organized around diverse methods. Among these are budget studies; research data of the Central Statistic Bureau; and works on "substantive changes" or transmutation of peasant households in Russia. Finally he considers the impact of biological and economic factors on the stability of the rural economy. The third part of the book is concerned with the period from the Bolshevik Revolution until 1925, when the Party began to make preparations for coercive collectivization. Social stratification in rural areas, and conflict and interaction among diverse centers of local power are discussed here. The writer demonstrates that the major conflict in rural areas after the Revolution was not so much between the poor peasantry and the kulak minority as between the peasantry as a whole and the external structure of Soviet authority.

The penetrating analysis of the literature on the subject and of the Russian reality splendidly supports Shanin's basic conclusions. Nonetheless, doubts may be raised about whether this disproves the argument of the writers from the opposite camp who claimed that left undisturbed, the awkward peasant society would have turned into a "normal," progressively more diversified and declining peasant social structure and culture. These arguments assert: (1) All peasant societies, whether in Western Europe in the past or in other parts of the world, have perpetuated themselves in cyclical and differentiating processes taking place within a more general tendency toward transmutation and decline; and (2) peasant society in Russia never existed as an undisturbed entity. The writer discusses a relatively short period of twenty years. Even in "normal conditions," the process of differentiation within a peasantry comprising 84 per cent of the population would have not been so overwhelming as to eliminate cyclical mobility. This was an exceptional period, and all factors at that time worked toward leveling the differences within the Russian village. The policies of the Soviet government directed against the kulaks, against the rich, and to a degree against any entrepreneurial activity reinforced the encapsulation and perpetuation of cyclical mobility. Thus accelerated differentiation was halted in such conditions. Besides, after the Revolution industries were destroyed and could not provide either an outlet for the surplus of labor in rural areas or an adequate volume of products to serve as an incentive for the peasants to increase their production and engage in entrepreneurial activities. There was little in the market to buy for the money that they could have earned. Peasants had to abstain from entrepreneurial activities in order not to be conspicuous so as to avert repressions directed against the wealthy. It is therefore not astonishing that differentiation in the Russian village was not too pronounced under such conditions.

These comments are made not to diminish the importance of Shanin's impressive work, which I very much admire, but rather to assert its provocative character. They are made to ask again what would have happened had there been less interference by Soviet authorities in the spontaneous development of the peasant society of Russia. With the highest regard for Shanin's excellent work, I have to say that that question remains and probably has to remain open.

SZYMON CHODAK
Sir George Williams University, Montreal

The Military in Politics: Changing Patterns in Brazil. By Alfred Stepan. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 314. $10.00.)

The literature on the military in politics in the Third World has dealt almost exclusively with three questions: Why do military coups occur? How stable is military government? How much a force for "modernization" and socioeconomic reform is the military? Alfred Stepan deals with all three questions, but mainly the first two, in this fine study of Brazil in particular and of the military in politics in general.

Stepan's main thesis is that to understand the propensity for and success of military coups, one needs to consider the military as a subsystem of the larger political system. One needs especially to know the attitudes of civilian groups in the political process. The military acts the way it does in politics, Stepan contends, not simply or even principally because of its size, financial resources, organizational strength, institutional interests, or socioeconomic backgrounds and characteristics (although these factors can play a part), but mainly because of the pressures placed upon the armed forces by other groups in the political process. At least this is the case, Stepan maintains, when the "moderator pattern" of civil-military relations obtains.

This part of the book constitutes much more than half the study, and it is very persuasive. Stepan's main thesis is well argued, illuminating, theoretically significant, and amply documented. Especially important in these chapters is an analysis of editorial opinion in upper- and middle-class newspapers during five coups and coup attempts in 1945, 1954, 1955, 1961, and 1964. The openness and intensity of civilian appeals for military intervention in these instances are astounding and very revealing of the reasons for the coups.

Stepan deals with the second question, regarding the military's capacity to govern, in three chapters on the military in power in Brazil from 1964 to 1968. He concludes that governance creates tensions and conflicts within the armed forces which in turn lead to instability and crises of succession. Moreover, the military desire for unity has led, in the Brazilian case, to repression of dissent (including widespread use of torture) and isolation from civilians. Such repression has its roots, according to Stepan, less in the internal contradictions of capitalism or the wily machinations of the United States (although Stepan has much to say about U.S. policies) than in the nature of the military as a governing institution. Stepan thinks that the often-presumed stability, unity, and fixity of purpose of the Brazilian military is an illusion. He anticipates more internal divisions and (possibly) coups and perhaps a return to at least a modified form of the old moderator model.

Stepan devotes least attention to the third question; however, his answer is essentially that although the military in Brazil has not yet been a force for socioeconomic reform and egalitarianism, its role may well shift at any time from one of "system maintainance" to one of "system-transformation" (p. 267). He sees the military as "above class conflicts." It is "above all a situational elite, not a class elite," and therefore the policies of the military in Brazil and elsewhere will probably shift "from far left to far right, and back again" (pp. 269–270).

Against Stepan's answer to the third question stands that of Samuel P. Huntington (*Political Order in Changing Societies*, pp. 219 ff.). Huntington suggests that the modernizing and reformist impact of the armed forces varies depending on the socioeconomic conditions of the country at the time the military is in power. In a traditional or transitional society, says Huntington, the military can play a radical role; in more modern societies, the military's socioeconomic role becomes more conservative. Stepan considers briefly, and rejects, Huntington's hypotheses (and those of José Nun, which are similar). But it is not clear that Stepan's representation of their analyses is entirely accurate.

Moreover, Stepan himself notes that in Brazil, "the continuing middle-class fears of the lower class remains [sic] a source of their support for the military's antimobilization policies" (p. 48), and that "military 'radicalism' [is] much more improbable in Brazil than in Peru," which is less modernized and complex sociologically (p. 271). These conclusions, which seem sound, flow much more logically from the Huntington-Nun perspective than from Stepan's conception of the military as a free-floating "situational" elite oscillating between the far left and the far right. The notion of oscillation is probably useful within countries over short periods of time; but Huntington's hypotheses seem necessary to explain the differences among countries, and within countries over longer periods of time. Thus, oscillations can occur anywhere; but on the whole they tend to have more radical consequences in a relatively backward country (Peru) than in a partially modern one (Brazil)—or in Brazil from 1870 to 1930 than in Brazil in the 1960s or 1970s.

This study is rich in orginal data. Stepan had formal interviews with sixty officers; he talked informally with more than two hundred military personnel; and he visited military installations in five states. He also used files of the Brazilian military academy, newspaper editorials, and a wide range of secondary sources in English and Portuguese. The techniques and measures Stepan used are sensible and innovative. A former journalist, Stepan writes extremely clearly and briskly, mixing quantitative materials and qualitative insights nicely, without belaboring the former. Finally, as an ex-marine (in the United States) who researched and wrote this study while employed by the Rand Corporation, he also had extraordinary access in Brazil. But his achievement is also a personal one: before this book, many experts claimed that an intensive empirical study of the Brazilian military was impossible, yet Stepan did it.

In sum, this book's contributions are both substantive and methodological, and it should serve as a point of departure for comparable studies in other countries. Stepan's *The Military in Politics* is probably the best study we have of civil-military relations in a poor country; it is also, along with Philippe Schmitter's volume on interest associations, one of the two best books by a North American political scientist on contemporary politics in Brazil.

ROBERT A. PACKENHAM

Stanford University

Approaches to Politics. By Pierre Elliott Trudeau. (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1970. Pp. 89. $1.95, paper.)

Trudeau in Power. By Walter Stewart. (New York: Outerbridge and Dienstfrey, 1972. Pp. 239. $6.95.)

These two short books encapsule the ideal and the reality of P. E. Trudeau, Canada's present Prime Minister. The former is an edited collection of Trudeau's essays, written for a small circulation journal of opinion in Montreal in the mid-'fifties. They are directed against the crude, repressive, boss politics of Premier Maurice Duplessis, and his use of nationalism as an instrument of political manipulation, along with old-fashioned Catholic attitudes of deference to authority. The result is a strongly argued if legalistic defense of the rights of the individual against abuses of power by the state and its agents. It shows no awareness, however, of the problems posed by modern structures and concentrations of power. And nationalism becomes Duplessis' crude, hate-filled racism, preached for ulterior motives—and nothing more. In reading this collection of essays, one has the feeling of reading the writers of the Enlightenment against the *ancien régime* (except for the recent Canadian references); and in a sense this is what it is. The Quebec of Duplessis was a kind of *ancien régime,* and Trudeau was a courageous defender of liberty in the face of reaction. His writing is studded with references to Rousseau, Austin, the *Vindicae Contra Tyrannos,* Saint Thomas More, the papal encyclicals, and lesser-known Catholic (usually Quebec) authorities, with whom he takes issue. His problems are the old ones: How does one man gain authority over his fellows, under what conditions is regicide justified, what are the bases of the social contract, what means can be used to achieve the greatest happiness of the greatest number. These articles reveal the categories in which this solitary man thinks, and, along with his *Federalism and the French Canadians,* indicate his approach to politics. He is both a vigorous defender of the rights of the individual, and a rigid legalist, tenaciously defending the established constitutional structure. He is a tough-minded rationalist who does not fail to act on his conclusions, which he draws simply and clearly from his evidence.

Having passed his heroic years in the battle against the Duplessis régime, Trudeau assumed attitudes suited to this situation; so he emerged with a simplistic approach to nationalism, little awareness of the powers and ways of modern, large-scale organization, and an excessively individualistic and legalistic approach to political problems.

Stewart's book, *Trudeau in Power* is a critical journalistic account of the Prime Minister in action; the treatment is factually accurate, but the author tends to draw more conclusions than his evidence supports. Canada's divisions and economic dilemmas were serious before Trudeau came along, and the author, like most Canadians, expected this oversold leader to resolve these problems (notably unemployment, the independence question and relations between English- and French-speaking people). It is true to say that these particular questions are now more serious than in 1968. His analysis of the new governing structure under what he calls the Supergroup, supported by two larger circles drawn from the public service and political recruitment is well presented, and his conclusion (which he admits is not original) is significant, that Trudeau is replacing the essentials of parliamentary democracy with power concentrated in his own staff, like the American president. The book presents the most important issues of Trudeau's Prime Ministership in lurid, but basically honest colours, and, while his criticism is severe, the essentials are sound.

H. G. THORBURN

Queen's University,
Kingston, Ontario

Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century. By Chester C. Tan. (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., 1971. Pp. 387. $7.95.)

World history seems to indicate a positive relationship between political instability and intellectual vitality. In China for instance, one of the greatest periods of intellectual activity, which produced Confucianism, Taoism, and other philosophies of the "hundred schools," was the chaotic time of the late Chou and the Warring States. Given the political disintegration and institutional uncertainty of late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century China, it should be no surprise that this period also reflects an intense level of questioning and analysis, system building, and the hybridization of ideas. It is this phenomenon which Professor Tan chronicles for us in *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century.*

Unfortunately Professor Tan does not attempt to explain the relationship between political instability and intellectual activity, although he does explicitly recognize the close association that political thought has with contemporary political phenomena. Indeed his account alternates between event and idea rather consistently, and he is successful in placing ideas in meaningful historical contexts.

The work is organized more or less chronologically and treats both individual thinkers and movements. It begins with a section on "Moral Conservatism and Liberal Democracy" (K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao and Chang Shih-chao), which is followed by sections tracing the development of anti-Confucianism and the appeals of democracy and such new "isms" as socialism, anarchism, and Marxism. Professor Tan's discussion highlights the powerful hold Confucianism had on the minds of China, even among the most radical anti-Confucianists. It also illustrates how Confucian prohibition against heterodoxy persisted in new forms into the twentieth century. As the discussion of Chiang K'ang-hu's socialism shows, the first step in the diffusion of new political thought was not the full articulation of a new doctrine, but was rather the propagation of ideas so as to establish the legitimacy of considering them.

The middle section of the book is perhaps the most interesting and useful. It includes a long chapter on the thought of Sun Yat-sen which attempts to establish Sun's thinking as the central alternative of Marxism. The following chapter on the political thought of Kuomintang leaders (Chiang Kai-shek, Tai Chi-t'ao, Chu Chih-hsin, Hu Han-min, and Wang Ching-wei) continues to play on the theme of the centrality of Sun. Two additional chapters, one on "Human Rights and Democracy" (Hu Shih, etc.) and one on the "Third Force" (Chang Chun-mai, Chang Tung-sun and Liang Sou-ming), complete the middle section of the book. Professor Tan concludes his study with two chapters on Chinese Communism, one devoted to the thought of the pre-Mao Communist leadership and one on Mao Tse-tung.

A few of its characteristics may rob Professor Tan's book of the impact it might otherwise have had. First it would have been helpful at the outset if the author had said explicitly what he meant by "political thought." The implied meaning of the term seems to include ideas which shaped national policy and initiated social trends, and includes philosophy, ideology, and strategy and tactics.

Most significantly the work has no clearly stated thesis and draws no conclusions. While this characteristic might be attributed to understandable scholarly prudence, it is regrettable in this case since one senses that the author has gotten to know his subject rather intimately. I would have welcomed the author's more general reflections on political thought in modern China. Some of the big questions remain unasked, although ironically, not completely unanswered. Why do some ideas, and not others, achieve a level of saliency to become the bases for an integrative doctrine (e.g., Sun's thoughts, Marxism)? At what point, and under what conditions does integrative doctrine become a weapon of ideological conflict and the object of disputes over orthodoxy (e.g., the varying interpretations of Sun by Tai Chi-t'ao and Hu Han-min)? How did the influence of modern empirical analysis affect the character of Chinese political thought?

Finally, there is a particularly curious omission in the book: Many of the men discussed by Professor Tan have been treated in depth in English language doctoral dissertations and published monographs (for instance, K'ang Yu-wei, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, Li Ta-chao, Sun Yat-sen, Ch'en Tu-hsiu, Mao Tse-tung). Strangely, there is little reference to this secondary literature. Professor Tan's strict adherence to primary sources is laudable, but one can't help feeling that this would have been a better book if it had come to grips with the interpretations of the secondary literature.

Although one might find analyses in greater depth of individual thinkers and movements elsewhere, the unique value of *Chinese Political Thought in the Twentieth Century* is that it gives us for the first time a synoptic view of modern Chinese political thinking from K'ang Yu-wei to Mao Tse-tung. For the scholar, this synoptic view offers a new perspective on the relationship between ideas and action in modern China. For the teacher, this volume read in conjunction with a book like *Sources of Chinese Tradition* would be useful for advanced undergraduate courses.

RICHARD P. SUTTMEIER

Hamilton College

Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico. By Melvin M. Tumin, with Arnold S. Feldman. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1971, 2nd ed. Pp. 525. $9.95.)

We, The Puerto Rican People: A Story of Oppression and Resistance. By Juan Angel Silén. (New York and London: Monthly Review Press, 1971. Pp. 134. $5.00.)

Two views of Puerto Rican society could hardly differ more than those of Melvin Tumin and Juan Angel Silén. Between these two authors exist generational, ideological, cultural, and disciplinary gaps which can be explained but not reconciled. Tumin's membership in sociology's establishment is reinforced by the painstaking manner of research and presentation in evidence in *Social Class and Social Change in Puerto Rico.* His approach and hardly earth-shaking conclusions are those of a detached behavioral scientist coming across an intriguing community. Silén, a young Puerto Rican scholar and activist, on the other hand, writes from the heart rather than the printout. His revisionist essays on Puerto Rican history and historiography lambaste what he calls the "pseudo-scientific" findings that Puerto Ricans are a sad and docile people (pp. 15, 36–45).

Tumin's book, which originally appeared in 1961, carefully, almost tediously, analyzes data from extensive questionnaires applied in the late 1950s to an area probability sample of one thousand Puerto Rican family heads. Aside from a very brief new preface, Tumin has neither revised his study nor conducted what would have been an extremely valuable longitudinal analysis. Given the past decade's surprising political developments, republication now would be unjustifiable were it not for the book's attempt at rigorous quantification and focus on significant theoretical issues. The book provides extraordinarily detailed, but frequently sterile, empirical findings on the consequences of social change on classes.

For Tumin, "Puerto Rico is a class-structured society that is undergoing rapid change" (p. 3). Such change, one learns, operates within a dualism which provides both successful adaptation to new urban and industrial relations and stubborn retention of most significant family and ethical norms. Parallel literature remains sparse and rarely deals with an entire society. Oscar Lewis developed provocative themes on the "culture of poverty" by focusing on representative social types. Manning Nash and Sol Tax studied communities' response to changing national and local conditions. The literature on social development has also uncovered ethical and structural inhibitions to change as seen, for example, in the work of Banfield and Lerner. Tumin's broad approach illuminates social change with a diffuse but dim beacon while the others use sharply focused flashlights.

The book explores two critical dimensions, education and residence. Halfway through the book, reliance on geographical differences (San Juan, other cities, and the countryside) are all but dropped, so that for most purposes, he defines classes in terms of years of formal education. Other variables (income, influence, professional status, and self-esteem) are found to be inferior predictors of class differentiation, but of course the argument is more circular than real. Surprisingly, Tumin makes no serious attempt to factor analyze competing indices to support his case. Using formal educational attainment as a blunt tool to distinguish three basic classes, Tumin explores class differentiations on attitudes toward racial issues, economic prospects, use of leisure, propensity to join voluntary organizations, reference groups, self-esteem, and social mobility. The reader expecting discussion of educational programs or, for that matter, any social program will be sadly disappointed. Quantity of formal education is taken to explain just about every facet of life in Puerto Rico, a point which will strike some as patently ridiculous and others as profound.

Far and away, the most absorbing, difficult, and probing analysis concerns measurements of social mobility. Tumin employs two, the Generational Occupational Mobility and Career Pattern Mobility scores. Although some minor differences arise, these inter- and intragenerational measures, respectively, are almost mutually supporting. A brief chapter analyzing these scores in Puerto Rico in the light of results of similar measures of representative nations might be read profitably by comparativists.

Some fascinating social questions are treated carefully and intelligently. The most crucial is whether ". . . the economic tasks of development and distribution (can) be carried out to increase the standard of living throughout the Island without developing, to any much greater degree than is now present, a cultural emphasis on ranking and on invidious distinctions based on occupation and income" (p. 483). Tumin's answer is couched in conditions. To retain economic growth without social cleavage will require (he claims) acceleration of the 1950s' impressive social mobility, increased use of education as an instrument of mobility as well as of socialization, common allegiance to symbols of national identity, and survival of cementing traditions regarding family and religious life and intergroup tolerance. This type of answer, almost a self-parody of academia, is not likely to satisfy anyone concerned with the relative significance of these often competing social changes and traditions. The dualism Tumin sees in Puerto Rican society may well be the result of his failure to employ multivariate analysis and the consequent significance he gives to salience and nonsalience of highly operational but dubious definition of classes.

Significantly, Tumin's work is bereft of any substantive evaluation of such key institutions as education, religion, voluntary association, or partisan politics. In such a lengthy and apparently comprehensive study this omission is serious. Social scientists are thus likely to find the book especially frustrating. While Tumin recognizes ". . . that economic decisions involve key issues of politics, social organization, and psychological motivation" (p. 21), these issues are neither studied nor defined. The momentous political events in post-1960 Puerto Rico—which may be seen largely in terms of rapid polarization—are not foreseen in Tumin's study. Education, regional planning, family life, and political status continue to generate dramatic issues on the island, but as issues these receive no attention.

An exciting but onesided account of them does appear in Silén's book which intentionally is a primer on Puerto Rican political and cultural history. It begins with a provocative but hardly scholarly historiographic essay which rightly points out the false images perpetuated by "colonial" academics; the stereotype of Puerto Ricans as "sad," passive, and docile people is ably rebutted. Moreover, as part of the genre of contemporary history written by "losers," *We, The Puerto Rican People* is best at dispelling old myths and worst at defending new ones. The role of radical movements is exaggerated in Silén's work, although his effort to cast them in the same terms as other Third World revolutions is not without some basis in fact. As Tumin would agree, Puerto Ricans are not merely poor Americans. Their resistance to assimilation and domination despite "carrot and stick" policies is what preserves Puerto Rican nationhood in the absence of political independence.

Silén argues that the reemergence of the draft issue (during the Korean War Puerto Ricans suffered casualties at a rate 35 times greater than the mainland population's) has increased revolutionary action. Also, the failure of capital-intensive industrialization to solve employment problems, the misguided and unscientific attempts at making English dominant in commerce and education, and the continued conservatism of much organized religion on the island are blamed for what Silén sees as the desperate plight of today's Puerto Ricans. His revolutionary prescription, however, is a mixture of organization and selective violence, and the results thus far are not impressive.

The irony of reading these books in tandem ought to be obvious. The stabilizing and complacent effect of education according to Tumin is lost on many Puerto Rican intellectuals. Silén represents a growing number of Puerto Ricans, well educated, of "good family," "cosmopolitan," who do not behave as Tumin tells us they should. Their disenchantment with Puerto Rico's political and social changes of the past decade are just as real as Tumin's social diagnosis.

WILLIAM J. BRISK

Inter-American Foundation
Rosslyn, Virginia

Iran Faces the Seventies. Edited by Ehsan Yar-Shater. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. xx, 391. $12.50.)

With the increasing emphasis in the social sciences upon the issue of modernization, the contemporary experience of Third World societies challenged by change becomes manifestly relevant. Iran is a dramatic case of a non-Western society confronted by the need to modernize. The Iranian case is an especially important one because of the political elite's calculated program to address the developmental challenge. The Shah of Iran, who rules as one of the last absolute monarchs in the world and whose power is flimsily dressed up in garments of modern representative institutions, is the major force shaping Iranian developmental policy. With the assistance of vast petroleum resources, the Shah emphasizes economic and military development, considers piecemeal social development, and ignores effective political development. In so doing, he consistently manages to remain one step ahead of social upheaval and personal disaster. The Iranian political elite's qualified success in instituting a program of selective reform from above deserves the careful consideration of developmental scholars everywhere.

Iran Faces the Seventies is a volume consisting of 15 articles first prepared as papers for a conference at Columbia University in 1968. The selections range all the way from discussions concerning religion and politics to writings focusing upon painting and music. There is no unifying intellectual theme other than the fact that all the articles have something to do with modern Iran. The result is a highly uneven and disjointed collection of essays, most of which have little to do with political analysis. Yet, this hotchpotch of articles contains a number of valuable sections that are well worth the exercise of mining them. These explicitly treat interpersonal relations, educational patterns, literary trends, and land reform programs. Implicitly, there is very occasional commentary that touches directly upon power and authority structure.

This volume contains three kinds of useful articles in descending order of significance: (1) those that provide new analytic material important to the student of Iranian and developmental politics; (2) those that provide competent presentations of subject matter also discussed elsewhere; and (3) those that provide useful descriptive material bearing on the political system. The articles falling outside of this classification are generally irrelevant to serious scholars of politics.

In the first category, I include the following three contributions: Brian Spooner's discussion of religion and society; Gustav Thaiss's piece on social change, religion, and the bazaar; and Ehsan Yar-Shater's analysis of modern literary trends. The Spooner article, although turgidly written and sprawlingly organized, contains a number of perceptive and fascinating ideas. The most important of these is the focus upon the dialectic between corporate and noncorporate groups that animates Iranian religious and social institutions. The emphasis upon the informal *hey'at* groupings and the decisional networks composed of such collectivities is crucial to one's understanding of power and change in the Iranian context. Such insights make the necessity of wading through 74-word sentences worthwhile.

Gustav Thaiss's study is a thoughtful analysis of the relationship between Shi'a Islam and social change. Besides capably discussing the struggle between tradition and modernity in the bazaar, Thaiss analyzes the amorphousness of political discussion and opposition among commercial and religious groups in Iran. Also, to my knowledge, this is the first time that the crucial sociopolitical role of institutions such as the Hosseiniyeh Ershad has been discussed in Western scholarship. More critically, there is perhaps a misplaced emphasis upon the asserted fissure that is declared to be occurring between the bazaaris on the one hand and the clerics on the other hand. A general common opposition to the regime in Iran continues to galvanize the traditional alliance between these two classes.

The article by Ehsan Yar-Shater on "The Modern Literary Idiom" is perhaps the most important selection in this volume. It is virtually impossible to understand Iranian politics without some knowledge of contemporary Iranian literature. It is in the literature that one finds revealed the unvarnished political orientations of significant sectors of the Iranian people. Yar-Shater's well-written article is the best available study in English of modern Iranian writers and their works. In Iran, literature and politics are intertwined; change in one area is immediately reflected by change in the other. Social scientists interested in Iranian society and politics must read Yar-Shater's study. Its only major defect is an occasional proclivity on the author's part to back away from political discussion by stressing form over content.

In the second category of contributions, we include the studies by A. K. S. Lambton, Marvin Zonis, and J. C. Hurewitz on land reform, education, and foreign policy respectively. Miss Lambton has written elsewhere at greater length on the same topic. The Hurewitz contribution is a good overview of Iran's place in regional and world affairs; it is less informed when it touches on domestic politics. Zonis's piece is one of the best available summaries of the relationship between higher education, politics, and change in Iran. It is well researched, well organized, and well written.

The final positive contribution in this volume is the article by Hafez Farmayan on political events in the 1960s. Relying heavily upon Persian sources, Farmayan provides a useful account that is long on description but short on analysis. All in all, this collection should serve scholars of contemporary Iran as a useful reference work. It is a volume, however, that political scientists must consult with a discriminating eye.

James A. Bill

University of Texas at Austin

The Flame of Freedom: The German Struggle Against Hitler. By Eberhard Zeller. Translated by R. P. Heller and D. R. Masters. (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1969. Pp. 471. $15.00.)

Most writings on "German resistance to Hitler" have a biographical or autobiographical character and are entangled in concerns about the political reputation of the Germans or some particular German individual or group ("the military," "the proletariat," "the bureaucracy," Catholics or Protestants, Bavarians, Prussians or Rhinelanders, and so on). They lack analytical distance from the subject matter. They are frequently silent or unconvincing about relationships between internal opposition to Hitler in Germany and modern German politics as a whole.

Eberhard Zeller's book is of this genre—indeed, one of its leading examples. This, however, is hardly to say that the book is without value. On the contrary, even in this abridged English translation (based on the 4th German edition published in 1963), Zeller's work is relatively comprehensive on the background and activities of those military and civilian officials (or ex-officials) who discussed a *coup d'état* against Hitler at various times and with varied intensity between 1938 and 1944. General Ludwig Beck, Mayor Carl Goerdeler, Count Helmuth von Moltke, and Count Claus von Stauffenberg are the best-known of these personalities, but Zeller gives considerable detail about many others whose names are less familiar.

In its essentials, Zeller's book is more than two decades old, the first German edition having been prepared in the immediate postwar years. His account of the military-civilian conspiratorial discussions is convincing in the sense that few serious persons would wish to deny the impressive personal stature of many of the conspirators. The materials which have come to light since the first edition—or since the last German edition of 1963—have not diminished the fact that there were oppositional Germans who engaged in efforts at undermining Hitler's rule, and who suffered grievously after the failure of the assassination attempt on July 20, 1944.

Moreover, these materials have continued to confirm Zeller's point that it is a gross oversimplification to attribute the oppositional sentiments and resistance activities of the conspirators solely to narrow national interests, resentment at Hitler's military bungling after 1940, or aristocratic "class interests." Most of the conspirators were considerably more complex personalities than such purported explanations would have us believe, and so were the facts.

Just because of these complexities, however, Zeller's work is a hopelessly inadequate guide to an understanding of the facts or significance of German resistance to Hitler. This is not just because it concentrates on a relatively limited group of conspirators or would-be conspirators and ignores broader manifestations of opposition in the populace or "the working class." The book defines its scope as that of the 1938–1944 conspiracy; moreover, except for the existence of the *Rote Kapelle* group with its links to Moscow, no widespread opposition to the regime has yet been demonstrated among the general populace or particular classes. Nor do the limitations of Zeller's account derive primarily from the clumsiness of parts of the translation or the elimination in this edition of portions of the German text. Very little improvement could be made in the translation of some of Zeller's more mystical and ambiguous passages.

The difficulty lies in the author's failure to grapple with the question of the extent of resistance activity directed to an overthrow of the regime (as distinct from complaints about its blunders) and in his blindness to the connection between the hesitancies of the conspirators and their uncertainties about a viable and desirable political alternative to the Nazi system.

That system had institutionalized a vulgarized and caricatured version of "revolutionary conservative" objections to Western "bourgeois" society. Most of the anti-Nazi conspirators between 1938 and 1944 also rejected "bourgeois" society and had participated in one version or another of movements of dissent and resistance against the Weimar Republic. Their attitudes on themes such as "the need for renewal" are rather faithfully—if often murkily—reflected in Zeller's own book. This is not surprising, since Zeller, a physician by profession, maintained ties with the Stefan George Circle, particularly in association with Claus von Stauffenberg's brother, Berthold von Stauffenberg. He was a rather representative figure of the "critical conservative" intelligentsia of the Weimar Republic, which maintained connections with aristocratic families (of pre-industrial lineage), and rejected "mass democracy" and "party politics," yet also despised the vulgarity of German economic and social development after 1870, together with its new men of power. In effect, Zeller's book is a testimonial to the differences between political romanticism and the Nazi criminality and vulgarity which used many similar slogans. At the same time, in its apolitical attitude Zeller's book reflects the desperate and isolated position of the political romantics when confronted by a regime which simply gave words and "ideas" the meaning it wished through sheer power.

Zeller's book seems to rest on the assumption that politics should consist in the assertion of principles or "spirit" by the individual. A more up-to-date term for this understanding of politics might be the expression "commitment." In West Germany today, both the young and men of letters and education seem increasingly ready to contrast "commitment," "dissent," and the need for a "true community" with bourgeois self-satisfaction—although now from a purportedly "left" perspective. The fate of the revolutionary conservatives in the world of political practice may have an unexpected contemporary relevance if it illustrates that passionate commitment is not the same as political judgment.

George K. Romoser
University of New Hampshire

SShA: Problemy vnutrennei politiki (The USA: Domestic Policy Problems). Edited by Valentin S. Zorin. (Moscow: Nauka Publishing House, 1971. Pp. 406. 1.55 rubles.)

Jointly authored by nineteen Soviet Americanists, this volume devotes one chapter to each of the following problems: the economy, urban affairs, mass poverty, crime, youth, the blacks, the far Right, and the military-industrial complex. Since it is impossible to treat each complicated chapter separately in a short review, the book will be considered in the light of the contribution it makes to the advancement of the Soviet study of American politics.

Nowhere between two Soviet covers has such a broad range of problems been studied so comprehensively and topically—most of the material deals with the 1960s with reference to antecedent considerations where necessary. The book is particularly interesting for the unusual mixture of information it presents to the Soviet scholarly community: a rare collection of statistics often giving a good overview of the dimensions and parameters of each problem; a summary of the differing views of American scholars, experts, and publicists on the problem with criticism of those views; a discussion of the policy efforts made to overcome the problem, and the resultant success or failure of the policies. There are also some predictable ideological concerns, especially the periodically reiterated assertion that, of course, these problems cannot be resolved in a capitalist society because it is in the very nature of that society to create just such problems.

The problems are analyzed in two time dimensions. In the long run, as their ideology tells the authors, the problems are insoluble. But then there is the meantime, when the ways in which the problems develop and are handled by the political system, become important concerns for Soviet scholarly analysts and political leaders. So the book concentrates upon the meantime (where ideological considerations do not loom so large) and predicts that the dominating class in the United States will continue its policy of "social maneuvering." That is, necessary concessions will be made to the disadvantaged elements of society in order to produce those incremental changes which ensure that the problems will not assume such proportions as to result in revolution. In the short run, therefore, the authors take an uncharacteristically moderate position respecting the capacity of the United States to cope with the problems under study: While the progress made toward their resolution should not be overestimated, the book cautions, neither should it be underestimated.

The moderation also emanates from the authors' analysis of the changing significance of domestic and international factors from the immediate pre-World War II years to the present. Since there were no critical domestic crises in the United States within that period until the mid-1960s, the government was able to concentrate its attention and expend its resources on international problems. But lately domestic problems have created internal instability and have even had a negative influence on America's international position.

The turning point was the 1968 election in which, although every politician talked about Vietnam, the authors say it was only "*one* of the central issues" (italics mine—R.M.); this fact was attested to after the election by the political analysts who agreed that the decisive role was played by domestic issues. Consequently, the authors predict that domestic politics will influence American foreign policy more in the 1970s than in the preceding decade as policy-making priorities change from foreign to domestic concerns. The obvious implication, which the authors do not make, is that since more attention will be given to "social maneuvering" and ameliorative programs are likely to increase, the system could indeed survive for some time. Within this framework the aforementioned moderation seems to be the most tenable polition.

The book maintains that in these matters the American politician has little choice, as is made clear in the discussion of urban problems. In keeping with his "new federalism" concept, President Nixon would prefer to have local government tackle urban problems by giving the broadest scope to private initiative. But that proves impossible, for his conduct and policies are "no less determined by the shortage of funds or fidelity to party ideals than by the very fact that the outstanding urban and other social problems have not been resolved; for in the contemporary, quickly developing and rapidly changing world the accumulation of unsolved problems, the manifestation of conservatism, sluggishness and backwardness, are fraught with more destructive consequences in the future" (p. 119, reviewer's translation).

This volume may itself mark a turning point. It is unusual for Professor Zorin to associate himself with a book that has such a low ideological profile. He had written a series of lengthy books on American domestic politics focusing on how the monopolies control politics. He then directed the compilation of another jointly authored and highly polemical popularization of some of the problems discussed in the volume presently under review entitled, *The USA: From "Great" to Sick* (Moscow, 1969. In Russian). But now he has apparently switched his interest to the problems which, so to speak, came to control the monopolies in the sense that the monopolies were forced to make concessions by the dissatisfactions caused by the problems.

It is welcome indeed to find Professor Zorin involved in producing a volume that goes beyond the narrowest confines of ideology. The book is characterized by a breadth of treatment which can be illustrated in some remarks made about the Negro problem:

> In analyzing the anatomy of protest of the Negro people it is necessary to consider the peculiarities of their historical development, the racial, nationality and class aspects of the Negro problem, the marked changes in the socio-political situation and the psychic make-up of black Americans, the ties between the white and black Americans and the policies of America's rulers in relation to the Negro people (p. 275 reviewer's translation).

Although these factors may seem obvious, they have been too often subordinated to ideological considerations in previous Soviet writing on the topic.

One hopes that this book, written under the sponsorship of the USA Institute, is a sign of change for the better in Soviet analyses of American politics, a change which may well have been engendered by the Institute's recent founding in 1968. The fact that the volume contains a large number of typographical errors in the English language citations does not detract from the contribution made toward the development of Soviet American studies.

RICHARD M. MILLS

Fordham University

Twentieth-Century American Foreign Policy. Edited by John Braeman, Robert H. Bremner, and David Brody. (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 567. $10.00.)

This volume is the third in the series entitled, "Modern America," the purpose of which is to examine the problems of change and continuity in twentieth-century United States history. The book comprises eleven essays. Two are of a historiographical nature. "The Changing Interpretative Structure of American Foreign Policy" by Charles E. Neu analyzes the schools of thought and changing assumptions of American diplomatic history since the 1920s. "Writings on American Foreign Relations: 1957 to the Present" by David F. Trask provides a systematic survey of scholarly works on American foreign policy. The remaining nine essays explore facets of American foreign policy and diplomacy.

The variety of topics and multiplicity of approaches make impossible a proper appraisal of each individual paper in a short review, but a few comments are in order. Waldo H. Heinrichs, Jr. in a comprehensive essay, "Bureaucracy and Professionalism in the Development of American Career Diplomacy," correctly emphasizes the triumph of careerism over amateurism. From the point of view of growth and quality this is a success story. But the coin has another side. Although American diplomats have a respected place in the competitive environment of diplomacy, the rapid progress of careerism has not increased the influence of American diplomats in the domestic political scene. While in most democratic countries the functions of foreign offices and the roles of diplomatic missions abroad have become increasingly important for a continuous and consistent foreign policy, regrettably this is not the case in the United States. The multiplication of offices and agencies dealing with foreign affairs in Washington does not facilitate the task of career diplomats. Scores of agencies have resident personnel in foreign countries who report directly to the home offices and try to influence decisions in the capital according to their special interests. The spoils system still exists. In addition, the role of some congressional committees and maintenance of a super-Foreign Ministry in the White House are symbols of the State Department's weakness in the formulation and execution of foreign policy.

Paul A. Varg in a perceptive piece, "The United States [sic] a World Power, 1900–1917: Myth or Reality?", characterizes international affairs after the turn of the century and the limited part the United States took in them. Even after acquisition of the Philippines, he notes the United States had only small interests in China, took a passive role in European affairs, but dominated the Caribbean states. It would have been interesting to appraise Theodore Roosevelt's passionate participation in international politics and the meaning of America's emergent economic power, dramatically demonstrated during and after the First World War.

The chapter on "The United States and the Failure of Collective Security in the 1930's" by Manfred Jonas is a useful contribution. The author examines the failure from an American point of view. Still, this reviewer believes that he overemphasizes the impact of neutrality legislation, especially on the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. Although this legislation might have influenced British and French attitudes, the influence was at best marginal. The decisive factor was that neither Britain nor France was willing to resist aggression. The British fleet, crowded into Alexandria harbor, had ammunition for about twenty minutes. Stanley Baldwin stated in 1936 that he did not dare to propose rearmament because this would have ensured his electoral defeat. Since the leading democratic countries were reluctant to consider forceful action, the resolutions of the League of Nations were exercises in futility.

In a valuable study on "The United States and the Atlantic Alliance," Lawrence L. Kaplan correctly indicates some of the reasons for U.S. policy changes toward the Soviet Union after World War II. In my opinion it would have been worthwhile to point out that Soviet refusal to evacuate Azerbaijan and Stalin's speech of February 9, 1946, exacerbated Soviet-United States relations probably more than Soviet policies in Eastern Europe. The sweeping statement that "a series of status-of-forces agreements effectively placed Americans abroad on military and civilian missions under the authority of foreign courts" (p. 323) would need some qualification in view of the many variations of status-of-forces agreements and the coexistence of jurisdictions of the receiving and sending states. Contrary to the author's suggestion (pp. 329–330), one could argue that Khrushchev's ultimatum of November 1958, solidified rather than divided NATO. The task force established in Washington worked out a united policy concerning Berlin and has become a model in interallied contingency planning.

The short and excellent essay on Canada by Robert Craig Brown could have served its purpose better if the author had indicated the stages in the emergence of Canada as an independent state. The chapter dealing with recent United States-Mexican relations by Lyle C. Brown and James W. Wilkie presents events in a narrative form but sometimes overlooks the diplomatically important aspect of political acts. The authors fail to point out that President Wilson changed the traditional recognition policy of the United States when he refused to recognize the Huerta Government in 1913. The change had broader implications than using recognition "as a means of seeking protection for the lives and properties of the United States citizen in Mexico" (p. 379). Wilson's policy was an enlarged application of the Tobar doctrine of 1907. The well-written chapter on "The United States and Cuba: The Uncomfortable 'Abrazo,' 1898–1968," by Allan R. Millett is rich in historical details and source references, but it is regrettable that out of the 50 pages of narrative there are less than three pages on Fidel Castro's regime. While most chapters in the volume are conscientious research pieces by competent historians, A. E. Campbell writes a concise analytical essay on relations between the United States and Britain, the "Uneasy Allies." The volume closes with a contribution by Warren I. Cohen, "From Contempt to Containment: Cycles in American Attitudes toward China," which offers good background material but now needs updating.

The apparent lack of a unifying theme is a shortcoming of this large volume. Probably a comprehensive introductory chapter about trends and problems of U.S. foreign policy in the twentieth century could have explained the rationale of the chapters, putting them into focus.

STEPHEN D. KERTESZ

University of Notre Dame

The Foreign Policy System of Israel: Setting, Images, Process. By Michael Brecher. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1972. Pp. 693. $17.50.)

This is a seminal work by an outstanding political scientist who has constructed an exquisite model and tested it in the study of the experience of a small new state with an unusually pervasive foreign policy system and baffling problems of external relations that stubbornly resist positive normalization. If sound, the model should have general application; and whether sound or not, it cannot help but excite foreign-policy theorizers. Nothing like it has ever been attempted for Israel, or indeed for any other new or old state, large or small. The model will doubtless spark other case studies. Yet in my judgment, Michael Brecher, formerly of McGill and now a visiting professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, has blundered by attempting to verify in a massive book a theory that was first published in 1969 as part of an article and would have been more convincingly presented at modest monographic length.

The first of a two-part study of foreign policy making in Israel, the present work sets forth the model and seeks to substantiate it with available evidence in the record of the state's first twenty years. The second part, which will come later, promises to assess major policies on the basis of the theory. Brecher tells us (p. vii) that the book is the product

> of a decade of grappling with questions of theory and methods in foreign policy analysis. The choice of "microlevel" research—the behaviour of a single actor—arose from dissatisfaction with two trends in the study of International Politics: an extensive concentration on the system as a whole, that is, "macro-analysis"; and traditional historical methods of surveying *foreign relations,* rather than analysing *foreign policy* [italics in original].

Existing case studies of foreign policy, Brecher argues (p. 1), tend to "amass empirical data but are usually devoid of theoretical value." Systemic inquiry "denigrates factual detail and posits a high level of mechanistic response in state behavior." And theory-based studies of foreign policy, relatively rare to begin with, "are essentially of the taxonomic type" which "develop categories for a mass of undifferentiated data," largely failing to "distinguish the crucial variables of the foreign policy process" or to "establish relationships among them." The work under review is designed to correct these inadequacies.

The author lists as the components of a foreign policy system: the operational or real environment (establishing the limits of possible choice), the communication network (chiefly diplomatic cables and the mass media), the decision-making elite, and psychological or perceived environment (describing desired choice), and the processes of policy formulation and implementation resulting from the interplay of actors and factors within and between the two environments and among many systems. Intrasystemic and intersystemic bilateral relations are also considered. Each component of the two environments and of the process receives detailed consideration. Brecher leaves no doubt from the outset that he is interested in the dynamics of the foreign policy system no less than in its structure.

The evaluation of the psychological environment includes a remarkably concise and meaningful assessment of the personalities and the socialization of Israel's high-policy elite, the eight men and one woman who in the author's view have shaped the foreign policies. The thumbnail biographies are truly brilliant. The process of foreign policy formulation and execution is also elucidated with enviable precision and attention to the involved technical elites, institutions, and methods, giving the quantifiers a rich feast of tables. By contrast, the analysis of the operational environment is too mechanistic and makes no allowance for irrationality and chance.

That environment, as Brecher sees it, consists of the global system and the Middle East subordinate system (with only passing reference to other subordinate systems) linked by the communication network. The global system, as he sees it, passed through three phases: from tripolarity in 1948 (with Britain and its Commonwealth-Empire as the third quasi superpower) to bipolarity in 1956 and polycentrism after 1962. Alongside it, he has posited a subordinate system that never stirs from its nearly moribund state. Its only assumed motion is the occasional movement of states from the outer ring to the periphery and from both to the core in a regional system, as viewed from Jerusalem, that "comprises three concentric circles of states" (p. 48). For a scholar who is so meticulous about the calculus of foreign policy making, Brecher treats the subordinate system and its constituents much too cavalierly. Between 1948 and 1968 the Middle East system, if anything, was more dynamic than the global system, since at the start only eight of the author's twenty states were wholly sovereign, and of the later expansion and its explosive systemic consequences he is wholly oblivious. Furthermore, he grossly oversimplifies the political diversity of the Middle East in cultures, structures, and ways of socialization. Bewilderingly detailed though the Brecher model is, it thus falls short of and distorts the reality.

For analytical purposes, Brecher has construed the Middle East subordinate system so as to fit the Israel case. So far, so good. But the system as seen from Cairo would look different. From there, for instance, the core circle might well include all Arab states instead of only Israel's immediate neighbors plus Iraq. As early as 1955, Egypt's Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir had become the embodiment of the Arab hope for unity, and his charisma in times of Arab-Israel crisis (1956, 1964, 1967) tended to unify the Arab response to Israel. In the Six Day War of June 1967 even Tunisia, Morocco, and Lebanon, to name but three Arab states that have inclined toward variant positions on Israel, had to join the pack. In trying to cope with Israel, the Arab states have faced the strict alternative of multilateral or bilateral diplomacy. Indeed, Arab political terminology distinguishes between multilateralism (which rests on *qawmiyyah,* or Arab unity nationalism), and bilateralism (which rests on *wataniyyah,* or state nationalism). Arab multilateralism in dealing with Israel has been reinforced ironically by the weak and deeply divided Palestine resistance movement. This is Israel's dilemma, for the final success of its Arab policy depends on its ability to break up Arab multilateralism into bilateral components so as to deal with each separately. But so long as Palestine Arab resistance eludes total suppression—indeed, so long as the Palestine problem is not resolved—the memory and the vision of "Palestinism" are likely to keep multilateralism alive. Here again, Brecher's simplistic handling of the Middle East subordinate system leaves out of analytical purview Arab multilateral diplomacy toward Israel. What is more, the subordinate system as seen through the eyes of the Arab foreign policy makers, which would undoubtedly have been part of the Arab psychological environment in an extended Brecher model, must be included in the operational or real environment of Israel's foreign policy makers, and its absence seriously impairs the model.

Brecher has thus created his own dilemma, since the model compels him to go too far while not going far enough. He fails, for instance, to explain how Israel's political system works insofar as it bears on the making of foreign policy. Israel's problem from the start was to find a means of converting inescapable coalitions into organs of decisive governance. This Ben Gurion contrived to do as early as 1949 in forming the first elected government. Ben Gurion's two principles for a cohesive coalition in a pluralist system included cabinet decision by majority vote and the collective responsibility of all coalition partners. It also included the invariable condition that his own Mapai or labor party, which had never returned more than 38 per cent and once as little as 32 per cent of the members to the Kneset or unicameral legislature, be given a majority of the seats in the cabinet, among them such key posts as the foreign, defense, and finance ministries, along with the premiership. By the rule of cohesive coalition government under this scheme, Mapai could, and indeed did, adopt virtually any foreign policy that it wished. To structure such governments necessitated advance negotiation among the partners until the terms of compromise as finally agreed became the immutable code of that government, enshrined as its so-called "Basic Principles" by endorsement of the Kneset. With the formation of the Government of National Unity in mid-1967—that is, in the last year or so of the period under review—Mapai lost its cabinet majority. The "wall-to-wall" coalition remained cohesive but lost its decisiveness, becoming largely immobilist in foreign policy making. If the model can explain the transformation in foreign policy making, the author does not show how.

Indeed, Brecher demonstrates the basic principle: an author's mastery of his invented model varies inversely with its complexity. Or to put it differently, the more complex the model, the more likely is the author to become its captive. Brecher deliberately eschews narrative as purely descriptive of the flow of foreign relations, in favor of developing a theory that rests on supportive evidence. As a result, he has contrived to convert a highly original conception intended for analysis into a machine for cranking out factual detail to uphold that conception. More than that, he runs the risk of confusing most of his readers, except the devotees of model-building and of Israel's internal and external politics. Yet almost all model builders have no critical knowledge of Israel politics, and most of those familiar with Israel's politics, not being sophisticated political scientists, probably cannot understand the model.

Still, despite the serious shortcomings, this is a work that cannot be ignored, and in fact cannot be fully assessed until after the appearance of the second volume that promises to investigate Israel's foreign policies at the strategic level.

J. C. Hurewitz

Columbia University

Basic Documents on Human Rights. Edited by Ian Brownlie. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971. Pp. x, 531. $11.25.)

The Human Right to Individual Freedom: A Symposium on World Habeas Corpus. Edited by Luis Kutner, (Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1970. Pp. 249. $12.50.)

These two books represent the two main approaches to international human rights problems. The first one is pragmatic, the second one programmatic; the first one provides a guide to the existing law, the second one proposes important changes in the law.

Brownlie's book contains some sixty basic documents on human rights, national and international, from 1688 to 1969. In the international field, he includes not only the documents of the United Nations and its specialized agencies, but also those of various regional organizations. The author provides short but pithy introductory notes to each chapter and to each document, with a few bibliographical references. Most of these notes are factual, but some of them are quite passionate (e.g., on Latin America, p. 387). Sometimes the author is too cryptic, and does not refer to some crucial facts. For instance, his note on the Indian Constitution (p. 29) does not alert the reader to the fact that several changes in the Indian Constitution had to be made to reverse judgments of the Supreme Court which tried to uphold rights of individuals against state interference. In discussing the Freedom of Association Convention (p. 279), Brownlie does not mention the many cases which have arisen under it and which are discussed in excellent books by Jenks and Haas. Many documents do not indicate the source from which the text was taken (see, e.g., pp. 8, 14, 29, 46, 56, 339).

These are, however, minor flaws. The collection is excellent and should be useful to all teachers and practitioners in this rapidly growing field.

The second book is a collection of essays—some reprinted, some new—by Mr. Krutner, an eminent Chicago lawyer, who since 1931 has single-mindedly pursued the idea of a "world habeas corpus," an international legal remedy against arbitrary detention of individuals. Over the years he has written several books and many articles on the subject. In the current volume, he has put together endorsements of his idea by prominent lawyers from the United States and other countries. Some of these essays —for instance, those by Justice Douglas and Mr. Tran Tam—are only marginally relevant to the main topic of the books. Many of the others are general and superficial. Some of the more thoughtful authors are rather doubtful about the feasibility of the whole project, even though they endorse its desirability (see, e.g., Müller, pp. 44–45; Benattar, p. 56; Q. Wright, p. 169; Sutton, p. 179).

In his concluding essay, accompanied by a draft "treaty-statute," Mr. Kutner makes a good case for the development of international due process of law and for using the historical writ "habeas corpus" as a means for terminating any violations of the basic rules for protecting individuals against abuse of power by the government. In many respects, the essay is much clearer than the rather confusing "treaty-statute," which does not reflect the latest evolution in the author's thinking.

One can hardly disagree with the author's goal, but in this era of growing rather than declining nationalism it is difficult to expect governments to accept such limitations on their freedom of action. The states which might accept his proposals are likely to be those that already apply the rule of due process in their internal affairs; on the other hand, it cannot be anticipated that the many authoritarian regimes which need such international control most would join a system of international courts for the protection of rights of individuals.

While Mr. Kutner mentions in his essay the existence of the European Commission of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, he has not taken their work into account, though they dealt effectively with many cases of arbitrary detention. In the long run, the best hope seems to lie in following this successful example and establishing similar institutions in other parts of the world, rather than continuing on the path blazed by Mr. Kutner. In a sense, events have overtaken him, and it might therefore be necessary for him to study more deeply the European experience and to recast his project accordingly.

Louis B. Sohn

Harvard Law School

American International Law Cases, Vol. I. Edited by Francis Deak. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1971. Pp. 484. $40.00.)

This is the first of a projected series of eight volumes of cases bearing on international law, decided in the courts of the United States: federal, state, as well as Claims, Military Appeals, Customs and Patent Appeals. A grant from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace enabled Dr. Deak, on his retirement from Carnegie, to launch and continue this monumental work up to his untimely recent death.

The important role of a national courts in the development of international law is too well expounded to require adumbration here. (Cf. Falk, *The Role of Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order,* [Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1964.]) One need perhaps only whisper to potential readers the warning that national courts are instruments of national government and that the international law they purport to dispense is circumscribed by acts of legislative fiat, manifestation of executive pleasure or displeasure (as in recognition), and judges' readings of the national interest and public policy. (Cf. Franck, *The Structure of Impartiality* [New York: Macmillan, 1968], espec. chap. 6: Denationalization of International Disputes, pp. 212 ff.). On the other hand, were it not for the decisions of national courts, international case law would be slim pickings for the law student. Perhaps this dilemma may in due course be resolved by permitting appeals or references to the International Court of Justice from national courts in international legal disputes between individuals affecting the jurisprudence of more than one state. This daring suggestion is persuasively made by Judge Philip C. Jessup in a recent work. (Jessup, *The Price of International Justice* [N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 1971.])

Meanwhile, one must be grateful for the diligence, by and large, of the U.S. courts in seeking to apply international law as part of the law of the United States, and in doing so with a tolerable minimum of chauvinism, cultural myopia, or excessive deference to the transient political preferences of the legislative and executive branches. It is this which emerges from Volume I of this series, the topic of which is "International Law in General."

The book, in sum, maps out the results of the process by which cases with an international aspect are decided in United States courts. Out of these cases, some quite dramatic, emerge doctrines that have gradually won acceptance among states, as well as others which are "international" only in an approximate sense. Moreover, the cases reveal how significantly international relations and law affect the interests of private American citizens. And, finally, they demonstrate that even quite complex and politically "hot" issues of recognition, nationalization, and sovereignty can be resolved by courts, not always with perfect impartiality but, at least, in such a way as to obviate recourse to violence: a lesson private individuals seem readier to learn than are national leaders. Since the book is in casebook format, with little in the way of formal notes, readers are left to make these deductions for themselves.

The series promises to be a useful counterpart to Professor C. Parry's *British International Law Cases* series, and Marjorie Whiteman's (U.S.) *Digest of International Law*. Nevertheless, this newest entry into the Anglo-American trio engenders minor reservations. The blurred and uneven type ranges from blow-ups of U.S. Supreme Court Reports that resemble a N.Y. Times Edition for the Visually Impaired to microscopic Federal District Court decisions, all rendered photographically. All this might be forgiven in the name of economy. But at $40.00 for approximately 500 pages, economy can scarcely be the altar at which style has been sacrificed.

THOMAS M. FRANCK

New York

Economic Sanctions and International Enforcement. By Margaret P. Doxey. (London: Oxford University Press, 1971. Pp. ix, 162. $4.50.)

This brief study presents a readable survey of the structures, applications, and problems of economic sanctions. Professor Doxey begins with an examination of the institutional framework available for international enforcement of sanctions by comparing the League of Nations with the United Nations. She calls attention to several major differences, which include: a difference in universality of membership, a more far-reaching and explicit renunciation of the use of force in the Charter, a tightening of the former freedom of League members under Article 16 to take enforcement action by giving primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace to the U.N. Security Council, broader circumstances under which enforcement measures may be taken under the Charter, and an attempt to integrate regional agencies into the U.N. system by allowing them controlled enforcement powers. She notes, however, that "in spite of these differences between the League and the United Nations, which appeared to make it easier for the latter to fulfil [sic] its purpose of preserving peace and security, the record of the United Nations reveals the limited role it has played" (p. 12).

Professor Doxey next considers the development and application of economic sanctions at the national, regional, and universal levels from the time of traditional siege and blockade tactics to modern times. Two points are made particularly well in Professor Doxey's discussion. First, she acknowledges the difficult methodological problem in measuring the apparent results of economic sanctions against the actual sanction actions undertaken. Second, she draws a necessary distinction between economic warfare and economic sanctions, although the techniques employed (and perhaps the results obtained!) in each are similar. As a measure undertaken as part of a war effort, the object of economic warfare is "to hasten the enemy's defeat, to reduce or eliminate its capacity to wage war, to undermine morale, and generally to make life for its citizens as difficult as possible" (p. 14). On the other hand, economic measures used as sanctions are intended "to deter or dissuade states from pursuing policies which do not conform to accepted norms of international conduct. Compliance is considered to be in the general interest and the sanctions are penalties which relate specifically to acts which the international body condemns" (p. 14).

The record of a spectrum of economic measures is reviewed, including experience during the two World Wars, the West's strategic embargoes in Europe and the Far East, the Arab boycott of Israel, Soviet and Eastern European boycotts of Yugoslavia and Albania, and OAS and U.S. sanctions against the Dominican Republic and Cuba. The study is particularly strong in discussing and evaluating the two major experiments with economic sanctions at the universal level—the League action against Italy for its efforts in Ethiopia, and the United Nations action following the United Kingdom's difficulties with Rhodesia.

The results of both the League and United Nations actions confirm what other experiences with economic measures had already largely suggested, namely that the use of economics as a political weapon is hardly reliable, owing to a discouraging array of problems. There is the basic difficulty of consensus on the existence of a problem and on the responsibility of a certain state (or states). Then there are decision-making problems in translating that consensus into action, including, *inter alia,* agreement on goals and selection of measures to be taken.

These difficulties are compounded by the reactions to the sanctions by the target state(s) and its (their) particular economic circumstances. The state may be able to anticipate sanctions and prepare itself, may be economically self-sufficient, may be strengthened internally by the development of a siege mentality, may be able to evade the sanctions, or may even be able to level countersanctions. Finally, there is the danger that sanctions will punish the wrong parties.

The ideal object of an international economic sanctioning effort would be a weak island state with no international friends and a highly vulnerable economy. The author concludes that economic sanctions have not worked as intended, and she suggests that their purely punitive rationalization be reviewed and that greater world attention be paid to the kinds of things that caused a state to undertake policies meriting sanctions.

FOREST L. GRIEVES
University of Montana

The Kennedy Round in American Trade Policy: The Twilight of GATT. By John W. Evans. (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971. Pp. 383. $13.95.)

This volume is a masterly review of the commercial policy of the United States over the past 25 or 30 years, focusing on the Kennedy Round. It is written from the standpoint of a U.S. government official who had a significant role in executing that policy.

The first third of the book is given over to a description of the main issues and problems of commercial policy in the period preceding the passage of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, which was the basis for U.S. negotiations in the Kennedy Round. Here, and throughout the book, the author shows the major role of "reciprocity" in international negotiations concerning tariffs and related matters. Each action permitting freer access to a country's markets has been regarded as a boon to other countries for which they must compensate by giving freer access to their markets. The guiding principle of the negotiations has always been to achieve a balance of benefits, although it must be done in such a way that each set of negotiators can return to the home country with the claim that they have gotten a better deal for their exports than they have accorded to the exports of the other countries. The latter objective is aided, as the author states, by the vagueness of scoring in the game, since the technical information necessary in order to assess the effects of any trade concession is simply not available. Nondiscrimination, the other major principle underlying the system of world trading relationships that has emerged in the postwar period, is also treated in this section. The author describes the provisions of GATT and the conflict between nondiscrimination and economic integration as represented by customs unions and free trade areas. Problems of agricultural trade, nontariff barriers, and the trade of less developed countries are also examined.

Most of the rest of the book is given over to the antecedents of the Trade Expansion Act in the United States and the Kennedy Round negotiations. Such familiar controversies as those surrounding the escape clauses and the peril points are briefly reviewed. The protracted and extremely difficult negotiations over the ground rules for the Kennedy Round and then the Kennedy Round negotiations themselves and their outcome are described. The Round's substantial success may be summarized by pointing out that the weighted average reduction in tariffs by the United States on dutiable nonagricultural imports was about 35 per cent and that reductions by the European Economic Community were roughly similar. This may be compared with weighted average U.S. reductions in tariffs of less than 19 per cent in the first round of multilateral negotiations (Geneva, 1947) and from two to four per cent in each of the four following rounds.

The strength of this volume is the author's broad knowledge and understanding of world negotiations on trade questions from the standpoint of an American participant; but whatever weaknesses the volume has also stem from this position. In general, the author provides a skeptical review of issues where skepticism was involved in the U.S. position, as, for example, with respect to the trading claims of the less developed countries about the impact upon them of U.S. tariff actions. There is less inclination to assess critically some of the more basic aspects of the U.S. position. For example, the author reports that item-by-item negotiations for mutual tariff concessions worked well as long as tariffs were high enough to give a comfortable cushion against competition. He describes the results as impressive without stopping to ask what benefits ensued if water were simply being squeezed out of tariffs. This is not to deny that there were some benefits; it is only to say that it would have been desirable for the author to assess them. Also, in his account of the U.S. violation of GATT through the imposition of restrictions on the imports of dairy products, the author does not suggest what seems to me to have been the traumatic impact of this action on the attitude toward GATT held by the other countries of the world. The United States had used its enormous power and prestige in the early postwar years to obtain worldwide sanction for the new rules of commercial policy embodied in GATT, but in this action it took the lead in demonstrating that the new rules were secondary to internal political requirements for protection.

One can also find other matters to quibble about. For example, the electronics and color television industries, even when they were being established, were hardly appropriate illustrations for what is usually referred to as the "infant industry" argument for protection (p. 25).

Nevertheless, when all these objections and quibbles are entered, the fact remains that this is an extremely useful book that is likely to become one of the standard reference works on the Kennedy Round and on American commercial policy of the period.

IRVING B. KRAVIS
University of Pennsylvania

Die Vierte Welt: Modell einer neuen Wirklichkeit. By Bruno Fritsch. (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1970. Pp. 212. 19.80 Dm.)

To gaze into the crystal ball and divine the future has become a profitable venture. Alvin Toffler, of *Future Shock* fame, Herman Kahn, Daniel Bell, George Orwell, and others dabbling in futurology have aroused the public's curiosity about such target dates as 1984 and 2000. Each author has his or her peculiar vision ranging from a blessed utopia to a pending doomsday. Into this motley crew steps Bruno Fritsch, a Swiss academician, who heads the Institute of Economic Research at the Zurich Technical University, has taught at Harvard, and has visited a number of American research institutes.

Fritsch has written a challenging but also disappointing book about the contemporary international system and a possible future system, one bearing little resemblance to the other. The reader will be challenged by a number of provocative ideas of a future society, but will be disappointed by the short space allocated to them. Three of the four chapters deal with present trends, and only one with the "Fourth World"—the world of the future. Such a proportion seems unobjectionable, except that the three chapters deal with matters often fairly well known to the international relations specialist.

The author first sketches the post-World War II era in which a population explosion has paralleled an explosion of new states, in which the share of exports of developing countries is declining in world trade, in which economic underdevelopment is concentrated in much of the world, and in which social underdevelopment is even more widespread. He explores the pattern of foreign investments, including that of American corporations successfully seeking new markets in which they make use of their technological and organizational superiority. He reminds the reader that corruption, exploitation, inequality, and wars are not restricted to any area of the globe, neither to the First World (the "West"); the Second World (the Communist bloc); nor to the Third World. He surveys the planning which has taken place on the national and supranational levels to overcome some of the world's ills and reduce the gap between rich and poor nations. While a global planning system and international solidarity might be able to narrow the gap, the political difficulties are formidable. Rich nations, beset by their own problems, are unwilling to help significantly the poorer nations, with the result that only a minimum of economic and social progress has taken place among the poorer countries.

But despite these difficulties, Fritsch is convinced that planning is imperative in such fields as population, education, and agriculture if technological breakthroughs are to be registered. There are enough agencies at the regional and United Nations levels to perform these tasks, but they often do not operate efficiently.

The author deals in the last forty pages with a number of "Fourth World" models, ranging from the Marxist conflict model to the convergence model. He assumes quite realistically that in the future it will be nearly impossible to eradicate economic gaps, military conflicts, and resource shortages. These difficulties will be compounded by authority crises within nations and by groups identifying transnationally rather than with their governments. In order to ease potential aggressiveness and conflict situations, he opts for a strange mixture of pleasure pills, teaching computers, participation in public affairs, technological forecasting, satellite communications, and computer-linked "response systems" which will add up individual values and preferences. He forecasts the decline in national loyalties and the growth of new subsystems based on transnational social experiments (communes, etc.).

Whether the world will move in this technocratic direction and witness an evaporation of the national state system remains to be seen. Fritsch has tantalized the reader with these all-too-brief speculative glimpses into the future. Now he should write a full-length book about the "Fourth World" as he sees it.

GERARD BRAUNTHAL
University of Massachusetts/Amherst

The Legal and Practical Aspects of Trade with the Soviet Union. Revised Edition. By James Henry Giffen. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. 366. $19.50.)

With major Soviet-American trade breakthroughs imminent, the updated edition of this 1969 book will be welcomed by American exporters, their legal advisors, and political and social scientists interested in the economic and microlegal aspects of the burgeoning Soviet-American détente. The author, a lawyer (with a B.A. in political science) and a leading private consultant on trading with the U.S.S.R., has had extensive field and negotiating experience in the Soviet Union. Writing in the Introduction, Senator Walter F. Mondale, a leader in liberalizing East-West trade, has quite aptly characterized the book as a "practical guide" (p. xix).

This is a competent survey of U.S. and Soviet civil law relevant to foreign trade, with the emphasis on contract law. In presenting Soviet law, the author has drawn heavily on English translations of Soviet civil law and commentaries and, to a lesser extent, on the standard American authorities on the subject such as Berman, Grzybowski, and Gsovski. The book is organized to take a private American businessman step by step through a trade transaction with a Soviet governmental trading agency. Chapters on U.S. export and import regulations are followed by chapters on the Soviet political and legal system as it bears on foreign trade, the art of negotiating with Soviet trade officials, and the legal procedures of contracting, making payment, and protecting private industrial property rights under Soviet law.

This specific and detailed scenario is further buttressed by numerous appendices, tables, and figures. In particular, there are 43 appendices comprising nearly a third of the book which make plain the author's practical intent. Most of them are photocopies of the relevant U.S. export and import forms and regulations. The remainder are photocopies of the English language versions of the appropriate Soviet forms, including sample import and export contracts, a standard purchase order, and typical arbitration clauses and licensing agreements used in Soviet international commercial transactions.

Because this is basically a handbook, Mr. Giffen's efforts are mainly descriptive and exegetic and rarely interpretative and evaluative. In chapter 4, however, which deals with proposed U.S. legislation on East-West trade, the author becomes somewhat more venturesome and gives the reader some insight into the underlying issues. He raises and effectively demolishes the standard objections to liberalizing U.S. trade with the Soviet Union. Interstitially and at best schematically, Mr. Giffen also lays out the basis of his own commitment to expanded Soviet-American trade. This rests on the familiar positions of easing "cold war tensions" (p. 97), helping the U.S. balance-of-payments problem (because the U.S.S.R. is expected to import from us more than she exports), taking profits (which other non-Communist countries will take anyway if we don't), and the more elusive notion of availing ourselves of the "opportunity to gain concessions and influence attitudes in the Soviet Union . . ." (p. 91).

The author has made no adequate attempt to examine critically his positions, some of them containing the troublesome snags upon which the ongoing Soviet-American trade negotiations are hung up. His basic argument that trade relaxes tensions is really no more than a hypothesis (as yet untested in the Soviet-American context) masquerading as a cliché of the East-West dialogue. Personally, I hope the cliché becomes reality, but professionally I can't ignore the possibility that substantially increased economic contact between two such disparate systems might also yield misunderstandings, mutual frustration, and irritating diplomatic wrangles over misperceived promises, broken contracts, and failed agreements. Although I hope this alternate hypothesis is not confirmed, I think that even a dedicated integration analyst (whose approach this book implicitly takes) would have to concede that it enjoys the same logical status as Mr. Giffen's hypothesis—until actual experience bears out one or the other.

As for the author's positions on the balance-of-payments problem and profit taking, a series of antecedent questions first have to be raised and resolved before his projections could become operative. For instance, what are the Soviets selling that we need besides certain rare metals? Assuming that they buy more from us, how large an imbalance-of-payments problem can we expect the Soviet leadership to tolerate and for how long a time? In view of the U.S.S.R.'s chronic shortage of hard foreign exchange, can we expect the larger American firms to accept their invitation to invest in the mineral exploitation of Soviet Far East, helping offset the cost of imports from the U.S.? Even more fundamental, will this administration or the next respond to Soviet requests for long term credits to finance the imports? These are some of the issues still unresolved in the current Soviet-American trade negotiations.

Mr. Giffen's most dubious point is that a trade dependency on the United States may give us some leverage for influencing Soviet politics. As he himself states, foreign trade as a state monopoly is a highly manipulable aspect of Soviet foreign policy. When necessary and expedient, the Soviet leadership has tended to compartmentalize and isolate their foreign economic policy. Witness the 1920s and 1930s, when the U.S.S.R. imported massive amounts of "Western" machinery and technology for industrialization while simultaneously maintaining toward the "West" cool to hostile political postures as well as implacable ideological hostility. Consequently, the broadening Soviet-American economic contacts at this time will not necessarily be accompanied by political spillovers.

As an advocate whose business it is to promote more trade with the Soviet Union, Mr. Giffen has done his job well in this book. He has convincingly demonstrated that one can do business with the Russians, but at the cost of glossing over the inevitable problems of trying to mesh public and private property economies and legal systems, each set within quite distinct political and legal cultures.

ROBERT SHARLET

Union College

The American Law of Sovereign Immunity: An Analysis of Legal Interpretation. By Theodore R. Giuttari. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1970. Pp. xvii, 438. $20.00.)

The classic case of *The Exchange,* 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 136 (1812), in which Chief Justice Marshall spoke of the "exclusive and absolute" jurisdiction of the territorial state and noted that all exceptions to it derived from its consent, has long served as the basis of the doctrine of sovereign immunity in the United States. Hence a foreign state and its instrumentalities could not be sued in the courts, and the principle was regarded as "absolute." In *Berizzi Brothers Co.* v. *S.S. Pesaro,* 271 U.S. 562 (1926), a unanimous Supreme Court even dismissed a libel against a public commercial vessel owned and operated by the Italian government.

In the ten chapters into which this book is divided, the author, a practicing attorney, traces the historic and legal evolution of the doctrine. His plan has two basic objectives: first, to show the shift from the "absolute" to a more "restrictive" theory; and, second, to evaluate the interrelationship of the three branches of government on the principle.

After an examination of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century practice during which states engaged in few commercial enterprises, Dr. Giuttari draws attention to the ever-increasing activities following the first world war. And while the Department of State at that time merely served as a conduit and favored the restrictive principle, the issue of immunity was regarded as a legal issue, and the judiciary advanced the absolute doctrine. In the 'thirties the courts on their initiative placed certain restrictions on the doctrine, primarily through the concept of waiver. But the major change which soon emerged was to consider the question political rather than legal. Although Chief Justice Stone based denial of immunity in *Republic of Mexico* v. *Hoffman,* 324 U.S. 30 (1945), on the absence of possession of the vessel by Mexico, he noted by way of dictum the predominance of an executive determination.

The next significant event was the Tate letter of 1952 in which the Department announced that henceforth it would follow the restrictive theory for private or commercial activities (*acta jure gestionis*) and expressed the hope that the courts would act in a similar manner. Widely hailed when issued, the pronouncement raised more questions than it answered. To be sure, both branches have frequently pursued the restrictive doctrine and the courts have limited political or public acts (*acta jure imperii*) to a few categories. The author concentrates on this modification and emphasizes that the letter "consolidate[d]" judicial trends in terms both of the restrictive theory and of judicial deference (p. 359). This may be something of an oversimplification. Even Dr. Giuttari acknowledges "[o]ccasional" deviations from the former tendency, deviations which he has termed "relatively significant" (p. 359). He also rightly observes that in *National City Bank* v. *Republic of China,* 348 U.S. 356 (1955), the Bench sustained an independent counterclaim. At the same time the Executive still adheres to absolute immunity from execution, a policy predominantly but not exclusively pursued by the courts as well.

On the basis of a number of developments—the Tate letter and other executive suggestions, recent treaty practice, the U.S. position before foreign courts, the impact of *Republic of China*, the independent rationalization of lower federal and state courts in support of the restrictive rule, and the "guidelines" in *Banco Nacional de Cuba* v. *Sabbatino*, 376 U.S. 398, 437 (1964)—the author suggests that "adherence both to the absolute doctrine of immunity and to the principle of complete subjection to the executive may no longer be in vogue" (p. 310).

The view concerning *Sabbatino* is particularly interesting. Dr. Giuttari repeatedly declares that the reasoning of the case may be employed *mutatis mutandis* in relying "less heavily" on the Executive in sovereign immunity suits (p. 366). Now, *Sabbatino* involved the act of state doctrine which the Supreme Court applied because it found the issue of the validity of foreign expropriations a twilight zone of international law unsuitable for its adjudication, and declared that the "national interest" and the international "rule of law" are best served by employing the doctrine and leaving resolution of the matter to the diplomatic sphere. The Bench reached its own determination; it did not hold that the Executive could tell it what to do; it did not rule as it did because of an executive determination. Indeed, there was none. On the other hand, the Solicitor General's brief on behalf of the United States as *amicus curiae* favored the diplomatic approach and stated that the Court should not hold that "executive silence" concerning the act of state doctrine meant "executive approval of judicial inquiry into the foreign act," 2 *I.L.M.* 1009, 1014 (1963). And the brief, which this well-researched book has overlooked, contains some of the reasoning and language found in the opinion.

Six years later, however, the Legal Adviser wrote to the Court that the doctrine should not be applied to bar adjudication of a counterclaim or set-off. The Solicitor General in two memoranda filed as *amicus curiae* on writs of certiorari declared that the Court of Appeals' application of the doctrine under such circumstances "seriously" impaired the Executive's power over the control of foreign affairs, 10 *I.L.M.* 1191, 1192 (1971); 11 *I.L.M.* 27, 28 (1972). When in *First National City Bank* v. *Banco Nacional de Cuba*, 406 U.S. 759, 92 S. Ct. 1808, 1813, 1816, 1824 (1972), a closely divided Bench reversed for a second time, three members of the majority held that where the Executive "expressly represents to the Court" that the doctrine "would not advance the interests of American foreign policy," the courts should not apply it, and for their part adopted and approved the narrow *Bernstein* exception, 210 F. 2d 375 (2d Cir., 1954). In so doing, these three justices stated that their holding was "in no sense an abdication of the judicial function to the Executive Branch" to which the dissenters responded that "it seems patent that the contrary is true."

Of course, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is one thing; the act of state doctrine another. Yet through such tendencies the immunity principle may witness further erosion not because of the rationale of *Sabbatino*, but as a result of still greater judicial deference. This could prove most unfortunate for a doctrine which is still subject to political considerations and not necessarily the requirements of international law, and could contribute to the judiciary's having to "receive," as Mr. Justice Powell remarked in *First National City Bank*, "the executive's permission before invoking its jurisdiction."

If viewed from an overall perspective, the book contains certain inexplicable statements. Among these is the comment that the Constitution has set forth congressional/executive roles with "relative clarity" with respect to "treaty-making or diplomatic appointments" (p. 23, n. 10), which is far from the case. Such defects are minor. Of greater import is the format of the volume. Unfortunately, much of the analysis is found in the notes, and this makes for rather awkward reading, especially for those not schooled in the law. Nonetheless, the study is a most valuable contribution to the literature and of considerable interest from the international and constitutional standpoints.

GUENTER WEISSBERG

Colby College
Columbia University (Visiting Scholar)

The Challenge to U.S. Dominance of the International Corporation. By Rainer Hellmann. (New York: Dunellen Publishing Company, 1970. Pp. 348. $17.00.)

Sovereignty at Bay: The Multinational Spread of U.S. Enterprises. By Raymond Vernon. (New York: Basic Books, 1971. Pp. 326. $8.50.)

Fads reign supreme in the world of scholarship and research as they do elsewhere, and quite recently the multinational corporation has become another fad, producing the usual body of polemics, apologetics, and every now and then some competent and enlightened analysis. Yet despite the popularity of the subject few contributions have been made by political scientists, and the study of the international system seems to reflect the state of its domestic counterpart: private power goes unexplained and unnoticed, and it is extremely difficult to come to grips with.

The two volumes under review raise some questions about the multinational corporation which are of potential interest and importance to political scientists. Ultimately, however, and because they are the product of other disciplines and skills, they only go so far, and it seems a bit unfair to expect others to do what political scientists themselves have so far failed to accomplish. Hellmann's book is written by a German economist with a European emphasis and point of departure. Vernon's is the work of one of the leading scholars in international business, the coordinator of Harvard's Project on Multinational Enterprise, to date the most ambitious and extensive research effort on the multinational corporation. Their high quality notwithstanding—and particularly the quality of the Vernon volume—both books adequately demonstrate some of the pitfalls and problems inherent in the study of the multinational corporation. I shall return to this point after presenting their main arguments and findings.

Despite the rhetoric of multinationality the giant corporations that dominate the world industrial order remain, for the most part, national entities domiciled in the worlds centers of wealth and privilege. The U.S. dominates the scene, and that is what makes Hellmann's study both timely and important. In a way it could be seen as another European perspective on the American economic presence in Europe, one more optimistic than Servan-Schrieber's popular argument in *The American Challenge.* The burden on Hellmann is essentially to demonstrate the "pluralist" nature of the multinational corporate phenomenon, or more precisely here, its non-American dimension. He fields useful data carefully assembled and documents what is known to most through common sense and intuition: America is the dominant force here accounting for 60 per cent of direct foreign investment—the principal vehicle of multinationality—while Europe is a distant second with about a third of the total. All others are minor participants in this game or mere spectators. The logic of the analysis and the findings here lend no support to a major challenge to the U.S. dominance of international business. They only demonstrate that Europe is still viable, and that a European response to the American challenge is still a possibility. Europe's chances here according to Hellmann would depend on four factors:

> (1) the ability and the willingness of the European firms to invest in the United States; (2) the readiness of European states not to complicate these investments but moreover to promote them; (3) the investment climate which the European will find in the United States; and (4) the American willingness to dismantle existing administrative barriers to foreign enterprises (pp. 159–160).

Hellmann lends his support to a European body of opinion, which is quite influential in business and government circles, namely that European firms have to emulate their American counterparts if they are to grow and compete successfully in the world economy. The remedy prescribed here is mergers and greater size, and governments are expected to encourage and facilitate giantism and industrial concentration. And reminiscent of the functionalist logic, Hellmann sees in economic integration the answer to Europe's problems. Otherwise, he argues, European firms "will have to rely on national partial markets which are too small a home basis for their international expansion" (p. 314). The choice presented for Europe by Hellmann is rather confining and deterministic: industrial giantism and economic integration or acceptance of American and Japanese dominance of world business. The thought that giantism and bigness in world business might be undesirable and that other alternatives need not be ruled out does not even occur to him.

Giantism in business is also Vernon's point of departure. His study is concerned with the multinational dimension of U.S. enterprises, but his universe is restricted to 187 manufacturing firms. The figure was arrived at by applying two criteria for inclusion: membership in *Fortune's* group of 500, and a significant degree of multinational activity as indicated by having manufacturing subsidiaries in six or more countries. The result is a highly selective and elitist club, but nonetheless a very powerful and important one. Vernon's data bear out their prominence and distinction. The 187 enterprises, when compared to the rest of U.S. manufacturing enterprises, were generally more profitable, dedicated a higher percentage of their sales to R & D efforts and advertising outlays, tended to involve greater use of skilled technical manpower, and were generally more diversified in their activities. In short, they were according to Vernon a "group of enterprises usually associated with oligopoly" (p. 12). And they are even more prominent if one looks at the linkage between America and the world economy. Vernon demonstrates the heavy involvement of his sample of 187 firms in export-oriented industries and products, their contribution to the U.S. balance-of-payments, and their dominant position in the foreign direct investments of U.S. firms. He estimates that this group alone accounts for as much as 80 per cent of the overseas liquid assets of U.S. firms. The last point is quite suggestive and important: multinationality and foreign investments are the domains and the activities of industrial giants and worldwide concentration is thus bound to become the most distinguishing feature of the world economy unless the current trends are reversed.

Like Hellmann, but in a much more systematic and analytical fashion, Vernon is sensitive to the impact of the multinational corporation upon the nation-state system and to the problems of interface between these two forms of organization. His major assumption is one of a basic asymmetry between them which calls for a degree of global regulation and control. The conflict here, we are told by Vernon and by much of the literature on the multinational corporation, derives from the flexibility of the multinational firm, the territorial nature of the nation-state, and the obvious desire of the latter to maintain a reasonable degree of autonomy in its economic activities. But Vernon ignores other possibilities and realities here, and minimizes the symbiotic relationships that develop between business and governmental elites. One need not probe too far to note the close symbiosis between giant corporations and the political order in most of the advanced industrialized countries. Nor can we ignore the alliances that develop between the subsidiaries of giant multinationals and the established guardians of order in the host countries of the Third World. Vernon is vulnerable here precisely because he sees the multinational corporation as a destabilizing force posing a major threat to established elites and vested interests. National authorities, it could be argued, both in the home and host countries, can coexist with multinational corporations to the mutual benefit of both. Policies can be pursued and regulations made which advance the interests of giant firms and governmental elites in both home and host countries. The major concern here would be the social costs to be borne by the powerless of the world's population. Inflated prices, a deteriorating environment, and much more centralized and inaccessible structures of power and authority, will accompany and indeed have already accompanied the spread and rise to power of the multinational corporation.

Another topic that Vernon attempts to treat is the cultural impact of the U.S.-based multinational subsidiaries. And here his analysis is excessively sketchy. He sees a potential clash of cultures, and applies this concept to the different cultural styles that characterize the interaction between U.S. firms and several industrialized countries. In so doing he overlooks, in my judgment, not only the cultural impact of the multinationals upon the weak and impressionable societies of the Third World, but also the cultural content and dimension of the multinationals and of their products. Clearly there is a life style imparted by the multinationals, and the desired outcome is the expansion of the world consumer system and the world comfort culture. We must wait for someone else to undertake this kind of analysis, and it is not in this area where Vernon makes his best contributions. He is at his best where he provides us with a painstaking analysis of the U.S. manufacturing subsidiaries and raw material ventures and an excellent discussion of the personality and dynamics of the multinational corporation.

The following general remarks are as much of a commentary on the two books under review as they are upon the major thrust of thinking about the multinational corporation. Both books reveal a certain fascination with corporate giantism and bigness. The costs of such bigness are rarely discussed. It is strange, indeed, that Vernon for example, notes in passing that his sample of multinationals is associated with oligopoly but fails to discuss the features and costs of a world economic order dominated by giant oligopolists. Furthermore, like a good deal of writing on the multinationals, the two studies here devote very little if any attention to the social costs of multinational corporate activity, and the entire notion of social costs and welfare implications does not even seem to have occurred to Hellmann. Vernon makes occasional hints and infrequent references, but that is hardly sufficient. A final criticism already stated but worth repeating is the failure of the Vernon and Hellmann studies and much of the literature on the multinationals to note the culture and ideology imparted and implied in multinational corporate activity. Unless the concern with the multinationals moves in these broad directions it will prove to be another short-lived fad whose scholarly outcome is as questionable as its normative priorities and commitments.

FOUAD AJAMI

University of Washington

The Bear at the Gate: Chinese Policymaking under Soviet Pressure. By Harold C. Hinton. (Stanford: Hoover Institution and the American Enterprise Institute, 1971. Pp. 112. $3.00.)

The developing rapprochement between Washington and Peking is surely one of the more significant international developments of our time. This monograph by an acknowledged specialist on Chinese foreign policy is therefore particularly relevant, for it analyzes the course of events that led the Chinese Communist side to such an important breakthrough. The main Chinese motive was supplied by the increasingly threatening conflict with the USSR, and the need to find a Great Power counterweight through better relations with the United States. Sino-Soviet tension had seemingly reached the boiling point with the serious fighting along the border in March, 1969. In this study Professor Hinton describes admirably the way in which the Chinese leadership coped with this crisis, easing a dangerous military situation into a protracted stalemate at the conference table, with the Nixon invitation as a final counter. Thus we have a study of Chinese Communist behavior in which the Chinese are found to be skillful at crisis management, though occasionally rash in initiating crises (p. 9).

Like the author's previous books, this briefer work demonstrates his gift for lucid synthesis, encyclopedic knowledge of the internal and external politics of the communist world, and flair for ingenious—sometimes overingenious—speculation. For example, on page 5 Hinton has Chou En-lai arguing in "intra-party debate" that Lin Piao was endangering Chinese security both by his unpopularity in Moscow and by his opposition to the opening to the United States. Yet one wonders whether the latter might not mitigate the former; if Lin Piao was a last-ditch opponent of detente with Washington, might he not have been more acceptable to Moscow than the wily Chou En-lai, for just that reason? This argument is strained, of course, but suggests how much guesswork must be involved in either interpretation. Also in evidence is the author's penchant for seeing intended political significance in almost every date as the "anniversary" of something else, a subtechnique of Kremlinology that Professor Hinton has developed into a virtual art form (see pp. 5 and 70 for examples). This idiosyncracy, however, does little harm to a book which, in style and execution somewhere between scholarship and an intelligence report, will be indispensable for the specialist and informative for anyone.

The Introduction and first chapter provide an overview describing the development of Sino-Soviet friction through the 1969 border clash and its denouement. Much of this ground has been covered elsewhere (see especially the account of Thomas Robinson in this *Review*, December, 1972). Most interesting are the author's interpretations of the roles of hawks and doves on both sides. Hinton suggests that Maoist elements (hawks) in the Army may have provoked the first fighting on the Ussuri as a way of re-emphasizing the correctness of a hostile line toward both the USSR and the USA. As already noted, he also argues that Lin Piao's mysterious fall in 1971 was the result of Chou En-lai's desire to eliminate this simplistic Maoist on the grounds that Lin had become a liability to China's security. The second chapter interweaves the diplomacy of Peking, Moscow, and Washington to show how the Chinese, in the face of continuing Soviet military pressure, defused an explosive situation into protracted, secret border talks, with Chinese claims still open. Again a main theme is the intransigence of the militant Maoists; one is almost led to conclude quite literally that Chou can make progress for China in foreign affairs only when Mao and his "true believers" are out of town. A third chapter analyzes Peking's internal responses to the crisis, suggesting that both Maoists and non-Maoists were able to make use of the War-Preparedness Campaign for purposes of their own. A following chapter on the current state (1971) of Sino-Soviet relations predicts continuing hostility but little likelihood of war. The author throughout handles a mass of detail in masterful fashion, but not everything falls neatly into place. For example, Hinton reports Mao as believing late in 1968 that the Soviet Union had become the prime enemy and that relations with the West must be improved, even with the United States (p. 32), but two pages later he writes that in early 1969 Mao "evidently did not take the Soviet threat seriously and therefore saw no reason to appease the United States" (p. 34). Even if the Chairman "was in one of his militant moods" (p. 33), one wonders at the apparent inconsistency. On page 20 is a chronological slip: the suppression of the Red Guards by the Army should be dated late 1968, not 1969.

The final chapter on the American role in the Sino-Soviet dispute sensibly concludes that the United States cannot gain from Machiavellian attempts at manipulation and should strive instead for modest improvements in relations with both Communist Powers without threatening either. Other aspects of this chapter are less appealing. It is marked by a Cold Warrior tone and an insistence that the primary interest of the United States in the Far East is to maintain "stability." But these implications for the larger realm of the proper bases, moral and pragmatic, for American foreign policy need not be debated here, nor do Professor Hinton's views in this respect seriously detract from the very real value of the rest of his analysis.

JAMES L. NICHOLS
California State University, Hayward

Every War Must End. By Fred Charles Iklé. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971. Pp. 160. $8.00.)

It is notoriously easier for nations to get involved in war than to extricate themselves from it, and the human as well as material losses suffered by belligerents sometimes reach monstrous proportions just because they don't know when and how to stop. The First World War offers a particularly telling and tragic recent example of this. When the holocaust finally ended, the thought uppermost in people's minds was that such a catastrophe must not be allowed to happen again. The issue, however, was not approached in terms of avoiding the undue prolongation of hostilities. Only the abolition of war seemed to offer any real hope. The war of 1914–18 had to remain on the record as the last war in history. This was to be guaranteed by the League of Nations, symbol and instrument of a total moral and political reform, changing the course of history once and for all.

After the collapse of the League and another world war, the victorious powers revived the idea of safeguarding peace through a universal supernational authority; the U.N. was organized as an improved version of the old League. Yet the problem constellation of peace and war had radically changed since the League days. The war that had just ended again was said to mark the beginning of a new historical epoch, but this was ominously dubbed the Atomic Age. The new era dawned amidst apocalyptic fears of sudden extinction, fanned by the nuclear armament race, the cold war, incessant international crises and war scares, and a succession of nonnuclear, "peripheral" wars that might escalate to the nuclear level.

The peace-keeping machinery of the U.N. offered little reassurance in the face of these threats. In time, however, another factor lessening the danger of war emerged, reciprocal nuclear "deterrence." Fear of the consequences of a nuclear exchange had a visible sobering, restraining effect upon the superpowers' behavior: in one cold war crisis after another, nuclear capabilities were held back on both sides. This of course provided no complete reassurance either: it was realized that mutual restraint might snap in certain circumstances. The important thing was, however, that at least in the normal run of things mere rational self-interest could be relied upon to ward off nuclear annihilation, even while the ideal solution, a new world order barring all violence, was not within reach. Accordingly, many policy planners and theorists turned their attention to the stabilization of deterrence, and the limitation of war, as the most important immediate, practical problem.

Every War Must End reflects this pragmatic approach toward peace and war in a nuclear technological environment. The central theme is the termination of war, that is cutting it short in order to avoid crippling losses. Professor Iklé, however, also deals with the initiation and the conduct of wars from the point of view of minimizing losses. He sees the key aspect of the problem in "rational" decision making, meaning, above all, that no move will be made without a realistic appraisal of its immediate and distant consequences.

The book is divided into five chapters dealing with the most important sources of "irrational" decision-making practices: going to war without having any idea of what the aftermath would be; errors in estimating one's own and the enemy's resources; reckless "escalation" when things do not go well; political constraints and inertia; failure to communicate with the enemy. Under each of these headings, striking examples of "irrationality" are presented, taken from the record of twentieth-century conflicts (the two World Wars, Korea, Suez, and Algeria). An epilogue deals with the strengths and weaknesses of the concept of deterrence.

From the historical material, which is treated with considerable virtuosity, we get vivid illustrations of such typical planning errors as letting the choice of one's objectives be dictated by available resources and capabilities (Germany, Japan), or improvising bizarre diversionary schemes to compensate for lack of resources (France). The study also presents very interesting, unfamiliar material about debates between politically weak and strong policymaking groups, the former being reduced to stressing technical side issues such as timing in opposing moves sponsored by the powerful. Finally, we may mention one more type of irrationality discussed in Prof. Iklé's study: abrupt shifts from one policy extreme to the other (e.g. from appeasement to all-out war). Here as in all other examples, we have to do with complex political strategic problems facing planning systems that lack the capacity to handle them; the book is intended to contribute to improving the problem-solving capability of decision-making systems working in technologically complex political environments.

Every War Must End does indeed make such a contribution by clarifying some significant aspects of "rationality" and "irrationality" in relation to decisions concerned with peace and war. At this point, however, a question of principle arises: Is "rationality" in the conduct of war a legitimate object of study? Should we try to make war more bearable? Why not seek to abolish war altogether?

It seems to me that these two objectives are not mutually exclusive. Abolition, of course, is the ideal. It is only that we cannot neglect "rationality" unless "abolition" is already an accomplished fact, but this means changing the course of history once and for all, and the trouble with this kind of objective is that one can never know for sure whether it has been accomplished. It is vital to be able to fall back upon "rationality" if necessary.

Paul Kecskemeti

Brandeis University

The Economic Impact of Commonwealth Immigration. By K. Jones and A. D. Smith. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Pp. 177. $6.00.)

The McCarran-Walter Act shut off British West Indian emigration to the United States and switched it across the Atlantic to England. The Negro migrants from the Caribbean were later joined by an almost equal number from India (mainly Sikhs) and from both wings of Pakistan so that today, twenty years after the McCarran Act, colored Commonwealth immigrants, together with the children born to them in Britain, account for some 4 per cent of the population.

The West Indians were attracted to the British labor market by the policies of full employment pursued by all postwar British governments. The curve of their arrivals throughout the 'fifties corresponded almost exactly to the curve of job vacancies with a three months' time-lag. The pull of the market was at least as strong a factor as the push of poverty. For this reason there has not been a colored manpower problem in Britain as there has been in the United States; the scarce resource in Britain has not been jobs but housing, since London and the industrial cities which attracted colored labor had been bombed during the war and had not had their housing stock replaced or renewed.

Britain's future has never been seen to depend on immigration (she has in fact been traditionally a country of emigration), and this is one of the reasons why no machinery existed to deal with the postwar Commonwealth immigration which, the Irish apart, was to be the largest in British history. It was also black and carried with it the seeds of social and political tensions: yet it was allowed to occur almost in a fit of absence of mind. Successive governments adopted a policy of laissez-faire, passing the responsibility for housing and education to the local authorities who were unable to cope with problems which were political dynamite.

There was no Ministry of Absorption; there was no central plan, and there were no planning instruments. Official information on the progress of immigrants was unavailable except through the decennial census which, unlike the U.S. census, did not include questions on income and expenditure. In 1964 the Home Secretary flirted with the idea of an economic census of the colored population, found it too difficult, and dropped it.

The work under review is particularly valuable as it is one of the very few attempts to assess the economic costs and benefits of the immigration and coming from the authoritative and independent National Institute of Economic and Social Research it had a particular political importance at a time when unscrupulous attacks were being made on the immigrants and on their cost to the country. The authors show that they were largely a replacement population filling the gap caused in the 25 to 44 age group by low British birth rates in the interwar period. Given the preponderance of this age group among the immigrants it is not surprising that their economic activity rate is higher than that of the indigenous population. What is more surprising is that immigrant workers are not highly concentrated in particular occupations. They appear to have provided an across-the-board increment to work forces in expanding manufacturing industries, as well as serving to mitigate the decline of employment in contracting industries.

The age-distribution of immigrants also has important implications for their use of the social services. Because only 2 per cent of the immigrants, compared with 12 per cent of the indigenous population is more than 65 years old and because of the very high cost of the geriatric services, immigrant families cost the health and welfare services less than other families, and the authors predict that this is likely to remain true at least until 1981. The age-structure factor more than outweighs the cost of special health and educational requirements.

Immigrants make greater demands (per head) on hospitals and schools, but their housing standards are lower. Many of their needs in this sphere have to be met by what the authors refer to as "delayed scrapping"—in housing, for example, slum clearance has been postponed. The authors find that immigrants' social capital requirements are some 19 per cent below that of the indigenous population, but that this is more or less balanced by a higher than average need for industrial capital, in the short term, because modern plants require more units of capital per unit of output than older plants.

However, the inflationary impact of immigrants' capital requirements is only marginal, and in the long term the position is reversed, since the majority of the immigrants are workers who have just entered upon their working life. Thus "a narrowly economic inspection reveals the acquisition of workers who will contribute, like indigenous workers, to capital formation but in whom much capital, social and industrial, has already been embodied, the cost of which the recipient body has been spared" (p. 160). This is particularly true in Britain where for the last 6 or 7 years colored immigration has been confined almost exclusively to men with professional qualifications.

This is a valuable study. The authors have had to rely mainly on the evidence from the decennial census of 1961 and the 10 per cent sample census exceptionally taken in 1966. It is not their fault that other evidence is lacking, but it is hoped that they have made the case for further research.

E. J. B. Rose

London

Euratlantica: Changing Perspectives of the European Elites. By Daniel Lerner and Morton Gorden. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The M.I.T. Press, 1969. Pp. xii, 447. $3.95, paper.)

This book represents the major research report of a most ambitious study: TEEPS (The European Elite Panel Survey). During a crucial decade for the development of Europe—1955 to 1965—five waves of interviews were carried out with a sample of elites in Germany, France and Britain. The elites were drawn from government, politics, business, and communications. In addition, other relevant groups were studied—officials of EEC, students at the *grandes écoles* in France (to get at future elites) and scientists at CERN. The selection of the elites is never completely described—except that they were chosen by a panel of experts in each country—but it appears clear that they represent a cross-section of the "establishments" in each nation.

The interviews covered many topics, but the main focus was on Europe, its future, and its options. The study is thus a social science enterprise with clear relevance to contemporary problems. (In this connection, it is unfortunate that a book issued in 1969 first reached this reviewer in the fall of 1972.)

The authors provide a lively account of the methodological problems involved in cross-cultural research, particularly with an elite population. And they demonstrate that a lot can be accomplished even when the experts tell one that survey techniques will not work with sophisticated elites. For instance, the authors found that their respondents were willing to answer closed-ended questions and did not resent the simplification that such questions imply.

The repeated surveys allow the authors to trace the evolving attitudes of the three elite groups to alternate patterns of European development: Atlantica (the Atlantic alliance of Europe and America embodied in NATO and the Marshall Plan); Europa (the Monnet or EEC model of European integration); and Euronationalism (the Gaullist design).

The surveys reveal a high level of consensus among the various elites groups—consensus in commitment to Europa and Atlantica coupled with rejection of the Gaullist alternative. And this policy consensus is based, so the authors tell us, on a growing pragmatism and a decline of commitment to "ideologizing" and "moralizing." "The underlying sentiment is that European integration/Euratlantic cooperation based on the Euramerican system of relations are historically 'right' [i.e., correct] in the sense that they represent the most rational options open to Europeans in the historical conditions of the post-war world" (p. 242). That these elites are pragmatic is clear in the data, but the authors (who share the policy preferences of their respondents) too often seem to equate "ideological" thinking (rigid, unrealistic, bad) with opposition to the "historically right" movement toward Euratlantica. It is ideological to oppose the European community and the Atlantic alliance, pragmatic to support it. Maybe so. But one man's pragmatism is often another's dogma.

The high level of consensus among the elites leads to a certain blandness in the data. The authors find few meaningful variations within the national samples. With almost no exceptions, the data consist of presentations of marginal results across time for each nation. Thus what is usually most interesting in cross-national research—comparisons across nations of patterns of internal variation within nations—is missing. Little, also, is done with the panel data—i.e., the fact that the same respondents are interviewed a number of times rather than using new replicated samples. We see movement in the marginals from time period to time period, but do not know how the reinterviewed respondents may have changed. Measures of the stability of preferences from one time point to another might have been most interesting.

One senses—particularly from the appendices, in which various attempts to find clusters of types of elites are reported with few substantive payoffs—that the authors searched hard for meaningful within-nation variations but the overriding consensus among the elites doomed most such attempts. That's the way things are with data!

The authors conclude that Europa and Euratlantica will very probably grow and prosper. In the few years since their last wave of interviews much has happened. The dollar crisis and (probably to a lesser extent) Vietnam have strained the Atlantic alliance. De Gaulle has left the scene, but the Gaullist view on Europe has not completely disappeared from the Elysées palace. Britain is in, but not all Britons are happy. And in Norway a movement—inconsistent with the new "pragmatic" Europe—arose to defeat EEC at least for the time being.

Despite all this, the authors' predictions are probably sound. Their interviews allowed them to penetrate beneath the surface events that push Europa and Atlantica temporarily forward and temporarily backward. Their data show a movement forward in the long run. And their judgment—based on a unique and valuable body of data—is probably correct.

Sidney Verba

Harvard University

Victors' Justice: The Tokyo War Crimes Trial. By Richard H. Minear. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1971. Pp. 229. $7.95.)

In his preface, Richard Minear, a legal historian, makes some fashionable charges against contemporary political scientists and area specialists. He has "grave suspicions about the concerns of political science, or at least political scientists writing about Vietnam" (p. xii). He holds that it is dangerous to leave recent history to the "tender mercies" of Samuel Huntington, Douglas Pike, Ithiel de Sola Pool, and Frank Trager. He asserts that area specialists should concern themselves at least part of the time with topics of immediate relevance to American policy.

The "wrongness" of the Vietnam War led Minear to doubt that American policy on Japan during World War II and the Occupation could have been enlightened. Thus the author begins by generalizing from the Vietnam War and applies the generalization concerning American policy in the 1960s to arrive at a revisionist interpretation of American policy in the 1930s and 1940s. He tends to assume that the reader already shares his ideological biases. Forewarned of the author's lack of objectivity, the reviewer might be forgiven if he is at first predisposed to dismiss Minear's book as just another antiwar tract.

The usual pacifist contention is that the Nuremberg and Tokyo war crimes trials provide moral and legal justifications to resist American involvement in Vietnam and to indict American policy-makers as war criminals. Minear declares, however, that his major concern is "to demolish the credibility of the Tokyo trials and its verdict" (p. ix). He holds that Tojo was "legally innocent" (p. x). He favors trials for conventional war crimes, but opposes trials for aggressive war itself. Thus he would oppose a trial concerned with the whole course of American policy in Asia (p. xi), which he regards as aggressive.

It is a tribute to Professor Minear's intellectual independence that, notwithstanding his views on Vietnam, he refuses to glorify the Nuremberg and Tokyo Trials and instead attacks them. Like many American military men and conservatives, he is appalled by the idea that a nation's military and political leaders might be held personally responsible and punishable for a war. Minear thus appears to attack the basis of the Vietnam War trials held in Stockholm and in Tokyo in 1967 unless he regards them as primarily concerned with conventional war crimes.

The Princeton University Press has announced that it advanced the publication date of Minear's book in view of the interest created by David Bergamini's massive *Japan's Imperial Conspiracy*, which appeared late in 1971. Bergamini, whose scholarly qualifications have been severely questioned by American experts on Japan, attacks the fairness of the Tokyo War Crimes Trial on the alleged ground that

Emperor Hirohito was a principal architect of Japan's aggressive policies and should have been tried along with Tojo and the rest. Although both books advocate a revisionist interpretation of the trials, Minear goes much farther than Bergamini, urging that the trial of a defeated nation's leaders by the victors lacked both legal sanction and fairness. Thus Minear would oppose the trial of the Emperor as well as the trial of other Japanese leaders for their policy of aggression. Minear even goes so far as to suggest that Japan's war policy was at least partly motivated by a legitimate concern for the national defense. Although the two books have become closely associated in the minds of many readers, they have very little in common, whether in content, method, or philosophy.

Minear criticizes the International Military Tribunal for the Far East and its verdict on nearly every conceivable score: the vagueness of the conspiracy charge, the alleged responsibility of individuals before international law, the dubiousness of the concept of aggression, the retroactivity of the verdict (in which people were convicted for deeds not crimes at the time committed), the concept of negative criminality (the failure of superiors to prevent crimes by subordinates), the selection of judges exclusively from the victor nations, dubious procedures (including the imposition of death sentences by a six to five vote of the justices), the failure to try any Allied leaders (even for such apparent violations of international law as the dropping of atomic bombs on cities and the Soviet Union's declaration of war on Japan while a neutrality treaty between the two countries was in force), inconsistencies in the selection of the Japanese individuals to be tried, the political decision not to try the Emperor, and the very loose and biased application of rules of evidence.

Minear's basic contention is that many of the ideals and preconceptions that lay behind the Tokyo trial "have played a contributing role in the more recent mistakes the United States has made and continues to make in Asia." These preconceptions include "the belief that change in the international arena should come only through peaceful means, that resort to force is unjustifiable whatever the provocation, that aggressive war (assuming we can decide what aggression means) is illegal" (p. 178). Dean Rusk's talk of "aggression" and President Nixon's talk of "a generation of peace," Minear says, echo the Pact of Paris and the Nuremberg and Tokyo verdicts.

Professor Minear, in attacking the legalistic, moralistic approach to the analysis of international relations is saying nothing new. The realist school led by Hans Morgenthau has been reiterating these ideas for twenty-five years. What is surprising is that Minear, an opponent of America's Vietnam policy, appears to deny the basis of the legalistic-moralistic attack on America's Vietnam policy. He evidently opposes the policy not so much because it is illegal or immoral (concepts inappropriate for foreign policy formulation), but because it is politically and strategically unsound.

The Tokyo trial occurred after the Nuremberg trial, and for the American public it was an anticlimax. Americans were much more familiar with the Nazi leaders and their philosophy than with the Japanese leaders and policies which were on trial in Tokyo. Americans forgot the Tokyo trial after 1952, when Japan became an ally. Twenty years later, troubled by the course of American policy in Asia, Minear has reopened the record of the Tokyo trial and raised many searching and difficult questions. Most of these questions were pretty thoroughly debated in the court and press at the time of the trial, although wartime emotions were still at a fairly high pitch. The answers the author advances sometimes seem onesided. This book is perhaps too short and polemical to be regarded as definitive. However, Minear's firm grasp of both law and history has enabled him to expound, in a masterful fashion, the lessons of the Tokyo trial. We must be grateful to Professor Minear for producing a readable and perceptive book about a much neglected but historically very important topic. His fundamental criticisms of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East are equally relevant to the Nuremberg trial and any trials for aggression that might be held in the future. To the student of international politics, the Minear volume provides corroborative data and analysis in support of the realist approach.

THEODORE MCNELLY

University of Maryland

Conflict Analysis. By Michael Nicholson. (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1970. Pp. 168. $8.00.)

Michael Nicholson's book *Conflict Analysis,* manifests the influence of several peace-oriented groups in England, including the Conflict Studies group at The University of Lancaster; the Center for the Analysis of Conflict at University College, London; and the Richardson Institute for Conflict and Peace Research, also in London. In spite of their peace orientation, these three groups have retained an analytic approach to conflict research in contrast to the more philosophical orientation of many other peace activists.

Among those activist scholars committed to an analytic approach to peace research, Michael Nicholson stands out as one of the most formal (i.e., deductive), yet one of those who is sympathetic to empirical work. Judged from the perspective of a balance between formal and empirical approaches, *Conflict Analysis* achieves a nice equilibrium. The book, however, does a rather uneven job of integrating findings from empirical studies with deductions from formal analysis.

Consider the chapter contents as a means for evaluating the balance between formal and empirical approaches. There are ten chapters in the book. Three deal with epistemological, definitional, or value problems; three chapters focus on formal approaches—game theory, bargaining, and arms races; three chapters contain empirical descriptions or summaries of the empirical literature regarding war, alliances, and crises, and one chapter deals with experimental methods, in particular, man-machine laboratory simulation. In short, three chapters deal with broad methodological issues, three are relatively formal expositions, three are more or less empirical, and one chapter is experimental.

While *Conflict Analysis* is relatively balanced between formal and empirical approaches, it is somewhat less successful in its attempt at theoretical coherence. That is, the formal approaches are used only rarely to illustrate how formal approaches can generate deductions about which empirical evidence would be relevant. In the relatively formal chapters dealing with game theory, bargaining, and arms races, Nicholson could have demonstrated linkages between formal and empirical studies. Although he acknowledges the gap between game theory and evidence from experimental games, Nicholson does not document the gap or suggest ways of relating insights from game theory either to experimental games or empirical work generally. In his discussion of Richardson's theory of arms races, Nicholson does a good job in evaluating Richardson's formal theory against his own evidence but a less adequate job of evaluating Richardson from the perspective of evidence from other scholars.

The less formal chapters dealing with war, alliance, and crisis contain excellent descriptions of current studies, but no attempt is made to link formal theory with empirical evidence. For example, Nicholson discusses the role of perception in mediated stimulus-response models of crisis decision making, but the potential link between formal theory and the empirical studies of crises is not pursued. For example, an assumption underlying game theory is that the actors have adequate information, i.e., misperception would not allow actors to be rational. If crisis studies find that misperceptions characterize escalation processes leading to war, such a finding would be evidence opposed to a game-theory assumption of adequate information, where the converse would be true if crisis research shows that perceptions are relatively accurate.

What, in fact, does the evidence suggest regarding the phenomenon of misperception? Some authors, such as Anatol Rapoport, assume that misperception is a principal factor explaining escalation. On the other hand, others such as Dina Zinnes suggest that misperception generally does not account for escalation. For example, Zinnes finds a positive relationship between a nation's expression of hostility and the target state's perception of threat or unfriendliness. In other words, nations correctly perceive threat or unfriendliness and express hostility in return.

In discussing game theory (rational) models of choice, Nicholson also overlooks another link between formal approaches and empirical evidence, namely, the role of organization in placing limits on the value-maximizing behavior assumed. Consider Graham Allison's findings regarding limited rather than comprehensive rationality in his study of crisis decision making in the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Allison stresses, inter alia, organizational pro- the crisis more as outputs of large organizations cesses to explain Soviet and U.S. behavior in functioning according to standard operating procedures and search processes rather than as the value-maximizing unitary actors suggested in the game theory assumption of comprehensive rationality. Allison's evidence concerning the limited applicability of comprehensive rationality has implications for the validity of choice models of the game theory type as discussed by Nicholson. In short, while Nicholson considers both formal and empirical approaches, he overlooks their potential interrelationships, thus weakening the book's intellectual coherence.

Nicholson's concern for peace is evident in his discussion of social science and the study of conflict as well as in the chapter on social science and values. A concern for peace, however, is not enough. That is, Nicholson should show specifically how peace research products might help bring about a more pacific world. Nicholson's experience with institutions which are devoted to the study of conflict and conflict resolution gives him a good perspective on the need for clarifying the relationship between social science research and policy making. Indeed, Nicholson states in the preface of *Conflict Analysis* that his purpose in writing the book is ". . . to describe . . . the current work in the application of methods and tools of the social sciences to further the understanding and to promote an ultimate cure of violent and in particular, international conflicts" (p. 14). Yet he devotes only a few pages to the discussion of the actual relevance of conflict and peace research to questions of policy making and policy outcomes.

Nicholson notes that political strategists such as Machiavelli and Clausewitz have discussed the uses of war as a tool for policy. If the purpose of *Conflict Analysis* is to further the understanding and to promote an ultimate cure of violent international conflicts, more attention could be given to applying the findings of peace research to historical situations as scholars such as John Burton have done.

In spite of my reservations concerning the lack of theoretical coherence between formal and empirical approaches, I believe nevertheless that *Conflict Analysis* should be a useful book. It could serve as an introductory text for upper level undergraduates and beginning graduate students interested in conflict studies. For the general academic reader, the book offers a good descriptive and evaluative view of some existing methods and models of conflict.

RAYMOND TANTER

University of Michigan

A Hundred Years of International Relations. By F. S. Northedge and M. J. Grieve. (New York: Praeger, 1972. Pp. 397. $11.50.)

"This book," the authors write,

> stems from a sense of the limitations of two types of writing about international relations: orthodox diplomatic history with its heavy emphasis on primary archival material, and general theory of international relations, which seems to us to be principally contemporary international affairs with a semblance of social-science analysis and a heavy ballast of incomprehensible jargon. The former tends to degenerate into a strict day-by-day diary of events divorced from the wider framework of the international political system which helps to shape the external behaviour of states. The latter appears to be too abstract, too uninformed about the historical dimensions of the subject, to throw much light on the living realities of state behavior (p. ix).

Some will say that Professor Northedge and Miss Grieve have not so much steered a careful course between the Scylla of diplomatic history and the Charybdis of international relations theory as fallen between two stools. For their book is too discursive and too dependent on secondary sources to rate as significant contribution to the former subject, and too loose and unsystematic in its argument to be regarded as an important advance in the latter. They have, however, provided the student and the general reader with an admirable historical introduction to the study of international relations.

There are five chapters on the pre-World War I period, five on the interwar period, and six (counting the Conclusion) on the years since World War II. All of the chapters combine wide reading with a willingness to identify the big questions and make judgments about them. The chapters on imperialism, on the League of Nations, the United Nations and "The Transcendence of Sovereignty" seem to me to be particularly valuable. There are some fine passages of writing. Unity is provided by the authors' concentration on the international political system and the changes it has undergone in the last century.

In handling this theme, which Professor Northedge has masterfully expounded in his lectures at the London School of Economics over a couple of decades, the book gives rise to expectations of a contribution to the theory of international relations that it does not quite fulfil. A concluding chapter identifies the main changes in the international system as the transition from a European to a world international system, the "socialization" of foreign policy and the growth of international organizations. Throughout the book the authors attempt to relate such developments as the growth of population, the advance of technology, the two world wars, the rise and demise of the cold war, and the emergence of new states to the shape and structure of the international system. But nowhere are we given a rigorous and systematic exposition of what the international system is, or how and why it functions as it does. A view of the international system is implicit in many of the chapters, and comes closest to the surface in the chapter on sovereignty. To advance our understanding of this subject we need to approach the historical material with rigorous definitions and carefully formulated hypotheses, i.e., to take the theory of international relations more seriously than Professor Northedge and Miss Grieve are prepared to do.

HEDLEY BULL

Australian National University

U.S. Foreign Economic Policy for the 1970s: A New Approach to New Realities. A Policy Report by an NPA Advisory Committee. With supporting papers. (Washington, D.C.: NPA, 1971. $2.50. 215 pp.)

Committees of the National Planning Association are normally composed of prominent, forward-looking representatives of agriculture, business, labor, and the professions. For many years the NPA could take justifiable pride in the ability of such committees to reach substantial agreement on what ought to be done about various problems of public policy. Skillful drafting on the part of the NPA staff was, of course, a *sine qua non.* So were "footnotes" that enabled signatories to ride their favorite hobbies, calibrate upward or downward their enthusiasm for particular paragraphs of the report, and in other ways get in their personal licks. Because the reports were timely and their general thrust was clear, they were influential documents, whether published with or without supporting essays.

Today the NPA can take pride primarily in the ingenuity of its staff in papering over substantial disagreement among committee members, producing a forward-looking report on foreign economic policy despite the inroads protectionism has made among supporters of liberal trade policies, and fortifying the report's uncertain trumpet with a half-dozen clear and well-written essays on specific issues of importance to the United States and other noncommunist industrial countries.

The book under review is a 215-page paperback published in November, 1971—i.e., in the shadow of the shock of the economic policies unilaterally introduced by the United States on the preceding August 15, and before removal of the 10 per cent import surcharge and negotiation of the so-called Smithsonian agreement on monetary policy late in 1971. It has not in any fundamental sense been overtaken by events and, in these days of soaring book prices, remains an excellent bargain at $2.50. The book begins with a 40-page policy report by an NPA advisory committee recommending domestic and international policies for the "new realities of the 1970s" (p. 4). For these new realities, the "new guiding principle" (which might not seem so new had it not so recently been flagrantly violated) is that "insofar as practicable, changes in trade, monetary, investment, and other national economic policies that significantly shift their costs to other countries or that are likely to generate trade and capital movements seriously disruptive to other countries should not be put into effect unilaterally" (p. 27–28).

To this reviewer, the ensuing catalog of specific recommendations for phasing out tariffs and quotas, reducing agricultural protectionism, attacking nontariff barriers, introducing monetary reform, etc. seems sensible. To the labor members of the committee, however, the recommendations appear "completely inadequate." In 13 pages of small print, 10 of the 21 signers add 40 footnotes (20 by Nat Weinberg of the United Automobile Workers) cogently expressing various degrees of dissent from the consensus.

NPA's Chief of International Studies, Theodore Geiger, who did most of the staff work for the report, adds "A Note on U.S. Comparative Advantages, Productivity and Price Competitiveness" which intelligently sifts the available evidence concerning the supposed narrowing of economic disparities among major trading nations and the resultant adverse effects on the balance of payments and domestic employment of the United States. He also contributes an essay on whether the world is moving toward a system of trading blocs and, if so, what would arrest the trend (freedom of trade and capital movements among the European Community, Japan, and the United States). His wife and NPA colleague, Frances Geiger, closes the book with an analysis of the U.S. adjustment assistance program and analogous programs of other OECD countries. (Only Canada operates a direct counterpart.)

Between the essays of Dr. and Mrs. Geiger are four other "supporting essays." Harald B. Malmgren considers nontariff barriers (NTBs) and recommends negotiations aimed at a two-tiered system: (a) a set of general principles to apply in all cases (e.g., no damage to other countries without a compensatory adjustment), and (b) specific agreements to cover designated NTB problems. C. Fred Bergsten makes international monetary reform comprehensible to the layman. Robert M. Dunn, Jr., in the most academic of the essays, wrestles with the problem that imbalances in payments flows are likely to increase in volume and frequency as barriers to trade and capital flows are reduced. Robert E. Hunter speculates in an informed and undogmatic way on U.S. defense commitments in Europe and Asia in the 1970s and their probable effects (modest) on the U.S. balance of payments.

All six essayists are as sensitive as sinus-sufferers in winter winds to the politics of economic change. Together they have produced a lucid, informative book.

ROBERT E. ASHER

Washington, D.C.

Partners in Development: Report of the Commission on International Development. By Lester B. Pearson, Chairman. (New York: Praeger, 1969. Pp. 400. $7.95.)

Ever since the Pearson Commission was requested by the World Bank to review the recent history of international development, evaluate its results, and propose new and better policies for the future, its report has been eagerly awaited by all those concerned with development activities in the less developed countries. The composition of the Commission, the authority vested in it, and the wealth of material at its disposal, gave rise to the hope that its report would conclude an era of unfulfilled expectations and open new roads to the future. The report was expected to have the contents and the ring of the cry, "The King is Dead, Long Live the King!"

It was therefore disappointing to discover that the report covered only part of what it was hoped that the Commission would do. In brief, while the report provides a clear and illuminating analysis of past trends and present problems, it barely touches upon the main issue—what are the *practical steps* to be taken in order to achieve better results in the future.

It is now quite obvious that in the last two decades the developing countries have made only slight progress, their pace of development being much slower than had been expected. This conclusion is stated unequivocally by the Commission on the basis of the extensive evidence it collected. "Of the population in the less developed world (excluding Mainland China) 22 per cent live in countries where per capita income has grown at less than 1 per cent per year, 48 per cent live in countries where it grew between 1 and 2 per cent, and 30 per cent in countries where per capita income grew by more than 2 per cent per year" (p. 29). These figures indicate that most of the developing countries have not yet experienced any meaningful change in their present poverty level. Moreover, their rate of growth is so slow that even the beginning of the road to improvement is not yet in sight.

In view of this evidence, it is difficult to accept the Commission's conclusion that "Economic growth in many of the developing countries has proceeded at faster rates than the industrialized countries ever enjoyed at a similar stage in their own history. The fears that economically underdeveloped parts of the world were incapable of growth, or that their political problems would be so great as to preclude any economic advance, have proved to be unfounded" (p. 3).

Even so, the difficulties which the Commission has forecast for the developing countries appear to be enormous; they are aptly summarized on pages 58–61 and include three basic problems: unemployment and underutilization of human resources, rural stagnation, and the unchecked urbanization rush. Unless a practical strategy is proposed to overcome these problems, no change will occur in the coming decade, and the consequences may well be disastrous.

The major part of the Report (Chapters 4–11) is therefore devoted to a detailed proposal of "a strategy" for future action which is addressed "to the developing countries, to the industrialized countries and to the international organizations" (p. 14). The proposal includes ten recommendations, nine of which are concerned exclusively with external factors; namely, the nature, the purpose, and the organization of international trade and aid. Only one recommendation—referring to population, education, and research—deals directly (albeit very generally) with the internal situation of the developing countries.

It seems obvious that any strategy of development must be concerned primarily with what is happening to each country's society, methods of production and organization, and so on. Extranational factors can only be of secondary importance. By devoting most of its attention to such factors as international trade and aid organization, the Commission missed the main issue—what kind of development programs should be undertaken *within* the developing countries in order to promote their economic growth, and how these programs should be implemented.

One example will illustrate this point. The Commission suggests that "the primary purpose of the additional development aid . . . for the 1970's should be to help bring as many less developed countries as possible to a level of growth of at least 6 per cent per year" (p. 124). The Commission concedes that "a high level of self-sustaining growth cannot be achieved simply by foreign aid, it requires the governments of developing countries to take very positive measures of their own to remove the obstacles in the way of growth" (p. 127). What kinds of measures? This question unfortunately remains unanswered.

Furthermore, without such a basic program for change it is impossible to evaluate any proposal for improving a trade policy or foreign investment or even the means for more effective aid. For instance, when dealing with more effective aid, in particular regarding projects and porgrams, how can one recommend an improvement in aid organization when one is in doubt about the nature of the desired projects and the contents of the programs needed in the developing countries?

In conclusion, the Report has described very ably the past trends, current conditions, and probable future difficulties and has systematically and eloquently described the enormity of the task which has to be done. But that is all. It does not propose any new approach, or *any new program which would lead to practical solutions* to the basic problems of underdeveloped countries. The old beliefs are indeed dead, but where are the new ones?

RAANAN WEITZ
Rehovot, Settlement Study Center

US/UN: Foreign Policy and International Organization. By Robert E. Riggs. (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971. Pp. 347. $4.95.)

To bend a familiar phrase slightly, "national interest" is in the eye of the beholder. No work demonstrates this more clearly than the present book, which aims at evaluating the performance of the UN from the perspective of United States national interest. This is a useful and important approach to the subject, but it demonstrates once more what a difficult analytical tool such a subjective concept as the "national interest" is.

All books, especially one this brief, must be selective, and this one chooses to concentrate on two major operational areas: so-called "power" (peace maintenance) and "welfare" (economic and social problems). Within each of these categories, the author examines UN experience in dealing with certain major issues as the basis of his analysis.

As always, the crucial aspect of the work is not the factual grist, although that is difficult enough, but the methodological mill through which the data are processed. At least five methodological questions can be raised about this work:

First, whose interests should guide the evaluation? While the author emphasizes United States national interest in most of the book, he introduces the interest of the "international community" toward the end when he discusses the general institutional development of the United Nations. On the basis of the general orientation of the book, one would expect the national point of view throughout. If, however, one introduces the international community perspective as a secondary theme, why not use it as a parallel comparative yardstick throughout?

Second, if the United States national interest is to be the dominant frame of reference, how does one determine its substance? In the author's discussion of his methodology, he mentions two obvious approaches: (1) to use official statements of national interest or (2) to substitute the analyst's own formulation of national interest. Either of these, as well as other, approaches can be justified, but they should not be confused.

On page 66, during the discussion of "cold war" disputes, Riggs says, "The effectiveness of American action in the United Nations will thus be judged by how well the policy makers succeed in doing what they were trying to do, not by what, from hindsight, the United States should have done." But later the author raises questions about the validity of United States policy and admits frankly, on page 204, "This line of argument does not attack the utility of the United Nations as an instrument of policy. Rather it questions the wisdom of the policy. . . ." Unhappily the author frequently mixes these two perspectives without adequately differentiating between them.

Third, what functional criteria should be used to evaluate UN performance in relation to either national or community interest? The author identifies three major functions in both the security and welfare fields: negotiation, legitimization, and material support. Granted, these are relevant and important, but they seem too limited and vague. Surely they do not exhaust the list of significant functions performed by the UN in the security and welfare areas. What about fact-gathering inquiries, systematic analysis of problems by staff or other groups, definitive decision making, the termination of hostilities, the peaceful settlement of conflicts, the formulation of advisory or binding standards, and general administration not necessarily involving material support?

Fourth, how does one measure the effectiveness of UN performance with regard to these functions? Admittedly, this is a most difficult question for any scholar to answer, especially in these amorphous areas of human relations where no one can measure activity with absolute precision. Nonetheless, the author does not adequately address this methodological problem, and his analysis seems more subjective, inchoate and unsystematic than some other works in this field.

Fifth, how does this study compare with other relevant investigations of either the UN or other international organizations? Regrettably the author has very little to say on this question.

Within this analytical framework, the author concentrates primarily on evaluating the utility of the UN with regard to two main categories of disputes: those involving Communist states and those not involving Communist states. While this is only one of many possible bases of classification and while such a boundary cannot be drawn so sharply, the distinction has utility and is frequently used.

In the Communist category, the author describes the United States emphasis on "legitimization" of its positions against the Soviet Union, in cases such as the Greek and Korean situations, during the height of the Cold War. During the post-Stalinist thaw, the US took advantage of the improved climate for negotiation in situations such as the Cuban missile crisis. At the same time, the analysis reminds us of the many factors which have limited UN achievement in this area: e.g., continuing and profound hostility between the two superpowers, preference for non-UN negotiations to avoid the multilateral decision-making process involving a growing number of lesser states, and the lack of significant UN resources to affect such issues.

While Riggs indicates that the UN has tended to be more effective in moderating conflicts in the non-Communist category, he concludes that, here also, the US has preferred bilateral or regional negotiation which is likely to be more amenable to US influence. The analysis ends with the statement, ". . . national interest dictates that the United States should work directly with the disputants whenever possible rather than risking dilution of objectives through UN action or . . . the development of a majority consensus that does not include the U.S." (p. 208). This is one of several places in which it is not clear whether the author is simply repeating official doctrine or expressing his own. In any case, though there is much to support this conclusion, it fails to reflect the positive contributions of the UN to which the author has made previous but muted allusions.

The welfare functions of the UN will surely have more significant long-range impact than its peacekeeping role will have in improving the quality of life in the world. And the US has given substantial support to these functions. Unfortunately, however, the author devotes only a quarter of the space he has given the security function to the welfare role. He limits his discussion entirely to human rights, trade, refugees, relief, and development, in that order, and gives virtually no attention to the specialized agencies. The analysis describes the gradual decline of US influence and interest in the UN as the membership has grown and the balance of votes has shifted in favor of the developing countries. While noting the increasing hostility toward the UN voiced in the US, the author, in this case, injects his own view that ". . . if the US should conceive its interests broadly . . ., a new era of constructive American leadership in the UN could begin, and the UN could become an important instrument of economic and social policy for the US" (p. 256). Unfortunately, his restricted analysis of welfare activities provides little empirical foundation for this conclusion.

H. FIELD HAVILAND

Tufts University

The Law in Political Integration: The Evolution and Integrative Implications of Regional Legal Processes in the European Community. Harvard University Center for International Affairs. Occasional Papers in International Affairs. No. 27. By Stuart A. Scheingold. (Cambridge, Mass.: The Center, June 1971. Pp. 59. $2.25, paper.)

Transatlantic Relations in the Prospect of an Enlarged European Community. British-North America Committee, BN-2. By Theodore Geiger. (Washington, D.C.: The National Planning Association, November 1970. Pp. 61. $1.50, paper.)

Changes in international society during the past twenty-five years have been so momentous and apparently unique that they have strained the imagination and vocabulary of political commentators. This is the case in the relations among the advanced industrialized societies as a whole as well as in the regional grouping that centers around the European Community. Both essays are imaginative efforts to come to grips with some of the problems associated with the description and explanation of these transformations. That neither has accomplished a significant theoretical breakthrough should not detract from their considerable contributions.

Unlike other works on the development of European Community Law, Mr. Scheingold's essay quite consciously sets aside what he calls a "federal teleology." That fallacy of analysis, which assumes a natural goal for the integrative process, impedes the development of descriptive concepts appropriate to the current status of interregional norms in Europe. Mr. Scheingold succinctly argues why the federalist model is inappropriate to the work of the Court of Justice. In fact, he demonstrates that the Court, itself, has avoided policy issues, the direct handling of which would assert federal prerogatives in deed as well as word. Rather than view the legal processes of the Community as fostering federal ends, he argues that they may best be understood in the framework of the consensual system in which they operate.

Prima facie evidence for Mr. Scheingold's hypothesis on the consensual bias of the Court of Justice comes from the Court's persistent refusal to utilize Article 177 in the face of its multiple opportunities to do so. Article 177 could be the most powerful federalizing instrument at the Court's disposal since it gives it competence to deal with the interpretation not only of the Treaty, but also of acts of the Community's institutions and of certain statues set up by other community bodies; and it establishes the Court as an appellate tribunal of last resort. More fundamental support for his thesis covering consensual processes stems from Mr. Scheingold's interviews and his analysis of litigation before national courts. From these, he concludes that there has been a sort of subterranean promotion of communitywide norms. This has been associated notably with attorneys who have fostered the socialization of these norms in business and interest group leaders. It has also resulted from the Court of Justice itself, insofar as its own validation of executive action reinforces the legitimacy of consensual procedures in the Commission and Council of Ministers.

Mr. Scheingold clearly believes that a consensual process has been developing in the legal system of the European Community, that it is the system's most pronounced characteristic, and that it will continue to be institutionalized as one "which softens rather than sharpens the hard edges of community rules and thus makes them more palatable to all participants" (p. 46). But he recognizes that his own findings are quite modest and do not provide a suitable basis for predicting the eventual level of legal integration in Europe. That, he recognizes, is a function of the political parameter inside of which the legal processes operate. If this is so, it is doubtful that any of Mr. Scheingold's hypotheses about the nature of the eventual legal patterns in the European Community can now be fully verified. What can be analyzed, however, are norms that develop along with increased levels of interdependence among societies. These change rapidly as a result of the sorts of transformations modernized societies continuously undergo. Mr. Scheingold has made an important effort to come to grips with these norms. If they are to be described and explained satisfactorily, attempts like his own to deal with extracurial participants in the legal processes are likely to prove to be the appropriate starting point.

Describing the whole range of changes in norms and processes among the set of industrialized societies is far more difficult than the rather narrow effort to treat legal processes in the European Community setting. Yet, Mr. Geiger does this with such care and eloquence that his essay is a virtual tour de force. Although written before the outbreak of neomercantilist trade and monetary policies in 1971 and the signing of treaties of accession or association to the European Communities by the former EFTA members, it has lost none of its force. In fact, predictions of the former and an analysis of the consequences of the latter are included in the essay.

Mr. Geiger moves with ease between his description of the political history of the European Community and of the transatlantic network and his explanation of more fundamental political and economic trends associated with the high levels of modernization of the societies composing this region. Like Mr. Scheingold, Mr. Geiger refuses seriously to consider any "natural end states" toward which these societies are being driven, whether in terms of a federal or functional Europe, or an institutionalized Atlantic Community. Instead he asks what kinds of institutions are appropriate for handling the levels of interdependence among those relatively modernized societies; and he tries to sketch out the emerging patterns of norms that describe the relations of these societies as their increased interdependence engenders increased tension among them.

The essay concludes with a series of scenarios listed according to Mr. Geiger's views on their probable occurrence. It is a considerable feat that some of his predictions have begun to be validated, especially in light of the rather low level of theory that is now at hand to describe or explain the phenomena with which the author has dealt. Although part of a larger book-length effort that Mr. Geiger has recently published, this essay provides appropriate and useful materials for both the classroom and for policy formation.

As both monographs point out, there is a great deal of theoretical work to be done on the relations between the advanced industrialized societies if the tensions and crises engendered by their interdependence are to be handled adequately by the appropriate public authorities. The requisite of such theorizing is the avoidance of teleological pitfalls and the rhetoric of outmoded political ideals. Another, of course, is innovative ideas. That both pieces are better in the former regard should not be undervalued in the development of adequate theorizing.

EDWARD L. MORSE

Princeton University

Confrontation and Intervention in the Modern World. By Urs Schwarz. (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.: Oceana Publications, Inc., 1970. Pp. 218. $7.50.)

In seeking its sources of verification, political science is more and more torn between persuasive interpretation that commands the consensus of the experts and rigorous conceptualization and measurement that stands the test of replication. Both aim at prediction, the first more successfully thus far since the second is only an arrogant youngster, a struggling science, whereas the first is a fine art. Yet the oldster can never really be the same with the youngster around. If the art tries to ignore the science, it is deprecated in the professional literature, and if it tries to make its peace with the science and meet it halfway, it is likely to satisfy no one, not even those who find their own peace and salvation in the middle of the road. In this case, both the reviewer and the reviewed are in the latter position, with all the advantages and disadvantages thereof.

Urs Schwarz, retired editor of the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* and the *Swiss Review of World Affairs* and author of *American Strategy: A New Perspective,* has written an interpretation of two typical mechanisms of contemporary international relations. The book is interesting but scarcely definitive, one that would make a good college international relations text and could trigger some further investigation by a more rigorous thinker. Both confrontation and intervention are defined as episodic encounters in postwar international relations, the first being a symmetrical limited use of threat of force (pp. 15–16) and the second being an asymmetrical one (p. 83 *et passim*). The two concepts are rather tightly defined, and are then used to identify a series of events in the contemporary world. One might then have expected an attempt to find typical patterns of action within each concept, either in an effort to identify some inherent process or in the hopes of finding ways in which the reaction can be kept from getting out of hand and peace (or some other value) can be preserved. Unfortunately, for an exercise that began so well, such an end is never attained, and the study concludes with some semantic juggles (p. 206) and some interesting comments on the erstwhile Cold War.

After an initial discussion of the constructive use of limited force and of the concept of confrontation, Schwarz launches into an excellent series of thumbnail sketches of a number of confrontations since the original Berlin blockade. He is particularly deft in portraying the chain of encounters of the Khrushchev era, from the Berlin ultimatum of 1958 to the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, with a fine capacity for summarizing context, options, moves, and outcomes. The chapter moves on to other confrontations and then just ends (p. 82), all trees and no forest. The second half of the book, on intervention, does not show the same skill in its case studies, but the wisdom of a sound and seasoned commentator on international affairs is still evident. The strength in the second part lies therefore not so much in the vignettes of intervention or in the more semantic discussions of the concept itself, but in Schwarz's perception of the evolution of international relations from a hierarchial system of power and responsibility where the stronger policed the weaker and were expected to do so, to a limited conflict system in which nonintervention is expected but intervention occurs, with neither power nor responsibility clearly defined.

Nowhere is this ambiguity more evident than in Schwarz's conclusions themselves. "Confrontation has become the accepted form of antagonistic international intercourse" (p. 208) whereas intervention "is not needed, . . . not safe, . . . [and] not right." Yet the best examples of confrontation come from the bygone Khrushchev era, whereas the lingering malignant cases of intervention in Czechoslovakia and Vietnam are still with us (p. 215), and the confrontational aspects of the latter two episodes have been notoriously mild or ineffectual (neither is discussed by Schwarz under "Confrontation"). Such ambiguities are of course part of reality and are properly reflected in the author's interpretation. If life is like that, it may be too much to expect more of analysis.

I. WILLIAM ZARTMAN
New York University

Conflict in World Politics. Edited by Steven L. Spiegel and Kenneth N. Waltz. (Cambridge: Winthrop Publishers, 1971. Pp. 474. $4.50, paper.)

This is a book of original essays dealing with various types of conflict situations—those involving Great Power conflicts, hegemonic conflicts, violent conflicts, muted conflicts, and policy conflicts. As one would expect, the essays are of varying quality and insight, although each contributes to a clearer understanding of the particular situation being discussed.

Aside from examining specific contributions, it is always difficult to evaluate a book of essays except in terms of its overall conceptualization and the way that conceptualization is reflected in the organization and content of the work. In evaluating the present work, then, one must note that the categories are not exclusive: Great Power or hegemonic conflicts may be either violent or muted. Nor are the principles guiding the selection of cases very clear. For example, is the conflict between East and West Germany really (or primarily) violent? If one were to answer in the affirmative, one would have to define violence and distinguish between its latent and actual forms. The larger question is whether all conflicts between divided countries are bound to be violent, as the scheme of the book suggests.

Another example of the questions that arise out of the organization of the work: Internal conflicts are subsumed under the category of "violent" ones, with case studies of South Vietnam and Nigeria/Biafra. No one would question that the categorization applies to these cases. But many internal conflicts (I would argue the great majority of them) are resolved short of violence: were this not the case, any given system would surely break down.

One of the most interesting categories in the book is that of "muted conflicts," with its subdivisions into "three-sided conflicts," "international cooperation and potential conflict;" and "social and economic cooperation and conflict." Some particularly fine case studies are presented here, but some difficult questions do linger. For instance, surely we are not asked to assume that all, or nearly all, three-sided conflicts are muted. Also, one can fully accept the proposition that cooperation does not preclude conflict; yet, the inclusion of case studies dealing with conflict between Portugal and South Africa, Great Britain and France, or the United States and Canada requires a very broad conceptualization of conflict. In short, I wonder whether a narrower, tighter, definition of conflict would not be more illuminating. As it stands, the "muted conflict" category appears miscellaneous; one cannot tell just what overriding or underlying principle holds it together.

Are there, then, common elements in conflict? The editors suggest five: every conflict has origins, scope, issues in dispute, methods-instruments-strategies, and outcomes. One cannot fault this scheme, but one must say that it is very minimal—and also that the cases presented are so varied that it is easy to lose sight of the basic organizing principle.

The question, of course, is whether it is possible to generalize more fruitfully about conflict —especially when the term is as broadly conceived as it is here. The editors appear to be somewhat ambivalent on this point. Professor Spiegel, in his introductory comments, seems to argue against generalizing, particularly when generalization is based on cross-cultural, cross-national, and comparative analysis. But he does, nonetheless, go on to make some rather broad statements about causes and consequences of conflicts. His conclusions are sound though not startling: Great Power intervention in local conflicts tends to intensify contention; distance tends to diffuse relations and facilitate conflict resolution; proximity intensifies both cooperation and conflict. One feels that one has known these things all along, though it is always reassuring to have them reconfirmed by case studies. I have the same reaction to the "questions about familiar themes" which, Spiegel writes, the essays raise: e.g., the challenge to the idea that postwar conflicts were ideological; the recognition that the relationship between American capitalism and Russian communism is "largely peripheral and partly irrelevant" (p. 10) to most conflicts being waged. Another point that emerges from the cases, namely that territory still does remain an issue of importance in contemporary conflict, strikes me as more controversial, since others have argued that this is not the case.

Professor Waltz concludes the book with a chapter on "Conflict in World Politics." I consider this the most important contribution to the work. The concept *is* elusive, as Waltz clearly recognizes. He views international conflict from a systems perspective in the sense that these conflicts do not emerge out of individual behavior but can best be viewed in terms of "an actual or postulated organization that overarches the units" participating in the conflict (p. 457); that conflicts are best viewed also "in terms of the effect of the environment on them and . . . their effects on the environment . . ." (p. 457). The point is that the structure of an international system at any given time is related both to the inception and the consequences of conflict.

Waltz adopts Kurt Singer's scheme ("The Resolution of Conflict," *Social Research,* 6 [1949]; "The Meaning of Conflict" *Australasian Journal of Philosophy,* 27 [December 1949] and *The Idea of Conflict* [Melbourne University Press, 1949]), which states that there are only a limited number of conflict behaviors: (a) regression, (b) integration, (c) withdrawal, and (d) resolute contention. The characteristics of these behaviors, respectively, are: (a) to stay behind a barrier; (b) to try to remove or modify the barrier; (c) to leave the field; and (d) to resolve to destroy the barrier. Waltz then matches the structure of international systems to these modes of behavior. Thus, he writes, regression appears to be typical in loose associations of states (US-USSR); integration is typical for close and cooperative associations (France-Germany); withdrawal is appropriate to nonassociation of states (a null category); and resolute contention is found when states are closely associated in an oppositional framework (as in East and West Germany). I happen to think the last example could be questioned and evidence adduced for a muting of conflict between the two German states. Similarly, North and South Korea no longer seem to fit into the "close association-oppositional" framework and appear to be moving toward some type of integration.

One could question whether all of this really does tell us a great deal that was not known before—though the scheme is useful in any case. One could worry about definitions of situations: Precisely what, for instance, changed the U.S.-Soviet relationship from "close association in an oppositional framework" to "loose association?" Most important, one might ask why, if this framework had so much to recommend it, it didn't serve as the organizing focus of the book.

Still, Waltz, with his characteristic insight and fine analytic skill, does contribute significantly to our understanding of the linkages between system and behavior in the discussion of the various types of conflicts. His conclusion that conflict is ubiquitous and will remain so, pending the unattainable condition of the abolition of international relations, is sobering but, in my judgment, entirely valid. In addition to the factual data and analyses presented in the essays that constitute the bulk of this book, Waltz's comments, even though they do not (and don't pretend to) cover the entire range of questions we must ask about conflicts, alone are worth the price of admission.

Fred A. Sondermann

The Colorado College

Swords and Plowshares: A Memoir. By General Maxwell D. Taylor. (New York: W. W. Norton, Inc., 1972. Pp. 434. $10.00.)

Tall, strikingly handsome, an acquirer of languages, holder of a distinguished war record in World War II and in Korea, and the author of a book protesting the Eisenhower Administration's excessive reliance on nuclear weapons, General Maxwell Taylor was conspicuously the kind of man who would captivate the late President Kennedy. The latter, always hungering for what he took to be "excellence," brought this former Army Chief of Staff out of retirement on the morrow of the Bay of Pigs fiasco to begin a second and far more important career than before. First special consultant to the President, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later Ambassador to Saigon, he then returned to be consultant to the late President's successors. In these posts he played a part in the dismal Vietnam story second to none played by any other military man.

His memoirs are a contribution to history because of what he inadvertently tells us about himself, not for what he says of those important events in which he figured so prominently. He is somewhat casual about these events, about which other sometimes conflicting reports make his own often appear unpersuasive. A noteworthy example is his insistence that the Wheeler-Westmoreland request for 206,000 additional men after the Tet offensive of 1968 was no request at all but reflected merely contingency planning. If so, some very bright officials, including Clark Clifford and Townsend Hoopes, strangely misconstrued it. One notices also with some wonder that the author professes even now inability to understand why the Communists launched that offensive!

One was perhaps forewarned about his views from various passages in *The Uncertain Trumpet,* published in 1959. It read somewhat oddly even then that American intervention at Dien Bien Phu in 1954 was "unfortunately" prevented by lack of the appropriate conventional forces. He then added: "This event was the first, but not the last, failure of the New Look to keep the peace on our terms" (p. 25). One remembers that Dien Bien Phu occurred only one year after President Eisenhower had finally got an armistice ending the three-year war in Korea.

In the present book we do not read far before we get similar indications of the author's set of mind. One concerns the curious postmortem he did for President Kennedy on the Bay of Pigs, given a chapter here. He does mention among many other things that were apparently done wrong the fact that the invading force was much too small to have the slightest chance of success, but he does not give that point the dominating position it deserves. Against it all other considerations were virtually insignificant —except the question which he does not try to answer: How *could* it have happened? He finally decided, but only as an afterthought *following* his final briefing on the subject to the President, that the operation should have been cancelled. In a later place he casually observes that surely "one of the prime lessons of the Bay of Pigs" is that if we take another such "first step" we must "be prepared to go all the way" (p. 248)! According to Arthur Schlesinger's account, President Kennedy reached a very different and far sounder conclusion about the same affair and the relevance to it of considerations of prestige. To Kennedy a loss of face or prestige was of only temporary moment, not worth paying too high a price to avoid or redeem. To Taylor it is all-important; for him a country like the United States must suffer a near-fatal blow in accepting any such loss.

We are thus prepared, though not sufficiently, for the author's concluding chapters dealing mainly with Vietnam. What one has increasingly suspected becomes in these last chapters firmly established: To this man, reared in the society and the schools of Kansas City before he ever went to West Point, democracy has no real value. In a chapter entitled "Lessons from Vietnam" he asserts that when a president in the future again decides on an intervention requiring the use of armed force, "he will be well advised to obtain Congressional approval before committing himself and then to seek a declaration of war or emergency to silence future critics of war by executive order" (pp. 405f.). One hardly knows what to be more amazed at, the spirit of this proposal or its author's ignorance of his country's laws. The final chapter is one long declamation against criticism, not omitting the now customary attack on "the media," which he feels should be at special pains to find the "wholesome" side of American life as newsworthy as the Calley trial.

Well, here is a soldier who does not understand or cherish democracy; might he still not be a good top-ranking soldier? Perhaps, but this officer cannot be evaluated simply as a commander in the field. It fell to him to play in a quite special and notable way the role of the soldier-diplomatist, not only as an ambassador but as a direct adviser to presidents.

To Taylor, war or any other major use of military force appears to have only one purpose, and that is self-engendered. The goal of fighting is to win. To accept anything short of that is "humiliating." The consequences in Taylor's mind of what he regards as "humiliation" are unclear, but they are obviously unspeakable.

Most other senior generals of our own and of previous generations have felt this way. But one somehow expected more of Taylor. His urbanity and facility with languages are no doubt exceptional, but intellectually and spiritually there is much less here than one had been encouraged to believe.

BERNARD BRODIE
University of California, Los Angeles

The Unique Partnership: Britain and the United States. By Arthur Campbell Turner. (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1971. Pp. 216. $6.95.)

Arthur Campbell Turner, who is Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Riverside, has written a well-informed, understanding, highly readable and gently amusing book about Anglo-American relations. It is agreeable to have explained in a footnote the difference between "swithering" and "havering." It is not quite clear why the book is called "The Unique Partnership," a title evidently suggested by Mrs. Turner. No one can doubt that the partnership is "genuinely unique: demography, language, literature and the carryover of political institutions have made it so," as the dustjacket says. But can Professor Turner think of the relations between any two states which are not unique? International relations are *sui generis* because states are *sui generis*.

Anyhow, there are certain special things about this "special relationship." There was the migration of over 15 million people from Britain to the United States between 1815 and 1940, with all that it meant in lingering family connections and cross-fertilization of ideas and social customs: the consanguinity of political thought and values, however different their institutional expression on either side of the Atlantic. There was, and still is, the common language, the political implications of which Bismarck so well perceived. There was the British awareness about the turn of the century that imperial decline was foreshadowed, and that America must be watched, cultivated, tutored perhaps, as Britain's successor; Professor Turner is very good on all this, though he should look again at his statement (p. 61) that in 1922, at the Washington Conference, the U.S. Navy "was not thought of seriously as a possible enemy fleet" in Britain. It is remarkable how many eminent British people did think so, absurd as it now seems.

And there was the partnership in the two world wars, underlined by Britain's painful interwar discovery that without the United States, power in Europe could not be balanced and the British Isles could not be secure. It is hard to see why Turner calls the Munich agreement of 1938 "the institutionalization of surrender" (p. 61). It could more properly be described as the acid test of "surrender" (in any case is that the right word?) as a policy since the mass of British people then finally learned, for the first time, the meaning of Hitlerism. It is a pity, too, that there is not something in this third chapter about the failure of the Anglo-American partnership in the 1930s in the Far East. Too often is it forgotten that an important factor in the weakness of Britain's European policy at that time was her inability to hold the line against Japanese expansion in the Far East without American help. Franklin Roosevelt could not even co-ordinate American protests to Tokyo with British protests against infringements of foreign rights in China in view of the isolationist state of American opinion.

There is, however, a good chapter on the Second World War, the high noon of Anglo-American accord, and another on American attitudes towards decolonization in the British Empire after 1945. Professor Turner does well to emphasize the ambivalence of these attitudes: the primitive American wish to demolish the Empire, so brusquely voiced by Mr. Roosevelt at Yalta in February 1945, followed by the fear that Britain would retreat from Empire so fast as to leave America alone to police the world. After that, the "unique partnership" rapidly lost its meaning. The Commonwealth, Professor Turner frankly writes, never meant anything to America, and when in 1968 Britain decided to cut her military presence east of Suez, America could only look at Britain henceforward as merely one of her 40-odd allies, not necessarily the strongest or most reliable. The test ban treaty of 1963, writes Turner, marked the end of the road for the partnership, unless, as he suggests in the conclusion, Britain were to become, not one, but thirteen states in the American union (strange irony!).

But Turner is less than fair, and less than correct, in assessing Britain's position vis-à-vis America since 1945. He argues that Winston Churchill was inconsistent in warning America against Soviet expansion in his Fulton, Missouri, speech in March, 1946, when he himself "handed over" certain European countries to Stalin at their notorious meeting in Moscow in October, 1944 (p. 180, n. 40). He forgets Churchill's rejected pleas to Roosevelt during the war that we should agree with Stalin about his territorial claims in Europe while we were still under arms and Russia needed our help. Churchill never denied that Stalin must be compensated in Eastern Europe; the question he raised in March, 1946 was what limit should be set to Soviet expansion in the west. Professor Turner also criticizes Britain (p. 180) for wanting summit talks with Russia in 1953 and 1955 when she had called for armed resistance to Russia in 1946. But Americans have practiced plenty of summitry with both Russia and China lately and will no doubt continue to do so. The fact is that in the years after 1945 America followed where Britain led in policies towards the Communist world. Britain aroused America to the need for an effective military balance in Europe in 1945 and 1946; America at length and suspiciously acquiesced. In the 1950s Mr. Dulles identified negotiating with Communists as parleying with the devil, Britain urged peaceful, though armed, coexistence, and a day came in 1963 when President Kennedy said "me too." Britain's role in helping guide America, now admittedly finished, was never superfluous.

F. S. NORTHEDGE

London School of Economics

German-Polish Relations, 1918–1933. By Harald von Riekhoff. (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1971. Pp. xi, 421. $15.00.)

German-Polish relations between 1918 and 1933 constitute perhaps the most severe test of the controversial Versailles system, and there is indeed a great need for a balanced, in-depth analysis of the specific issues which shaped the relations of these two countries, each in its own way a creation and a victim of the postwar settlement. Professor von Riekhoff's aim, and his chief contribution, is thus not so much to produce another history of the period but to provide an analysis of the problems which beset it, the positions taken on them by the two governments and the consequences which followed.

In a series of interlocking and well-documented essays he traces separately the development of the major points of contention and the efforts to overcome them, particularly in the Locarno era. Perhaps no other author has so skillfully clarified the tangled and controversial problems associated with economic relations and the treatment of minorities—problems which played a major role in the strained relations between Germany and Poland in this crucial period. Nor has anyone so effectively highlighted and documented the roles of the individual diplomats and government leaders on both sides. One might well use this volume as a case study of modern diplomacy and its limitations. Professor von Riekhoff's book is an example of the excellent work which can be done on the basis of archival and other sources now available and deserves recognition as a major scholarly contribution.

His is, however, not likely to be the last word on the subject, at least insofar as interpretation and conclusions are concerned. His inclination to build a case against German policy, a theme which grows noticeably in the second half of the book, tends to upset the balance that marks the work otherwise. Revisionism inevitably emerges as the devil of the piece, and Weimar Germany stands condemned for that "natural German tendency" to base its policy on "romantic strivings" rather than reality and its "habit of judging everything connected with Poland as inferior" which blinded even her best statesmen and prevented reconciliation (p. 383).

In the end, the "only redeeming grace" in Weimar policy via-à-vis Poland was its commitment to peaceful means to achieve its revisionist goals, and even this virtue remains in doubt since there is no way to know whether it was the result of principle or "merely a temporary concession to the military weakness under which Germany was then operating" (p. 269). The admittedly "completely uncompromising Polish attitude" was, on the other hand, simply a fact of life which could not be changed and thus one to which Germany had to adjust or be held accountable (p. 291). Since the roles of Soviet Russia and France and the other powers are also viewed primarily in this context, the author has not really fulfilled his stated intention of projecting German-Polish relations "onto a wider screen that features the inter-war diplomacy of the European powers" (p. ix).

On balance, however, there is no doubt that this is a very important study which, even with the usual faults of monographic studies, goes to the heart of the problem of peace in Europe in the period which laid the foundations of the contemporary world and which thus holds vital lessons for today. Professor von Riekhoff notably praises the courage of Germany's Social Democrats for their active promotion of economic cooperation and political accommodation in the face of great obstacles, including German public opinion. The publication of his book thus fittingly anticipated the restoration of German-Polish relations some 27 years after World War II, a time lapse nearly twice the entire life span of the Weimar Republic.

George Brinkley

University of Notre Dame

Peking's U.N. Policy: Continuity and Change. By Byron S. J. Weng. (New York: Praeger Publishers, Inc., 1971. Pp. 344. $12.50.)

This is a welcome addition to the small but growing collection of books which analyze Chinese foreign policy through case studies rather than by textual exegesis of *Peking Review*. Professor Weng's survey of all statements and actions from the People's Republic of China (PRC) relating to the United Nations virtually down to its admission in 1971 fills an important gap in the factual literature. No less important is his analytical insight, which probes behind the chronological account for the assumptions and political dynamics that explain both continuities and change in Peking's posture toward the UN. The strength of his analysis is evidenced by the consistency between his projections of probable PRC behavior in the UN and developments since the book was finished.

The first part of the book, a general overview of Chinese foreign policy, is the weakest portion, perhaps because it attempts too much in too short a space. Weng's attribution of "rational" and "irrational" characteristics to "national interests" is unfortunate. He makes no effort to speculate on how conflicting bureaucratic interests, as for instance between those pursuing diplomatic interests and those responsible for supporting revolutions abroad, affect PRC policies. But Professor Weng's analysis of policy means is valuable in placing the UN "as actor" and "as arena" within Mao Tse-tung's concepts of "contradictions" and "struggle." This correctly anticipates both the seeming confusion in China's attitudes from 1949 to 1969 and its behavior since entering the UN in 1971.

Part II, the bulk of the book, is an unusually comprehensive review of Peking's statements concerning the UN examined within the context of ongoing domestic and international developments. Professor Weng's periodization is empirically derived within a theoretical framework evaluating policy as positive-negative, offensive-defensive, active-reactive, and direct-indirect. Despite the subjectivity of his terminology, the framework is nonetheless useful for demarcating tactical as opposed to strategic changes in posture. While the content analysis is purely qualitative and should be tested by more rigorous quantitative measurements, its logical inference pattern is persuasive.

Part III recapitulates the evidence in terms of China's legal approach, the instrumental use of the UN, and Mao's "thought and psychology." Although relatively brief, these three portions are neither superficial nor tendentious. They conclude the study with a dispassionate, multilevel overview which should be of value to students of China and of international organization. Professor Weng offers alternative guides to understanding Peking's postures and policies which account for unique aspects without isolating China as idiosyncratic among other states in the international system.

It is unfortunate that the publisher did not take greater pains with proof reading, especially of dates. The shortcoming is particularly reprehensible in view of the book's inordinate price, which cannot be justified by any visible production costs. Mao's first trip to Moscow was in 1949 (not 1931—p. 31); he enunciated the "lean to one side" policy in 1949 (not 1957—p. 31); the Gulf of Tonkin incident occurred in 1964 (not 1965—p. 56). It was Khrushchev who "visited Peking in July 1958" (not Mao—p. 121); the journal is *Asian Survey* (not *Agents Survey*—p. 256); etc. Perhaps haste resulted from an effort to mesh publication with public attention to the subjects covered. If so, the errors are a minor fault compared with the major strengths of the study. It is a happy coincidence that so scholarly a work becomes available just when the PRC assumes its long-delayed responsibilities in the United Nations.

ALLEN S. WHITING

University of Michigan

Intergovernmental Military Forces and World Public Order. By Walter L. Williams, Jr. (New York: Oceana Publishers, 1971. Pp. 703. $19.40.)

This lengthy tome is evidently the doctoral dissertation of a Yale Law School graduate who at the time of publication was a major in the Judge Advocate General Corps of the U.S. Army specializing in international law and stationed at SHAPE. It is an extensive compendium of concepts and facts concerning multinational and supranational military forces, primarily of the peacekeeping variety. It is highly theoretical both in its approach and in its methodology.

The writer's thesis, based on the positivist legal philosophy of Justice Holmes, is that "without some sort of police force," voluntary international law simply does not work well in the world. At the time he launched into his subject (or wrote his dessertation) the author was optimistic about the prospects for a U.S.-Soviet agreement on peacekeeping. He cites with approval the proposals (and equally optimistic tone) of the 1969 UN Association panel on "Multilateral Alternatives to Unilateral Action," and he correctly diagnoses the trend toward *détente* on the part of the Soviets toward their western flanks. But alas, U.S.-Soviet differences over Security Council vs. Secretary General in even noncoercive peacekeeping still consign it to the deep-freeze. I also think in retrospect that at least my own view as a member of that 1969 panel was perhaps too optimistic. Given increased U.S. willingness to use its own forces unilaterally, the arguments for improved and more reliable peacekeeping capabilities are stronger rather than weaker. But unfortunately, the author of the Nixon doctrine has not yet recognized its principal corollary—the need for a better multilateral alternative to fill the gaps left by national dropouts such as the U.S.

Mr. Williams's book is, however, really not a policy document, or even a historical text, so much as it is what he calls "policy-oriented contextual analysis" (p. 7). This description, plus the method he follows for the remaining 700 pages, are derived from a well-known framework developed over the years at Yale Law School by Professors Harold Lasswell and Myres McDougal. It is a method which even one sympathetic to their views finds too rigid to achieve the sought-after improvement in communication about complex social and political phenomena. I shall have more to say about this presently.

The first section of the book is a historical survey of military cooperation from early times to World War II. Like most doctoral dissertations, it leaves no stone unturned, in this case going back to the Delian League. We are led through the various coordinating bodies in World War I and through the League of Nations, with its not half-bad record of sanctions accompanied by military observers and enforcement personnel (as in Vilna, Leticia, and the Saar), to the cooperative forms devised in World War II.

The following chapter carries us into the more fragile if not downright spongy ground of the analytical format prescribed by the Yale school. The premise of this discussion is the interdependency of the world community—fair enough. On this premise is superimposed a theory of "world social process" which subsumes the "world process of military cooperation" (p. 90). The Yale morphologists and taxonomists are certainly entitled to call what is happening in the world a process of military cooperation, although few observers I know would put it in that particular box. But their examples perforce are somewhat unconvincing and in the end inadequate to the rigor of the model. (Examples cited include: the Inter-American Combined Quarantine Force in the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, which I always thought stood as a classic example of two-power confrontation. I suppose by a vigorous stretch of the imagination it could be called an inter-American combined quarantine, but as a good example of multilateral action it strikes me as little short of ludicrous. Another example given is the Warsaw Pact forces' occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968, which as an exemplar seems to me hardly supportive of the author's categorical imperatives that link "some sort of police force" to improvements in the status of international law.)

The author then moves to the relatively familiar ground of United Nations intergovernmental military forces. I cannot recall another writer on the subject who manages to subsume all aspects of the "era of peacekeeping" under the legalistic rubric of "claims." Perhaps if I had gone to law school I would understand why this is a good rubric for the political and diplomatic processes that produced some peace-keeping operations and inhibited some others. As a layman I find the author unhelpfully locked into an approach in which everything is an example of applying to "authoritative decision-makers for settlement of claims." This in turn is an analogy of the "constitutive process" of Messrs. McDougal and Lasswell, according to which all interactions are ascribed to authoritative decision makers who allocate goods, services, and other values to contending claimants. I don't want to do any of these theory builders an injustice, but I must say it makes of the dynamic political-diplomatic-military process a pretty bloodless courtroom in which King Solomon is mated to hard-core social science with a J.D.

Part 2 lays out what the author calls "selected trends of authoritative decisions," which, translated, means some but not all issues of competence of international organizations to organize and field peacekeeping forces. The remainder of the book is a comprehensive and useful treatment of commitments on the part of governments to provide, assist, and receive intergovernmental military forces.

Again, here, however, the framework the author imposes upon himself requires that he link all of this to what he calls "community policies." But really now, to understand its successes and failures, is it more useful to relate UN peacekeeping to the complex games played between nations within the weak fabric of voluntary international cooperation—or to pretend somehow that what we have been witnessing are "communities policies"? I myself thought our problem was the *absence* of true community, and of the crucial common values necessary to underlie it. Describing the situation correctly tells one something important about what needs to be done to remedy it. Giving the problem a highly theological cast resting on categorical imperatives seems to me to serve only recondite purposes.

This is doubly unfortunate, since the literature on intergovernmental military forces is about as thin as its present prospects. We should welcome any new contribution to the field, but what is needed is better rather than worse linkage to the real world, where peacekeeping still looks alien and suspect to the *real* "authoritative decision-makers." Exercises like this, hobbled by the rigid canons and cabalistic formulas of the monastery, serve to put scholars several further removes from the communication urgently needed to help link national behavior and greater-than-national action. For those to whom world public order is a desperately-needed good, the time may be at hand to protest louder than in the past against the obscurity into which that norm has been forced by some of the most influential contemporary scholastics.

LINCOLN P. BLOOMFIELD
Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Global Politics of Nuclear Energy. By Mason Willrich. (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1971. Pp. xii, 205. $15.00.)

Mason Willrich, professor of law at the University of Virginia, has written a highly competent study of the political implications involved in harnessing nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Wisely, he first explains the technological essentials of this new energy source and does so in clear and simple language. He aptly summarizes the major problems associated with the development of nuclear power, both those that spring from its technology and those that society imposes. He discusses the implications of nuclear energy in general, as well as of certain specific technological developments—breeder reactors, Project Plowshare (peaceful uses of nuclear explosives), and controlled fusion, as examples. While Willrich treats many different aspects of nuclear energy, comments here will be limited to his discussion of political ramifications.

First and foremost Willrich asks, "Will existing political institutions and policies be adequate to exploit the opportunities and to contain the dangers implicit in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy?" He feels that only when nations are willing to give up more of their sovereignty for interdependence will nuclear energy be exploited properly on a global scale. However, he doubts that nations are about to shed their nationalism. The issues of national security, of proliferation of nuclear weapons, of possible clandestine diversion of fissionable fuel to war purposes, of the attitudes of less developed countries, of cooperative development on an international basis and of others are viewed with this in mind.

With consummate skill, Professor Willrich lays out the problems, but in my opinion, the author underestimates the amount of nuclear development that can take place worldwide without a major restructuring of the nation-state system. Since World War II cost has proved the greatest obstacle to the growth of a nuclear industry. Once the economics of nuclear energy become sufficiently attractive, nations most likely will find ways to accommodate the technology.

This is not to discount all the problems that Willrich outlines. They are very real and impose major obstacles to nuclear development. Yet the energy problems of mankind are so immense that political exigencies will not kill any technology that gives promise of helping to solve them. Political factors have conditioned and will continue to help set the pace with which society is willing to adopt such technologies. Willrich is clearly right in asserting that the problems he discusses will slow the pace of nuclear developments on a global scale; but history shows that sooner or later society accepts beneficial technologies and makes its political adjustments. The major question is, "Will nuclear energy prove beneficial on a worldwide basis and if so when?"

Ralph Sanders

Industrial College of the Armed Forces

Le Programme des Nations Unies pour le Développement. By S. S. Zarkovich. (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1970. Pp. 246. Frs. 26.00.)

This book, written by a Yugoslavian official of FAO and former professor of statistics at the University of Belgrade, presents a critical analysis of the working of the United Nations Development Program. The overall thesis of the book is that UNDP could be a great means for solving some of the problems of the underdeveloped world, if only a different system were set up to make it work. In the beginning of the book the author claims that he considers UNDP ". . . the most important enterprise ever set up to extend the field of knowledge and to permit human work to improve the material conditions of existence" (p. 23). Having said this, he starts a very critical indictment of the existing system, then presents his own suggestions for improvement and ends with some more critical remarks about the Jackson report on UNDP, which was published a year before.

The author condemns the system of sending foreign experts to underdeveloped nations. They come, do their work and go, but fail to transfer their technical and expert knowledge to the people in the receiving country. The changes and improvements brought about by the expert's activities are thus of a rather limited and short-term character. Moreover, many of the experts lack the necessary qualifications; they are nevertheless maintained in their positions, as the receiving countries do not want to criticize their work for fear of losing all further financial and technical assistance. Dr. Zarkovich is hardly less critical of two other activities of UNDP: the foreign scholarships and the training centers and seminars organized by UNDP. The people from the underdeveloped countries who should profit from these programs are often insufficiently qualified, causing the intellectual level to drop below the level originally intended. The scholarships are a waste of money. Their main functions, according to Dr. Zarkovich, is to promote foreign travel. In addition to these shortcomings, the author strongly criticizes UNDP for being excessively bureaucratic and for lacking the flexibility to adapt itself to changing conditions. "Coordination" is the catchword used to deal with all kinds of problems. As the number of coordination activities increases, so does the number of coordinators and administrators, who have become a more important feature of UNDP than have the technical people who carry on the development activities in the field. UNDP has lost its former vitality and has become what Dr. Zarkovich calls a "tired organization" (p. 135).

While praising the Jackson study for at least acknowledging that something is wrong with UNDP, Dr. Zarkovich feels that it does not offer the right remedies; it puts too much trust in more and better kinds of inspection and surveillance, assigning even more tasks to central headquarters. While this would perhaps be a good solution if the UN were a full-fledged world government, Dr. Zarkovich claims that at the present state it would only mean a further wasting of resources, without creating the improvements the Jackson report envisages.

What Dr. Zarkovich has in mind is a much stronger emphasis on the capacity of the underdeveloped countries to help solve their own problems. They themselves should carry part of the responsibility for the success or failure of a development project. He hopes to realize this by setting up international centers for training and research, financed by UNDP and having strong ties with similar institutes in the underdeveloped countries themselves. The training and research programs of the envisaged centers would be geared to the needs and special interests of the underdeveloped world. The existing programs of UNDP would have to be disbanded.

Having finished reading Dr. Zarkovich's forcefully presented case, the reader is left with the feeling that some very useful criticism has been directed at an organization which already has generated quite a bit of dissatisfaction (cf. the Jackson report). One wonders, however, whether the proposed remedies will work; whether the "holy war against bureaucracy," which according to Dr. Zarkovich, should become the "great task of our generation" (p. 214) will be won in this way. Why do international organizations in general and development programs in particular so often get bogged down in bureaucracy? Is this bureaucracy of a different and stronger kind than the one we are used to on the domestic scene? Only when these and similar basic questions have been answered, shall we know whether and where remedies can be found. Dr. Zarkovich has not tried to answer these questions of a more general nature. His book is more practical, based on an extensive knowledge of UNDP operations. It should be of interest to students and practitioners in the field of international organizations to make them think or to get them annoyed, or possibly both.

PETER R. BAEHR

University of Amsterdam

For students of politics and government of all fields of interest

Midwest Political Science Association

The Midwest Political Science Association is devoted to scholarly and professional interchange, has a national membership and is oriented to the entire discipline.

Membership includes:

- The MIDWEST JOURNAL OF POLITICAL SCIENCE, a respected scholarly quarterly, which publishes the latest research on a wide variety of subjects and reviews outstanding books.
- Annual Meetings, with stimulating programs of current interest. 1973 Annual Meeting May 3-5, Pick-Congress Hotel, Chicago, Illinois.
- Professional placement service at the Annual Meeting at no additional charge.

Annual Dues:

Professional $10.00 ☐ Student $6.00 ☐ Family $14.00 ☐
Retired $7.50 ☐

Name____________________________

Mailing Address____________________

______________Zip Code____________

Affiliation__________________________

Fields of Interest____________________

____

Send with remittance to:

Jean M. Driscoll
Secretary-Treasurer
Midwest Political Science
Association
North Park College
5125 N. Spaulding
Chicago, Illinois 60624

Checks payable to Midwest Political Science Association

Registry of Retired Professors

The Association has established a Registry of Retired Professors. The Registry serves as an information exchange for those retired professors who are willing to teach one or more courses on a one-semester or one-year basis, and those institutions desiring to make such appointments. Any retired professor wishing to be listed in the Registry should contact the Association to receive an application form. Departmental chairmen wishing to inquire about the availability of retired professors in a certain specialty or geographic area should write specifying their requirements.

Director, Registry of Retired Professors
American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

JUST PUBLISHED BY APSA

A GUIDE TO GRADUATE STUDY IN POLITICAL SCIENCE 1973

The 2nd edition of the authoritative compilation of Ph.D. and Masters programs in political science, containing information on admissions policies, costs and financial aid, and fields of specialization.

$2.50 (prepaid)

Available Direct From:

American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

NEW

1973
APSA Biographical Directory

The sixth edition of the APSA Biographical Directory has been published and copies may now be ordered for immediate delivery. The Directory includes complete, up-to-date names and addresses of approximately 12,500 individual APSA members as well as biographical information on over 7,000 political scientists. The Directory also includes appendices classifying members by geographical location and fields of interest.

ORDER FORM

NAME:____

ADDRESS:______________________________________

____________________________ZIP____________

PRICE LIST

APSA MEMBERS:	☐ Hardback,	$10.00
	☐ Paperback,	$7.50
NON-MEMBER:	☐ Hardback,	$15.00
	☐ Paperback,	$12.50

Send form with payment (prepaid) to:

1973 APSA Biographical Directory
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

APSA HOSPITAL CASH PLAN

The American Political Science Association announces its new low cost group Hospital Cash Plan designed to provide participants with a cash payment of $20.00 or $40.00 a day depending upon the program selected. The Plan, underwritten by the Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co., pays for every hospitalized day for up to 365 days for each period of hospital confinement. Benefits are doubled if the participant is hospitalized for cancer.

For further information on the APSA Group Hospital Cash Plan write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

PERSONNEL SERVICE

The American Political Science Association's Personnel Service operates as a clearinghouse, bringing together political scientists seeking positions and prospective employers. Registration in the service is open to members of the Association and to Political Science Departments. Membership in the Service, which includes a subscription to the monthly Newsletter, is $6.00 per year. Membership in the Credential Referral Service of the Personnel Service is an additional $8.00.

NEWSLETTER

A Newsletter, listing openings for political scientists including teaching, administrative and research openings, is mailed monthly to all Personnel Service members. Positions are listed by institution with a brief description of each opening.

CREDENTIAL REFERRAL SERVICE

A file will be maintained at the Association office for all members of the Credential Referral Service. This file will include a résumé, a dissertation abstract and/or a list of publications, and up to three letters of reference for each member. Referrals are made upon the request of a member or of an institution.

EMPLOYERS USING THE SERVICE

The Association's Council has adopted a policy that it is a *professional obligation* of all political science departments to list publicly all vacancies in the APSA Personnel Service Newsletter for which they are recruiting except those vacancies at the association and full professor levels which departments expect to fill from among people known to them. There is no cost to the institution listing its vacancies with the Service. Forms for listing openings in the Newsletter are available from the Personnel Service.

For further information concerning the Personnel Service write to:

Director, Personnel Service
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Students, professors, and those interested in the study of politics and government are invited to become members of the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION

JOIN APSA

membership includes:

THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW—quarterly journal of scholarly articles and book reviews in political science, and

PS—quarterly journal of association news and articles of professional concern

Opportunity to register in the APSA Personnel Service—currently lists the largest number of political science teaching and research positions.

Attend the APSA Annual Meeting, September 4-8, 1973, New Orleans.

- -

Name ____

Mailing Address ______________________________________

______________________________________ (Zip) ________

This is an application for membership. Upon receipt of this form we will mail you a membership card and begin a year's subscription to the AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE REVIEW and PS.

Student	$10	☐
Annual if your annual income is under $12,000	$20	☐
$12-15,000	$25	☐
over $15,000	$30	☐

Please send with remittance to:

Membership Secretary
AMERICAN POLITICAL SCIENCE ASSOCIATION
1527 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036

Add $1 for foreign postage.

LOW COST GROUP INSURANCE AVAILABLE TO APSA MEMBERS

APSA INSURANCE PLANS

Group Life Insurance
- $15,000 protection with gradual reductions after age 50.
- Optional Dependent Life Coverage.

Accidental Death and Specific Loss
- Worldwide Coverage.
- Permanent Total Disability Benefits.

Hospital Cash Plan
- $20 or $40 each and every day hospitalized.
- Payable for up to 365 days for each period of hospital confinement.
- Benefits begin with the first day of hospitalization.
- Daily benefits are doubled if you are hospitalized for cancer.

For further information write to:

Director, Insurance Programs
The American Political Science Association
1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20036

CHANGING YOUR ADDRESS?

If you are planning a move, please fill in the form below and return it to the American Political Science Association, 1527 New Hampshire Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20036. Address changes should be received at the Association by the 5th of the month to be included in the monthly update of the Association mailing list.

Name ______________________

OLD ADDRESS ________________ NEW ADDRESS ________________

____________________________ ____________________________

____________________________ ____________________________

__________ (Zip) __________ __________ (Zip) __________

New

North for the Trade
The Life and Times of a Berber Merchant
John Waterbury
Mr. Waterbury studies the transition from traditionalism to modernity in the Third World by examining the life of Hadj Brahim, a Berber tradesman from southern Morocco, who embodies the experience of his region, a region that within two generations has moved from semi-anarchy to a position of dominance in the trade with cities in northern Morocco. LC: 70-174453 240 pages $10.75

Leadership and National Development in North Africa
A Comparative Study
Elbaki Hermassi
In this model for studying the formation and transformation of national societies, Hermassi analyzes national achievement accounting for stagnation, lost opportunities, and the major dilemmas confronting new nations. He devotes particular attention to the leadership that shapes social transformation. LC: 70-182279 250 pages $8.50

Governing Metropolitan Toronto
A Social and Political Analysis 1953-1971
Albert Rose
For nearly 20 years the Metropolitan Council of Toronto, the governing body in a federation of local governments, has been widely acknowledged as a successful prototype. Rose, a native of Toronto and a former government official, presents a detailed history of the Toronto experience.

A publication of the Franklin K. Lane Memorial Fund,
Institute of Governmental Studies, Berkeley.
LC: 72-157821 223 pages $8.95

The Consolidation of the South China Frontier
George V. H. Moseley, III
The presence of large ethnic minorities along the southern Chinese frontier from the Himalayas to the Pacific poses a special problem for Peking. Moseley's findings, based on firsthand research in the field as well as on obscure published sources, attempt to define an historical continuity in China's minority policy from before the Revolution.
LC: 73-170719 225 pages $10.00

Wittgenstein and Justice
Hanna Fenichel Pitkin
This is an introduction for students of politics and society to the later philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein and some topics in "ordinary language" philosophy. Wittgenstein's works offer a revolutionary new conception of language whose implications for the social sciences and political action are wide-ranging and surprising.
LC: 76-138508 416 pages $12.50

The Political Economy of Development
Theoretical and Empirical Contributions
Edited by Norman Thomas Uphoff and Warren F. Ilchman
In this sequel to *The Political Economy of Change*, the editors present their model of the "political economy of development" and bring together previously published studies that contribute to this new, supradisciplinary view of development, more relevant to policy than that usually found in social science literature.
LC: 77-161999 416 pages cloth $15.00, paper $4.95

University of California Press

from California

The Idea of Fraternity in America
Wilson Carey McWilliams
McWilliams offers an interpretation of the whole of American history and political thought from 17th Century Puritanism to the Black Panthers of today.

"This is an astonishing book—in terms of scholarship, of insight, of breadth of vision. Anyone concerned with the future of democracy will be profoundly stimulated by this truly remarkable book." —*Peter Berger* LC: 73-101339 608 pages $10.75

The Soviet Union in Asia
Geoffrey Jukes
Jukes examines the Soviet Union's involvement in Asia by delving into the realities of geography, politics and economics rather than revolutionary polemics. An inextricable part of the Asian continent, the U. S. S. R. fulfills a myriad of roles in the military, diplomatic, and economic fields. LC: 72-95303 320 pages $8.75

Now available in paperback
Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture
Richard H. Solomon
"Offers absorbing detail that demonstrates the distinctive social configurations of both old and new China . . . the analysis is generally sound and often illuminating—and because the book is both comprehensive and readable, the newcomer as well as the specialist will find it a rewarding experience." —*New York Times Book Review*
604 pages cloth $16.75, paper $5.95

China and Africa, 1949-1970
The Foreign Policy of the People's Republic of China
Bruce D. Larkin
"One can only be grateful for such a well-crafted book on this topic, the product of several years of painstaking research. Completely devoid of 'red scare' (or 'yellow peril') polemics, carefully sifted, ably written—this study will be a landmark both in Chinese and African studies for many years." —*Africa Today* 350 pages cloth $8.50, paper $3.25

War Comes to Long An
Revolutionary Conflict in a Vietnamese Province
Jeffrey Race
" 'War Comes to Long An' is brilliantly conceived and executed; it achieves an excellence that sets new standards for scholarship on both Vietnam and the nature of revolution."
—*The New York Times Book Review*
LC: 79-14793 299 pages cloth $11.95, paper $3.45

The State of the Nations
Constraints on Development in Independent Africa
Edited by Michael F. Lofchie
Taking the African states' own developmental objectives, this collection of essays examines their progress and the obstacles that impede their achievement.

"The vantage point of the authors in this volume is primarily political, but their understanding of African development encompasses the social and economic spheres as well."
—*Off the Press*
LC: 75-121191 305 pages cloth $10.00, paper $3.25

Berkeley, California 94720

The first systematic, quantitative, sample-based analysis of interest group behavior in Canada


Robert Presthus
Elite
Accommodation in Canadian Politics
Presthus: Elite Accommodation in Canadian Politics
Cambridge University Press

by ROBERT PRESTHUS

University Professor, York University
author of *Men at the Top* and *The Organizational Society*

ELITE ACCOMMODATION IN CANADIAN POLITICS
based on four years of field research funded by the Canada Council

Working from computerized data collected in Quebec, Ontario and British Columbia, which together contain 77 percent of Canada's population, Dr. Presthus develops a base of empirical information on the structure, resources, values and roles of Canadian political elites. From these findings he demonstrates the theories of elite accommodation and interaction on both the provincial and federal levels.

His conclusion is that elite accommodation in Canada fosters national unity and the salutory allocation of social resources, but is less effective in terms of extensive or long-lasting social and economic development; paradoxically, it tends to reinforce the status quo.

". . . is certain to become recognized as the definitive study of the public policy-making *process* in Canadian politics . . .

". . . will further distinguish Robert Presthus as a leading contemporary theorist of political and organizational behavior . . ."

—*Glendon Schubert*

Methodological appendix, 55 tables
$16.50

Cambridge University Press
32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Cornell
University
Press

New Paperbacks for Course Adoption

JAPANESE POLITICS— AN INSIDE VIEW

Readings from Japan

Translated and edited by HIROSHI ITOH. Some of Japan's most eminent political commentators and scholars are represented in this collection of nine empirical studies on Japanese policymaking at the local, national, and international levels. Together with the editor's introductions, the essays provide insights into a unique and effective political system.
$3.95, paper; $11.50, cloth

MARXIST ESTHETICS

By HENRI ARVON, translated by Helen Lane with an introduction by Fredric Jameson. This civilized and sensible work introduces the potentialities—and problems—of an esthetic committed to political relevance, conveys the ideological importance of art, and presents a capsule history of socialist art and criticism. The ideas of Bertolt Brecht are treated at length; of especial interest is a discussion of the dispute between Brecht and George Lukács.
$3.45, paper; $9.50, cloth

XENOPHON'S SOCRATES

By LEO STRAUSS. In this third and concluding work on the writings of Xenophon, an eminent scholar discusses Xenophon's *Memorabilia*, *Apology of Socrates to the Jury*, and *Symposium*. Professor Strauss's study is an attempt to recover the true Socrates and, with that, to discover the character of political philosophy. $2.45, paper; $8.50, cloth

THE NEW DOCUMENTS OF REVOLUTION SERIES
General Editor: HEINZ LUBASZ

THE ANARCHISTS IN THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION

Edited by PAUL AVRICH. Participants in the Russian Revolution and Civil War tell their own story—through articles and manifestoes, speeches and resolutions, letters and diaries, poems and songs. Mr. Avrich adds an introduction that draws together the disparate ideas and actions of the anarchists to show that they were part of a single movement and includes historical notes throughout. $2.95, paper; $6.95, cloth

THE COMMUNARDS OF PARIS, 1871

Edited by STEWART EDWARDS. Mr. Edwards uses eyewitness reports, accounts of participants, and archival documents to illustrate the many facets of the Paris Commune, the largest urban insurrection in modern history. Each section of the book is preceded by an explanatory note, footnotes clarify contemporary references, and the introduction provides a general survey of the origins and events of the Commune.
$2.95, paper; $6.95, cloth

CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS ITHACA AND LONDON

British Journal of Political Science

VOLUME 3 PART 1 JANUARY 1973

ARTICLES

L. J. Sharpe

American Democracy Reconsidered: Part 1

Ivor Crewe

The Politics of 'Affluent' and 'Traditional' Workers in Britain: an Aggregate Data Analysis

D. T. Denver and J. M. Bochel

The Political Socialization of Activists in the British Communist Party

Ian Budge

Consensus Hypotheses and Conflict of Interest: an Attempt at Theory Integration

Lawrence V. Grant

Aspects of Theory Evaluation

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Daryl Nelson

The Support of University Research by the Science Research Council

Claude Ake

'The Scientific Status of Political Science'—Rejoinder

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Bentley House, 200 Euston Road, London NW1 2DB
American Branch: 32 East 57th Street, New York, N.Y. 10022

Single parts £2 net in UK ($6.00 in USA)
Subscription price £6 net in UK ($19.50 in USA)

STOP AND CHECK

POLITICAL SCIENCE TEXTS

NEW IN '73

APPEAL TO FORCE
American Military Intervention in the Era of Containment
HERBERT K. TILLEMA
University of Missouri-Columbia
January 1973 272 pages $3.95 paper

CHOICE IN AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
Options for the Future
JAMES P. COBBLEDICK
Eastern Connecticut State College
February 1973 304 pages $3.95 paper

POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
An Introduction
WILLIAM T. BLACKSTONE
University of Georgia
April 1973 288 pages $3.95 paper

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT IN CALIFORNIA
Eighth Edition
BERNARD L. HYINK
Sacramento State College;
SEYOM BROWN, Washington, D.C;
and **ERNEST W. THACKER**,
Los Angeles Valley College
June 1973 320 pages $3.95 paper

THE SOCIAL PHILOSOPHERS
Community and Conflict in Western Thought
ROBERT NISBET
March 1973 446 pages $5.95 paper

PREVIOUSLY PUBLISHED

PARTY POLITICS AND PRESSURE GROUPS
A Comparative Introduction
MAURICE DUVERGER
translated by David Wagoner
1972 168 pages $2.95 paper

AMERICAN STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
Fifth Edition
CLAUDIUS O. JOHNSON,
H. PAUL CASTLEBERRY,
THOR SWANSON,
and **DANIEL M. OGDEN, JR.**
1972 304 pages $4.95 paper

AMERICAN FEDERALISM
A View from the States
Second Edition
DANIEL J. ELAZAR
1972 286 pages $3.95 paper

Address your inquiries for examination copies to
Director of Marketing, College Department.

THOMAS Y. CROWELL COMPANY
666 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10019

dorsey

Texts in Political Science

AN INTRODUCTION TO SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL SCIENCE

DAVID H. EVERSON, *Sangamon State University,* and JOANN P. PAINE, *Southern Illinois University*

Describes and analyzes those approaches to the study of politics which most frequently provide the organization for the substantive contained in more advanced courses. *Paperbound Text Price: $5.95*

PUBLIC OPINION: Micro and Macro

JAMES J. BEST, *University of Washington*

Focuses on public opinion at two levels. *Micro* concerns opinions people hold as individuals, their development and their changes. *Macro* focuses on the aggregation and articulation of mass opinions and how, when and with what impact they can be fed into policy-making decisions. *Paperbound Text Price: $4.95*

BEHAVIORAL PERSPECTIVES ON AMERICAN POLITICS

RALPH M. GOLDMAN, *California State University - San Francisco*

Presents an analysis of the institutions of American national government from the points of view suggested by a number of behavioral science concepts. Peer Instruction Manual and a Bank of Test Questions are available to adopters.
Paperbound Text Price: $5.95

CASES ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: Political Roles of the Supreme Court

Edited by VICTOR G. ROSENBLUM, *Northwestern University,* and
A. DIDRICK CASTBERG, *California State College at Los Angeles*

Arranged by political significance, rather than by legal substantive criteria, the editors have carefully selected U.S. Supreme Court cases which illustrate political relationships between the Court and other branches of government, as well as between the Court and the people and the state and local government.
Text Price: $12.00

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY: Response to a Sense of Threat

HENRY T. NASH, *Hollins College*

Analyzes postwar changes to identify attitudes that account for America's perception of international threats and to describe the organizational alterations that occurred within the government to contend with these threats.
Paperbound Text Price: $4.95

For examination copies please write on departmental stationery indicating course title and text presently used:

THE DORSEY PRESS Homewood, Illinois 60430

RECENT HARPER PAPERBACKS

PEASANT WARS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY

By Eric R. Wolf. "The best thing about this book is that it represents a non-Marxian attempt at class analysis. It is precisely the kind of book that one needs to comprehend the roots of revolt in the third world, and to divine the patterns of the future."—*The Economist (London)* TB/1774 $3.45

THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT

A Critical Analysis of Prisons in America

By Erik Olin Wright. With contributions by Robert Barber, Brian Glick, Thomas Lopez Meneweather, John Pallas, Eve Pell, Frank L. Rundle, James F. Smith, and Fay Stender. "An important contribution to the literature on prisons. More than a valuable inside look at American prisons, [the book] is an exceptionally lucid exposition of the radical point of view."—Jessica Mitford CN/318 $3.75

ON THE DEMOCRATIC IDEA IN AMERICA

By Irving Kristol. ". . . A very slender book of great merit. Mr. Kristol adds something very important to recent political discussion in the United States. What he adds is the appreciation of civility which is the virtue of the citizen and which has been lacking in the debate in recent years about the course of American events."—Edward Shils, *Encounter* TB/1761 $2.45

POLITICAL VIOLENCE AND CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE

By Ernest van den Haag. "I will simply urge the readers to get hold of this short and eminently readable book. . . . [The author] brillantly demonstrates that there are no simple, clearcut or morally right answers to the questions of when civil disobedience is justified or how authority in a democracy should react to it. Life and politics [he demonstrates] are rarely simple."—Seymour Martin Lipset, *National Review* TB/1626 $1.95

For a complete
catalog, write
Harper & Row
Paperback Dept.
10 E. 53d St., New York 10022

For each examination copy of these books ordered please include $.75 for postage and handling.

A HISTORY OF THE MODERN AGE
Julian K. Prescott. "Everything I know tells me this is an important, fair recreation of world events between 1944 and 1964."—*Robert Townsend.* "Creates in the mind of the reader the inescapable feeling that this is the way it was."—*Newsweek.* Paperbound, $2.95

MAO TSE-TUNG AND LIN PIAO
Post Revolutionary Writings
Edited by K. Fan. This volume contains some of the most important writings of Mao and Lin, all written since 1949, which paved the way for China's recent re-emergence into international politics. An Anchor Original. Paperbound, $2.95

PAN-AFRICANISM OR COMMUNISM
George Padmore; foreword by Richard Wright; introduction by Azinna Nwafor. The classic study of the Pan-African movement by one of its chief architects. Hardcover, $9.95; paperbound, $2.95

POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN DE GAULLE'S REPUBLIC
Philip M. Williams and Martin Harrison. A penetrating look at the efforts of one of the most perplexing, admired, and influential men in recent history to create a new French state while struggling with the problems of social and economic modernization. Paperbound, $2.95

PRESS · ANCHOR · P

ECONOMIC METHODS AND THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PRODUCTION

E. G. Liberman. The most recent and only comprehensive full-length volume by Evsei Grigorievich Liberman on the U.S.S.R. economic reforms of the mid-1960s, which have been labeled "Libermanism" in the West. Paperbound, $1.95

GUERRILLA THEATER
Scenarios for Revolution

John Weisman. A political, cultural, and theatrical phenomenon, guerrilla theater is most simply defined as radical community theater. This first book on the movement includes scripts, interviews, letters, essays, and 16 pages of photographs. An Anchor Original. Paperbound, $3.50

RED GUARD
The Political Biography of Dai Hsiao-ai

Gordon A. Bennett and Ronald N. Montaperto. A unique eyewitness account of Mao's Cultural Revolution compiled from extensive interviews with a former faction leader who ultimately defected to Hong Kong. "Fascinating . . . the most interesting piece I have read on the Cultural Revolution and the Red Guards." — *Edwin O. Reischauer.* Hardcover, $5.95; paperbound, $1.95

STRENGTHENING THE STATES
Essays on Legislative Reform

Edited by Donald G. Herzberg and Alan Rosenthal. Leading politicians and legislative experts discuss the need for reform in state legislatures and possible directions realistic reform might take. Hardcover, $6.95; paperbound, $1.95

ESS · ANCHOR · ANCHOR · PRESS · DOUBLEDAY ·

Doubleday & Company, Inc., Garden City, New York 11530

God Save the Commonwealth

An Electoral History of Massachusetts

A. T. Barbrook

A Britisher takes a look at the political behavior of a unique state, including the voters' inclination to support man rather than party, the shift from Republican to Democratic loyalty, and the Kennedy phenomena.

300 pp., cloth, $12.50

Private Interest and Public Gain

The Dartmouth College Case, 1819

Francis N. Stites

An historian, in a definitive study, explores the political, economic, and social forces which surrounded and influenced this landmark case.

200 pp., cloth, $9.50; paper, $2.95

University of Massachusetts Press Amherst, Massachusetts 01002

The International Political Science Association Invitation to Membership—1973

The International Political Science Association welcomes political scientists as members. The Association, founded in 1949, is composed of three categories of members: individuals, institutions and national associations.

Membership in the Association of $4.00 a year entitles members to receive the Newsletter giving information about IPSA activities and meetings; to purchase material published under ISPA auspices—including the *International Bibliography of Political Science,* published annually by Stevens in London and sets of papers submitted at IPSA meetings at reduced cost; and to register at IPSA meetings at lower rates.

Individual members who pay a higher membership fee of $12.00 a year are, in addition, entitled to receive either the *International Political Science Abstracts* published bi-monthly by the Association itself or the *International Social Science Journal,* the quarterly organ of the Department of Social Sciences of UNESCO. To join the Association send your name and check to the International Political Science Association, 27 rue Saint Guillaume, Paris 7e, France.

Indiana University Press

10th & Morton Streets
Bloomington, Indiana 47401

America and the World Political Economy

Atlantic Dreams and National Realities

by David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland

Arguing that our international economic policies create the very problems they seek to solve, the authors delineate the political rules that should govern our international economic system.

384 pages paper $2.95 cloth $10.95

Crossroads to Israel 1917-1948

by Christopher Sykes

"I can recommend this book with enthusiasm. . . . it is excitingly and clearly written . . . it is exceedingly well informed; it exhibits a fine readiness to make and document judgments."—Manfred Halpern

416 pages $3.50

From Crossbow to H-Bomb

revised and enlarged edition

by Bernard and Fawn M. Brodie

A comprehensive history of weaponry from Archimedes' catapult to MIRV and the ABM with special emphasis on the contributions of science to warfare.

320 pages, illus. paper $2.95 cloth $7.95

Solzhenitsyn

A Documentary Record

enlarged edition

Edited by Leopold Labedz

This absorbing collection of letters, speeches, and articles by Solzhenitsyn and his critics reveals the antagonisms that divide the Soviet literary scene today. Included is the text of Solzhenitsyn's Nobel Prize Lecture.

320 pages $3.50

Hegel

by Raymond Plant

With the recent revival of interest in Hegel, this stimulating book will be welcomed as the first concise study of Hegel's political thought and its relation to his metaphysics.

216 pages $7.95

Modernization Without Revolution

Lebanon's Experience

by Elie Adib Salem

An authoritative analysis of Lebanon's struggle to preserve political liberty and a pluralistic society while at the same time meeting an array of social goals. *(International Development Research Center, Studies in Development Number 6)*

192 pages $7.95

THE ONE BOOK YOU AND YOUR STUDENTS NEED
TO UNDERSTAND NIXON'S FOREIGN POLICY

America and the World, Volume II

Retreat from Empire?

THE FIRST NIXON ADMINISTRATION

Robert E. Osgood
Robert W. Tucker
Francis E. Rourke
Herbert S. Dinerstein
Laurence W. Martin
David P. Calleo
Benjamin M. Rowland
George Liska

There can be no doubt that the first Nixon Administration witnessed and in some ways initiated significant changes in America's world outlook and that the nature of the world itself seemed to have changed.

But what do these changes portend? What effects will the mixture of retrenchment and assertiveness heralded in the Nixon Doctrine have on America's relations with Europe, Japan, the Soviet Union, and the third world? What do these changes mean in terms of domestic priorities?

These are some of the questions addressed in *Retreat from Empire?* the second volume in a continuing assessment of American foreign policy by well known experts from the Washington Center for Foreign Policy Research. $14.50, $3.95 paper

Volume I, a widely used text of continuing importance

America and the World

FROM THE TRUMAN DOCTRINE TO VIETNAM

Robert E. Osgood
Robert W. Tucker
Herbert S. Dinerstein
Francis E. Rourke
Isaiah Frank
Laurence W. Martin
George Liska

"This is a typically sound, well-written, scholarly analysis of American foreign policy. . . . Solidly analytical . . . the book represents in the main the thinking of some of the more sophisticated and 'realistic' members of the present administration."
— *World Affairs* $15.00, $3.45 paper

Johns Hopkins
The Johns Hopkins University Press
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

SPRING 1973

Gloria J. Barron

LEADERSHIP IN CRISIS
FDR and the Path to Intervention

In this study of the crucial years 1939-41, Gloria Barron probes the ambivalence and ambiguities of democratic leadership, and particularly the subtle and sophisticated reactions of a dedicated and able statesman who knew that popular support is essential to leadership in a democratic society.

June 1973 $7.95

Leland V. Bell

IN HITLER'S SHADOW
The Anatomy of American Nazism

In this first scholarly account of the rise and fall of the would-be American Reich, Leland Bell traces the roots of American Nazism to indigenous dissatisfactions and pro-German sympathies.

May 1973 $7.95

Mark L. Berger

THE REVOLUTION IN THE NEW YORK PARTY SYSTEMS: 1840-1860

This book offers important insights into one transformation of the American two-party system that has a striking parallel with the crises and confusions of our own times, and will interest those concerned with the dynamics of political change in the United States.

May 1973 $8.50

Randall W. Bland

PRIVATE PRESSURE ON PUBLIC LAW
The Legal Career of Justice Thurgood Marshall

The story of Thurgood Marshall is an example of what a "conservative" strategy of social reform has been able to achieve by working within the system. Dr. Bland examines Marshall's contribution to the American legal system and his impact on the civil rights movements.

June 1973 $9.95
Paper $3.95

Nick Aaron Ford

BLACK STUDIES
Threat or Challenge?

This monumental study by an eminent Black educator and humanist presents the first comprehensive, fully documented report on the history, scope, effects, and future development of Black Studies programs in American schools and colleges.

June 1973 $8.95
Paper $3.95

Glen Gabert, Jr.

IN HOC SIGNO?
A Brief History of Catholic Parochial Education in America

Glen Gabert presents the problems facing the Catholic schools in historical perspective. Drawing heavily on official documents he constructs a revisionary interpretation of Catholic education in the U.S. that challenges the official history at many points.

May 1973 $6.95

William T. Generous, Jr.

SWORDS AND SCALES
The Development of the Uniform Code of Military Justice

Dr. Generous's impartial, thoroughly researched study presents a critical analysis of the events, attitudes, and political forces that have led to reforms in American court-martial law, with special emphasis on developments since 1945.

June 1973 $12.50

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY PUBLICATIONS

Send for Complete Catalog

KENNIKAT PRESS

90 SOUTH BAYLES AVENUE
PORT WASHINGTON,
N.Y. 11050

Carl Nordstrom

FRONTIER ELEMENTS IN A HUDSON RIVER VILLAGE

Professor Nordstrom applies Turner's thesis to the analysis of a single post-frontier community — the small town of Nyack. His approach combines the methods of economic history, anthropology, and phenomenology.

May 1973 $9.95

Joseph M. Siracusa

NEW LEFT DIPLOMATIC HISTORIES AND HISTORIANS
The American Revisionists

Arguing that the primary target of the scholarly New Left was not the conduct of U.S. foreign policy but the validity of American society itself, Dr. Siracusa shows that the revisionist historians advocated replacement of America's capitalist economy with a non-expansionist, democratic socialist society.

May 1973 $6.95

Harry M. Ward

STATISM IN PLYMOUTH COLONY

Professor Ward discusses the origins of the Plymouth community, and shows that the problems faced by the Pilgrims in confronting the growing power of the state have an immediate relevance for our own time.

June 1973 $9.95

JOHNS HOPKINS

The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, Maryland 21218

International Safeguards and Nuclear Industry

Edited by MASON WILLRICH Nuclear industries will soon be processing enormous quantities of fissionable materials to fuel nuclear power plants. A small amount of this material in the wrong hands would be enough to create a nuclear explosive that could destroy a small city. A distinguished group of lawyers, scientists, and social scientists here examines the safeguards developed through the International Atomic Energy Agency and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty to prevent such a disaster. *Published under the auspices of The American Society of International Law* $11.50

From Confederation to Nation

The American Constitution, 1835-1877

BERNARD SCHWARTZ In the years between 1835 and the end of Reconstruction, American democracy was put to the test of fire. Out of these four decades came a "second Constitution," very different from the original, and a nation, not a mere confederation of states. Professor Schwartz describes how the Supreme Court laid the groundwork for Constitutional amendments which made enforcement of civil rights a national function and extended federal protection of life, liberty, and property against the powers of government. $10.00

Daniel Webster and Jacksonian Democracy

SYDNEY NATHANS Daniel Webster was an anachronism in the Jacksonian era. Reared to rule in a world of defined class structure where gentlemen led and the masses followed, he at first resisted, and later tried to answer, the demands of the new mass politics. Professor Nathans shows that the meaning of Webster's career lies in his attempt to bridge old and new politics, and that this attempt was doomed to ironic and revealing failure. $10.50

The Politics of Continuity

Maryland Political Parties from 1858 to 1870

JEAN H. BAKER Jean Baker challenges the assumption that the Civil War marked a major turning point in American political history. She demonstrates that political realignment in Maryland came on the eve of the war, and that patterns established in the 1850s persisted throughout the 1860s. She shows how fear of Negroes, concern for the Union, and rhetoric about free elections helped define and continue the realignment in Maryland politics. In The Goucher College Series, published for Goucher College $11.00

The Advisory Function of the International Court in the League and UN Eras

MICHLA POMERANCE The International Court's advisory jurisdiction has never been as thoroughly analyzed as in this valuable book. The author critically examines the course of advisory opinions and contrasts the experiences of the League and UN in the use, nonuse, and abuse of the Court's advisory functions. Her book is a timely contribution to the current debate on affording the Court a greater role in settling international disputes. $17.50

Have You Examined These Texts for Fall?

PAPERBACKS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT

Ross AMERICAN NATIONAL GOVERNMENT
An Introduction to Political Institutions
Mitchell PUBLIC CHOICE IN AMERICA
An Introduction to American Government
Ross and Mitchell, eds. INTRODUCTORY READINGS IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT
A Public Choice Perspective
Ross, ed. PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC POLICY
Seven Cases in American Government
Barber CITIZEN POLITICS
An Introduction to Political Behavior
Second Edition
Barber, ed. POWER TO THE CITIZEN
Introductory Readings

FOR INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Coplin INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
A Theoretical Overview
Coplin and Kegley, eds. A MULTI-METHOD INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL POLITICS
Observation, Explanation, and Prescription

IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

Sharkansky PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Policy-Making in Government Agencies
Second Edition
Lyden and Miller, eds. PLANNING-PROGRAMMING-BUDGETING
A Systems Approach to Management
Second Edition
Merewitz and Sosnick THE BUDGET'S NEW CLOTHES
A Critique of Planning-Programming-Budgeting and Benefit-Cost Analysis

MARKHAM publishing company
3322 West Peterson Ave. • Chicago, Illinois 60659 • (312) 539-0626

new—completely revised

American Defense Policy

THIRD EDITION

Edited by
RICHARD G. HEAD
& ERVIN J. ROKKE

Articles by
Henry A. Kissinger
Maxwell D. Taylor
Richard M. Nixon
Melvin R. Laird
Robert E. Osgood
Morton H. Halperin
Stanley Hoffmann
Adam Yarmolinsky
Samuel P. Huntington
Charles C. Moskos, Jr.
Morris Janowitz
and other experts

The Air Force Academy's widely used textbook on American defense policy has now been thoroughly revised and updated to take into account striking changes in America's defense posture since the second edition was published in 1968. The new edition emphasizes the substance of defense strategy and the process by which it is formulated. A new section, "The Military and American Society," considers such issues as public opinion of military expenditures, racism in the armed forces, and the implications of an all-volunteer military.

Previous editions of *American Defense Policy* have been used as basic texts in defense policy courses and as supplementary texts in government, international politics, public administration, and history courses.

From reviews of previous editions:

". . . deserves careful and thoughtful reading by all interested in the study of national defense and in related fields." — *Western Political Quarterly* ". . . useful reading for any college course in international politics and post-World War II history." — *Military Affairs*

712 pages. $17.50, $6.50 paper

Johns
Hopkins

The Johns Hopkins University Press
Baltimore, Maryland 21218

Oxford University Press

Oxford World Atlas

Geographical Editor, SAUL B. COHEN, *Clark University. Prepared by the Cartographic Department of the Clarendon Press.* Designed to meet the needs of geographical teaching and study in America, the OXFORD WORLD ATLAS presents an entirely new approach to the mapping of man's environment. Bold new cartographic techniques and design features give it a deeper perspective and wider coverage of the world than any atlas now available. *200 pp., 124 pages of full-color maps, 74 pages of notes, gazetteer, 10" x 15".* *Cloth,* $19.95. *Paper,* $6.95

CORE: A Study in the Civil Rights Movement, 1942-1968

By AUGUST MEIER *and* ELLIOTT RUDWICK, *Kent State University.* "It is in a class by itself as the only historical study of the recent civil rights movement based on depth research and written with the right balance between sympathy and detachment. . . . The authors have skillfully interwoven treatment of the national and local, the society and the Movement, ideology and action." – LOUIS R. HARLAN, University of Maryland $15.00

Communication is Power

Unchanging Values in a Changing Journalism

By HERBERT BRUCKER. "No journalist in America owns stronger credentials for presenting a critical analysis of the press of our country." – BARRY BINGHAM, SR., Chairman, *Louisville Courier-Journal.* "[Brucker's] best work . . . a book marked by his wisdom and the grace and clarity of his writing." – JOHN HOHENBERG, Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism $9.50

The Middle East

A Political and Economic Survey; Fourth Edition

Edited by PETER MANSFIELD. Taking account of the major transformations – political, economic, and social – that have occurred in the Middle East since the last edition of this work in 1958, some seventy per cent of the material in this fourth edition is totally new. Developments in Arabia, Egypt, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Sudan, Syria and Turkey are fully covered. *3 maps.* $19.95

Black Men, White Cities

Race, Politics and Migration in the United States, 1900-1930, and Britain, 1948-1968

By IRA KATZNELSON, *Columbia University.* Examining the capabilities of the two leading "liberal democracies" to deal with the politics of race, this volume investigates responses to black migration at local and national levels during two comparably fluid and changing periods. It assesses the influence of party and community organizations. *(Institute of Race Relations)* $9.95

The Jews in Soviet Russia Since 1917

Second Edition

Edited by LIONEL KOCHAN, *University of Warwick.* Sixteen authorities explore various facets of the Russian-Jewish experience from the Bolshevik revolution through current attempts to emigrate to Israel. This revised edition examines in detail the remarkable recent change in attitude of Soviet Jews and traces the development of Jewish activism and its relationship to Soviet authority. $12.50

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

Nuclear Politics

The British Experience with an Independent Strategic Force, 1939-1970

By ANDREW J. PIERRE. "Mr. Pierre has written a work of the greatest importance for understanding the circumstances in which Britain became and remained a nuclear power. . . . He is very convincing in his analysis of the impact of Britain's possession of nuclear weapons upon Anglo-French as well as Anglo-American relations and of the way in which party controversies impinged upon British decisions in the field."—*American Historical Review* $18.75

Trudeau and Foreign Policy

A Study in Decision-Making

By BRUCE THORDARSON. "An excellent book. Thordarson, a student at Carleton University in Ottawa, has talked with most of the men who make foreign policy in Canada's capital and has produced the best description of the process of change that occurred after 1968. . . . Highly recommended."—*Choice* *Paper,* $2.95

The Bases of International Order

Essays in Honour of C. A. W. Manning

Edited by ALAN JAMES. In this extensive and systematic inquiry various aspects of the interaction of states within a basic international order are examined. Among the topics discussed are the relationship between order and change at the international level; the question of whether war is a threat to or a support of international order, or both; and the contribution of contemporary theorists to our understanding of the bases of international order. $11.25

Documents on International Affairs 1963

Edited by D. C. WATT, JAMES MAYALL, *and* CORNELIA NAVARI. Major developments in international affairs during 1963 are covered in this volume, including: Berlin's role in East/West German relations, the Soviet Union's conflict with Communist China, the war in Yemen, the United States involvement in Viet Nam, the Federation of Malaysia, and the Inter-American Committee on the Alliance for Progress. *(Royal Institute of International Affairs)* $32.00

Pan-Africanism and Nationalism in West Africa 1900-1945

By J. AYODELE LANGLEY. A detailed study of the origins of Pan-African politics in western Africa, this book investigates nationalist ideology and social classes in that area during the inter-war period. Of particular interest is the author's re-discovery of the Francophone African contribution to Pan-Africanism and his analysis of the impact of black American ideologies in western Africa. *(Oxford Studies in African Affairs)* $21.00

A Theory of Ideology

The Tanzanian Example

By JOHN R. NELLIS. The author investigates the potential of utilizing a methodology drawn from the field of economics, to bring some logical consistency to the area of political ideology. A model is constructed, then applied analytically and critically to Tanzania—with emphasis on the village settlement program. $12.25

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Oxford University Press

The Impact of Supreme Court Decisions

Empirical Studies   Second Edition

Edited by THEODORE L. BECKER, *University of Hawaii, and* MALCOLM M. FEELEY, *New York University.* In keeping with the growing field of impact analysis, the second edition of this book has been revised to encompass a new section, "Toward a Theory of Impact." Nine of the nineteen selections are new and include an analysis of two Presidential attempts to alter the nature of the Court, an example of the Court's "self-correcting" mechanism, and a discussion of the Court's overall effectiveness in resisting popular majorities.

1973   256 pp.   paper $2.95

The New Federalism

By MICHAEL D. REAGAN, *University of California, Riverside.* This incisive and timely analysis of a controversial public issue reassesses the concept of federalism with focus on grants-in-aid and revenue-sharing as competing approaches to intergovernmental relationships. Professor Reagan examines the Nixon administration's revenue-sharing plan, pointing out the weak points and suggesting an alternative concept of "permissive federalism."

1972   (paper, 1973)   192 pp.   cloth $5.95   paper $1.50

Word Politics

Verbal Strategy Among the Superpowers

By THOMAS M. FRANCK, *New York University, and* EDWARD WEISBAND, *State University of New York, Binghamton.* "Putting it quite simply, *Word Politics* is a very good book. It is brief, well written, interesting, and worthwhile. . . . [The authors] have harmoniously blended case studies, logical analysis, theoretical analysis, and policy prescription. Moreover, the context of superpower relationships makes the book quite relevant."—RICHARD B. FINNEGAN, *The American Political Science Review*

1971   (paper, 1972)   192 pp.   cloth $5.95   paper $1.95

Contemporary International Theory and the Behaviour of States

By JOSEPH FRANKEL, *University of Southampton.* This book introduces the reader to theoretical ways of thinking about international relations. It is primarily concerned with the purpose of theory rather than what it actually is. Selective in its emphasis, the study concentrates upon the behavioral approaches and, within them, upon the roles of values and the concept of "national interest." The text surveys briefly and in nontechnical language the major approaches to international theory: systems analysis, integration theory, the actions of states, and states in interaction.

1973   144 pp.   cloth $4.00   paper $1.95

Canadian and Australian Politics in Comparative Perspective

By HENRY ALBINSKI, *Pennsylvania State University.* Within an analytic framework oriented toward political processes and outcomes, this volume offers an integrative approach to comparing the governments of Canada and Australia. The author analyzes the societal basis for the governments, their political organization, and the processes of public policy.

1973   448 pp. $12.95

Between Ideals and Reality

A Critique of Socialism and Its Future

By SVETOZAR STOJANOVIĆ, *Belgrade University.* "This is a most useful addition to the literature of Marxian studies. It makes available a thoughtful new development of Marxist political thought that should be considered by every serious student of contemporary politics." —BRUCE E. WRIGHT, *California State University, Fullerton.* "An important contribution to socialist and Marxist thought . . . most interesting and, to my mind, right on the mark."—MICHAEL HARRINGTON

1973   240 pp.   cloth $7.95   paper $2.95

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Who Rules The Police?

Leonard Ruchelman, editor

Drawing on a wide range of reading selections, Dr. Ruchelman seeks to probe the realities of the police officer's job in the context of community affairs. His essential interest is to examine the subject of civil accountability and control of the police. In his selection and ordering of case material, Dr. Ruchelman succeeds in illuminating a new political dimension which makes vital reading for police officers and citizens alike.

320 pages	LC 72-96430
SBN 8147-7354-0	11.95

Urban Lobbying

Mayors in the Federal Arena

Suzanne Farkas

"Dr. Farkas has written an interesting and informed study of the efforts by big-city mayors to lobby for increased federal attention to urban problems. This book should be read by every citizen seriously concerned with the future of our cities."—Mayor John V. Lindsay

336 pages	LC 77-124523
SBN 8147-2550-3	8.50

Labor At The Rubicon

J. B. S. Hardman

With the editorial collaboration of
Virginia M. Hardman

Eminent labor authority J. B. S. Hardman offers a wealth of detail about what really goes on in the union world in this study of the central problems of labor leadership: internal union democracy and power accumulation within the context of the revolutionary 1960's in America. *"This is vintage Hardman, brilliantly written, easily read, it's a mind-stretching book."* – Herbert Bienstock

192 pages	LC 72-92552
SBN 8147-3364-6	6.95

The International Regulation Of Civil Wars

Evan Luard, editor

In a period in which civil conflict has become an increasingly frequent form of war, the work of the United Nations and other international organizations is vitally important. This book discusses the causes and resolution of major civil wars, from Spain in the 1930's to the post World War upheavals in such countries as Laos, the Congo, and Cyprus.

244 pages	LC 79-185330
SBN 8147-4953-4	8.95

Sources Of Our Liberties

Richard L. Perry, editor

Sponsored by the American Bar Foundation

Updated and now available in paperback for the first time, this volume presents in a single binding the historic documents constituting the major legal sources of our individual liberties, from the Magna Carta to the U.S. Constitution.

456 pages	LC 59-12742
SBN 8147-6557-2	paper 3.95

Fascism In Western Europe 1900-1945

H. R. Kedward

The fervour of its propaganda and the prophetic role of the leader made fascism one of the most powerful movements in history. H. R. Kedward tries to analyze this wide and dynamic appeal, describing the nature of fascism and its history, and attempting to move towards its definition. *"This fine popular history of Fascism should be included in all general collections. In a highly readable manner, Kedward describes and explains complex phenomena."* – *LIBRARY JOURNAL*

272 pages	LC 78-135658
SBN 8147-4551-2	6.95

ORDER DIRECTLY FROM:

New York University Press

WASHINGTON SQUARE, NEW YORK 10003

WILLIAM MORROW & COMPANY, INC. 105 Madison Avenue NY 10016

MOTION WILL BE DENIED: A New Report on the Chicago Conspiracy Trial

by JOHN SCHULTZ $3.95

". . . For those interested in a study of justice at its worst, this book is essential . . ."—Donald J. Dunn, University of Texas School of Law Library, Austin, Texas. "This may prove to be the most comprehensive, most fascinating, and, in general, the best book written on what its author calls 'the most notorious political trial of the century'."—ANCORP

IDENTITY, RACE AND PROTEST IN JAMAICA

by REX NETTLEFORD $2.95

The essays are concerned mainly with the problems of the Jamaican black majority and the uncertainties and contradictions of their role in what is supposed to be their country.

PHILOSOPHY OF THE URBAN GUERRILLA: The Revolutionary Writings of Abraham Guillen

Edited and translated by Donald C. Hodges $2.95

Abraham Guillen is most renowned for his theory that Che Guevara was wrong; that revolutionary activities ought in most cases be conducted not from the country-side, but the cities: hence, the "urban guerrilla".

NLF: NATIONAL LIBERATION FRONTS, 1960-1970

Edited by DONALD C. HODGES and
ROBERT ELIAS ABU SHANAB $2.95

". . . This unique collection of documents, interviews, and essays will give the reader an understanding of the philosophies of National Liberation Fronts around the globe. It is world wide in scope, comprised of the following sections, each with its own introduction: Asia, The Arab World, Black Africa, Latin America, and North America."—ANCORP

JULIAN BOND: Black Rebel

by JOHN NEARY $1.95

". . . In this worthwhile book, John Neary traces Bond's career and, with the help of Bond's own comments, considers his political philosophy . . ."—LIBRARY JOURNAL. ". . . Neary's book is full of illuminating perceptions of both southern and national politics . . ."—WASHINGTON, D.C. EVENING STAR

HERO'S CHILDREN: The Post-War Generation in Eastern Europe

by PAUL NEUBURG $2.95

". . . study of the youth of Eastern Europe . . . concerns itself with Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria, Poland and Czechoslovakia. The "hero" is the Communist Party, which called upon the young as its natural vanguard against the older generations."—ANCORP

The truth behind Rhodesia's anti-colonial struggle

THE RIGHT TO SAY NO

by Judith Todd

"This well-written and eloquent book" *(Publishers Weekly)* is the story of one country's epic struggle for freedom. In it the daughter of the former Rhodesian Prime Minister recounts her personal ordeal of five weeks in solitary confinement, without either a trial or being accused of a crime, and of the regime still illegally in control.
$6.95

THE THIRD PRESS
Joseph Okpaku Publishing Co., Inc.
444 Central Park West
New York, N.Y. 10025

The Presidential Character

NOW IN PAPERBACK!

James David Barber Professor and Chairman, Department of Political Science, Duke University

"The most original, most provocative, and most daring study of the presidency of the past decade...A major intellectual breakthrough."

So says James MacGregor Burns of this unique analysis of why our Presidents act as they do. In researching the Presidents from Taft to Nixon, Professor Barber discovered that there is a close correlation, which can be predicted, between personality type and White House performance.

1973, 479pp. paper $5.95

For more information, please write Robert Jordan, Dept. CJ677

Prentice-Hall

Englewood Cliffs New Jersey 07632



The
future
of
America . . .
can
we
survive?

THE CONGRESS AND AMERICA'S FUTURE, 2nd edition
Editor, David B. Truman, Mount Holyoke College

Here's what the critics said about the first edition of this outstanding analysis of today's Congress: "A significant new work on congressional reform. . . . Excellent handbook . . . thought-provoking. . . ."—*Political Science Quarterly* "A significant contribution to recent political literature."—*The Western Political Quarterly* "Valuable."—*Social Science*

Now the second edition, revised and updated, reveals the obstacles that Congress must conquer in order to become a decisive legislative body prepared to deal with the pressing issues of contemporary America. $6.95 cloth/ $2.45 paper

THE FUTURE OF FOUNDATIONS
Editor, Fritz Heimann, General Electric Company

Nine authorities grapple with the basic issues endangering the status of American foundations. Chief among these issues—too much government involvement. $6.95 cloth/$2.45 paper

AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: The Defendant's Perspective
Jonathan Casper, Stanford University

"Warrants attention. We all need to be reminded of the essential human involvement, a subject all too easy to forget in the crush of the daily criminal justice process with crowded courts and overburdened manpower." —*Library Journal* $5.95 cloth/$2.45 paper

BEYOND MALTHUS: Population and Power
Neil Chamberlain, Columbia University

"An outstanding contribution by an outstanding scholar, this book will be discussed for years. Highly recommended. . . ."—*Library Journal*
A Prism Paperback, $1.95

THE FUTURE OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT: Toward the Year 2000
Editor, Harvey S. Perloff, University of California, Los Angeles

Distinguished contributors call for major structural changes in the U.S. government to meet the needs and expectations of our society and to end government ineffectuality. A Prism Paperback, $2.95

Spectrum Books
Prentice-Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey 07632
Teachers: Examination copies are available from your local fieldman.

"DANIEL P. MOYNIHAN'S important new work is indispensable to anyone who claims to speak on social policy in the United States...

necessary reading for all those concerned with the urgent problems of this nation . . . There is so much to be learned from it, so much that is intriguing and informing . . . A major accomplishment." **—MICHAEL HARRINGTON,** *Saturday Review*

"**A magnificent diary** of his efforts to get a guaranteed income proposed by President Nixon and then enacted into law."
—TAYLOR BRANCH, *Washington Monthly*

"**A truly superior piece of work,** full of insight into the crazy mix of White House, Congress, press, and public that makes up government. It provides the rare historical understanding that comes from learning how something did *not* happen."
—JOSEPH KRAFT

The Politics of
A Guaranteed Income

The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Program

$15, now at your bookstore
RANDOM HOUSE

American Foreign Policy: Prospects and Perspectives
edited by John L. Gilbert, North Carolina State University

Ten essays, nine published here for the first time, analyze American foreign policy in the Nixon years and beyond. The contributors are Hans Morgenthau, William W. Van Alstyne, Ernest R. May, Robert E. Osgood, Stanley Hoffmann, Anatol Rapoport, James C. Thomson, Jr., George W. Rathjens, J. David Singer, and Inis L. Claude.
June 1973 224 pages $8.95, hardbound

Reform and Revolution in Asia
edited by G. F. Hudson

The original essays in this book examine the political changes in China, Japan, India, Pakistan, and Indonesia, and explore the reasons why each country has developed in a unique way. March 1973 312 pages $16.95, hardbound

European Political Facts
edited by Christopher Cook and John Paxton

This is an essential reference that contains all important political, social, and economic facts for 35 European countries. The book covers international organization membership, government and political systems, justice, treaties, population trends, economic policy, trade unionism, and education and the press.
June 1973 400 pages $14.95, hardbound

Czechoslovakia: The Party and the People
edited by Andrew Oxley, Alex Pravda, and Andrew Ritchie

Articles, speeches, and statements trace the Czechs' own attitudes toward their country's revival from January 1968 to the Soviet invasion in August of that year. The selections outline the main forces and conflicts created by the political and social changes that occurred. March 1973 303 pages $11.95, hardbound

Latin America: The Dynamics of Social Change
edited by Stefan A. Halper and John R. Sterling

Specially written articles by eight outstanding authorities explore the relationship between political, economic, and social modernization and the revolutionary process. The contributors are Gino Germani, Helio Jaguaribe, Irving Louis Horowitz, John Gerassi, André Gunder Frank, Ivan Illich, Anthony F. C. Wallace, and Richard R. Fagen.
Published 1972 220 pages $8.95, hardbound

International Disputes: The Political Aspects
F. S. Northedge and M. D. Donelan

The authors analyze 50 international disputes that occurred between 1945 and 1970. They cover their origins, development, and solutions and focus on one major question: why are some disputes settled peaceably while others are resolved with force?
Published 1972 348 pages $11.95, hardbound

International Disputes: Case Histories, 1945-1970
M. D. Donelan and M. J. Grieve

Short chronologies of the 50 disputes analyzed in *International Disputes: The Political Aspects.* June 1973 279 pages $12.95, hardbound

St. Martin's Press 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10010

Stratagems & Spoils

A Social Anthropology of Politics

F. G. BAILEY

Paperback edition available June, 1973, at $2.95.

STRATAGEMS & SPOILS is about political competition, about the nature of people in search of power and the effect of the power-struggle on life in society. The author, currently Professor of Anthropology at the University of California, San Diego, seeks to discover some general principles of political maneuver which hold good in any culture and in any context. Thus he treats of General de Gaulle outfacing the opposition in Algeria; of a group of Untouchables worsting the rich and influential leaders of their village; and of gang warfare in America. The politicians, of whatever culture, who appear are all caught in the act of out-maneuvering one another, of tripping their rivals up, or knifing them in the back.

"Full of useful insights, productive ideas, shrewd and interesting analyses. Furthermore, the writing is often a good deal more graceful and interesting than social science standard." —*American Anthropologist*

"In its mixture of the obvious and less-than-obvious . . . STRATAGEMS AND SPOILS resembles THE PRINCE. . . . If I had to choose which to recommend to a student, I would be strongly tempted to opt for Bailey."

—Anthony King in *New Society*

"Attempts by political scientists . . . to take inspiration from anthropology are beginning to come into vogue. None, however, has as yet been as well done as this book. . . . Easy to read and very informative, especially for American students. . . ." —*Choice*

Gifts and Poisons

The Politics of Reputation

Edited and including four chapters by F. G. Bailey

Cloth $9.50

Thirteen studies describing European village communities, all of which are, or until recently were, peasant communities facing a series of crises which resulted either in their demise or their rebirth in a different form. The book explores social control and group identity through comprehensive social pictures of life in villages in Austria, Italy, France, and Spain. It investigates mores, gossip, and the determinants of social control.

"A worthy successor to the classic studies of Laurence Wylie . . . and Edward Banfield. . . . As a careful analysis of the forces at work in European villages, it can offer a number of useful frameworks for interpreting much of what passes as politics in the world." —*Social Forces*

Examination copies are available when requested on academic letterhead.
Write to Dept. 327

Schocken Books
200 Madison Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10016

Revolutions

A Comparative Study from Cromwell to Castro

Edited by LAWRENCE & CAROL KAPLAN. The first anthology to compare the 17th-, 18th-, and 19th-century revolutions with the 20th-century revolutions of the Third World. Contributors include Georges Lefebvre, Ho Chi Minh, Frantz Fanon, Maurice Zeitlin, Mao Tse-tung. $3.45

Parties

The Real Opportunity for Effective Citizen Politics

by JOHN S. SALOMA III and FREDERICK H. SONTAG. "Exposes the soft underbelly of politics and shows the grass roots the tremendous opportunities to take over . . . It really breaks new ground."—Roscoe Drummond. "They have subjected our party organization and machinery to a most searching and ruthless examination and propose the most explicit set of recommendations for reform that I have seen."—James MacGregor Burns. $2.95

The Case for Black Reparations

by BORIS I. BITTKER. The Sterling professor of law at Yale analyzes the legal case for group compensation to blacks for damages inflicted by segregation and the slave system: legal precedents, problems in administering a favorable decision, and implications for America and the rest of the world. $1.95

Propaganda

The Formation of Men's Attitudes

by JACQUES ELLUL. The author of *The Technological Society* and *The Political Illusion* explores the thesis that propaganda is perhaps the most serious threat to humanity in the modern world. "A far more frightening work than any of the nightmare novels of George Orwell."—Robert R. Kirsch, *Los Angeles Times*. "Ellul has made many splendid contributions in this book." —Marshall McLuhan, *Book Week*. $2.45

We Must Make Haste Slowly

The Process of Revolution in Chile

by DAVIS MORRIS. An on-the-scene investigation of Allende's Chile and the meaning of its revolution for Latin America and the rest of the world. $2.95

Woman's Estate

by JULIET MITCHELL. The author of the now-classic essay, *Woman, the Longest Revolution* (included in this book), analyzes the woman's liberation movement as part of a world-wide social crisis and argues that in both its political and sexual content it must use the insights of Marx and Freud to survive. "An excellent and deeply perceptive book."
—Elizabeth Janeway, *Book World* $1.95

VINTAGE BOOKS
a division of Random House

Two of the Most

TIMELY VOLUMES on THE PRESIDENCY

Edited by R. Gordon Hoxie, President
Center for the Study of the Presidency

[1] THE WHITE HOUSE: ORGANIZATION and OPERATIONS
1971-XIX, 217 pages.
Paperback $3.00; Cloth $6.00.
Add 75¢ for postage and handling.

[2] THE PRESIDENCY OF THE 1970's
1973-XV, 196 pages.
Paperback $3.00; Cloth $6.00.
Add 75¢ for postage and handling.

Today as the nation considers the most revolutionary changes for the executive branch of the government ever proposed by the President, it is most timely to have the views of the "The White House: Organization and Operations" and the "The Presidency of the 1970's".

They are here presented by 76 contributors, including key members of every administration from Presidents Herbert Hoover through Richard M. Nixon—Presidential scholars, business leaders, White House reporters, and representatives of the Ash Council, who proposed these sweeping changes.

However, these volumes' contributors do not limit their views to the structural changes, such as the new Domestic Council and the new Office-of-Management and Budget. They trace the the modern Presidency through the 1933-1972 period.

"The books . . . will be cited for a generation in the footnotes of all serious treatises on the Presidency. And, they will be on the reading lists of all courses on the Presidency in our colleges and universities for a long time to come." Dr. Kenneth W. Colegrove, Professor Emeritus of Political Science, Northwestern University.

Address for orders:

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY
926 Fifth Avenue, New York, New York 10021

another new publishing company?

Sure, we publish original modules and we reprint articles from SOCIETY, APSR, COMPARATIVE POLITICS, POLITICS AND SOCIETY, DAEDALUS and dozens of other leading sources. But our major concern is communicating ideas from the cutting edges of political science to teachers, scholars, and students. This simply means that our innovative, flexible, up-to-date REPRINT and MODULE program has a few OLD-FASHIONED QUALITIES:

ECONOMY:	Reprints priced from $.20 to $1.50; Modules from $.50 to $1.50.
INVOLVEMENT:	Free syllabi to suggest and discuss approaches to and content of courses.
EXCELLENCE:	Leading scholars selecting our reprints (such as Willard A. Mullins on "On the Concept of Ideology in Political Science"; C. Wright Mills on "Work," from his *White Collar: The American Middle Classes;* D.L. Rosenhan on "On Being Sane in Insane Places"; and Fred I. Greenstein on "The Best Known American."
SPEED:	Three months publishing schedules for modules, less for reprints - Bookstore orders filled within forty-eight hours - Comp copy/desk copy orders sent day of receipt.
PERSONAL ATTENTION:	We invite you to call (617 475-9605) and ask for Larry Wilson or Pokey Gardner, for sample reprints and modules in areas of your interest.

ANOTHER NEW PUBLISHING FIRM ??

NO !! A NEW COMMUNICATIONS SERVICE !!

WARNER
MODULAR PUBLICATIONS, INC.
Eleven Essex Street, Andover, Massachusetts 01810 Telephone (617) 475 9600

WHAT ARE WE DOING FOR THE 21st CENTURY

THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF RACISM

by Raymond S. Franklin and Solomon Resnik, Queens College

Written from the viewpoints of a political scientist and an economist, this book juxtaposes both the economic and political forces of contemporary racism against Black Americans. Issues discussed include the historic legacy of racism; the economics of discrimination; the black ghetto; class-race-ethnic divisions; various manifestations of black nationalism in relation to the American political system; broad economic policy considerations, and strategies for change.

January, 1973/288 pages/$4.00/paper

THE BASIC ECONOMICS OF THE URBAN RACIAL CRISIS

by Daniel R. Fusfeld, University of Michigan

This is the first text to develop an analytical model of the ghetto economy as a separate economic sub-system and relates it to a larger economy. Dr. Fusfeld develops an analysis of the basic causes of the urban racial crisis, beginning with the riots of 1964-69 and their aftermath, emphasizing economic causes and their ramifications in politics, society and individual psychology.

Spring, 1973/128 pages/$3.00/paper

CREATING SOCIAL CHANGE

by Gerald Zaltman, Philip Kotler, Northwestern University, and Ira Kaufman, University of Manchester

Representative of the best work that is being done in the area of social change, this collection of articles provides an innovative view of the social change process and a broad coverage of crucial issues of the 1970's: family planning, ethical dimensions of social change, pollution control, drug abuse, juvenile delinquency, innovations in education and problems of the ghetto. The editors have drawn from many disciplines for this collection including education, sociology, psychology, anthropology, law and communications.

AVAILABLE NOW/800 pages/$11.50

For additional information or examination copies,
address your requests to:
Jere L. Calmes, Director of Editorial Acquisitions,
HOLT, RINEHART AND WINSTON, INC.
383 Madison Avenue, New York, New York 10017

NEW FROM BASIC BOOKS

MODERNIZATION: LATECOMERS AND SURVIVORS

by MARION J. LEVY, JR., *Professor of Sociology and International Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School, Princeton University.* This unique volume takes an in-depth look at what Professor Levy calls the most significant social determinant of the last two centuries—modernization. In refreshingly straightforward language, it discusses the viability of the social patterns of the modernized for today's emerging nations and takes up the educational environmental, and interpersonal problems which must be faced by the modernized and would-be modernized.

> "This book should be useful to everyone with an interest in understanding the dynamics of modern society . . . Levy succeeds in saying very important things simply, trenchantly, and often with great wit. His book is a most welcome contribution to the literature in the field."—Peter L. Berger, Rutgers University
>
> "Professor Levy presents a view of our world which commands attention. Giving a forthright, general analysis of how unusual and how recent modern societies are, he asks us to consider what the world looks like if you divide all the countries into modern and non-modern."— Rheinhard Bendix, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton
>
> "Among the recent books on modernization, this is the most unorthodox and daring. The author asks pertinent questions and admits that we know very little about many aspects of modernization processes crucial for survival of mankind."—*The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.* $5.95

THE BUDGETING AND EVALUATION OF FEDERAL RECREATION PROGRAMS, *OR, Money Doesn't Grow on Trees*

by AARON WILDAVSKY, *Dean of the Graduate School of Public Policy,* University of California, & Jeanne Nienaber, *Library of Congress.* Providing a direct comparison of PPBS and the traditional line-item approach in evaluating government expenditures, this book represents the first comprehensive attempt to examine in detail how special programs are converted into a budget in the Executive branch.
September/$8.95

POLLS

Their Use and Misuse in Politics

by CHARLES W. ROLL, JR., *Study Director of the Gallup Organization,* and ALBERT H. CANTRIL, *Consultant.* Foreword by Bill D. Moyers

> "A superb guide for the concerned layman that can be read with profit by professional social scientists."—Dr. Robert T. Bower, President, American Association for Public Opinion Research.
>
> "By far the best statement available on the significance of polls in politics. It should be required reading in every civics or political science class in the country."—John W. Gardner, Chairman, Common Cause *New* $6.95

POLITICIANS, BUREAUCRATS AND THE CONSULTANT

A Critique of Urban Problem Solving

by GARRY D. BREWER, *The Rand Corporation.* This brilliant book describes and analyzes the disastrous experiences of two major cities—San Francisco and Pittsburgh—when consultants were called in to design urban renewal programs with the help of the latest theoretical techniques. In trying to piece together what went wrong, Dr. Brewer demonstrates the pitfalls, as well as the possibilities, of applying gaming and systems analysis to actual policy problems. July/$12.50

BASIC BOOKS, INC.
10 E. 53 St., New York, N.Y. 10022

NEW
for '73

Public Administration

THE EXECUTION OF PUBLIC POLICY

by Don T. Allensworth

Concise, yet comprehensive, this new book—an introduction to public administration—covers all major aspects, including the full range of recent developments and current trends. Those familiar with other texts in the field will find greater emphasis here on the administration of public policy, contemporary bureaucratic behavior and the politics of administration. Organization charts, tables, graphs, diagrams, maps, drawings and chapter-end summaries are included.

Special features include:

☐ **The *practice* of administration emphasized**
Administrative processes in particular government agencies are examined, and the many constraints, pressures, decisions and problems facing administrators are considered.

☐ ***Principles* of public administration developed**
Principles are advanced for activities such as administrative agency clientele bases, administrative power centers, administrative agency interests and bureaucracies as change-inducers.

☐ **Administration of *public policy* stressed**
Administrative activity in specific policy areas is stressed, including transportation, environment and urban planning. Problems of policy coordination in the executive branch, and strategies to promote central direction and accountability are also examined.

☐ **Administration viewed in *political* terms**
Administrative agencies are seen as centers of political activity, with links to key interest groups, legislative committees and others with important stakes in policy outcomes.

☐ **The *intergovernmental* nature of administration examined**
Patterns of administrative interrelationships among the various levels of government are discussed.

213 pages / May / paperbound, about $3.75

Lippincott
J. B. Lippincott Company
Division of Higher Education
East Washington Square, Philadelphia, Pa. 19105

New Paperbacks from Praeger

THE POLITICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERN

Walter A. Rosenbaum, *University of Florida*

This book draws together the basic elements of environmental politics: the nature and gravity of the ecological threat; the roles played in pollution politics by politicians, government agencies, businessmen, and public interest groups; conflicting ideologies and resulting concerns; and current administrative practices and legislative developments at the federal, state, and local levels. Using a variety of pertinent case material, the author explores several specific problems concerning the regulation of air and water pollution, including the politics of water resources and timber use, and the paradoxical public handling of two major blights--strip mining and solid waste disposal. The contributions and boon-doggling of HEW, Interior and Agriculture departments, and the Council on Environmental Quality, the tenuous position of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the conflicts among ecologists and the public are weighed throughout. The book concludes with an assessment of what needs to be done--and what action may be possible.

CONTENTS:

1. The New Environmental Politics
2. The Environmental Toll
3. Beyond Birdwatching: A Political Profile of the Environmental Movement
4. The Pikes of Politicians: The Governmental Setting of Environmental Policy
5. "You've Got to Hit Them with a Two-By-Four": Regulating Air and Water Pollution
6. About Earmuffs for Alligators: The Politics of Water
7. The Politics of Timber
8. Paradox One: Surface Mining
9. Paradox Two: Solid Waste
10. The Future Fight for Environmental Planning

May, 1973 308 pp. $3.95

AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY SINCE WORLD WAR II

Sixth Edition

John Spanier, *University of Florida*

In this thoroughly updated new edition, Professor Spanier provides a thoughtful reassessment of the successes and failures of our entire postwar policy, culminating in a searching analysis of the American involvement in Vietnam. In a new final chapter, he focuses on the policies of the Nixon Administration with regard to Vietnam and our relations with China and the Soviet Union. Professor Spanier examines the views of the critics of America's recent "policeman" role in the world and the effects their policy views would have upon the balance of power in the state system in post-Vietnam period.

CONTENTS:

1. The American Approach to Foreign Policy
2. The Beginning of the Cold War
3. Containment in Europe
4. Containment in the Far East
5. The Strategy of "Frontiersmanship"
6. Berlin, Cuba, and the Crisis of Massive Retaliation
7. The Third World and the American-Soviet Competition
8. The Passing of Bipolarity
9. The American Empire: Vietnam and the Nixon Experience

April, 1973 336 pp. $3.95

URBAN POLITICS AND PUBLIC POLICY

The City in Crisis

Edited by Stephen M. David, *Fordham University*, **and Paul E. Peterson**, *University of Chicago*

This imaginative new reader illustrates how deficiencies common to most urban political systems affect the formulation of public policy in our cities. The book is divided into three sections. The first defines and analyzes three of the most glaring of these inadequacies—the autonomy of urban bureaucracies, the existence of multiple governments, and limited access to political processes given groups with little power. The second section examines the effects of these deficiencies on four key policy areas-land use, law enforcement, education, and transportation. Section three presents a series of proposals for solving the problems defined and illustrated in the first two sections of this collection.

CONTENTS:

I Governments Without Purposes; Citizens Without Power
II Government, Citizens, and Public Policy
III Can the Political Systems of Cities Be Changed?

May, 1973 352 pp. $3.95

College Department Praeger Publishers, 111 Fourth Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10003

praeger

THE NEW LEFT AND THE ORIGINS OF THE COLD WAR

ROBERT JAMES MADDOX

The New Left interpretation of the origins of the Cold War rests on a reinterpretation of known evidence. Robert James Maddox shows, by close scrutiny of seven major works by William Appleman Williams, Gabriel Kolko, and others, that the revisionists have "proved" their points by revising the evidence itself. New Left scholars, he charges, have left their scholarship behind when writing about the Cold War. $7.95

ADMIRALS, GENERALS, AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1898-1914

RICHARD D. CHALLENER

This examination of civil-military relationships in the period 1898-1914 sustains the case for interpreting 1898 and its aftermath as a deliberate search for an "informal" or "insular" empire, and shows that American leaders, both civil and military, accepted an interventionist ethic. $16.00

CONFLICT AND POLITICAL CHANGE IN VENEZUELA

DANIEL H. LEVINE

To explain the transformation of Venezuela into one of the few effective democracies in Latin America, Daniel H. Levine analyzes the development of modern mass-based political parties; the changing structures and content of social and political conflict; and the emergence of common norms for political behavior. $13.00

LIBERAL AMERICA AND THE THIRD WORLD

Political Development Ideas in Foreign Aid and Social Science

ROBERT A. PACKENHAM

Despite the difference in results of aid to Europe and the Third World, American conceptions of political development have remained largely constant. Robert A. Packenham accounts for how the objectives and theories of U.S. aid officials and social scientists have remained the same in spite of negative results and the seeming inappropriateness of their ideas in the Third World context, and offers suggestions for future policy. $12.00

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS

Princeton, New Jersey 08540



$50,000 of life insurance costs less than $100 at age 30.

That's right! For a man, age 30, the annual premium for a 20-Year Home Protection policy providing $50,000 initial amount of insurance is $159.00. The first-year dividend, based on our current dividend scale, is $61.50, making a net payment of $97.50. Dividends, of course, are not guaranteed.

The Home Protection plan is level premium Term insurance providing its largest amount of protection initially, reducing by schedule each year to recognize decreasing insurance needs. This is just one example of the many low-cost TIAA plans available.

If you need more protection for your family, ask us to mail you a personal illustration with figures for a policy issued at your age. We'll also send the Life Insurance Guide describing other TIAA policies.

ELIGIBILITY

Eligibility to apply for this or other TIAA life insurance is limited to persons employed at the time of application by a college, university, private school, or other nonprofit educational or scientific institution that qualifies for TIAA eligibility.

TEACHERS INSURANCE AND ANNUITY ASSOCIATION TIAA sG
730 Third Avenue, New York, N. Y. 10017

Please mail the Life Insurance Guide and a personal illustration.

Name ____________________ Your Date of Birth __________

Address ____________________
Street

____
City State Zip

Dependents' Ages ____________________

Nonprofit Employer ____________________
college, university, or other educational or scientific institution

UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE

If you cannot visit the United Nations, subscribe to UN MONTHLY CHRONICLE. Every issue of the CHRONICLE contains a complete record of the month, describing the proceedings, decisions and resolutions of the main organs and committees in the political, economic and social, legal and administrative fields. There are articles by distinguished contributors on various aspects of the work of the United Nations in all parts of the world. The notes of the month include announcements of international meetings, book reviews and selected documentation.

Annual Subscriptions:
For the U.S. and Canada $9.50

United Nations Publications

Room LX-2300
New York, N.Y. 10017

or

Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10 Switzerland

R. H. Tawney and His Times

Socialism as Fellowship

Ross Terrill

Economic historian, democratic socialist, educator, and British labor party activist, R. H. Tawney fertilized many worlds. This first study of his life and thought leans on unpublished materials, and interviews with more than fifty of his closest friends. Mr. Terrill, who believes in the relevance of social democracy, argues for the continuing validity of Tawney's view of socialism as *fellowship*. $15.00

HARVARD

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS, 79 GARDEN STREET, CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS 02138

New from Columbia

THE PRESIDENCY IN FLUX

George Reedy

A thoughtful, wise, and extraordinarily well informed view of the challenges faced by our political system today. Mr. Reedy is particularly concerned about the fact that mass government and the public relations methods used to market it have cut leaders off from their constituencies and allowed too much power to slip into the hands of the president.
$5.95

AID TO RUSSIA 1941-1946

Strategy, Diplomacy, the Origins of the Cold War

George C. Herring, Jr.

A re-examination of the evolution of American policies for lend-lease and aid for Russian reconstruction within the context of the formation, development, and subsequent breakdown of the wartime alliance between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Contemporary American History Series $15.00

THE POLITICAL SYSTEM OF BRAZIL

Emergence of a "Modernizing" Authoritarian Regime 1964-1970

Ronald M. Schneider

An inexpensive paperback edition of what is recognized as a definitive analysis of recent Brazilian politics. $6.00

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS

Address for orders: 136 South Broadway, Irvington, New York 10533

Important new books from WESTMINSTER

THE SINO-SOVIET TERRITORIAL DISPUTE
by TAI SUNG AN

A detailed, documented examination of the centuries-old border strife between Russia and China. "A timely book . . . readable, well-organized . . . The subject lies at the heart of present-day international affairs."—*Library Journal.* $8.95



THE RECOVERY OF AMERICA
by JOHN CHARLES COOPER

The author of *The New Mentality* and other penetrating analyses of contemporary America now looks ahead to the challenges and opportunities we face now that the Vietnam nightmare is over. Paper $3.25

GENERATIVE MAN: PSYCHOANALYTIC PERSPECTIVES
by DON S. BROWNING

A University of Chicago professor compares the views of man set forth by four leading interpreters of Freud — Philip Rieff, Norman Brown, Erich Fromm, and Erik Erikson — and finds Erikson's "generative man" the most satisfying concept of all. $10.95. *May*

Now at your bookstore
THE WESTMINSTER PRESS,
Witherspoon Bldg., Phila., Pa. 19107

ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Action Studies

Codeword BARBAROSSA
by Barton Whaley
$10.00

The Coming Crisis in Israel:
Private Faith and Public Policy
by Norman L. Zucker
with the Assistance of Naomi Flink Zucker
$10.00

Englishmen and Irish Troubles:
British Public Opinion and the Making of Irish Policy 1918-1922
by D. G. Boyce
$10.00

Science and Politics
by Jean Jacques Salomon
translated from the French by Noël Lindsay
$12.50

Work in America:
Report of a Special Task Force to the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Foreword by Elliot L. Richardson
$10.00 hardcover; **$2.95** paperback

Decentralizing the City:
A Study of Boston's Little City Halls
by Eric A. Nordlinger
$12.50

The Price of Power:
Electric Utilities and the Environment
by The Council on Economic Priorities
$12.50

The MIT Press
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142

Lexington Books

HEATH
D. C. HEATH AND COMPANY
125 Spring Street
Lexington, Massachusetts 02173

NOW AVAILABLE

RESEARCH IN THE POLITICS OF POPULATION
edited by **Richard L. Clinton,** *University of North Carolina*
R. Kenneth Godwin, *Oregon State University*
Foreword by **Moye M. Freymann**
The first book to present a comprehensive review of current research on the role of political science in solving population problems presents contributors who investigate population policies in the U.S. and find them to be products of elitist attitudes and without much relevance to the lifestyle of the mass population. 196 pp. $10.00

POLITICAL SCIENCE IN POPULATION STUDIES
edited by **Richard Clinton, William Flash,** *University of North Carolina*
R. Kenneth Godwin, *Oregon State University*
Foreword by **Moye W. Freymann**
Experts in political science reject the standard classical and behavioralist explanations of the political implications of population growth, and suggest new approaches to population analysis. 196 pp. $11.50

POWER AND CHOICE: FORMULATION OF AMERICAN POPULATION POLICY
Peter Bachrach, *Temple University,* **Elihu Bergman,** *Harvard University*
A major study traces the formation and goals of pressure groups, the testimony and debate relevant to legislation and the effectiveness of recommendations and laws in achieving what Americans view as population policy objectives. 134 pp. $10.00

THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION
George R. LaNoue, Bruce L.R. Smith, *Columbia University*
An in-depth examination of 28 cities form the basis for the first empirical study of the phenomenon of the movement towards greater community participation in the control and operation of urban school systems. 256 pp. $10.00

FORTHCOMING

POLITICAL STRATEGIES IN NORTHERN DESEGREGATION
Robert Crain, *Johns Hopkins University;* **David Kirby,** *Memorial University*
The most complete study available of *de facto* segregation in northern U.S. schools, this book examines the causes of community demands for action and the response in 93 school districts throughout the United States. ca. 256 pp. Oct. ca. $10.00

THE PATHET LAO, Leadership and Organization
Joseph J. Zasloff, *University of Pittsburgh*
A timely and penetrating study of the Pathet Lao traces its origins and development from the beginnings to the 1970s, reveals important characteristics of this revolutionary organization, and concludes that it will continue to be a strong force in the future of its country. 120 pp. Jul. $10.00

RADICALS AND MILITANTS, An Annotated Bibliography of Empirical Research on Campus Unrest
Kenneth Keniston, *Yale Medical School*
A total of 303 abstract presents detailed summaries of and critical comments on available empirical research since 1950 on student activism, campus unrest, and the meaning of "youth revolt."
240 pp. Jul. $13.50

STUDENT POLITICS AND HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES, A Selected Bibliography
Philip G. Altbach, *University of Wisconsin*
A comprehensive bibliography which provides essential information for putting student unrest into perspective, this work stresses student activism in all of its sociological, political, organizational, historical, and psychological aspects. 320 pp. Sep. $16.50

SOLDIERS, GUERRILLAS, AND POLITICS IN COLOMBIA
Richard Maullin,
Deputy Secretary of State, state of California; formerly a staff member of The Rand Corporation
By focusing on military professionalism as it relates to internal political violence in Colombia and as a factor in the Colombian military's political behavior, the author probes the nature of insurgency in Colombia, the Colombian military, and the impact of prolonged guerrilla warfare. 160 pp. Sep. $10.00

Criminal Justice

Introductory Cases and Materials

by John Kaplan Professor of Law, Stanford University

with foreword by **Heinz Eulau**
Past President
American Political Science Association

- A brilliantly-conceived new book for undergraduate courses exploring the criminal justice system.
- Already has been termed "...the best text in the field; an absolutely excellent collection, which should be usable for a great variety of purposes."

Two Important New Works from

THE FOUNDATION PRESS, INC.
170 OLD COUNTRY ROAD, MINEOLA, NEW YORK 11501

Foreign Affairs and the Constitution

by Louis Henkin One of the keenest minds in our time and one of the greatest authorities on foreign relations and diplomacy.

"In my opinion *Foreign Affairs and the Constitution* will become the classic of its field, a reference for lawyers and laymen alike for years to come. As such it compares with Corwin's *The Constitution and What it Means Today*—and I can think of no higher praise."

Nicholas Katzenbach
New York Times Book Review

553 Pages $11.50

4 important new titles fall classes

AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES

The Competing Political Beliefs of the 1970s

SECOND EDITION

by **Kenneth M. Dolbeare** *and* **Patricia Dolbeare**
with **Jane Hadley**

Continuing on the theme of "the role of ideology in the United States," the Dolbeares' historically have viewed the established political ideologies with what's happening today. The counterideologies—of blacks, Chicanos, Indians, women's lib, and the new left, and varieties of democratic and revolutionary socialism—that challenge the more established ideologies of the 1960s and 1970s, comprise the new expanded material of the second edition of this highly successful text.

READINGS IN AMERICAN IDEOLOGIES

edited by **Kenneth M. Dolbeare, Patricia Dolbeare,**
and **Jane Hadley**

Designed to complement the Second Edition of *American Ideologies*, this new reader illustrates the varieties of ideologies and ideas now current in U.S. society and the political arena. A collection of original works by major authors, this work includes chapters on Minority Liberation, Women's Liberation, and The New Left, as well as the mainstream political ideologies.

FOUNDATIONS OF EMPIRICAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS

by **James L. Payne**

Departing from a traditional discussion of epistemology in political science, Professor Payne has written a concretely-focused treatment of the principles of the scientific method as applied to practical political analysis. The practical student of politics will easily be able to comprehend and apply this practical manual on "how to settle empirical arguments."

CAPITALISM AND IMPERIALISM

An Introduction to Neo-Marxian Concepts

by **Irving Zeitlin**

Cutting across the rigid confines of traditional analyses within academic disciplines, this expository essay explores the concepts of "capitalism" and "imperialism" to make sense out of the present-day social realities in society.

MARKHAM publishing company

3322 West Peterson Ave. • Chicago, Illinois 60659 • (312) 539-0626